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A Thesis submitted for  
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy  
in the University of Cape Town  
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by  
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The Afrikaner Bond has been neglected, it would appear, because it does not fit neatly into the framework of the more recent Afrikaner nationalist mythology: Pretoria never really became its Mecca, nor Paul Kruger its prophet. It was, however, the first South African political party, properly so called. It was, in its day, the medium of political expression for a large-scale nationalist movement. It wielded an influence in South African politics during the last two decades of the nineteenth century less spectacular than that of Paul Kruger or Cecil Rhodes, but no less important in the determination of political trends. For all this, it has received incidental mention in a large number of historical works, because historians of the period have been unable to ignore its existence. It has featured rather more than incidentally in the biographies of Jan Hofmeyr and Ds. S.J. du Toit, in a handful of academic theses, and in a few monographs on other related subjects. But it has never been the subject of a full length study in its own right, nor has it received anything like due attention in periodicals.

I have tried in the following pages to fill part of the void, by relating the story of the Afrikaner Bond from its beginnings until the outbreak of the South African war. The work falls into three sections. In the first, an attempt is made to explain how and why the Bond came into being. Ground already covered in print is covered again, because I cannot accept any of the existing accounts as they stand. In the second section, the emphasis lies on the part played by the Bond in South African affairs during the two decades under discussion. I have not attempted to break new ground concerning the main political developments of the era, and have relied on published works for most of the external details of the story; but I have found that an approach to these events made through the Bond records has helped to make some of the

developments more intelligible. In the third section, I have attempted a brief evaluation of the Bond as a political party and as the vehicle of a nationalist movement.

Problems of terminology are inevitable in a work in English on this subject. I have thought it best to quote freely in Dutch and Afrikaans without translating, and to retain certain terms used within the Bond to describe its own organization and procedure, for the sake of preserving something of its atmosphere. The term Bestuur is retained for want of an adequate English translation, and to distinguish it from the term Comité. I have used it as if it were an English word - hence the frequent use of bastard expressions such as 'Ward Bestuur', which might give offence to language purists. I use the word Afrikaner, and its variants, in the normal twentieth-century sense of a white Dutch- or Afrikaans-speaking South African. It is necessary to be explicit on this point, because it was given a somewhat broader meaning in many of the Bond documents which are brought under contribution.

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University of Cape Town,

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## P R E F A C E .

Romantic history has long supplied much of the stuff of South African politics, because the teaching of history has been largely devoted to the cultivation of mythologies whose main purpose is to strengthen the inner cohesion of the separate cultural groups within the nation. This holds obvious dangers for society, of the sort noted by Lord Durham in his Report on Canada, where he saw the different language groups living

in a world of misconceptions, in which each party is set against the other not only by diversity of feelings and opinions, but by an actual belief in an utterly different set of facts.

So pronounced has this pre-occupation with the building up of group traditions been, that it has had, in addition, a deleterious effect on the selection of fields for historical study and instruction. Some have been greatly overworked. Others, of no less intrinsic interest for the study of South Africa's past, have been largely neglected.

Afrikaner historians have, on the whole, shown comparatively little interest in the history of the Cape Colony between the Great Trek and the South African War. The Cape Colony has supplied very few of the heroes in the Afrikaner nationalist hall of fame. Almost its only contribution, if the bulk of published writings are a reliable index, was to set in motion the first Language Movement. But even the historians of this Language Movement have paid far more attention to its linguistic aspect than to the political campaign for the recognition of Dutch as an official language in the Colony. There is a Gedenkboek in honour of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, with whom the Language Movement started, but no similar memento for the political organizations which broke the legal monopoly of English.

PART ONE

THE BOND IN ORIGIN

University of Cape Town

## CHAPTER ONE

### THE GERMS OF AFRIKANER NATIONALISM

The central event in nineteenth century South African history was the Great Trek. This Trek was a migration of Boers, who felt unable or unwilling to accept the social and legal revolution which had followed the imposition of British authority on the Cape Colony, into regions where they hoped to be able to preserve their own traditional way of life under Abrahams, Isaacs and Jacobs of their own choosing. "Die Groot Trek was 'n heldedaad", a twentieth-century Afrikaner historian has written, echoing a sentiment which is certainly not confined to members of his own kin. It is the event to which those who seek to understand the qualities of the Afrikaner people habitually and rightly turn; and many have elected to follow the Voortrekkers to their new abodes and write of their institutions, their heroism, their devotion, or their human weaknesses, according to taste. But the historian of the Afrikaner Bond, impelled though he may be by the same urge to understand a people who have impressed their way of life and habits of thought so deeply into the character of this land, must turn away from the glamour of the ox-waggon pioneers. For he is concerned, not with those who went on trek, but with those who stayed behind, to resent or come to terms with the new social and political milieu in which they were obliged to live.

It is no part of the present work to write the history of the Colonial Afrikaners between 1840 and 1870, though this was the period in which those attitudes which ultimately found expression in their own distinctive political movement must have matured. But an answer must be sought to the primary question, which is not that of determining what events precipitated the Afrikaner political movement into existence, for the answer to that is straightforward and will be discussed in due course. It is, rather; Why, when these events took place, were the Afrikaner people ready to respond? This is much less easy to

answer, but their reaction becomes more intelligible if we accept as a fact the truly astonishing conservatism of the ordinary Boer, the austere, essentially religious, fully acclimatized, unschooled countryman who provides the backbone to the story. For all the changes in the conditions of rural life between 1840 and 1870, there still existed at the latter date remarkable similarities of circumstance which continued to evoke the same time-honoured reactions among the Boer population of the interior. The patriarchal ideas expressed in Retief's manifesto on the subject of master and servant relationships, to take one significant example, still commanded general assent. The arguments which had led to the great emigration in the 'thirties were still being propounded in the 'seventies, and there were many Boers who had lived under an egalitarian legal system for fifty years and still thought they were right. This essential continuity of life and outlook on the platteland needs to be stressed, especially because it was only from about 1870 that the pace of Colonial economic life began to quicken, stimulated by the discovery of diamonds and a new rush of immigrant settlers. Yet within fifteen years of the first diamond discoveries, cells of Afrikaner political activity had arisen in most parts of the Cape Colony, and the organizations which had given rise to this activity became a power in the land almost before they saw the light of day. It was of great significance for the history of the Colonial Boer that he embarked on a political revolution before he had really begun to show much interest in those new forms of economic activity, such as digging for valuable minerals, or even running retail shops, which were beginning to develop in the regions of the interior, and that, once stimulated to political action, he should have been torn between an urge to condemn these new practices as alien incursions on his way of life, and a desire to take over the practices for the material blessings they brought, or for the sake of getting rid of the aliens who ran them.

The present chapter will be concerned with the background to the Afrikaner political movement in the Cape, which was the only part of South Africa where the Afrikaner Bond's impact was deep and lasting. This political movement found its ultimate cohesion in the advancement of both cultural and agricultural interests: but we are concerned at present only with the political awakening of the Afrikaner, considered as a member of a distinctive cultural group, and tied to his fellow Afrikaners by a common religion, a common linguistic tradition, and a sense of being different from the kleurling<sup>1</sup>, whether aboriginal or half-caste, and the Engelsche veroveraar who governed him at a distance. After a consideration of the position of the Afrikaner in the Colonial society of the 'seventies, it will be time to turn to the first stirrings of Afrikaner national feeling in Cape Town and in Paarl.

## I

Because the cultural history of the Afrikaner people has already been well covered in published works<sup>2</sup>, it will not be necessary to treat this subject in detail, save at those points where its connection with the Afrikaner political movement was a close one. We need, however, to take stock of the very important impact which was made on Afrikanerdom by the British occupation of the Cape, for after the permanence of that occu-

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1. The word kleurling was used very frequently in the late nineteenth century to denote any person who was not 'white'. See I. D. Bosman's discussion of the term in van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, Geskiedenis van Suid-Afrika, vol. II, pp. 469-70.
  2. See, for example, the three-volume Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner; van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, vol. II, book V; J. du P. Scholtz, Die Afrikaner en sy Taal, 1806-1875; F. A. van Jaarsveld, Die Afrikaner en sy Geskiedenis; C. L. Leipoldt, "Cultural Development" (in the Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII), and the bibliographies to which they refer.

pation had been secured by treaty in 1815, it became the policy of the British administration to endow its new Colony with institutions of a British type, sometimes at the expense of those which already existed. Whether these institutional changes amounted to a studied attempt at cultural conquest is an open question.<sup>3</sup> British policy at the Cape was never so calculating as that of Durham in Canada or so systematic as that of Milner in the Transvaal. But in practice a form of cultural conquest took place as the century advanced, through the introduction of British governmental institutions and to a limited extent of British law; through the substitution of English for Dutch as the official language of Parliament, the civil service and the courts, as the medium of instruction in at least the secondary schools, and, in practice, as the language of business transactions; through the introduction of English and Scottish teachers and ministers of religion; and through the aided immigration of English settlers who, in addition to buttressing an insecure frontier, would help to fill the cup of loyalty and propagate their British way of life among the inhabitants.

It is beside the point to labour the rights and wrongs of this policy, but some estimate needs to be made of the measure of its success, and here it is both helpful and necessary to draw a distinction between what happened in Cape Town and what happened in the country districts, where the process of acculturation took significantly different forms.

The Cape Peninsula and the immediately adjoining districts were the home of a Dutch-speaking aristocracy before the British arrived. They retained that character, though in a progressively diluted form, throughout the nineteenth century. The Dutch language survived in common speech, and was kept alive in the worship of the Dutch Reformed Church and through educational institutions

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3. For the view that they did, see J. du P. Scholtz, c.I., and G. S. Nienaber in van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, vol. II pp.613ff.

like the Tot Nut van 't Algemeen (founded in 1805), the work of teachers like Dr A. N. E. Changuion, and a Dutch-language press which the capital was never without after 1826. The existence of a flourishing stage, and the foundation of cultural associations like the Aurora Rederijkerskamer (dramatic society), gave the Cape Dutch focal points for their community life over and above that provided by their Church, which for the greater part of the century enabled them to tolerate the spread of English institutions and customs in the capital without developing a sense of insecurity. Thus fortified, the Cape Dutchman was prepared to adapt himself to the new exigencies of British rule, by learning English in order to qualify for a post in the civil service, for example, or by opening his church for the holding of services in English. He often accepted the British Crown and British political institutions as part of his own heritage, and developed an owner's pride in them. This easy-going tolerance characterized the relationship between Dutch and English until the late 'sixties, and it was only then that the leaders of Dutch opinion came to realize that their own cultural tradition was being forced into the background, and that much which they treasured had been taken too much for granted or signed away. The Tot Nut van 't Algemeen closed its doors in 1870, at a time when the use of the Dutch medium in secondary education had all but disappeared. Services in the English language had become so much a part of the life of the Groote Kerk that the Church authorities were becoming concerned at the number of Cape Dutchmen who were attending these rather than the services in their own language.<sup>4</sup> More serious, since this was undoubtedly<sup>at</sup> the root of the problem, the use of English had come to be regarded by many as a hallmark of breeding, a necessity in polite society, as is suggested by the following editorial comment from the Zuid Afrikaan in July 1871:

Het schijnt thans bij sommigen niet meer tot den 'bon ton' te behooren om iets dat Hollandsch is, te patroniseren, of zelfs om Hollandsch te spreken<sup>5</sup>.

4. Scholtz, p. 176.

5. Quoted by Scholtz, pp. 175-6.

Thus the strength of the Dutch cultural tradition had become its weakness. It would take all the efforts of the devotees of this tradition to evoke a sufficient response to the new challenge; but when that response came, it stood every chance of being moderate, and governed by a conviction that much of what had evolved in the common white society of the Cape Peninsula was intrinsically good and worth preserving.

The problem on the platteland was different. Here the spoken language was generally an immature form of Afrikaans, unsupported, except in the long-established homes of the Western Province, by any significant amount of cultural activity; unsupported, too, by a literature, for the language of worship and of the Bible, which was often the only book in the household, was High Dutch. The spoken language was not catered for in the schools, nor was Dutch encouraged as a subject of study in its own right. The Education Ordinances of 1839 and 1865 had gone a long way towards anglicizing the educational system, more especially in areas where it was practically impossible to build up an indigenous educational tradition to compete against it. But in spite of this fact, the Afrikaner way of life on the platteland was much safer from English influences than that of the capital. Schooling was not compulsory. For the sons of farmers short of labour and far from towns, schooling was often impracticable. This point was stressed by Dr Dale, the Superintendent-General of Education, in reply to an assertion made at the Bond's Cradock congress in 1882, that far too little public money was being spent on third class rural public schools.<sup>6.</sup> F. J. Dormer, editor of the Cape Argus, put the point in his usual succinct way when he wrote:

It will be found, upon reflection, that most of the difficulties of which the farmers complain ... would be experienced under any system ... No system which could be devised would enable children to be at work on a farm and learning their lessons at the same time.<sup>7</sup>

6. Notulen, Cradock Congress, pp. 18-20. Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Nov. 1882

7. Cape Argus, 9 Nov. 1882.

One of the commonest Boer objections to the administration of local government in the Colony was that Resident Magistrates could not speak the language of the people, or alternatively that the farmers could not understand the proceedings in the courts of law because they were conducted in English. This was not an objection confined to the first few decades after 1827, when the exclusive use of English had first been made compulsory in the courts, for Jan Hofmeyr himself made it at a dinner in Bloemfontein in May 1883, stating that the Colonial Boer took little interest in Colonial politics because he could not read the published reports, and that he was at sea in the courts because he could not understand the proceedings. "Soms", he added - and the reflection is interesting, coming from him -

Soms gebeurt het, dat een Kaffer tusschen hem en de regter staat, die zijn Hollandsch den Magistraat in het Engelsch vertolken moet<sup>8</sup>.

But the real point is this, that to the extent to which the language of the administration was not understood by the Boer, the policy of anglicization had been a failure. Moreover, official policy took cognizance of this fact. It was both permissible and common practice for Field Cornets, for example, to submit their reports in Dutch<sup>9</sup>, and although the Government Gazettes contained many more notices in English than in Dutch, they usually contained a few pages of Dutch language notices where the application was local rather than general. Government could not have been carried on in the rural areas unless such practices had been permitted.

The platteland Boer was protected from the direct influences of anglicization, above all in the thinly populated regions of the north-western Cape but to some degree everywhere, by his iso-

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8. Zuid Afrikaan, 24 May 1883. J. H. Hofmeyr, Life of J. H. Hofmeyr, p. 235.

9. A. 13 of 1880. Report of Select Committee on District Justice Courts, before which it was repeatedly argued that, because this was the case, there could be no objection to the use of Dutch as a medium for the keeping of judicial records, should judicial powers be given to Field Cornets.

\* Erratum: there is no page 7.

lation, before one begins to take into account the factor of opposition to cultural conquest. But he was not as isolated as his forbears of the 'thirties had been, and to suppose that he was able to live his own life without running up against English cultural influences would be totally false, chiefly on account of the quickening of commercial activity in the interior, allied to the fact that English settlers were beginning to gain control of the towns.

The building of towns was not, of course, an exclusively British contribution to the growth of South Africa. Quite apart from centres like Graaff-Reinet, which was an important town long before the British occupation, the siting and founding of most towns of the interior was the result of Boer enterprise, and according to Archdeacon Merriman they were much more skilled town planners than the English, thanks largely to the efforts of their Church. After describing the foundation of Middelburg in 1852, Merriman gave the following account of the procedure followed in his day:

A new town is agreed upon as desirable in a given district; the synod of the Dutch Church appoints a commission; a spot is chosen, the farm purchased (generally on very easy terms from a man anxious to do something for his Church), and a church is built; erven are marked out, and sold with conditions attached to them, securing the maintenance of the church. This is the centre of attraction; old Boers who have been a long way from the public ordinances of their religion readily come and settle round the church, and the remaining elements of town life, as trade or winkelling, a clergyman and a magistrate with government salaries, speedily follow.<sup>10</sup>

The foundation of Britstown in 1878 followed this pattern. A commission was appointed by the Ring of the Church, a farm was selected for purchase, and, records T. P. Theron's biographer,

als echte zonen van de N.G.Kerk, zorgde de kommissie dat die kerk een leeuwe-aandeel behield in de inkomsten uit de erven<sup>11</sup>.

Colesberg and Queenstown, likewise, were founded on terms which gave the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk considerable control over and revenue from the land.

10. D. H. Varley and H. M. Matthew (eds.) The Cape Journals of Archdeacon N. J. Merriman, 1848-1855, pp. 190-1, 210.

11. B. J. Wepener, Een Model Afrikaander, p. 27.

The "winkelling", however, usually came slightly later, and it was at this point that the nation of shopkeepers stepped in. The middle years of the nineteenth century witnessed the still largely uncharged spread of English settlers, accompanied by immigrant Jews, Germans and others, fanning out from the coastal towns, especially those of the Eastern Province, sometimes to farm, but more often to set up trading establishments and offices in the villages already established by the Dutch. A perusal of local newspapers of the 'seventies and 'eighties forces the conclusion upon the reader that by this time the cultural life of the majority of centres was conducted for the most part on English lines. To start with, the newspapers which yield the information were nearly always owned and edited by British settlers, whether they appeared in English or Dutch or both. Thus Der Boeren Bode of Aliwal North, which first appeared in 1881, was owned by Francis Hamilton, who also owned the Northern Post. De Afrikaansche Boerenvriend was the Dutch counterpart of the Colesberg Advertiser, and both were owned and edited by George R. Weakley. An Atkinson owned the Richmond Era, a Bryant the Beaufort (West) Courier and the Beaufortsche Courant, H. E. Turkington the Cradock Register and the Cradocksche Afrikaner, J. N. Heathcote the Middelburg Gazette (until it was taken over and renamed by Frederic de Waal in 1882<sup>12</sup>), while the Burghersdorp Gazette was the property of St Patrick O'Shaughnessy O'Brien, whose namesake, J. V. O'Brien, ran the Dordrecht Frontier Guardian. Rare exceptions to this rule were papers such as the Opregte Afrikaner of Bedford, founded in 1882 by N. P. van der Meulen, de Waal's Middelburg Getuige, and the large independent Dutch papers of the Western Province, which circulated widely throughout the Colony and the Republics.

As for the society which these newspapers described, the reader is admitted to a world where debating societies and horse-racing, and cricket matches between "Home born" and "Colonial

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12. See below, p. 65

born", or shooting matches referred to as "Wimbledons", were among the leading recreational pastimes. Local Chambers of Commerce began to appear in a number of these centres from the 'sixties onwards<sup>13</sup>, and these were chiefly English-speaking bodies. The surnames of the original committee of the Burghersdorp Chamber, a body founded in 1877, whose activities were to help precipitate the Albert Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging into existence<sup>14</sup>, were Sichel, Tennant, Mosenthal, Stuart and O'Brien<sup>15</sup>. None of the leading tradesmen in the town who advertised their businesses in the local newspaper had Dutch names, while the minister of the N.G. Kerk in the only town in South Africa which boasted a "Dopper" seminary was Ds. William Cormack.

Absolute generalizations on so complex a subject as the social composition of the Colonial towns are obviously impossible, especially when the evidence available is that of names alone. But what was true of Burghersdorp by this standard was also generally true of the other towns in the eastern and north-eastern Cape. In the western Cape the position was not quite the same. Thus at Worcester, where, according to Scholtz, it was advisable for the English trader to learn Dutch, the list of retail licences issued by the Sub-Distributor of Stamps in January 1883 contained thirty-nine names, including a Bosman, a Meiring, a Joubert, a Hoffman, two de Villiers and two du Toits. The list contained its Harris, Levy and Witzenleithner as well, but the exotic element was not in complete control. In the Midlands there was some Afrikaner commercial activity, but it did not amount to very much, while it is doubtful if there was a single town in the Cape Colony in 1880 which did not house at least one English-speaking tradesman.

The argument that the further east one looked, the slenderer

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13. e.g. Graaff-Reinet, Mossel Bay, Burghersdorp, Queenstown and elsewhere. See R. F. Immelman, Men of Good Hope, passim.
14. See below, p. 57
15. Burghersdorp Gazette, 8 Mar. 1878. C.f. Northern Post, 30 Jul. 1881, which gives the following committee members of the Aliwal North Chamber: G.A. Orsmond, T.A. O'Flaherty, F. Greenslade, J.L. Bilbrough, J. Carter, C.A. Smart and B. Levy.

grew the control of the Afrikaner over urban life, applied to a slightly lesser extent in the case of the Municipal Boards. In the western Cape, apart from the capital itself, where the participation of Afrikaners in city government was by no means negligible, town councils often contained a majority with Afrikaner names. This applied, for example, in the case of Worcester after the municipal election of 1883<sup>16</sup>. Members of the Beaufort West town council at the beginning of 1882 included four Afrikaners of whom one, C. J. M. van der Spuy, was chairman of the local Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging<sup>17</sup>. When Richmond elected a new Municipal Board in 1883, Hofmeyr's paper noted that the new body was "door en door Hollandsch-Afrikaansch", and rejoiced accordingly because this was something new<sup>18</sup>. But the Municipal Commissioners in Burghersdorp and Dordrecht were still mainly English-speaking.

Although the Afrikaner carried little weight in many of the Colonial towns, especially in the east, this does not mean that he was excluded from participation in local government even in the east. Field Cornets, who were men of his own flesh and blood, no longer exercised the powers they had once held; but a great deal of the work of local administration still fell on their shoulders, and on those of the Divisional Councils. The constitution of these Councils had been consolidated in 1865.<sup>19</sup> With the exception of the Cape Division, which was differently organized, each fiscal division of the Colony was divided into six wards, each ward returning one representative to the Council save that in which the Civil Commissioner's office was situated, which returned three. A Divisional Council of eight members, presided over by the Civil Commissioner who had no casting vote, might thus be expected to contain a majority of farmers over townsmen of five against three, though as the

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16. Worcester Advertiser, 1 Mar. 1883.

17. Beaufort Courier, 17 Jan. 1882.

18. Zuid Afrikaan, 8 Mar. 1883.

19. Act 4 of 1865.

residential qualification for membership applied to the division as a whole and not to the individual ward, it sometimes happened that the urban representation was somewhat larger. A high fixed property qualification for membership, however, tended to encourage the better off farmers to stand for election. Councils held office for three years, members were re-eligible, and they held a general supervisory control over the local school committees, as well as responsibility for the divisional roads, for which purpose they were empowered to levy a road rate, raise and spend revenue from tolls, appoint road inspectors and determine their salaries. The reports of Divisional Council meetings given in the Colonial press indicate that these afforded valuable experience for men who hoped for political careers. The Boer took his local politics seriously.<sup>20</sup> An examination of the names of Divisional Councillors elected throughout the Colony in 1882 has shown that approximately one quarter of the successful candidates were, at that time or within a year or so, committee members of the local branches of the Afrikaner Bond or of the various Boeren Vereenigingen. The names of Councillors elected in 1867, the first election after the consolidation of the Councils, included not a few who were later to become prominent leaders of the Afrikaner Bond, among them V. J. Janse van Rensburg, later M.L.A. for Cradock and chairman of the Bond's Cradock congress in September 1882. More than one witness testified to the superb way in which van Rensburg handled the Cradock congress, and it is perhaps not fanciful to suggest that it was a short term in Parliament, preceded by long experience of Divisional Council work, which had equipped him for his task.

Die Distriksrade [said the Geskiedenis] is omtrent so's die Heemrade eers was. Een van die voordele hiervan was dat die Boere leer om meer belang te stel in publieke sake.<sup>21</sup>

Whereas it was not difficult for the Dutch-speaking Boer to find his niche in politics at the local level, it was quite

20. See, for example, the Northern Post, 17, 31 Jul., 21 Aug., 18 Sept. 1880 (A vigorous dispute in Aliwal North Divisional Council).

21. Die Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk, p. 140.  
See below p. 31.

another matter for him to find his way into Parliament. A rough analysis of the names of members of the Cape House of Assembly in 1854 and 1872 indicates that members with English names in each case outnumbered those with Dutch names by about two to one. This situation had come about partly through the fact that English-speaking people were more familiar with parliamentary institutions and attached more importance to them, democracy of a more direct variety at the local level conforming more closely with the traditions of the Afrikaner Boer. But the main reason for the predominance of English-speaking parliamentarians was undoubtedly the fact that the English language alone was permitted in either House. This issue had been raised as early as the 'fifties, when Jacobus Kruger, member for Albert, had requested permission to speak in Dutch and have his speeches translated. Permission was refused, and, comments Scholtz, four successive attempts in the period 1856-8 were likewise turned down<sup>22</sup>. Failure to secure the right to speak Dutch in the early days of representative government gave rise, in turn, to two further complementary developments. The one was that the Boer came to look with growing indifference on an institution which for practical reasons largely excluded his own representatives, and the other was the emergence of carpet-bagging on a fairly extensive scale by semi-professional politicians with English names who came mainly from the three urban centres of Cape Town, Grahamstown and Port Elizabeth. "Grahamstown had most say in everything, and the country was almost entirely ruled by that town", Janse van Rensburg told the Cradock Boeren Vereeniging in 1882, commenting on the situation as he remembered it in 1858. The Zuid Afrikaan remarked that in a Colesberg by-election in 1875, "in de buitendistrikten is men als gewoonlijk zeer ~~sta~~auw in de stemming geweest"<sup>23</sup>; but it was the Paarl paper, Die Afrikaanse Patriot, which best caught

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22. Scholtz, pp. 116-8; G. S. Nienaber in van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, vol. II p.622.

23. Zuid Afrikaan, 2 Jun. 1875.

the atmosphere of Boer indifference. It explained how parliamentary candidature was reserved for a few "Engelse kooplui, Jode en Jodegenote", who received a requisition from "een of ander hoge meneer, 'n koopman, of advocaat of so, wat graag die eer wil hê van in die Parlement te sit". Such people, it said, had themselves praised in the local newspapers, while "onse boerebevolking sit stil; hulle nomineer gen eie kandidate nie; met stemdag blijf hulle tuis, of moet stem ver een van die self-opgeworpe erebejagers"<sup>24</sup>. The Seven Circles Act of 1874, which recast the boundaries of Upper House constituencies so as to create several predominantly rural divisions, did something to arrest this trend, but it did not touch the root of the problem.<sup>25</sup> Carpet-bagging was not in itself a social evil, as the members of the Afrikaner Bond would have been bound in honesty to admit, for they practised it extensively enough in later years<sup>26</sup>. It derived its significance mainly from the fact that it was prevalent before any political parties had come into being in the Colony, at a time when the constituencies should therefore have been expected normally to return local men.

No law expressly debarred the Afrikaner from entry into any field of public life, and he was legally entitled to hold any position of authority in the public service from the Field Cornetcy to the Bench; but the practical difficulties in the way of his promotion in the public service, or of his entry into professional life, were very real for the Boer from the country districts, as distinct from his urban counterpart. It was a common complaint in the country districts that the wrong sort of people were appointed to the Magistracy, either because they could not converse with the Boer in his own language, or because they administered the law in a manner repugnant to the inner feelings of the average Boer. The Bond congress at Cradock in September 1882 discussed a motion

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24. Die Afrikaanse Patriot, 31 Jan. 1879.

25. Text in G. W. Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents, p. 64.

26. J. H. Hofmeyr, of Cape Town, represented Stellenbosch. In 1894-6, S. J. du Toit contemplated standing for all of the following seats: Paarl, Victoria West, Barkly West, Vryburg and Piketberg.

Het Gouvernement te verzoeken om bij de aanstelling van Magistraten alleen de zulken aan te stellen die ook Hollandsch kunnen spreken en verstaan, vooral in de Hollandsch-sprekende distrikten<sup>27</sup>.

A few days later, Thomas Louw, M.L.A. for Malmesbury, wrote to the Argus, quoting an instance which he claimed to lie within his own experience, where a Colonial-born Magistrate had succeeded in emptying the local gaol by enforcing the Masters and Servants Law with maximum severity, after an outsider had managed to fill it through a policy of kindness<sup>28</sup>. In fact, the number of 'exotic' Magistrates was far fewer than some Bondsmen supposed. The Grahamstown Journal had published a list of the existing R.M.'s, with their countries of origin, a few days earlier, and reached the conclusion that forty-nine of the seventy-two who then held office were Colonial-born, that seven of the remaining twenty-three had received their education in the Colony, and that of those who were Colonial-born, "about thirty are of Dutch extraction"<sup>29</sup>. These facts may well have been true, but they did not really meet Louw's objection. What lay at the root of the trouble was what might be termed a cultural incompatibility between the magisterial class, of whatever origin, and the rural Afrikaner. Magistrates reached their exalted position through promotion from the lower grades of the public service, to enter which they had been obliged to show a proficiency in the English language, but not in Dutch. Most of them had probably received their education in centres where the English way of life was dominant, for it was almost impossible for the Afrikaner from the rural districts to obtain the sort of education which would fit him for a civil service career. Dormer hinted at this in an editorial to which Louw's letter was intended to be a reply. He wrote:

The misfortune of the young Afrikander ... is that he is either so untrained altogether that nothing but a life of unscientific and comparatively profitless farming is before him, or, by the self-sacrifice of his parents, he has been brought up to one of a few professions which already show indications of being overstocked<sup>30</sup>.

Dormer was not lacking in charity for the Boer, and his point is

27. Notulen, Cradock congress, Item no. 9.

28. Cape Argus, 28 Sept. 1882.

29. Grahamstown Journal, 18, 19 Sept. 1882.

30. Cape Argus, 25 Sept. 1882.

a valid one. Afrikanerdom was by no means devoid of professional men; but of those who embarked on professional careers, more particularly in medicine, the law, the ministry of the Church and the civil service, it is safe to say that comparatively few came from the platteland. A considerable number of professionally qualified Afrikaners took up posts in the towns of the interior, but they were often people who consorted more freely with their English-speaking fellow-townsmen than with the farmers, and there were occasions when the influence of such people would be used to weaken the political efforts of the Afrikaner Boer. A good example of this occurred at Riversdale in November 1881, when a meeting was held to establish a branch of Hofmeyr's Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging. The proposal met with opposition, and according to the correspondent of the Zuid Afrikaan, the leading opponents were Gijsbert Reitz, M.L.A., Dr Esselen and C. P. A. Lourens, all described as "dorpelingen". These three managed to persuade the meeting to set up a Boeren Vereeniging independent of Hofmeyr's organization, and to elect a committee which gave the town much better representation than the rules of Hofmeyr's association allowed. The result was that many farmers handed in their resignations and held another meeting a month later, this time on a farm and not in the town itself, to set up a Boeren Vereeniging in association with Hofmeyr's body<sup>31</sup>. The Patriot commented on this incident with the remark that a similar sort of fate had befallen the Aberdeen branch of the Afrikaner Bond, and it offered the following advice:

Ons buite mense sal gek wees om hulle van so 'n Dorpsklik by die neus te laat lei. As hulle enigsins gelyk is kan hulle die spul in hulle eie vet lat bak, deur sig te onttrek en andere Takke op te rig<sup>32</sup>.

Incidents of this sort were exceptions rather than the rule, but they point to the existence of a certain class consciousness within Afrikanerdom, which sometimes manifested itself in the opposition of farmers to parliamentary candidates who, if their

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31. Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Dec. 1881.

32. Patriot, 9 Dec. 1881.

names were any criterion, might have been expected to receive Boer support<sup>33</sup>. All that can be usefully derived from this observation, however, is that the presence of a Dutch name among the members of a Municipal Board, or on the magisterial bench, or in Parliament, need not in itself mean that such a person lived in close affinity with the Boer community outside his home town.

The Afrikaner had good cause for being dissatisfied with his position in Colonial society in the second half of the nineteenth century, above all on account of the language barrier, which injured his dignity (once he cared to think about it) and stood in the way of his advancement in public life. This was the one respect in which he did not enjoy proper equality before the law, and it mattered because it denied him equality of opportunity as well. The Afrikaner of the platteland was affected by this limitation in a different way from the Afrikaner of the large town. Preferment was indeed harder for him, but he missed it less. His contact with the alien culture was direct, but it was only occasional. He might have sat for irregular periods as a child at the feet of a Scottish schoolmaster, and perhaps even struck up a friendship with him, while at the same time noting the irrelevance to his own situation of some of the things he was required to learn. He would do regular business with the shopkeepers in the nearest town, and perhaps suspect that he was being overcharged, without knowing what prices were paid at the coast. From time to time he would appear at the magistrate's court to discharge the burdensome obligation of unpaid jury service, or alternatively to appear as plaintiff or defendant in a case, as often as not, between himself and his own servant. He would thus make direct contact with the extended arm of an alien legal system remarkable, from his point of view, not so much for its impartiality, as for the enormous inconvenience which it caused him, its unfamiliar procedure, its unprofitable judgments, and - insult of insults - its "Kaffir" interpreter to help make good his own deficiencies

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33. See below, p. 448.

in the English tongue<sup>34</sup>. But the backvelder lived his own life, so far as he was able. He would not take the lead in disturbing these arrangements, and it might not even have occurred to him that they ought to be disturbed, for they had already been in operation for several decades. But as soon as a prophet arose among his own people - he tended to think in biblical terms - and denounced the regime, he would be more than willing to do his duty to his Volk, and follow the man raised up to lead him. This leadership, however, could only be expected to come from the western Cape, where the inroads into the Afrikaner way of life had been most marked, and where alone the resources in educated manpower and organizing ability were sufficiently concentrated.

## II

At the end of the 'sixties, the energies of the leaders of Dutch opinion in Cape Town were gradually being released for secular politics by a decline in their preoccupation with ecclesiastical. A conflict between the orthodox and liberal sections of the Nederduit Gereformeerde Kerk had reached a climax with the successful appeal by Di. T. F. Burgers and J. J. Kotzé to the Privy Council against their conviction on a charge of heresy by the N.G. Synod. There had been larger issues at stake than the theological soundness of a pair of clergymen, for the dispute had extended to cover the major question of the relationship between Church and State. The N.G. Kerk was still shackled to the civil authority by an Ordinance of 1843 in such a way that it could neither subject its members to effective discipline nor alter its own articles of belief, which had been ambiguously set

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34. The attitude of the Afrikaner Bond to the Colonial legal system is discussed below, v For the "Kaffir interpreter" as a figure, see p. 240. p.p. 229 ff.

out in the same Ordinance, without the approval of the civil power. Under these circumstances, the liberal minority in the Synod had won successes quite out of proportion to their numerical strength, and circulated their views widely with the aid of their own press. The Church, however, gradually succeeded in closing its doors against their growing influence. The foundation of the Stellenbosch Seminary in 1859, together with the introduction of a method of screening new ministers (the Golloquium Doctum) before granting them a licence to preach, helped to shut out heterodox clergy trained in the more liberal schools of Holland. The liberal press survived until the mid-'eighties; but by 1870 the outcome of the struggle was already a foregone conclusion despite the tenacity of the liberal leaders and their congregations<sup>35</sup>. The interest of the public in ecclesiastical controversy began to flag, and Jan Hofmeyr, who had handled much of the orthodox propaganda as editor of the Volksvriend, found an opportunity to amalgamate his own paper with the struggling Zuid Afrikaan in 1871, and develop an editorial policy which was rather more secular in emphasis.

The occasion for this change of emphasis was provided for him by a worsening of relations between the Imperial Government and the Boer Republics of the interior. This first happened as a result of Sir Philip Wodehouse's decision to annex Basutoland in 1868, and when this was followed after an interval of three years by the British annexation of the Diamond Fields, many Kapenaars began to feel that their loyalties were divided. In April 1869, H. W. Teeng's De Moord van Dingaan aan Pieter Retief was played at the Aurora, and this heralded a succession of plays based on episodes out of the Great Trek, about which Scholtz has observed:

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35. On the ecclesiastical struggle, see in particular S. P. Engelbrecht, Geskiedenis van die Nederduitsch Hervormde Kerk van Afrika, and Thomas Francois Burgers: a Biography; T. N. Hanekom, Die Liberale Rigting in Suid-Afrika: 'n Kerk-Historiese Studie; G. B. A. Gerdener, "Die Kultuurhistoriese Bydrae van die Ned. Gereformeerde Kerk in Suid-Afrika" (in Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, vol. II, pp. 188-222); and D. P. Faure, My Life and Times.

Die opvoering in hierdie tyd van toneelstukke wat handel oor episodes uit die Groot Trek, is opvallend, omdat die Afrikaners voorheen nooit vir die heroïese in hul eie geskiedenis oog gehad het nie. Van nou af begin did dade van die verlede vir hul nasionale betekenis kry.

"Die geskiedenis was die bindkrag van binne-uit wat die volksdele tot geestelike eenheid sou maak", as another writer has put it<sup>36</sup>. Afrikaners had taken the first step in the development of a nationalist spirit by manifesting an interest in the sagas of their own people, as a direct consequence of the change in Imperial policy.

With the discovery of diamonds, political developments in South Africa began to move fast. Great Britain saw fit once again to assert her claim to paramountcy in these parts. She crossed swords with the Free State over land between the Orange and the Vaal, with the Transvaal over that Republic's western border, and with Natal over the treatment of the Hlubi chief, Langalibalele. The Cape Colony was offered responsible government, and accepted it with mixed feelings in 1872, at about the time when the confederation of all the South African territories was first mooted in the Colonial Office. The efforts of Disraeli's Conservative ministry to achieve confederation miscarried, however, in 1876, and Sir Theophilus Shepstone was commissioned to annex the Transvaal. On top of all this, towards the end of the decade there broke out a sequence of wars between the whites and the African tribes, more extensive, and more expensive in lives and money, than any of the frontier wars of the past. The Transvaal became involved in a war with Sekhukhune, which broke out again during the British occupation; the eastern frontier of the Cape saw a sustained outbreak of violence in 1877-8, in the course of which the Governor dismissed the first Colonial prime minister from office; the Zulus scored spectacular early successes against imperial arms on the borders of Natal; and in 1880 the Basuto rose and effectively defied the Cape Colonial

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36. Scholtz, p. 164 and note; F. A. van Jaarsveld, Die Afrikaner en sy Geskiedenis, pp. 93, 112-3.

forces till the Cape was eventually obliged to call in Imperial aid.

Colonial Dutch opinion could not fail to be excited by these alarming events, but it took time to unite. This can readily be seen in the inability of the Dutch press in the capital to agree on even the major issues of the day. There were two prominent Dutch newspapers in Cape Town during this eventful decade: the Volksblad, edited by B. J. van de Sandt de Villiers, and the Zuid Afrikaan, under the joint control of J. J. H. Smuts and Jan Hofmeyr. They had taken opposite sides during the theological disputes of the 'sixties. When the Volksvriend and the Zuid Afrikaan amalgamated in September 1871, the liberal editor of the Volksblad concluded hopefully but incorrectly that this marked a retreat by the orthodox party, "against which it has been the lot of this journal to make stout combat for many years"; but he was compelled to admit that the new hybrid was really "the Volksvriend in a more commercial guise", and that Hofmeyr's would be the dominant voice<sup>37</sup>.

Of the two papers, the Volksblad tended to be the more outspoken. It delivered a strong attack on Sir Philip Wodehouse after his annexation of Basutoland<sup>38</sup>. It disapproved of the annexation of the Diamond Fields, though an interval of four months and a strong letter from a group of anonymous correspondents in Paarl were necessary before it generated much heat on the subject<sup>39</sup>. It devotedly supported the cause of responsible government in 1871-2; it backed Carnarvon's confederation proposals of 1875, and continued to advocate such a policy, in defiance of political realities, after Shepstone's annexation of the Transvaal, an event which it nevertheless described as a "most unwarranted interference with the rights of a State whose independence has been admitted and confirmed by solemn treaties"<sup>40</sup>. The Volksblad was in most respects a liberal paper which argued

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37. Volksblad, 7 Sept. 1871.

38. Volksblad, 17 Mar. 1868.

39. Volksblad, 14 Mar. 1872, quoted also by Scholtz, p. 167.

40. Volksblad, 15 Mar. 1877.

from first principles. It consistently opposed authoritarian tendencies in theology and politics, and its motto, "South Africa for the South Africans", was aimed at obliterating any narrow racialism from the political calculations of its readers.

Until 1878, the Zuid Afrikaan tended to take a more pragmatic view of affairs. Hofmeyr<sup>41</sup> showed a disposition to look at the big political issues through plain glasses, and his tone was moderate and rather cautious. At the height of the Diamond Fields controversy, he ended a strong defence of the Orange Free State's case with the suggestion, "Would it not now be discreet [for the O.F.S.] to submit under protest?"<sup>42</sup> His opposition to the grant of responsible government to the Cape in 1872 - an issue on which he parted company with the Volksblad - was rooted in the belief that there was as yet insufficient unity among white Colonials to make such a system work: it was not, that is, an opposition to the principle of self-government. When the Transvaal was annexed by Britain, he confessed to a feeling more of sadness than of anger, blamed Shepstone's presumption, and began a sustained attack on the reputation of President Burgers; but he found space to discuss without passion the question of whether the Republic was financially and militarily capable of standing on its own feet<sup>43</sup>. On some important points, above all in their concern to defend and strengthen Colonial Dutch culture, the Volksblad and the Zuid Afrikaan came near to agreement, and it might well be said of them, as Hazlitt said of the Whig and Tory parties in the 1820's, that they were like two stage coaches, splashing each other with mud, but travelling along the same road to the same destination. Each held to its own ruts, but the Volksblad stopped short before that destination was reached. After the death of van de Sandt de Villiers in 1878, the paper lost the initiative in its running fight with the Zuid Afrikaan, and for the first time allowed its rival to pose as the leading

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41. The political outlook of Jan Hofmeyr at this stage in his career is considered more fully below, pp. 37-41.

42. Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Sept. 1871.

43. Zuid Afrikaan, 10, 14 Mar., 18 Apr. 1877. (The Volksblad supported the liberal Burgers.)

champion of a popular cause. The event which tipped the scale in favour of Hofmeyr's paper was the imposition of an excise duty on Colonial brandy in July 1878. The Volksblad, albeit with weighty arguments, supported the principle behind the tax, and when the farmers of the Western Province organized themselves under Hofmeyr's leadership to fight it, the Volksblad gave only lukewarm support and hinted obliquely that it thought Hofmeyr was fostering racial bigotry<sup>44</sup>. After not many weeks it began to modify its opinion; but its continued confidence in Sprigg's Government, occasioned chiefly by the latter's persistent advocacy of confederation, told in the long run against the Volksblad and lowered its claim to echo Dutch opinion. The initiative therefore passed to Hofmeyr; but before we look at the way he used his advantage, it is necessary to turn our attention to an independent and vigorous flowering of the Afrikaner national spirit which had by this time already emerged in Paarl.

## III

Most of the direction and the drive behind the movement in Paarl were supplied by a minister of the N.G. Kerk, Stefanus Jacobus du Toit, and his brother Daniel François, the thirteenth and twelfth children respectively of a wine farmer in nearby Dal-josaphat<sup>45</sup>. Both the du Toits received their early education at home. Daniel François, whom G. R. von Wielligh later described

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44. Volksblad, 25, 27 Jun., 2, 9 Jul., 6 Aug. 1878.

45. For published biographical information on the du Toit brothers, the fullest source is J. D. du Toit, S. J. du Toit in Weg en Werk. See also, P. J. Nienaber, Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordboek, pp. 245-6, and the memoir by G. R. von Wielligh in the Gedenkboek ter eere van die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, pp. 59-62. Various monographs on aspects of S. J. du Toit's career will be noted in this and subsequent chapters.

as a voracious reader ("liefhebber van lees"), became a teacher at the Daljosaphat school. Stefanus Jacobus went to the Paarl Gymnasium in 1867 at the age of nineteen, and proceeded from there to the Stellenbosch Seminary to receive his theological training. At the former establishment he came under the influence of two notable exponents of Dutch culture, Ds. G. W. A. van der Lingen, who had battled successfully to maintain the independence of the school and keep Hollands as the medium of instruction, and the talented linguist Arnoldus Pannevis. At the seminary, his chief mentor was Professor N. J. Hofmeyr, an uncle of Onze Jan and a very strict Calvinist. Both these influences, the cultural and the theological, left a lasting impression on him, and were developed in his active and versatile mind into a popular mystique of great power. An early visit to the Transvaal created in him an admiration for the burgher of that State, as "geen slaafse onderdaan", who was not afraid to criticize his own government and refused to truckle to the foreigner. After a series of short calls to various congregations in the western Cape, S. J. du Toit accepted one to the new gemeente of Noorder Paarl in July 1875. This congregation had been created as a result of a split in the Paarl gemeente over the issue of the place of the Dutch language and of religious education in schools<sup>46</sup>, and du Toit accepted the call as an advocate of Christian National Education, a philosophy which he was to expound the following year in his De Christelike School in hare verhouding tot Kerk en Staat, and subsequently put into practice as Superintendent General of Education in Kruger's Transvaal.

The arrival of S. J. du Toit in Paarl coincided almost exactly with the first organized attempt to turn Afrikaans into

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46. Du Toit, pp. 14-18; J. A. S. Oberholster, Die Gereformeerde Kerke onder die Kruis, pp. 21-3; J. C. Coetzee, S. J. du Toit en die Onderwys, p. 143.

a written language, for it was on 14 August 1875 that the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners was born. The background to this devoted and to some extent clandestine organization must be briefly told<sup>47</sup>. The development of written Afrikaans had up to this point owed more to external influence than to that of Afrikaners themselves, if the work of men like C. E. Boniface and L. H. Meurant be taken into account, though the latter's influence had begun to show itself in the Dutch press in the 'sixties when, as Scholtz observes, "Klaas Waarseggers en Jan Twyfelaars skrywe nou uit alle dele van die land"<sup>48</sup>. So far however the movement lacked organization, and it was chiefly due to the insight of two Hollanders, Arnoldus Pannevis and C. P. Hoogenhout, that the next steps were taken. The former, with his sensitive feeling for language, regarded Dutch as too far removed from the experience of South African youth to serve as a satisfactory educational medium, and in September 1872 he urged that the Bible should be translated into Afrikaans, the spoken language of the people, though for the needs of the Coloured people rather than the Afrikaners themselves. No such qualification existed in the mind of Hoogenhout, who was probably the first to advocate the development of Afrikaans as a literary language in its own right, and as the most suitable medium for the expression of the spirit of the Afrikaner people. A letter which he wrote to the Zuid Afrikaan in April 1873 initiated a campaign for the recognition of Afrikaans, which grew in intensity over the next few years.

Had the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners limited its activities to the intellectual exercise of constructing the rules of a language, its enthusiasm would probably have flagged and the work petered out long before completion. That this did

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47. It has been told at greater length by Anna de Villiers, "Die Afrikaanse Kultuurstryd" (in van der Walt, Wiid and Geyer, vol. II pp. 634ff.); by J. du P. Scholtz, Die Afrikaner en sy Taal; by du Toit, op.cit., c. VI; etc. The rules of the Genootskap are given in Appendix A.

48. Scholtz, p. 217.

not happen must be attributed to the intense desire of the founders of the movement to provide an outlet for the expression of the Afrikaner cultural tradition in its totality, drawing not only upon the linguistic heritage, but upon religious and historical tradition as well.

The formation of the society was partly the outcome of a meeting between S. J. du Toit and a representative of the British and Foreign Bible Society named Morgan, who met to discuss the possibility of translating the Bible into Afrikaans<sup>49</sup>. Thus the Genootskap owed something to religious enthusiasm. "Ider lid moet gelowe in die Versoeningsdood van onse Heer Jezus Christus", ran one of its rules, and something of the Calvinist intensity of the founders of the movement may be seen in the newspaper advertisement with which they announced themselves. "Ons Liewe Heer het ver ons in Afrika geplaas", it said, "en ver ons die Afrikaanse taal gege"; but this precious gift had been taken away from the Afrikaner in Parliament, the courts and the classroom.

Hulle ontnem ons wat hulle nooit weer kan ge nie. Want daar is maar één moedertaal, die taal van ons hart. Die taal waarin ons an moeders bors pa en ma leer sê het, - die taal waarin ons die eerste indrukke ontvang het, - die taal waarin ons vrome moeder ons as kinders geleer het om die dierbare naam van ons Heere Jesus uit te spreek, - die taal waarin ons ou'ers altyd hulle God gedien het, - die taal waarin ons brawe vader ons op syn sterfbed nog vermaan het, die taal waarin ons moeder stervend haar laatste aassem uitgeblaas het in een gebed ver ons; - die taal blyf ons heilig ... En wat gaat ons dan maak? ... Regte Afrikaanders, ons roep julle op om same met ons te erken dat die Afrikaanse taal ons moedertaal is wat ons Liewe Heer ver ons gege het; en om same met ons te staan ver ons taal deur dik en dun; en nie te rus nie vóór dat ons taal in alle opsigte algemeen erkend is, as die volkstaal van ons land<sup>50</sup>.

The extreme theological position of some of the Genootskappers, combined with their presumption in trying to change the language of their Church, invited a good deal of odium theologicum and had the effect of driving the organization into secrecy<sup>51</sup>.

49. Du Toit, pp. 285ff.

50. Zuid Afrikaan, 4 Dec. 1875.

51. Du Toit, pp. 65-6. G. R. von Wielligh, Baanbrekerswerk, pp. 17-21; The rules of the Genootskap contained no secrecy clause; but the anonymous Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Taalbeweging observed that the Genootskap, unlike the Freemasons, kept its membership secret but publicized its good works.

They set themselves the task of propagating the Afrikaans language by means of the printing press, and were dependent for the greater part of 1876 on the good offices of Smuts and Hofmeyr in Cape Town. As yet they had no press of their own, but in the course of that year they succeeded in producing a grammar and a reader and made a start on a dictionary. Smuts and Hofmeyr, in addition to receiving and forwarding applications for membership, which had to be addressed to "Oom Lokomotief"<sup>52</sup>, undertook the publication of their monthly newspaper, Die Afrikaanse Patriot, and in 1877 published the first edition of their much read essay in historical interpretation, Die Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk. "Mnr. Jan Hofmeyr het 'n volkome onpartijdige houding aangeneem, maar indirek gesteun", S. J. du Toit told his son long afterwards<sup>53</sup>. By the beginning of 1877, however, the Genootskap had acquired its own printing press and had taken over responsibility for the Patriot. It began to publish under the name of the Paarlse Drukkers Vereeniging, naming one of its members, M. L. Rossouw, as the "bestuurder van die drukkerij" - a purely nominal role<sup>54</sup> -, and it was not until towards the end of 1878 that the Patriot began to advertise the firm of D. F. du Toit and Company, printers and bookbinders.

After experiencing severe financial difficulties in the first two years of its existence, which only the self-sacrifice of its members could overcome<sup>55</sup>, the Genootskap began to overcome its troubles in 1878 only to run into an obstacle of a different kind. This was the emergence of a rival campaign for the recognition of Hollands in public life, which was actively

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52. Initially, the sobriquet of the anonymous editor, which attached itself in the course of time to D. F. du Toit in person.

53. On the collaboration of the Zuid Afrikaan, see Patriot, 15 Feb. 1876; du Toit, pp. 65-6.

54. Du Toit, p. 87.

55. Du Toit, pp. 65-6, 77. "Bijna mijn ganse salaris het in die drukkers gegaan. Ja, ik moes boeke uit mijn bibliotheek neem en verkoop om die drukkoste te betaal", S. J. du Toit told his son.

promoted by Jan Hofmeyr and received widespread support, especially among the clergy. In August 1877 a letter signed "Hollandsche Afrikaner", usually attributed to Hofmeyr, appeared in the Zuid Afrikaan, suggesting the formation of a Hollandsche Genootschap. The author invited the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners to join forces in the production of a combined journal. Meeting on 10 August, the leaders of the Afrikaans Genootskap drew up their terms: the Patriot was to be allowed to continue under its own name, principles and direction; the language sponsored by the combined society was not to be stiff, but "eenvoudig Kaaps-Hollans, sonder inmenging van uitheemse woorde", and the Afrikaans Genootskap was to be allotted two columns for advertisements, reports and articles in each number. These conditions were regarded by the sponsors of the Hollandsche Genootschap as too severe, and the attempt at amalgamation therefore failed. Hofmeyr's Zuid Afrikaansche Tijdschrift began to appear in 1878, therefore, as a venture entirely independent of the Paarl society<sup>56</sup>.

This disagreement could easily have developed into a dispute of sufficient dimensions to paralyze all attempts to secure the recognition of either Dutch or Afrikaans as an official language, but the tact of both sides prevented such a situation from arising. People remembered a speech made by Chief Justice de Villiers at the annual meeting of the South African Public Library in May 1876, in which he had expressed the hope that the English language would gradually supplant any form of Dutch. De Villiers would later modify his view; but at the time both Hofmeyr and the protagonists of Afrikaans took his words very much to heart<sup>57</sup>. Under these circumstances, it was unthinkable that the two parties should cut each other's throats. The Afrikaans Genootskappers

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56. Hofmeyr, p. 75; du Toit, pp. 78-9, quoting the Genootskap's minutes; Anna de Villiers, Die Hollandse Beweging in Suid-Afrika, p. 98.

57. E. A. Walker, Lord de Villiers and his Times, pp. 146, 278. For de Villiers' later views: Zuid Afrikaan, 2 May 1882; South African News, v13 Jun. 1907. A Dutch translation of de Villiers' original speech is in the Zuid Afrikaan, 17 May 1876, with Hofmeyr's editorial comments.

therefore decided to lend their support to the campaign for the recognition of Dutch, and limited their own activities in the main to two fields: they continued to publish the Patriot in Afrikaans, and they persevered in their plans for an Afrikaans translation of the Bible<sup>58</sup>. The Paarl Drukkerij turned out as many books in Dutch as it did in Afrikaans<sup>59</sup>.

To limit a discussion of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners to its efforts to propagate the Afrikaans language would, as has already been indicated, be to ignore its more fundamental significance. The recognition of Afrikaans was partly an end in itself; but the Afrikaans language was also the vehicle of a bigger idea, as yet only vaguely formulated, which involved the cultivation of a distinctive Afrikaner outlook, rooted in the religion and the history of the people, to be attained by an all-embracing programme of popular education. Here the starting point of the Genootskappers was the concept of Christian National Education, which had first appeared in the Netherlands with the establishment of a Vereeniging van Christelijk-Nationaal Onderwijs in 1860, and begun to take root in South Africa owing largely to the work of Ds. G. W. A. van der Lingen of the Paarl Gymnasium. S. J. du Toit, who wrote his De Christelijke School in hare Verhouding tot Kerk en Staat in 1876, aimed in particular to do two things: to restore the Church's influence over the minds of the young by securing the principle of confessional religious instruction in the schools, and to protect those same minds from the cultural domination of things English. The first of these aims represented a protest against the secular trend of the education ordinances of 1839 and 1865, which du Toit and those who thought like him regarded as the evil fruits of French Revolutionary liberalism, a doctrine which they held to be erosive of Christian values in general and of Calvinist ones in particular. These earnest advocates of a return to a theocratic polity

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58. On the translation of the Bible, see du Toit, pp. 285-98.

59. Von Wielligh, p. 83.

expounded their views at a time when the trend of public opinion in the Colony was disinclined to follow them, for in 1875, albeit after sustained opposition from the established Churches, Saul Solomon had succeeded in turning all Churches into "voluntary associations". The clergy of the N.G. Kerk as a whole mistrusted the zeal of du Toit and his fellow enthusiasts on the particular matter of education, especially at a time when they had successfully closed their pulpits to liberal preachers. The synod placed its confidence in Christian teachers rather than in the overhaul of the school system, and with that object secured the establishment of its own Normal College in Cape Town in 1878<sup>60</sup>. The aims of the Genootskappers in the field of religious education therefore encountered considerable opposition within the ranks of the Dutch Reformed Church in the Cape Colony<sup>61</sup>.

Fewer obstacles attended their efforts to turn the minds of Afrikaners inwards towards their own "national" traditions and way of life, and there is no better example of their aims and methods in this respect than the Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal van ons Volk. This was a co-operative effort, parts being written by Gideon Malherbe, senior, and C. P. Hoogenhout, but the greater portion was the work of S. J. du Toit<sup>62</sup>. In a modest preface, the authors deplored the lack of adequate source material in the Dutch language, but claimed to have written many letters in the hope of eliciting further information<sup>63</sup>. They realized that their pioneering efforts fell short of their aim, and hoped to produce a second, improved edition at a later date.

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60. G. B. A. Gerdener, in the Kultuurgeskiedenis van die Afrikaner, vol. II, p. 193.

61. The above is based largely on the works by T. N. Hanekom and G. B. A. Gerdener referred to above.

62. See du Toit, pp. 73-76.

63. Special acknowledgement was made in the preface to Cloete, Voorlezingen and Stuart, De Hollandsche Afrikanen. For a consideration of the Geskiedenis in its context in the history of Afrikaans historical writing, the reader is referred to F. A. van Jaarsveld, Die Afrikaner en sy Geskiedenis, especially pp. 96-101, 112-8. See also L. van Niekerk, De Eerste Afrikaanse Taalbeweging, pp. 18-22.

"Die doel van die besproke Geskiedenis was beslis nasionaal", wrote J. D. du Toit, and his conclusion need not be questioned. The book was directed at the Afrikaner public, and was intended to enthuse as well as to teach. The authors' method was boldly eclectic, and those aspects of South African history which did not readily lend themselves to the case they were expounding - for example, the story of the constitutional development of the Cape Colony - were compressed into a narrow compass not unlike the form of the thinner sections of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle. It was ~~romantic~~ history of an exaggerated kind, reminiscent of Carlyle only more tendentious, in which the hero was the Afrikaner Boer. He was seen first of all trying to build a colony, oppressed between the upper and nether millstones of the Dutch East India Company and the "wilde naties", and was made to prevail over both because the Lord was on his side. The Huguenots were treated at considerable length, and their fusion with the Cape Dutch was likewise brought within the scope of the Providential plan. The emphasis moved to the Republics from the time of the Great Trek onwards, but less use was made of the Great Trek itself than might have been expected. In their analysis of its causes, the authors took into account the supposed partisanship of English justice in favour of the Hottentots, the introduction of paper money and the issues connected with slavery and the frontier; but, they urged,

Die eerste oorsaak dat hulle o'er die grense getrek het is seker toe te skrywe an die geneigdheid van een mens om van woonplaas te verander. Die sug om te trek leg in al die afstammeling van Jafeth, so's ou vader Noach voorspel het: 'God breide Jafeth uit' (Gen. ix.27). Mar vernameelik leg dit in die volke van Saksise afkoms, so's ons.

The authors made a studied attempt to belittle the contribution of English-speaking people to the development of South Africa, using the technique of mockery - Wilmot's writings were subjected to clever ridicule - and they sought to arouse the group patriotism of the Afrikaner through a melodramatic approach, best seen in a particularly vivid and sentimental account of the Slagters Nek

executions<sup>64</sup>. At rare moments, their ingenuity knew no bounds, as for example in their explanation how British stupidity over the emancipation of the slaves was prevented, by an act of divine intervention, from causing disaster to the Colony when the emancipation became effective in 1838:

Mar still! 'De Heer heeft het ten goede gedacht' (Gen.50:20). Onverwags - buitentyds - in die hartjie van somer - laat ons liewe Heere, wat alles so wys bestier, 8 dage agtereen re'en, so's nog nooit vóór of na die tyd in die kolonie gebeur is nie. Toen kon die losgelate slawe nie so by troppe rondloop nie; hulle moes weer gaan werk om kos te kry; die meeste gaat na hulle ou base terug om hulle te verhuur; beter was dit toen ver baas en jong. En hoe veel of daar oek verkeerds was in die manier waarop die Engelse regering die slawe vrygemaak het, vandag dank ons die Heere dat Hy dit alles so wys bestier het.

When the second edition was published in 1895, a new section was added, covering the period from 1877 to 1895, from which anti-British sentiment, which was then out of fashion, was excluded; but it was not suppressed in the rest of the book<sup>65</sup>.

The Geskiedenis provided a good foundation for a nationalist mythology, even if that mythology was not as complete as it was later to become<sup>66</sup>. Only five hundred copies of the first edition were printed, and the demand so far exceeded the supply that the Patriot repeatedly advertised for unsold copies to be returned. So it was evidently much read; but, great through its impact on the unlettered mind of the average Boer must have been, it is likely to have been small by comparison with that of the Patriot itself.

64. Their intention, of course, was to break away from the version of South African history propagated by the English veroveraar.

65. Apart from the addition of this new section, the second edition differed from the first in two respects: the spelling was revised, and much documentary material originally incorporated in the text was relegated to appendices. This time it was published, not by Hofmeyr's firm, but by the Paarl Drukkerij.

66. It is of some interest that the authors could make a strong attack on the missionary societies (other than the Moravians) without so much as mentioning the name of Dr John Philip, and that they could write a narrative history of the Great Trek without any reference to a covenant before Blood River.

Die Afrikaanse Patriot first appeared, as a monthly periodical, in January 1876. The original intention was that the work should be entrusted to an editorial board of four: C. P. Hoogenhout, D. F. du Toit, S. J. du Toit, and another Hollander, J. W. van der Rijst; but from the start the chief responsibility devolved upon the brothers du Toit. D. F. du Toit recorded that "die inleidingsartikels werd mees deur Ds. du Toit geskrewe, nadat 'n groot gedeelte van die artikels deur ons same besproke was", while during S. J. du Toit's periodic absences and after his departure for the Transvaal in 1882, D. F. du Toit took on the full responsibility.

Year by year until 1879, the Patriot grew in size. Beginning as a monthly magazine containing articles but very little news, it became a weekly newspaper in January 1877. The number of its columns had doubled by the beginning of 1879, before which time its format had come to resemble that of the other large newspapers of the Colony. Yet in content, approach and opinion, the Patriot was very different from its contemporaries, a fact which requires illustration if the effectiveness of its appeal is to be understood.

From the start, it cultivated a friendly, informal relationship with its readers, and was not afraid to talk down to them. "Oom Lokomotief" was a topical enough nickname for the editors to choose at the beginning of the South African railway age. It was funny, familiar and above all avuncular. "Oom" encouraged his readers to write to him, and the correspondence columns of the Patriot were usually full, sometimes to overflowing, with letters from all over the Colony and the Republics. By the early months of 1881, correspondence sometimes covered as much as five full columns, nearly always in Afrikaans, and sometimes the letters were written in simple verse.

Die pos bring ons soms tot in die 80 briewe op een dag ...  
En die geykte versoek van byna elke korrespondent is:  
'Waarde Oom Lokomotief, plaas tog asseblief die paar reëls  
in jou veel gelese blad'. Dat dit onmoëlikheid is om  
daaraan te voldoen spreek as 'n boek.

When the Patriot was first published, its news service was exceedingly poor, though this improved rapidly as it acquired more and more correspondents in all parts of South Africa. The paper does not appear to have had its own parliamentary correspondent, at least for the first six years of its existence, and it was dependent on the Zuid Afrikaan or the Volksblad for much of its political news. It did not report the parliamentary session of 1877 at all until it was over, and then dismissed its lengthy deliberations with the terse comment, "soos gewoonlik, meer gepraat as gedaan"<sup>67</sup>. The following year it carried brief parliamentary reports, with the introductory explanation that "wat ons hief geef is wat elke Afrikaner behoort te lees" - and no more. As a weekly, the Patriot could hardly compete in its editorial policy with the Zuid Afrikaan, which appeared twice a week until March 1880, and thereafter three times. It did not, however, attempt to do so, and instead of aiming at a wide range of editorial coverage, it tended to pick on fruitful themes and "plug" them. Thus six of the seven issues between 24 December 1880 and 4 February 1881 contained leaders in support of a Huguenot memorial, which received better editorial coverage than the first Anglo-Boer war, then taking place. Four consecutive issues in March and April 1882 were devoted to an attack on the Standard Bank, and there are numerous examples of this repetitive technique. The arguments were usually couched in the simple, monosyllabic form to which the Afrikaans language so easily lends itself, of which the following paragraph, taken from an editorial of 1 December 1882, entitled "Di Volk syn Wil is di Wet van God", is a particularly good example:

Di hoogste wet is di wil van di volk. Wat di volk wil moet wet worre. En as 'n volk ni eenstemmig is ni, dan gaat dit by meerderheid van stemme. Die meerderheid maak di wet ... Geen regering kan staan teen di volkswil. En so is di wil van di volk di hoogste wet en daar dit tog al te erg sou wees, dat 'n heel nasie sou se: daar is geen God, en di mens tog ni onder God wil staan, so is dan di wil van di volk di wet van God geworre ...

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67. Patriot, 24 Aug. 1877.

In its editorial policy, the Patriot aimed to instruct rather than to inform, and it tended to do this rather in the manner of a schoolmaster preparing pupils for an examination, setting out its arguments in simple language, numbering them, sometimes reprinting full series' of leaders in pamphlet form where they related to a common subject. Meanwhile its subscribers grew from the fifty who took the first issue in January 1876, to about 3,700 at the end of 1881, by which time the paper's agencies in the Colony were nearly as numerous as those of the Zuid Afrikaan, and those in the Transvaal considerably more so. The circulation of the Patriot in the Transvaal would eventually have great importance for the Paarl movement, though not until 1881.

Within a year or two of its inception, the leaders of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners had achieved much in focussing the attention of Afrikanerdom on the unsatisfactory features of their position in society. Their enthusiasm was infectious, and their methods were well suited to stir up the elemental fervour of an intense, conservative and unsophisticated people. But they were not methods which appealed to the taste of all Afrikaners - of those whose relationship with their English-speaking fellow-Colonials was reasonably cordial, of such as regarded the retention of the Dutch language as necessary for the growth of their own civilization and scorned the 'patois' offered as an alternative, or of the theological moderates, the middle-of-the-road Calvinists who would no more accept Christian National Education than the teachings of Charles Darwin. The Genootskap's approach was strong because it captured the spirit of the platteland; it was weak because it alienated most of the men who would have been qualified to provide a national movement with wise or moderate leadership. The fervour of its crusade was marred by the crude aggressiveness of some of its propaganda.

## CHAPTER TWO

## THE BOEREN VEREENIGINGEN

## I

At the time of the foundation of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, there was little on the surface to suggest that the leadership of the Afrikaner nationalist movement in the Cape Colony would fall on the shoulders of Jan Hofmeyr. His background was against him. Born in Cape Town in 1845, he had spent the greater part of his life in the capital, being educated at the Tot Nut van 't Algemeen and afterwards at the South African College, where he was known as John Henry. The cultural surroundings in which he moved were largely English, and it has even been suggested that he found difficulty in speaking Dutch, though he never had much difficulty in writing it. When he first stood for a Stellenbosch parliamentary seat in 1875, he wrote to his brother-in-law, David de Waal, asking that his proposer and seconder at the nomination meeting should speak in English: "Als zij Hollandsch spreken, zou ik dat welligt ook moeten doen"<sup>1</sup>. When the audience at the meeting pressed him to address them in Dutch, he evaded the issue by explaining that English was the language he would have to use in Parliament. He also lost the election. On a farmers' occasion at Kruisvallei in 1883, he was again taunted with the shout "Hollands! Hollands!" as he rose to speak. This time he began in Dutch, saying that he proposed to speak first in English and repeat his message in Dutch afterwards, which he did. But this was eight years later, and it was a farmers' gathering at which there were unlikely to have been any language purists to take him up on his "dens" and "hets".

Although Hofmeyr took up the Afrikaner's cause, not as something totally external to himself, but as something in which his feelings as an Afrikaner were deeply involved, there

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1. J.H.H. de Waal, Die Lewe van D.C. de Waal, pp. 58-60; c.f. J. H. Hofmeyr, Life of J. H. Hofmeyr, pp. 138-9.

is no doubt that his background and upbringing tended to create a barrier between him and the Boer of the platteland which he would find great difficulty in breaking down. His apparently unnatural alliance with the farmers of the Western Province, which was his stepping stone to political leadership, may be explained by the fact that some of his close relations were wine farmers<sup>2</sup>, while in later years he maintained contact with opinion on the platteland chiefly through his farming friends in Parliament, men such as "Dolf" Botha, "Oom Daantje" van den Heever, J. J. Janse van Rensburg and Thomas Theron. He tried hard to keep farmers' interests to the fore in the editorial columns of the Zuid Afrikaan, by paying much attention to topics such as the farm labour shortage, irrigation, squatting and vagrancy. But he could not completely span the gulf, largely a cultural one, which separated him from his rural readers. The uncertainty of his standing among the farmers would sometimes prevent him from taking a bold line on policy matters unless he received clear indications of overwhelming support, for fear of testing the loyalty of the farmers too far<sup>3</sup>. His detached position enabled him to take a dispassionate view of the Boers' political competence, which he did not rate highly. Consequently, once he had won control over their political movement he never felt that he could allow it to slip out of his hands. The fact that, with all his disadvantages, it never did so is an indication of his consummate tactical skill.

His religious views differed considerably from those of S. J. du Toit, and if they were less likely to alienate the mass of his fellow Afrikaners, they were also less likely to evoke a nationalist spirit among them. His paper gave dutiful coverage to the Ring and Synodal meetings of the

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2. His father, for example, who farmed at Somerset West, and D. C. de Waal, who married his sister.

3. The Scab Act of 1894 gives the best illustration of this. See below, pp. 332-41.

Church and to the affairs of the Cape Town congregation. He threw his weight, though not very hard, against Saul Solomon's Voluntary Bill<sup>4</sup>, and opposed the extension of English services in the Groote Kerk<sup>5</sup>. He also supported the efforts of Ds. W. P. de Villiers in Parliament to secure state assistance for schools which gave religious instruction in ordinary school hours; but he was an opponent of Christian National Education, and would later be attacked by the same de Villiers in the columns of the Patriot, for advocating what the latter described as Hofmeyr's "godsdienstige onkerkelike school"<sup>6</sup>. That Onze Jan was no extreme Calvinist may be seen in the interest which he showed in spiritualism<sup>7</sup>, and in his membership of the Cape Town Masonic Lodge<sup>8</sup>. Above all, he was not the sort of person who would try to arouse religious passions for political ends.

The political pragmatism of his editorial policy in the early 'seventies likewise gave little indication of a desire to launch a nationalist movement. His biographer has noted a reference made by him to the 'National Party' during the early stages of Molteno's Ministry<sup>9</sup>; but the expression bears no apparent relation to the state of affairs in Parliament at the time, while it is fairly certain that Hofmeyr saw no special virtue in the existence of an Afrikaner party organized on racial lines, then or at any other time.<sup>10</sup> His concern at first was rather to awaken Afrikaner self-respect outside the political field. In this connection, he allowed his columns to be used for the debate over the rival merits of simplified Hollands and Afrikaans, and he put his press at the disposal of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners for the whole of 1876.<sup>10</sup> He showed some sympathy with Afrikaans as a vehicle for "gezond nationaal gevoel", but opposed its

4. e.g. Zuid Afrikaan, 26 May 1875.

5. J. du P. Scholtz, Die Afrikaner en sy Taal, 1806-75, pp.190-5.

6. J.D. du Toit, S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, pp. 45-7.

7. Hofmeyr, p. 76.

8. T.N. Hanekom, Die Liberale Rigting in Suid-Afrika, p. 150.

9. Hofmeyr, p. 124. For Hofmeyr's attitude to political parties, see below, p. 442.

10. See above, p. 28

becoming a language taught in the schools, "zoodat de gansche Engelsche en Hollandsche letterkunde voor onze jongelieden een gesloten schatkamer werd"<sup>11</sup>. He preferred Hollands to Afrikaans because it possessed a literature, and it was to develop his people's familiarity with the Dutch language that he started the Zuid Afrikaansche Tijdschrift in 1878. But for him Hollands was also a means to the knowledge and appropriation of a national history. He desired to evoke among his compatriots an appreciation of the epic moments in their national past, so that later generations of South Africans "should boast of the exploits of De Ruijter, as well as those of Blake"<sup>12</sup>. It is of some interest that he derived at least as great a thrill from the history of the Netherlands as from the sagas of the South African frontier.

As the 'seventies advanced, Onze Jan's political outlook tended to harden. An opponent of responsible government in 1872, he had nevertheless supported the Molteno Ministry, for want of a better, until it set its face against confederation, which Hofmeyr at first supported. Although he greeted Frere's dismissal of Molteno in 1878 with strong disapproval, he accepted Sprigg's succession to the premiership without malice, but soon found that he was unable to march in step with the new premier owing to his persistent advocacy of confederation, which no longer appeared reasonable to Hofmeyr after Shepstone's annexation of the Transvaal, and which looked in Sprigg's hands rather like a veiled attempt by an eastern Ministry to obtain by other means that separation from the west which direct agitation in the past had failed to bring about<sup>13</sup>. It was developments in the Transvaal, however, which chiefly drew his anger. In June 1878 he refuted in strong terms the suggestion that the annexation was popular among the burghers. The following February he endorsed the Patriot's advice to the Transvalers to offer passive

11. Zuid Afrikaan, 22 Mar. 1879.

12. Hofmeyr, p.84. See also F. A. van Jaarsveld, Die Afrikaner en sy Geskiedenis, p.100.

13. Zuid Afrikaan, 27 Nov. 1875; 4 Apr., 11 Aug.; 8, 26 Sept. 1877; 9 Feb., 16 Mar. 1878.

resistance rather than armed defiance, reiterated the advice a week later in answer to criticisms from the Volksblad, and repeated it again in April:

Alzoo blijft er slechts één middel over om het oor de Rijksregering te bereiken, te weten, in de Transvaal te blijven bij lijdelijk verzet, en in de Kolonie te weigeren te confedereren zoo lang dat verzet voortduurt.

The advantage of passive resistance, he wrote, was that it kept the British on the alert in case violence should break out, and also involved them in heavy military expenditure<sup>14</sup>. Time and the workings of the British parliamentary system might be expected to bring a cure. Meanwhile, armed resistance should be discouraged. Hofmeyr never admitted its necessity, and even urged on 24 May that the sensible thing for the Transvaal to do once it got its independence back was to accept membership of a confederation under the British Crown. But the restoration of the Transvaal's independence had to come first, and to that end Hofmeyr sponsored a petition to the Queen and maintained a barrage of criticism directed against the agents of Imperial policy, more especially against Sir Bartle Frere, whom he did not hesitate to describe as "een echt vertegenwoordiger van den Britschen 'grondhonger'"<sup>15</sup>.

When Hofmeyr stepped into the leadership of the Western Province farmers' political movement in 1878, his mind was already busily turning over the problem of the Afrikaner's position and status in the Cape Colony and the Transvaal. At first he managed to keep the farmers' difficulties in a separate mental compartment from those of the Afrikaner; but eventually the pressure of circumstances would force him to jumble the two together. It is not clear that he ever really expected to be able to keep them apart.

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14. Zuid Afrikaan, 1 June 1878; 15, 22 Feb., 2 Apr. 1879.

15. Zuid Afrikaan, 23 Apr. 1879.

## II

The rural economy of the Western Province rested largely on the prosperity of its vineyards, but from 1825 onwards the fortunes of the Cape wine industry went into almost continuous decline. In the 'seventies, the wine export trade had not yet recovered from the setback it had sustained through the loss of a privileged position on the British market during the Napoleonic wars. For most of the century, Cape wines indeed enjoyed a protective tariff against the products of all parts of the European continent; but as Great Britain moved in the direction of free trade the tariff wall came to provide progressively less shelter for the Colonial producer, especially in the period after Cobden's treaty with France in 1860. The much greater distance meant higher costs for the Colonial exporter, and the climatic conditions encountered during transit made it necessary to fortify Cape table wines to such a degree that they became liable for a higher rate of duty than the lighter French product. A decline in the Cape's export trade reacted in turn upon the quality of the Colonial product, placing the Cape producer at a still greater disadvantage, and sometimes inflicting real hardship upon him and his employees<sup>16</sup>.

The position gave rise to considerable local concern, and the Cape Chamber of Commerce took up the farmers' case with the Imperial Government in 1866 and again in 1872<sup>17</sup>, but without success. The farmers failed to take the advice of a parliamentary select committee to form a co-operative in 1868<sup>18</sup>; but eight years later a determined effort to launch a Wijnbouwers Vereeniging was made, largely on the initiative

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16. For example, in Stellenbosch in 1876. The price of wine was usually as low in Stellenbosch as anywhere in the Colony; but in this year hardship was made worse by the impending collapse of the Stellenbosch Bank, itself partly the result of a severe shortage of money in the district. Hofmeyr's brother-in-law, David de Waal, was among those affected. See J. H. H. de Waal, pp. 37, 61, 66.

17. R. F.M. Immelman, Men of Good Hope, pp. 241-4.

18. C. L. Leipoldt, Three Hundred Years of Cape Wine, p.135.

of Hofmeyr and the Zuid Afrikaan<sup>19</sup>, which resulted in the establishment of such an association in October 1877<sup>20</sup>. It had a nominal capital of £50,000, and by May 1877 nearly 3,500 people had begun to take out shares, most of them from the districts of Paarl, Wellington and Stellenbosch, and from the Cape Peninsula, with some from as far afield as Beaufort West and Riversdale<sup>21</sup>. The Vereeniging began with a flourish. It engaged a Spanish viticultural expert to visit the Cape in an advisory capacity in March 1878. It bought its own warehouse for the storage of wine, and then proceeded to buy up large stocks with a view to maturing them prior to resale. The fact that its directors had indulged in gross over-speculation did not become apparent before the annual meeting in 1879, and the ultimate collapse of the Vereeniging in November 1882 at the hands of its persistent creditors could not then be foreseen, as the wine farmers looked forward to relief from their cares in the long-term fruits of co-operation.

In the middle of 1878, however, when the prospect of recovery still seemed unusually bright, this hard hit industry was assailed from another quarter: Sprigg's Government announced its intention of placing an excise duty on Colonial brandy. The background to this decision was the necessity in which the Government found itself, on taking office, of raising a substantial loan to cover the cost of new railways and a frontier war, the interest on which would have to be met by increased taxation. The possibility of a brandy excise was raised by the Zuid Afrikaan on 10 April; but Hofmeyr ventured to think that Sprigg, whose Ministry was composed of easterners, would not contemplate endangering the good relations between east and west by authorizing a measure of this sort, and when it became apparent that the

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19. Zuid Afrikaan, 11 Nov. 1876.

20. Zuid Afrikaan, 27 Oct. 1877.

21. Zuid Afrikaan, 2 June 1877.

Government was in earnest, demonstrations against the proposed tax were made in many parts of the Western Province with the whole-hearted support of the Zuid Afrikaan. A mass meeting assembled at Paarl on 24 June which reminded J. S. Marais, a local member of Parliament, of the anti-convict agitation of 1848<sup>22</sup>. Before the month was out, meetings of a similar nature had been held at Stellenbosch, Montagu, Cape Town, Wellington and Worcester<sup>23</sup>. Hofmeyr used his editorial talent to argue that an increase in the price of brandy would not only encourage producers to adulterate their product - a point which the Volksblad, which favoured the measure, conceded - but also ruin a precarious export trade. He deplored the provisions for inspection, the inevitable increase of paper work, and the penalties for infringement laid down in the Bill. He complained rather sensationally and with overt special pleading that it was not "het brandewijn stokende Westen" but "het brandewijn drinkende Oosten" which ought to pay the tax, and invoked the support of Adam Smith and J. S. Mill to prove that the tax ought not to be imposed at all<sup>24</sup>.

In fact, the supporters of the measure had a stronger case than the readers of the Zuid Afrikaan were led to suppose. As the Volksblad pointed out, the excise was not the only measure introduced by the Government to raise the extra revenue, for it also brought in a house tax levied pro rata on the value of fixed property, beginning with a five-shilling tax on native huts<sup>25</sup>. Again, the excise was imposed in such a way as not to injure the Colony's export trade, for the Government allowed the establishment of entrepôt warehouses for the protection of the exporter. It was indeed primarily this consideration which had precluded the taxation of wealthier interests such as wool, a principle the validity of

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22. Zuid Afrikaan, 26 June 1878.

23. Zuid Afrikaan, 29 June 1878.

24. See the very frequent editorials in the Zuid Afrikaan in June and July 1878.

25. Volksblad, 25, 29 June 1878.

which Hofmeyr admitted. Further, it could not be contended with absolute fairness that this was an attempt to place an unequal burden on the farmer, since the greater part of the Colonial revenue was derived from import duties which probably hit other interests harder<sup>26</sup>. An income tax would have been fairer, but the machinery did not exist for its immediate introduction. A poll tax levied on all, irrespective of race or income, would have distributed the burden more widely, but less equitably: "a very convenient tax for well-to-do people", was how the Volksblad dismissed a suggestion made at many a farmers' meeting<sup>27</sup>. Saul Solomon, who disliked the tax on principle because it was levied on a particular interest, voted for it on the ground that it was a sure way of raising the necessary revenue without causing undue hardship, and he was right. It yielded substantial sums down to its abolition in 1886, without in fact turning out to be as great a burden as the farmers anticipated<sup>28</sup>. Yet the excise, when all is said, contained all the ingredients for a good agitation. It hit a struggling industry just at a time when it was attempting to apply to itself the good Victorian virtue of self-help. Again, though it was a safe enough assumption that the costs would be passed on to the consumer, for the citizen would continue to drink his brandy even if he did have to pay more for it, the tax was in fact levied on the producer, which was itself bad budgetary policy except from the point of view of the ease of collection. Finally, it was pushed through

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26. Volksblad, 27 June 1878.

27. Volksblad, 25 June 1878.

28. W.E.G. Solomon, Saul Solomon, pp. 229-34. The Blue Book figures for revenue from the excise were:

1878-9: £63,522	1881-2: £58,293	1884-5: £94,686
1879-80: £74,104	1882-3: £43,103	1885-6: £59,494
1880-1: £49,566	1883-4: £19,469	

In 1878-82, the rate of the excise was ls. per gallon on all types of brandy. From 1882-4, the excise on brandy made with Colonial-produced materials was removed, and that on brandy made with imported materials retained at ls. During the session of 1884, owing to the severe depression, the duty on brandy made with imported materials was raised to 2s. and the shilling duty on ordinary brandy restored. In 1885, primarily as a protective measure, the duty on the imported product was doubled, and in 1886 the excise was abolished altogether. See Hofmeyr, pp. 227-8, 253-4, 276, 280-1.

with almost indecent haste. The Opposition's request that it be referred to a select committee was turned down, and even the Volksblad agreed that the practical interests of the wine farmers had not been sufficiently closely considered.

Once the Bill had become law, however, Hofmeyr accepted the fact; but he also set out to exploit what, on analysis, appeared to be a far from hopeless situation. He summarily rejected the idea, to which the Patriot lent its support in banner type on 2 August, that the producers should give vent to their indignation by refusing to produce. His own answer recalled, either consciously or unconsciously, a suggestion first made by the Patriot over a year earlier<sup>29</sup>, and can best be given in his own words:

Wat dan gedaan? Wij geven het antwoord in één woord: ORGANISEER. Dat de wijnboeren trachten invloed uit te oefenen op de aanstaande electiën. Naar de mate hunner krachtsontwikkeling bij de stembus zal hun kracht in het Parlement zijn. Maar om kracht bij de stembus uit te oefenen zullen zij met overleg moeten te werk gaan. Zij zullen moeten worden georganiseerd, om niet als een orde-looze hoop volks, maar als een afgerigt leger ten strijde te gaan. Daartoe zullen zij een groote vereeniging moeten oprigten met hare hoofdkwartieren dicht bij Kaapstad, maar met vertakkingen in elk distrikt waar een wijnboer wordt gevonden ... Zulk een Vereeniging moeten uitgaan van publieke vergaderingen; maar vergaderingen zonder een degelijk afgerond schema ter overweging zullen weinig goed doen. Dat de Paarlische en Stellenbossche Parlementsleden de zaak aan de gang zetten ...<sup>30</sup>.

Four days later he widened his appeal:

Die organisatie behoort niet ten doel te hebben enkel de herroeping der Accijsacte; want in dat geval zou zij bij slechts weinigen buiten wijnboeren medewerking erlangen. Men stichte eene algemeene 'Landbouwers Parlementaire Vereeniging', om te waken voor alle takken der boerderij, hetzij wijnbouw, tabaksbouw, schapenteelt, veeteelt, struisboerderij - eene vereeniging die het oog zal slaan op onderwerpen als meesters en bedienden wet.

Farmers of different sorts should act together, and not cut each other's throats:

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29. Patriot, 15 Jun. 1877. After receiving the printed report of a congress of English-speaking farmers' Associations held in Grahamstown, the editor asked: "Waarom kan in die Westelike Provinsie, Vrystaat en Transvaal nie sulke Vereniginge van boere gevorm worde...?"

30. Zuid Afrikaan, 27 Jul. 1878.

Laat de Vereeniging tak-vereenigingen hebben in elke afdeeling, met vertegenwoordigers in elk veldkornet-schap. Laat er een algemeen hoofdbestuur zijn nabij Kaapstad, gekozen door die leden der Vereeniging, die een zeker jaarlijksch bedrag storten. Dan zal men bezitten een hoofd zoowel als een ligchaam, en wel een ligchaam met leden, zich als een netwerk over het gansche land uitstreckende ... eerst zorgende voor eene behoorlijke registratie van kiezers, dan voor de keuze van de regte kandidaten ... in het Parlement.

The concluding section of this article alluded to Cobden's Anti-Corn Law League. Hofmeyr's thoughts were clearly turned towards the success of that body, with special attention perhaps to its skilful dissemination of propaganda, and the spread of its political influence by means of a systematic registration of new voters<sup>31</sup>.

What happened next was told by Hofmeyr at a meeting in Stellenbosch on 12 August<sup>32</sup>. After the passage of the Excise Law, several directors of the Wijnbouwers Vereeniging visited him in his office to consult him about the sending of a "monster-deputatie" to the Governor to request him not to sign the Bill, as the Patriot had urged repeatedly since 12 July. But the same morning the Law was gazetted, and Hofmeyr said that he objected in any case to this sort of interference in the legislative process. He told them that the only action he could recommend was parliamentary action, the course which he had suggested in his editorial in the Zuid Afrikaan that morning<sup>33</sup>. The result was that within a few hours several people, including some members of Parliament, had met together, discussed the position, and decided to adopt Hofmeyr's suggestion, not simply of an organization to fight the excise, but of a general union of farmers. After further private consultations, Hofmeyr and H. P. du Preez, a Cape Town attorney, were appointed to draw up suitable rules for such an association<sup>34</sup>.

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31. Zuid Afrikaan, 31 Jul. 1878. For the methods of the Anti-Corn Law League, see J. Morley, Life of Richard Cobden, pp. 210, 290, 305-6.

32. Zuid Afrikaan, 14 Aug. 1878.

33. Zuid Afrikaan, 27 July 1878 (quoted above).

34. The account of the birth and development of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging which follows is based on press reports in the Zuid Afrikaan, and, where they exist, the printed records of the Vereeniging in vol. I of the Hofmeyr Papers.

The original intention was that these rules should be discussed at a meeting in Stellenbosch on 7 August, but the meeting was postponed until the 12th so as not to clash with the first annual meeting of the Wijnbouwers Vereeniging. When the day came, about two hundred farmers filled the Stellenbosch town hall, several members of Parliament among them. Jan Mader of Stellenbosch, who was elected to the chair, explained that the meeting had originally been called by a vigilance committee appointed at an earlier meeting of wine farmers in Stellenbosch, to discuss the formation of what he described as "eene vereeniging van wijnbouwers", and other matters relevant to the wine trade; but he went on to mention Hofmeyr's proposal to broaden the scope of the movement to include farmers of all types. Hofmeyr then read out the proposed rules (Bepalingen en Regulatien) which he and du Preez had drawn up, and after some debate these were accepted as they stood. Hofmeyr then rose again to commend the formation of what he now referred to as a Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, a body which he hoped would create among the farmers of the west a political sense comparable with that already shown by their eastern counterparts, among whom

er meer staatkundige geestdrift ... bestond - omdat Boerenvereenigingen en congressen van waakzaamheid jaren lang aan de staatkundige opvoeding ... hadden gearbeid,

thus enabling them to exercise an influence in Parliament quite out of proportion to their numbers<sup>35</sup>. The object of the new association, he said, should be to educate the farming population of the western Cape to a realization that their interests too could only be furthered by their own efforts. Once they understood this, it would matter little even if the Excise Law remained on the statute book. Hofmeyr's enthusiasm carried a sympathetic meeting. A provisional committee was elected and a decision taken to canvass for

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35. An example of this activity in the eastern Cape is provided by the report of the Grahamstown Farmers' Congress of 1877 referred to in note 29 above.

members in the districts of Stellenbosch and Paarl. Other meetings quickly followed, and a formal act of association was made at a meeting of delegates in Cape Town on 31 October.

No official record of this October meeting has survived. It was held behind closed doors, and we are dependent upon Hofmeyr's "discreet vogeltje" for information as to what took place<sup>36</sup>. According to this no doubt well-informed source, about sixty members attended, "meest van Wijnberg, Stellenbosch, Paarl en Wellington". G. J. de Korte, a Capetonian and parliamentary candidate for the Western Circle, was elected to the chair. The draft rules were considered and formally adopted, this time with two changes, one permitting the formation of more than one local Vereeniging in the same fiscal division if each had more than twenty-five members<sup>37</sup>, and the other enlarging the head committee (Hoofdbestuur) from thirteen to seventeen members. This council of seventeen was then elected, if this is the right word to use, for the tone of the Zuid Afrikaan's account suggests that they were at least partly chosen in order to fulfil certain conditions, for example their accessibility for meetings of the Bestuur. Hofmeyr's "vogeltje" noted that they included two journalists, two advocates and four merchants; that two were English-born, while another had an English background - evidence enough, it considered, to prove that the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging was not meant to be a racialist organization. Nine of the first directors lived in the Cape Peninsula, and most of the remainder came from Stellenbosch, Paarl and Wellington. As five directors constituted a quorum in terms of the rules, this meant that urgent decisions could, if necessary, be taken by the peninsular members in the name of those who lived further afield.<sup>38</sup>

The most complete description of the aims, methods and organization of the Zuid Afrikaansche Boeren Beschermings

36. Zuid Afrikaan, 2 Nov. 1878. Hofmeyr was, of course, present at the meeting.

37. This was to remove a difficulty raised by the farmers of Wellington, which was in the same fiscal division as Paarl.

38. Hofmeyr, p. 149. At the subsequent annual general meetings, the Hoofdbestuur was elected by ballot of those present.

Vereeniging is to be found in the constitution which this meeting adopted<sup>39</sup>. According to this document, it aimed at the protection of farming interests of all kinds, stock-raising as well as crop-raising, within the borders of the Colony, and there was no suggestion that it should operate outside the Colony. It planned to secure the election to Parliament of members who would oppose any measures considered oppressive to the farming population, who would work for the repeal or at least the reduction of the brandy excise, who would support the special interests of the farming population over legislation dealing with masters and servants, and back judicious schemes for the subsidization of farming projects out of public revenue<sup>40</sup>. The Vereeniging would attempt, secondly, to secure the registration as voters of all who had an interest in farming, and guard against the abuse of the franchise. In the third place, it would provide suitable means for keeping farmers informed about all projected legislation thought likely to injure their interests. The organization was to be centred on a head office in Cape Town, with local associations spread throughout the Colony, full members of which were to be entitled to attend and vote at general meetings called by the Hoofdbestuur. The Hoofdbestuur was obliged to call a general meeting each year and present a report on its activities, on which occasion a new Bestuur would be elected. It was to control the purse, receiving

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39. The text is given in Hofmeyr, pp. 643-5. See also Appendix B.

40. In terms of article xxiii of its constitution, the Vereeniging would not "interfere with party politics as such, but ... pursue [its] objects ... regardless of any effect such course of conduct may have on the state of Parliamentary parties". This article can only have the opposite meaning to that which Hofmeyr's biographer gave it (p.201) for all it did was to prevent the Vereeniging from tying itself to any other group in the House, come wind, come weather, and free it to follow an independent course - as a party in its own right, or at least as a compact and disciplined pressure group. It is difficult to believe that the lack of discipline often shown by Vereeniging parliamentarians was actually stipulated in the constitution.

all the money raised through subscriptions, and it was to be responsible for the selection of candidates for parliamentary seats. Local Vereenigingen, whose committees had to include representatives from each field cornetcy in the division, were empowered to draw up their own internal regulations subject to the terms of the general constitution. Life members; who had paid a lump sum of £10.0.0, and general members, who paid an annual subscription of £1.1.0, could vote at the general meetings of the Vereeniging. There was a further grade, that of the local member, who paid 10s.6d. per annum, but could only participate in the proceedings of his branch.

The formation of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging did not receive the blessing of the English language press, with the partial exception of the Cape Argus, whose editor saw in it the germ of a new political party<sup>41</sup>. The Cape Times described it as "nothing more nor less than an organization for influencing elections by intimidation, bribery and corruption"<sup>42</sup>. Even the Volksblad could not overcome its initial qualms. It was apprehensive lest racial animosity should result, and it disagreed with the platform which the Vereeniging had chosen; yet it was happy at the same time that an association should have come into being in the western Cape to counterbalance the influence of those operating in the east<sup>43</sup>. The Patriot, on the other hand, was unstinting in its praise<sup>44</sup>.

At the time of the formal inauguration of the Vereeniging on 31 October, a few branches already existed in the western Cape, and the number grew in the next few months. Procedure for the formation of branches quickly became standardized. A public meeting would be called, at which either Hofmeyr or H. P. du Preez was usually present. The constitution would be read out and explained by one of them, and resolutions would then be adopted, usually without dissent, accepting

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41. Cape Argus, 24 Aug. 1878.

42. Cape Times, 14 Aug. 1878.

43. Volksblad, 1 Aug. 1878.

44. Patriot, 9, 16 Aug., 8 Nov. 1878.

the rules and agreeing to establish a branch. Thereupon a provisional committee would be elected, care being taken to see that each ward in the district was represented by two people, who would be instructed to canvass for members. Subscription lists would then be opened, and in some cases generous donations were made on the spot. Finally, a date would be fixed for a subsequent meeting, at which the Vereeniging was to be formally constituted and a proper committee elected. In this manner, a meeting was held at Paarl on 18 August, the preparatory work done, and the local Vereeniging constituted on 18 September. At Wellington the interval was rather longer, because the local members required an assurance, which they only received on 31 October, that their branch would be independent of Paarl. The Stellenbosch branch was established early in September. Tulbagh held its first public meeting on 2 October, and formed its branch on the 23rd. Du Preez used the opportunity of the Western Circuit to set the movement on foot in the South Western Districts, but in spite of the optimism of the report which he made on his return<sup>45</sup>, it soon became apparent that there was far less enthusiasm beyond the mountains of the Western Province. At Prince Albert, Riversdale, Heidelberg and Swellendam, du Preez's first efforts to form branches failed, though all of them eventually joined. Montagu and Caledon both formed branches, but the former succumbed in 1879, while the latter did so in 1880 and was never resurrected. The branch at Worcester, founded by Hofmeyr in September 1878, remained in being but was also very inactive. A dejected supporter wrote to the Zuid Afrikaan in 1880:

Ik ben grootelijks in mijne verwachting teleurgesteld, wat de Worcester'schen tak betreft. Die is in een diepen slaap gevallen<sup>46</sup>.

This branch did not contribute to central funds until 1882, though it had been receiving a steady income for over three

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45. Zuid Afrikaan, 13 Nov. 1878.

46. Zuid Afrikaan, 10 June 1880.

years. Apart from the fickle Caledon, only one branch was formed during the initial drive in a predominantly grain-growing district, and that was at Malmesbury. Here torrential rains did not prevent a good attendance, when Hofmeyr, forgetting for the moment the debt which he owed to the Anti-Corn Law League, put the wind up his audience by saying that there was a move on foot in parliamentary circles to abolish the duty on imported grain. Malmesbury's interest in the Vereeniging was thenceforth immediate and lasting.

Thus the first efforts to establish the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging in the rural districts barely carried it outside the four electoral divisions of the Cape, Stellenbosch, Paarl and Malmesbury. This was in spite of the stimulus of Upper and Lower House elections in 1878-9, in which the successes of the Vereeniging were considerable, once the fact that it was not given proper time to organize its campaign is taken into account<sup>47</sup>. However, once the excitement of the elections was over, the Hoofdbestuur had the utmost difficulty in encouraging even the well established branches in the Western Circle to do very much. At the first annual meeting in 1879, the members talked at great length about the brandy excise but neglected to discuss any other matters of interest to farmers. The report of the Hoofdbestuur a year later made sorry reading. The Bestuur itself had been active, more especially in attending to matters connected with viticulture and parliamentary registration; but its report grieved "over het zich steeds meer en meer openbare gebrek aan tastbare belangstelling in de Vereeniging", illustrated by the fact that not a single branch had paid its subscriptions as required by the constitution<sup>48</sup>.

A change came over the Vereeniging in 1881, mainly as a result of the stimulus provided by the Transvaal war of independence and the emergence of the Afrikaner Bond as an

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47. These elections are discussed below, pp. 148-9

48. Volksblad, 23 Nov. 1880. The report of the annual meeting of 1880 is missing from the files of the Zuid Afrikaan in the S.A. Public Library.

open rival for the Afrikaner's political soul. In that year Hofmeyr, who had entered Scanlen's Cabinet without portfolio, undertook two branch-forming tours in the southern coastal districts of the Colony, with the result that the number of branches had more than doubled by the end of 1882<sup>49</sup>; but his efforts to persuade the members of the Vereeniging to lend their support to cultural objectives in addition to agricultural reform met with only moderate success, for when the Vereeniging associated itself with the current campaign for the extension of Dutch language rights at a special meeting in March 1882, it was handling this subject officially for the first time.<sup>50</sup>

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49. Hofmeyr's tours are discussed below, pp. 90-1. The spread of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, as shown in the references to branches in the reports of the annual general meetings, was as follows (see Map 1):
- Oct. 1879: Branches existed at Paarl, Stellenbosch, Cape Division, Tulbagh, Malmesbury, Wellington, Worcester and Caledon.
  - Nov. 1880: Caledon had ceased. A new branch existed at Prince Albert.
  - Sept. 1881: New branches existed at Beaufort West, Oudtshoorn, George and Uniondale.
  - Aug. 1882: New branches existed at Robertson, Swellendam, Montagu, Heidelberg, Riversdale, Humansdorp.
  - May 1883: New branches existed at Willowmore and Alexandria.
50. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. I. Notulen, Speciale Vergadering, 10 Mar. 1882. For Hofmeyr's efforts to enlarge the aims of the Vereeniging in 1881-2, see below pp. 91-3, where they are considered in relation to the challenge of the Afrikaner Bond.

## III

There existed in the eastern Cape by the early 'eighties a number of Boeren Vereenigingen, modelled on the older English-speaking Farmers' Associations, yet independent both of them and of Hofmeyr's Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging in the west. The English Farmers' Associations may be left out of account at this juncture, for they had no real connection with Hofmeyr's movement; but their Dutch counterparts must claim our attention because Hofmeyr regarded them as necessary adjuncts to his own movement, and their existence as a valid reason why it should confine its activities mainly to the west. There is no infallible criterion for determining whether these farmers' organizations in the east should be labelled Boeren Vereenigingen or Farmers' Associations, for the one term is a conventional translation of the other, and language was not usually treated by either kind of organization as an absolute determining factor. Yet the language barrier was a fact, and it must be understood that the Boeren Vereenigingen referred to in the present context were bodies which were predominantly composed of Dutch farmers who conducted their business in their own language and associated with other bodies of the same type.

Word reached Hofmeyr early in October 1878 that a move was on foot to establish such a Vereeniging at Graaff-Reinet, and he used the occasion to set down a few thoughts on the relevance of this project to his own western Vereeniging:

Het zou voor Graaff Reinet welligt best zijn zich te constitueeren tot centrum van eene groote Boeren-vereeniging in het Oosten, niet juist een deel uitmakende van, maar zooveel mogelijk in gemeenschap handelende met die, welke thans in het Westen wordt op touw gezet.

He suggested that the Graaff-Reinet body might take over the western Vereeniging's regulations, constitute itself a local Hoofdbestuur, set up more branches in the eastern Cape, and send delegates to the meetings of the western Hoofdbestuur. As soon as such vereenigingen were established in the east,

he concluded, the Government would have to take notice of them<sup>51</sup>. The Middellansche Boerenvereeniging was born the same month, but when the names of its committee members were announced<sup>52</sup> Hofmeyr apparently lost interest in it as the sort of body on which he could pin his hopes as the nucleus of an eastern vereeniging. He had to wait for the establishment of the Albert Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging before he felt able to influence developments in the east, and this did not occur until the middle months of 1879.

The beginnings of the Albert Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging are wrapped in an obscurity made more obscure by the fact that the two near-contemporary accounts which exist are mutually contradictory and both unreliable. The one, published by a foundation member of the Vereeniging in De Tolk over three years after the event, almost certainly explained the origin of the Vereeniging in terms of a movement of public opinion which only developed after that body had been formed, and used phrases to describe its organization which did not become current until after the formation of the Afrikaner Bond<sup>53</sup>. The other, written after the same interval of time by the editor of the local newspaper, who possessed no esoteric knowledge, cannot be reconciled with the contemporary reports in the same newspaper, and dates the formation of the Vereeniging a full year too early<sup>54</sup>. The fact that the editor of the Burghersdorp Gazette, St P. O'S. O'Brien, did not enjoy the confidence of the founders of the Vereeniging lies near the root of the difficulty. He came to the point of refusing to accept reports of the Vereeniging's activities unless they were paid for as advertisements, with the result that much of its activity was not reported at all.

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51. Zuid Afrikaan, 5 Oct. 1878.

52. Zuid Afrikaan, 19 Oct. 1878. They included several strong opponents of Afrikaner nationalism.

53. De Tolk, 1 Sept. 1882. Article by A. S. du Plessis; quoted also by du Toit, pp. 150-1.

54. Burghersdorp Gazette, 1 Sept., 6 Oct. 1882. The theory propounded here, with great assurance, is that the Albert Vereeniging was formed in 1878 to promote the election of

The division of Albert had been politically awake for some years before its Boeren Vereeniging was formed, and had taken a lead in the efforts to secure the use of Dutch in Parliament in the 'fifties<sup>55</sup>. The establishment of a Burghersdorp Chamber of Commerce and Association for General Purposes took place in January 1877, and this body, in collaboration with Political Committees in Burghersdorp and Ventersburg, was active in the election campaign of 1878-9. All three candidates returned in these elections, J. A. Vermaak for the Council, George Sichel and Andries Stockenstroom for the Assembly, received requisitions signed by prominent men in town and country of both language groups, while the election of Vermaak was strongly approved by the Zuid Afrikaan<sup>56</sup>. But there was one notable absentee from the list: F. H. Hopley, a farmer who had represented the constituency in Parliament almost continuously since 1864. Hopley had aroused the anger of an important section of the electorate by failing to support Molteno in the 'no confidence' debate of 1878, and the Burghersdorp Gazette gave him no mercy:

He preferred the pusillanimous method to sneak away from the ranks of either side and vote neither way when the time came. Such political cowardice our member will find will have its own reward. Happily, the session is the last of this Parliament; we can confidently assert that it will be the last one in which Mr. Hopley will ever find a seat in the House<sup>57</sup>.

This editorial, followed a week later by an open letter signed by "Members of the Burghersdorp Municipality; of the Divisional Council of Albert; of the Chamber of Commerce and inhabitants of the town and district of Burghersdorp", stung Hopley to the quick, and he was still nursing his grievance at a meeting in October the following year. On this latter occasion, the Gazette alleged, he ascribed his failure in the 1879 election "mainly ... to town influence"<sup>58</sup>.

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55. See above, p. 14.

56. Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Oct.; Burghersdorp Gazette, 4, 11 Oct., 1878; 21 Feb., 7 Mar. 1879.

57. Burghersdorp Gazette, 21, 28 June 1878.

58. Burghersdorp Gazette, 24 Oct. 1879.

It was to the Albert Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, which had in the meantime come into existence, that Hopley made his complaint.

The first meeting of the Vereeniging to be reported in the press took place on 26 May 1879<sup>59</sup>. The occasion was a joint meeting of representatives of the Vereeniging with the committee of the Chamber of Commerce, to interview George Sichel, the new M.P., and "make known to him the opinions of the said Committee". A. S. du Plessis referred in his article in De Volk to the drafting of a "Program van Beginsels" of nineteen points by a general meeting of the Albert Vereeniging, which must have taken place shortly before this interview with Sichel, for the latter was given a document containing nineteen propositions on this occasion. Another foundation member of the Vereeniging, Jotham Joubert, referred in a letter to the Burghersdorp Gazette to "the nineteen points brought forward by the chairman, at the first meeting of the Society (the 'Board of Commerce' being present, at the request of the Society to co-operate...) and handed to Mr Sichel"<sup>60</sup>. This must refer to the same occasion, and makes it reasonably certain that the Albert Vereeniging did not exist before May 1879.

The nineteen propositions presented to Sichel were not a "Program van Beginsels" in the sense in which the Afrikaner Bond would later use the term, but a mandate to the new member, setting out the real or imagined interests of a farming community, and very little else. They contained no suggestions whatever that the Vereeniging was interested in the political or cultural claims of the Afrikaner<sup>61</sup>. But the Patriot was read in Burghersdorp, the Gazette having already indulged from time to time in an attack on its views. Between

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59. Burghersdorp Gazette, 30 May 1879.

60. Burghersdorp Gazette, 19 Sept. 1879. My italics.

61. The English text was given in the Burghersdorp Gazette on 30 May, 1879; the Dutch text on 6 June. No ordinary programme of principles would contain a demand for a tax on imported mules. See Appendix B.

this first meeting of the Albert Vereeniging and its second, held at Vinkelfontein on 2 July, S. J. du Toit had published his rousing appeal for the formation of an Afrikaner Bond<sup>62</sup>, and the chairman of the Vereeniging had evidently read it. This was D. P. ("Oom Daantje") van den Heever, a farmer from Ventersburg, whose rock-like personality stands out in the history of the Afrikaner political movement of the late nineteenth century. His rhetorical gifts could sway an audience, as the Bond would discover to its cost during the dispute over the Scab Act in 1895, and to its advantage during the election campaign of 1898, when "Oom Daantje" would be called upon to bolster up the position of several hard-pressed candidates. At Vinkelfontein, van den Heever gave a demonstration of his powers:

Myne Heeren, - De morgenstond is aangebroken, en de dag is daar dat Zuid Afrika door omstandigheden des lands den Afrikaner toeroept om zyn plicht te vervullen. Wy hebben reeds te lang gesluimerd. De tyd roept ons toe te ontwaken opdat wy onze rechten uitdelven van onder den pynhoop van verwaarloozing ... Ik vertrouw dat elk lid getrouw zal zyn op zyn post en waar het noodig is in de bres zal springen, tot welvaart van zyn land. Nu is het de tyd voor het Comité om te werken, en de handen te versterken van de leden van het Parlement.

He then gave the Vereeniging four objectives to work for: the right to speak Dutch in Parliament (if that is what he meant by "onze moedertaal"), the redemption of the Colonial debt, the raising of the franchise and punishment of corrupt practices at elections, and finally:

Niet alleen het Boerenbeschermings Comité maar een Afrikaanderbond, een aaneengeschakelde overeenkomst van getrouwheid en belangstelling, waarin elk Afrikaander zich te huis mag voelen. Dan zal Zuid Afrika worden wat het wezen moet, en dan zal de uitlandsche taal niet meer de heerschappy voeren in Zuid Afrika<sup>63</sup>.

What the meeting thought of this utterance was not recorded; but it is evident that something of the group exclusiveness breathed by the Patriot had found its way into the Albert Vereeniging on the morrow of an electoral feud which threatened

62. Patriot, 20, 27 June 1879. See below, pp. 71-3

63. Burghersdorp Gazette, 8 Aug. 1879 (taken over from the Volksblad!).

to drive a wedge between town and country.

The situation was given no chance to quieten down, for in September Stockenstroom resigned from the Assembly in order to take up an appointment to the Bench. Sichel, on his return from Cape Town in the same month, felt called upon to "regret exceedingly, that the Community should be divided on matters of the utmost importance", a sentiment shared by the editor of the Gazette<sup>64</sup>. The Vereeniging, however, was not to be soothed by gentle words. It held a meeting on 17 October and chose Jotham Joubert as its parliamentary candidate to succeed Stockenstroom, the Chamber of Commerce having already met on the 6th and chosen F. R. Tennant. The former was a farmer, the latter a merchant who dealt, inter alia, in agricultural implements, and both were local men. Hopley was the moving spirit in the choice of Joubert, and it was he and van den Heever who put his name forward on nomination day, Tennant having meanwhile withdrawn his candidature in the interest of local peace<sup>65</sup>. The Albert Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging had thus won its first political victory, and, as O'Brien saw the position, Hopley had had his revenge. And now, for the first time, the Vereeniging began to attract the attention of the Afrikaner leaders in the western Cape.

Before Joubert's nomination, van den Heever sent an address on behalf of the Albert Vereeniging to Ds. W. P. de Villiers, congratulating him on the stand which he had taken during the 1879 session on the matter of Dutch language rights<sup>66</sup>. De Villiers, whose political ideas corresponded closely with those of S. J. du Toit, replied cordially, while du Toit found occasion to compliment the Albert Vereeniging on being the "wakkerste en vurigste" of the three Afrikaner political associations<sup>67</sup>. Hofmeyr did more, and chose the occasion to make a second attempt at

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64. Burghersdorp Gazette, 26 Sept., 1879.

65. Burghersdorp Gazette, 24 Oct., 14 Nov. 1879.

66. Zuid Afrikaan, 15 Nov. 1879. C. C. L. L., 7.

67. Patriot, 24 Oct. 1879.

establishing an effective liaison with a political movement in the east. On 15 November the Zuid Afrikaan applauded the Albert address to de Villiers,

als een bewijs te meer dat er werkelijk een gevoel van nationaliteit onder onze Afrikaanders begint te ontkiemen ... Zulke vereenigingen als de Albertsche zullen onberekenbaar veel kunnen uitrigten ter aansluiting van Oost en West en ter aankweeking van een waren Afrikaandergeest.

The Hoofdbestuur of the western Vereeniging also sent its good wishes to Jotham Joubert. The Volksblad asserted that the western Vereeniging was bent on incorporating the Albert association in itself, but this Hofmeyr vigorously denied. All he said he wanted was an informal alliance between the Boeren Vereenigingen of east and west, on a basis of complete administrative independence and mutual consultation<sup>68</sup>. He expressed these ideas with some sense of urgency in another editorial the following March, on the occasion of the setting up of a Boeren Vereeniging at Maraisburg<sup>69</sup>. At about the same time he received information that the Albert Vereeniging planned to hold a large meeting on 19 March, to which representatives from other Vereenigingen were to be invited, including that of the western Cape. An opportunity for the reorganization of the eastern Vereenigingen appeared to be at hand, and Hofmeyr put up his own proposals for discussion. These were that each electoral province should have its own Hoofdbestuur, which could meet in the various towns of the province in rotation, and invite representatives from other provinces to participate in discussions on more general affairs. Each bestuur could then look after its own parliamentary elections. The absence of any obvious administrative headquarters for all the Boeren Vereenigingen in the eastern Cape was a cogent argument in Hofmeyr's mind for the type of decentralization which he proposed<sup>70</sup>.

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68. Zuid Afrikaan, 19 Nov. 1879, replying to Volksblad of 18 Nov.

69. Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Mar. 1880.

70. Zuid Afrikaan, 11 Mar. 1880.

The western Vereeniging made good use of the opportunity afforded by the Burghersdorp meeting of 19 March. It was not represented, but it set up a special committee to attend to its relations with the movement in the east and plied the men of Albert with its own literature, which was gratefully acknowledged<sup>71</sup>. The Albert Vereeniging then reciprocated with an address to Hofmeyr which amounted in effect to an acceptance of Onze Jan's political leadership:

... Wij vragen u om voort te gaan met het verdediging van ons volk en onze taal, en wij zullen u volgen waar het noodig is,

to which Hofmeyr replied with thanks and an exhortation to further action:

... De organisatie die te Albert is begonnen, behoort te worden uitgebreid naar alle Oostelijke distrikten, waar zich Hollandsche Afrikaanders bevinden om hun te doen beseffen, welke groote staatkundige magt zij bezitten, indien zij maar willen leeren die uit te oefenen. Hopende dat gij op den ingeslagen weg volhardend zult voortgaan...<sup>72</sup>.

Contact between the Boeren Vereenigingen of east and west had been opened, and in December 1880, the month in which the Transvalers threw down the gauntlet before the Imperial power, the Albert committee decided to develop it still further. They sent Oom Daantje van den Heever on a progress to Cape Town in January 1881, armed with credentials and a sheaf of formal introductions to merchants, lawyers and the "Boerenbeschermings-comité van de Westelijke Provincie". There were letters to various parliamentarians in the Western Cape, and to the prime minister in person, and Oom Daantje took a private secretary with him to assist him in what promised to be a very full programme<sup>73</sup>. His itinerary took him through Beaufort West, where he took steps to set up a Boeren Vereeniging, which joined Hofmeyr's organization three months later<sup>74</sup>. From there he travelled to Paarl, had talks with

71. Volksblad, 23 Nov.; Zuid Afrikaan, 1 Apr. 1880; Burghersdorp Gazette, 26 Mar. 1880.

72. Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Apr. 1880.

73. Patriot, 7, 28 Jan.; Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Feb. 1881. The Burghersdorp Gazette made no reference to van den Heever's trip.

74. Zuid Afrikaan, 29 Jan., 23 Apr. 1881.

members of the local Boeren Vereeniging, including its parliamentary team, and appeared on the same platform as S. J. du Toit at a public meeting to discuss the Transvaal crisis<sup>75</sup>. He then moved on to Cape Town, obtained an interview with Sprigg, attended a meeting of the Hoofdbestuur of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, and after a brief visit to the branch at Malmesbury, returned to the capital for an audience with the Governor. This took place on 16 February, after which Oom Daantje went home, fully satisfied with the success of his mission:

Ik werd overal van harte welkom geheeten en ontving de verzekering, dat de Westelijke vereenigingen volkomen bereid zijn om in de toekomst naauwer met ons zamen te werken<sup>76</sup>.

The people of Albert were pleased with the cordial reception their delegate had received. He had cemented the good relationship between the Albert and the western Vereenigingen, and (though this did not become apparent until after he had returned home) he had also laid the foundations for an alliance between the Albert Vereeniging and the Afrikaner Bond, which would have considerable importance in the future.

In the same month that D. P. van den Heever went to Cape Town, an open air meeting in Middelburg was addressed by Janse van Rensburg, Hofmeyr's parliamentary ally from the Cradock division, who, in the opinion of the editor of the Middelburg Gazette, "spoke as disloyally as the warmest supporter of the Opposition could desire"<sup>77</sup>. The meeting was an important occasion for the people of Middelburg, who had come together under the auspices of their local Boeren Vereeniging to discuss the important political issues of the day. This was the first time that the Middelburg Vereeniging had shown any lively political interest in matters outside farming; but

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75. Zuid Afrikaan, 12 Feb. 1881.

76. Zuid Afrikaan, 15 Feb. 1881. Text of van den Heever's report.

77. Middelburg Gazette, 25 Jan.; Zuid Afrikaan, 5 Feb. 1881. The latter gave a fuller report.

it was now prepared to argue in favour of Dutch in Parliament, express itself on the Burgher Law and the Basuto situation, listen to a fiery tirade by van Rensburg on the successful resistance of the Transvalers to British arms, and demand for the district a place on the political map, instead of remaining split between the electoral divisions of Cradock, Albert, Colesberg and Graaff-Reinet.

Local English-language newspapers did not always treat the establishment of Boeren Vereenigingen as a matter for regret<sup>78</sup>. We have noted, however, that such was the situation in Albert, and it was no different in Middelburg. Here the only local newspaper was the Gazette, owned and edited by a man who looked upon the Afrikaner political movements with an almost pathological mistrust. Consequently, as in the case of Albert, reliable information is lacking concerning the origins and early history of the Boeren Vereeniging<sup>79</sup>. The chief importance of the Middelburg Vereeniging, however, lies not in its date of origin but in the fact that it provided an entry into Colonial politics for a talented Hollander who quickly built up a strong personal influence in the Midlands which he invariably used to support the policies of Jan Hofmeyr.

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78. Two exceptions may be quoted. (a) Northern Post, 12 June 1880. Francis Hamilton wrote after the foundation of the Aliwal North Vereeniging: "Farming Associations fulfil a perfectly legitimate function in looking after their interests ..., and caeteris paribus [a member of Parliament] with a knowledge of Dutch is to be preferred". (b) Frontier Guardian, 28 May 1881. J. V. O'Brien wrote, at the time of the formation of the Wodehouse Vereeniging: "Under the auspices of the above Association the Dutch farmers of this district are rapidly emerging from the chrysalis state of apathy and indifference in which they have been so long wrapped up, into a commendable political activity ... The formation of Farmers' Associations throughout the Colony is a matter of congratulation".

79. The evidence is highly discordant. Hofmeyr, p.144, states that the Middelburg Vereeniging was founded in October 1873. But see Middelburg Getuige, 4 Mar. 1882, where N.F. de Waal states in an editorial that the Vereeniging was only two years old when he took over the editorship of the paper at the beginning of 1882. The rules of the Vereeniging were drawn up at a meeting in de Waal's office in February 1882 (Middelburg Getuige, 18 Feb., 25 Mar. 1882).

Nicolaas Frederic de Waal was born in Rotterdam in 1853<sup>80</sup>. He was the son of a banker, received a commercial education in Brussels and then returned for a short while to work in his father's bank. Already a good linguist, he had also begun to study law privately, and had travelled in Europe and America before a chest complaint brought him to South Africa in 1880. He met Hofmeyr within a year of his arrival, and the two men developed a mutual friendship and respect before de Waal moved to the Midlands, first to Graaff-Reinet where he was employed by a firm of general agents and auctioneers, and subsequently to Middelburg, where the firm had opened a new agency, at the beginning of November 1881. With almost unbelievable rapidity, de Waal set about the propagation of his own political ideas through the only available medium, namely Heathcote's newspaper, to which he contributed the first of a number of articles on 15 November. On 20 December Heathcote announced in the Gazette that he had "secured the co-operation for the next three years of N. F. de Waal Esq., who will hereafter take the sole management of its columns, both Dutch and English". The paper's name was to be changed to De Middelburg Getuige, and the space allocated to Dutch language news and comment was to be greatly increased, at the expense of English.

Like many Hollanders of his day, de Waal was able to identify himself quite easily with the aspirations of the Colonial Afrikaner, but in sympathy he stood closer to Hofmeyr than to the extreme nationalists. It was for Hollands that he claimed legal rights, not the "verbasteren taal" which, for want of a better, the bulk of the Dutch colonials were obliged to use<sup>81</sup>. In this respect he was no Pannevis. It was not long before he was active in the local Boeren Vereeniging. He was elected general secretary and treasurer in March 1882, and used his influence to keep the Vereeniging on the moderate Hofmeyr path. In this he succeeded, though attempts were made to affiliate

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80. Biographical information on N. F. de Waal is here derived from the MS. article by R. Kilpin, in the Jagger Library, University of Cape Town.

81. Middelburg Gazette, 15 Nov. 1881.

with the Afrikaner Bond, and it does not seem that his newness to South African politics was held against him.

Boeren Vereenigingen were set up at Maraisburg and Cradock in January and June 1880, and the reports in the Cradock Register suggest that both of them were moderate in their politics. At the inaugural meeting of the former, an English-speaking farmer received the assurance that occupation, not home language, was the qualification for membership<sup>82</sup>. The rules of the Cradock Vereeniging were much briefer than those of Hofmeyr's, but they covered much the same ground, and this body maintained its separate identity even though branches of the Afrikaner Bond began to appear in the Cradock district from the middle of 1882<sup>83</sup>. With the formation of further Vereenigingen of the same type, each independent of the others, at Petrusville, Colesberg, Murraysburg, Wodehouse, Aliwal North, Steynsburg, Somerset East, and apparently nowhere else, all before the end of 1881, the network of such associations was complete.<sup>83a</sup> From the Cape Peninsula to Aliwal North, the Colony was studded with them. West and south of Beaufort West, they were affiliated to Hofmeyr's Hoofdbestuur in Cape Town. From Murraysburg eastwards, they were independent units, co-ordinated by no clear central principle, though all used the Dutch language and none felt themselves under an obligation to limit the range of their interests to purely agricultural matters<sup>84</sup>. The pull of the Bond was felt more strongly by some than by others. The Murraysburg Boeren Vereeniging, for example, called itself a branch of the Bond from about May 1881, but in April the following year it reverted to its

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82. Cradock Register, 16 Jan. 1880.

83. Cradock Register, 25 June 1880. This issue contains the Vereeniging's rules.

84. At one time or another, all these Vereenigingen debated issues such as Dutch in Parliament, Basuto policy, reform of the Burgher Law, and the "Voluntary Principle" (referring to religious instruction) in schools.

83a. See Map 1.

original name.<sup>85</sup> The Aliwal North Vereeniging went over to the Bond in April 1882, following a move from its Lady Grey members in the previous July<sup>86</sup>. The Colesberg Vereeniging fought a war on two fronts, against the English in the dorp on the one hand, and on the other against Bond branches in the neighbourhood which refused to allow it to affiliate with them unless it dropped the name "Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging" from its official title<sup>87</sup>. But whatever the reasons which these associations had for choosing to retain this nomenclature, it may be regarded as certain that some - perhaps the majority - were apprehensive about the political direction which the Bond was taking. At all events, their resistance was determined enough to suggest that amalgamation would be no simple process. The ideal of union was immensely attractive, but the eastern Boeren Vereenigingen were no more ready than the western to sell their souls in order to get it.

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85. This is plain from the following reports of meetings: Zuid Afrikaan, 26 May; Patriot, 27 May 1881 (conversion to the Bond). On the return to "vereeniging" status, see Craddock Register, 14 Apr., supported in Zuid Afrikaan, 27 June, denied by Patriot, 30 June, but confirmed beyond question in Zuid Afrikaan, 11 Nov. 1882.

86. Northern Post, 23 Jul. 1881; Der Boeren Bode, 8 Apr. 1882.

87. The Colesberg case is discussed below, p. 84.

## IV

The first Boeren Vereenigingen to come into existence were created with the sole publicized object of looking after the farming interests of their members. Their concern for the cultural interests of the Afrikaner was a subsequent development. In the case of the Albert Vereeniging, whose earliest documents contained not a trace of Afrikaner national feeling, the transition was almost immediate; but it meant little in practice until after van den Heever's visit to Cape Town in January 1881. The cultural interests of the Afrikaner did not feature strongly in the politics of the western Vereeniging either, until the same year. But by that time, against the background of the Transvaal war, the campaign for Dutch language rights in the Colonial Parliament, and the early successes of S. J. du Toit's openly nationalist Afrikaner Bond, the several Vereenigingen were coming to concentrate more and more on cultural issues while still retaining their primary interest in farming matters. The extension of Dutch language rights was actually incorporated in the principles of the Middelburg Vereeniging when its constitution was drawn up in March 1882<sup>88</sup>.

Hofmeyr not only permitted this change of emphasis, but so far as his own western Vereeniging was concerned, actually encouraged it to develop. His correspondence with the Albert Vereeniging, together with his campaign for Dutch in Parliament, indicates that he was at least as interested in the cause of the "Hollandsche Afrikaander" as in that of the farmer. Did he therefore vest his energies in the farmers' movement as a way of concealing his real intentions? Was the open-hearted "Sir John Falstaff" of South African College days<sup>89</sup> already on the way to becoming Merriman's "Mole"?

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88. Text in Middelburg Getuige, 18 Feb. 1882.

89. Sir J. G. Kotze, Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, vol. I, p.84. C.f. Hofmeyr, p.33 ("John Bull").

When the Volksblad noted on 9 July 1878 that "there appears to prevail, in some quarters, an opinion that the opponents of the Excise Bill are, in reality, fighting the battle of Dutch versus English", Hofmeyr vigorously denied the charge. He shared the Volksblad's abhorrence of naked racialism; but he considered that the absence of a strong Afrikaner group feeling could no longer be taken for granted. According to his diagnosis, it already existed, and the problem for the statesman was to ensure that it developed in a healthy manner and remained under control. He called for a resurgence of Afrikaner self-esteem, not from a hatred of things English, though he hated some current manifestations of Imperial policy, but from a feeling that unless the Englishman could be persuaded to look upon the Afrikaner as his equal and grant him full equality of opportunity, the existing ascendancy of the one group over the other would continue and perhaps grow worse, to the enduring disadvantage of a Colony where harmony between the two white groups was essential if self-government was to work, or the ultimate withdrawal of Imperial authority be a sensible and desirable step.

Hofmeyr's interpretation of the position was probably the correct one; but by using a farmers' movement as a vehicle for the development of Afrikaner solidarity, he smothered at birth a possible Colony-wide Anglo-Dutch farmers' party. The widespread agricultural depression of the early 'eighties, together with the opposition of many farmers to a number of laws affecting their social and economic position, and the fact that the farming interests were if anything under-represented in the Colonial Parliament, provided a considerable stimulus for the formation of such a party<sup>90</sup>. For such a farmers' party to come into existence, and to draw support from farmers of

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90. These points are considered in more detail in c. VII, below.

both language groups, racial politics would have had to be excluded from the Boeren Vereenigingen and the Farmers' Associations. But racial politics were not excluded from the former, with the result that when the situation was peculiarly ripe for the Dutch and English farmers to sink their differences, in the period between 1886 and 1895, an inner tension prevented the leaders on both sides from effectively spanning the gulf of suspicion which kept them apart. Too much racial passion was generated in the years 1881-4. For this, the Afrikaner Bond was in large measure responsible, though the fires of mistrust were also fed by a spate of anti-Republican feeling which developed among English-speaking colonials during the Transvaal crisis. Hofmeyr, who can hardly be blamed for not seeing how events would develop, found himself in the awkward position of having to keep in check a nationalist movement which he had himself done much to promote, and at the same time to spur his own Vereeniging on to a more forthright adoption of cultural objectives, for fear lest the Afrikaner Bond should steal all his thunder.

## THE FOUNDING OF THE AFRIKANER BOND

## I

The Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners paid next to no attention to the question of political organization during the first three years of its existence, but its nature was such that it could, without incongruity, step into the political arena at any time. As soon as the supporters of either "volkstaal"<sup>1</sup> began to show that they were really serious, the language question was bound to become a political issue, and the connection between language and politics in the outlook of the Genootskappers was emphasized by members of the society both at the time and afterwards<sup>2</sup>. It was in fact during the course of a discussion in the press on the language question that S. J. du Toit first developed his political programme.

On 7 June 1879, at a moment when Hofmeyr's Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging had already achieved some notable electoral successes during its seven months' existence, the Volksblad came out with an editorial in support of the "Rechten van onze Landstaal", meaning Hollands. The Patriot welcomed the tone of the article, made a strong plea for a movement to press for the recognition of Dutch language rights in Parliament, and left to the Volksblad the privilege of suggesting a plan of campaign<sup>3</sup>. The Volksblad, sensible of the honour, did not object to the assignment, but thought that the lead should come from "de mannen van Stellenbosch (dat er naar streeft een Z. Afrikaansch Athenaeum te worden)", rather than from a Cape Town paper. But the Patriot was not so sure that Stellenbosch, with its dominant Scottish element, really was the right place<sup>4</sup>. The Zuid Afrikaan,

1. i.e. Hollands and Afrikaans. This, and "landstaal", were the smokescreen terms usually employed to mask disagreement on the language issue.

2. For example, Patriot 24 Oct. 1879: "Die Genootskap had ... sowel 'n politieke as 'n taalkundige doel". See also S.J. du Toit's Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Taalbeweging, and the article by G.R. von Wielligh, "Die Betekenis van die Genootskap", in the Gedenkboek ter eere van die Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, pp. 52-3.

3. Patriot, 13 June 1879.

4. Volksblad, 17 June; Patriot, 20 June 1879.

meanwhile, had stepped in, and endorsed the Patriot's argument that what was needed was a parliamentary leader who would give his life to the cause, as Saul Solomon had done over the Voluntary Principle, backed by "eene wakkere organisatie het geheele land door"<sup>5</sup>. There were not many men in Parliament who measured up to the qualifications demanded by the Zuid Afrikaan. The Patriot could, however, name three, of whom the editor of the Zuid Afrikaan was one<sup>6</sup>, and the eyes of the Afrikaner people, it hinted, were fixed upon him. Here, it continued, was an example of rare unanimity in the Dutch-Afrikaans press, a sign of a general awakening of national feeling which ought to be seized upon. S. J. du Toit therefore set out to meet what he regarded as a general demand, and launched a proposal for the formation of an Afrikaner Bond -

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, waarin al wat Afrikaner is kan thuis voel en samewerk tot heil van 'n Verenigde Suid Afrika;

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, waarin gen nasionaliteit ons van makkaar skei nie, mar waarin almal wat Afrika erken as hulle Vaderland, same woon en werk as broeders, van één huis, al is hulle van Engelse, Hollanse, Franse, of Duitse afkoms, met uitsluiting alleen van die wat van England praat as hulle 'home' of van Holland en Duitsland as hulle 'Vaderland' en ~~wat~~ hier net hulle beurs wil vul met Afrikaanse welvaart om dit dan in Europa te gaan verteer;

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, wat dan oek die ware belange van ons land en van alle partye bevorder, en belet dat die belange van Afrika an England, of die van die Boer an die Koopman opgeoffer word;

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, wat die oog hou op die politiek, om land verraiers uit die raadsaal te weer, en te sorg dat die ware vrinde van die Vaderland hulle plaas inneem;

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, wat die ontwikkeling van die hele bevolking beoog, en nie miljoene ponde besté an die opvoeding van een deel van die bevolking nie, terwyl 'n ander en groter deel totaal verwaarloos word; en wat dus vanself daarin moet voorsien dat in die opvoeding die taal van alle dele van die bevolking gelykelyk moet erkend worde in Skool en Kantoor, in Regbank en Raadsaal;

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, wat Handel en Nyverheid bevorder ten dienste van die land en nie ter vulling van de beurse van spekulateurs; wat vereers nie toelaat dat onse geldmark heeltemaal beheers word deur Engelse Banke; wat fabriekwese bevorder sodra daar kans toe is;

5. Zuid Afrikaan, 18 June 1879.

6. Patriot, 20 June 1879. The other two were Ds. W. P. de Villiers of Beaufort West and J. S. Marais of Paarl.

'N AFRIKANER-BOND, wát Vrijstaat en Transvaal insluit; met aparte vertakkings o'er heel Suid Afrika om bysondere belange te beskerm, en 'n Bondsraad of Centraal Bestuur om die algemene belange te behartig;

So 'n Bond het ons nodig; an so 'n Bond word elke dag al meer behoefte gevoel; so 'n Bond sal toegejuig worde deur duisende en tienduisende, en is ver Afrika's toekoms onmisbaar<sup>7</sup>.

Hofmeyr was prepared to accept these ideas as grand ("grootsch") in conception, but considered them to be impracticable, premature, and fundamentally unwise<sup>8</sup>. He had been able to reach an understanding with du Toit on the language question after a certain amount of give and take on both sides; but these new proposals made only incidental mention of language, and drew into the discussion a wide range of potentially explosive issues which Hofmeyr did not really care to talk about, then or at any other time. His published reply, however, concerned itself with questions of practice and made only oblique reference to matters of principle. He asked how it would be possible to cast a net wide enough to contain both farming and mercantile interests. There were patriotic Afrikaners, he said, who thought that the money market ought to be free, and who were therefore unwilling to obstruct the activities of English companies. Difficulties could also arise within an organization which embraced both the Colony and the Republics, especially on tariff questions. There was consequently a real danger that a clash of interests would drive many true Afrikaners out of such a Bond, focus attention on their disagreements rather than their group cohesion, and thus weaken the position of their parliamentary party when issues affecting language and nationality came before the House. Du Toit had suggested too broad a basis for his political movement, for "een breede basis kon praktisch even eksklusief zijn als een al te smalle"<sup>9</sup>:

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7. Patriot, 20 June 1879.

8. Zuid Afrikaan, 25 June 1879; J. H. Hofmeyr, Life of J. H. Hofmeyr, p. 197. C.f. J. D. du Toit, S. J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, pp. 140-2.

9. Zuid Afrikaan, 25 June 1879.

Du Toit was not convinced by Hofmeyr's arguments, which he rebutted seriatim on the 27th. On 4 July he published a draft constitution for his Afrikaner Bond<sup>10</sup>, which reaffirmed the main points made in the editorial of 20 June, and which he would use as the basis for a further series of articles in the following November and December.

The surprising feature of du Toit's proposals, for all Hofmeyr's unwillingness to accept them, was their moderation. This is very apparent if they are compared with the tone of De Christelike School and the Geskiedenis van ons Land, written mainly by du Toit three and two years earlier, or the suggested Program van Beginsels and the commentaries upon it, also written by du Toit between two and four years afterwards, and intended by him as a statement of political faith for the Afrikaner Bond<sup>11</sup>. These other documents were the outpourings of a convinced Afrikaner nationalist, unafraid to speak his mind however unpalatable his words might be to Afrikaners who did not belong to his own particular school of thought. But the proposals made by du Toit in June and July 1879, though they contained ideas which could be interpreted in a narrow nationalist sense, were coated with a liberal veneer. They contained no colour bar, no discrimination against people of Anglo-Saxon origin, and no Christian National Education. These notable omissions throw light on du Toit's purpose. The Afrikaner cause, as he saw it, was being cared for by several separate groups of devotees: the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, the promoters of the Zuid Afrikaansche Tijdschrift, the Transvaal Volks Committee and (as he made a special point of noting in October 1879) the Albert Boeren Vereeniging<sup>12</sup>. Co-ordination between their activities was poor; none of them was

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10. Patriot, 4 July 1879. This is referred to hereafter as the Ontwerp van Bepalings, the text of which is given in Appendix C.

11. On De Christelike School and the Geskiedenis van ons Land, see above, pp. 30-3; and on the Program van Beginsels, see below, pp. 104-9

12. Patriot, 24 Oct. 1879.

organized on a sufficiently comprehensive basis to absorb the others in itself; yet unity was essential if the Afrikaner cause was to triumph, and it was a foundation for such unity that du Toit hoped to supply. Considered as an exercise in kite-flying, his proposals of June and July 1879 make good sense, and they seem to have been directed mainly at Hofmeyr. Though he had been a keen supporter of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging since its foundation, and backed it whole-heartedly in the elections of 1878-9, du Toit did not consider that it provided a rich enough political fare to sustain a national movement of the type which he desired to launch. On the other hand, to abandon it was unthinkable. Its success in the elections made it the natural spearhead for a political offensive, while he could not afford to ignore Hofmeyr's influence over the minds of the Afrikaner people as editor of the Zuid Afrikaan.

By turning du Toit's proposals down and choosing not to revert to them again, Hofmeyr defeated his object. Du Toit, however, made a second attempt at the end of the year. He devoted a series of editorials in November and December to rousing the feelings of Afrikaners against political carpet-baggers, urging them to register as voters, and telling them to look for suitable parliamentary candidates - not necessarily good speakers, but faithful mouthpieces ("manne wat mar reg stem"). This advice was linked with instructions as to how branches of the Afrikaner Bond could be formed:

Enige buurt of wyk kan 'n begin maak. Waar tve of dri same die saak goedkeur kan hulle 'n kleine vergadering belê, lees die Regels voor. Maak 'n besluit waarin hulle dit goedkeur. Kies 'n plaselike Komité om eie reëls te maak en begin te werk. En lat die dan verder in die distrik werk. Deel dit an die Patriot mé, en andere sal oek wel volge ...<sup>13</sup>.

Nothing could have been easier, yet nothing happened for another six months.

This lack of success is most easily understood if it is considered in relation to du Toit's unpopularity in the

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13. Patriot, 12 Dec. 1879.

N.G. Kerk at the time, for there was a close correlation between his theological and his political views. Du Toit was a disciple of Dr Abraham Kuyper, who was devoting his energies at the time in the educational, political and ecclesiastical fields to the propagation of Neo-Calvinist doctrines in the Netherlands. He attacked, not only the out and out liberals, but all who could not accept a strict interpretation of the Formularies of Uniformity on which the faith of the Dutch Church was based. He desired, on the one hand, a more resolute preaching of Predestination, and on the other the elimination of "nieuwighede" in the worship of the Church, with special reference to such matters as emotional prayer-meetings and the singing of non-scriptural hymns. In the matter of church government, he proclaimed the autonomy of the individual congregation ("kerkgenootschap") as against the over-riding authority of the central synod, and sought to enlist the solid conservatism of the rank and file churchmen against the modernist doctrines emanating from the universities. S. J. du Toit was attracted by Kuyper's arguments on these points, and, like Kuyper, sought to build up a following for his theological views by political action<sup>14</sup>.

Further, by accepting the call to Noorder Paarl, by publishing De Christelijke School, by propagating the cause of Afrikaans, and by delivering outspoken attacks on the doctrines of individual ministers in the Patriot, he invited the criticism of the moderate Calvinists in the Cape Church, who had already declared their opposition to theological liberalism and strongly denied that their doctrines and practices represented any departure from the Formularies of Uniformity. Matters

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14. The fullest discussion of S. J. du Toit's theological views is in J.A.S. Oberholster, Die Gereformeerde Kerke onder die Kruis. See, also, J. D. du Toit, pp. 343-67. His relationship with Dr Abraham Kuyper is also discussed in C. van der Walt, S. J. du Toit in Die Diens van die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek, and P. J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders. For his dependence on Kuyper's political doctrines, see below, pp. 105 ff.

came to a head in October 1880, shortly after the Patriot had incited the Transvalers to take more active steps to drive the British out of their country, when the Cape Synod decided

om te onderzoeken, of en in hoeverre zij een oordeel zal uitspreken over den geest en de strekking, in het godsdienstige zoowel als in het politieke, van het weekblad, genoemd Die Afrikaanse Patriot<sup>15</sup>.

The discussion was allowed to continue for long enough to leave no doubt that hostility towards the Patriot was shared by many of those present, partly because it encouraged a "geest van oproer ... tegen het Gouvernement", and partly because some ministers felt bitter at the personal attacks to which it had subjected them. The influence of the pulpit on public opinion may be taken to explain the rest.

But if du Toit's poor standing in the Cape Church adversely affected the success of his political activities, the converse was also true: namely, that wherever he found support for his theological views, he was likely to find supporters for the idea of an Afrikaner Bond. There was an obvious connection in his mind between the idea of decentralized church government, and the principle of extreme decentralization on which he desired to base his Bond. His concept of the autonomy of the local community, whether in a political or an ecclesiastical sense, also had its reverse side in his criticism of the top-heavy organization of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging and his reluctance to allow real authority to the Colonial Synod. Furthermore, it can hardly have been pure coincidence that of the three branches of the Afrikaner Bond which were established in 1880, two of them arose out of the ashes of a local ecclesiastical dispute.

The first instance occurred in Hope Town. S. J. du Toit, as the son of a wine farmer, and as a Neo-Calvinist anxious to purge the Church of "methodist" tendencies, was a strong opponent of total abstinence<sup>16</sup>. But "temperance", then as

15. Patriot, 29 Oct. 1880. For du Toit's attacks on individual clergy, see Oberholster, p.25.

16. See J. D. du Toit, pp. 345-8, for an account of his dispute with Theo Schreiner over afschaffing.

now, was a subject on which strong feelings could be held. Towards the middle of 1880, Olive Schreiner conducted a spectacularly successful temperance mission in Hope Town<sup>17</sup>. Very soon after her departure, two further developments occurred. First, a dispute broke out in the Hope Town congregation as a result of a decision by the minister, Ds. W. P. Rousseau, to join the Templars, which precipitated the resignation of nine members of the Kerkraad. This dispute reached such proportions that a Rings Commissie had to be set up to investigate it<sup>18</sup>. Secondly, a branch of the Afrikaner Bond was set up at a meeting on 16 June (the first Bond branch ever to be formed)<sup>19</sup>, and at least two of the men who helped to establish this branch, P. J. du Toit and B. J. Badenhorst, were interested enough in the ecclesiastical dispute to write letters to the Patriot about it<sup>20</sup>. During the debate on the Patriot at the Synod in October, one of the delegates affirmed that "voor een paar avonden had hy eenige Kerkraadsleden van Hope Town ontmoet, die sterke voorstanders van die Patriot waren"<sup>21</sup>. It is not suggested here that the first branch of the Afrikaner Bond saw the light of day simply as the result of an argument about strong drink; but the episode throws some light on the sort of cross-currents, above all the ecclesiastical cross-currents, which influenced the course of Afrikaner politics during these formative years.

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17. Full report in Northern Post, 12 June 1880 (with acknowledgements to the Zuid Afrikaan).
18. Among the papers which reported the dispute and the findings of the Rings Commissie was the Burghersdorp Gazette, 10 Sept. 1880.
19. Du Toit, p.152.
20. See correspondence in the Patriot, 24 Dec. 1880, 21 Jan. 1881. See also, Notule Boek, Tak No.3, Hope Town, entries under the dates 25 May, 28 Aug. 1894, for indications that the branch of which B.J. Badenhorst was chairman was wedded to Neo-Calvinist ideas (in this case the principle of the free election of church officials). The Kerkraad of Strydenburg, through which they proposed to act, was the first to break away from the N.G. Kerk to join the schismatic 'Kerke onder die Kruis', led by S.J. du Toit, in 1897. On the Kruiskerke, see J.A.S. Oberholster, esp. pp.225-46.
21. Patriot, 29 Oct. 1880. (Speech by the Elder of Maraisburg).

At Petrusville, six months later, a similar situation arose. A Boeren Vereeniging had been set up there, probably before the end of 1879; but, though it was still in existence at the beginning of 1881, it had failed to make much headway, and in December 1880 several of its members met to consider forming a branch of the Afrikaner Bond<sup>22</sup>. J. D. du Toit's account of the meetings on 9 December and 5 January, based on the Patriot, indicates that these Petrusvillers had only vague ideas about the political implications of what they were doing<sup>23</sup>, while some of those who spoke were of an extremely fundamentalist turn of mind. What seems to have given urgency to their deliberations was the fact that the Colesberg Ring of the Church had denied the Petrusvillers the right to become a separate congregation, and though the latter, according to Oberholster, put behind them all thought of secession, they did write to Oom Lokomotief, asking him "of hy vir hulle 'n Patriot predikantjie kan rekommandeer"<sup>24</sup>. Within a year the people of Petrusville had obtained their ecclesiastical independence, and four of the six office-bearers of their new church were almost certainly men who had taken an active part in the establishment of the local branch of the Bond<sup>25</sup>.

The Petrusville branch of the Bond, founded on 5 January 1881, was only the third to be established<sup>26</sup>, and it must have

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22. Zuid Afrikaan, 24 Sept. 1879; Patriot, 21, 28 Jan. 1881.  
 23. J. D. du Toit, pp.152-4.  
 24. Patriot, 28 Jan. 1881; Oberholster, p.27.  
 25. The Patriot of 24 Feb. 1882 names the following office-bearers of the Petrusville congregation: Elders: Stephanus du Plessis and Andries Izel. Deacons: H.S. du Plessis, Petrus van der Walt (Kalkpoort), Sarel Marais and Cornelius Fourie. According to J.D. du Toit, a Stephanus du Plessis had spoken at the Bond meeting on 5 January 1881, while the committee appointed at this meeting to draw up a constitution for the local Bond branch included A.G.C. Yzel, C. Fourie and Petrus J. van der Walt (Kalkpoort).  
 26. The second was Calvinia (see du Toit, p.152, and Patriot, 24 Dec. 1880, 4 Mar. 1881). Almost immediately after the formation of the Petrusville branch, some of its members succeeded in setting up another in the Onder Zeekoe Rivier ward of Colesberg.

seemed to S. J. du Toit at the time that his efforts had been in vain. His plans for propagating the Afrikaans language had been eclipsed by the movement in favour of Dutch; the ideas which he had expressed in the field of theology and religious education had aroused the opposition of the moderates, and done much to undermine his influence; and his first attempt to launch a political movement had aroused hardly any response at all. But his harvest was brought very much nearer by the success of the Transvaal revolt at the beginning of 1881.

## II

On 1 April 1881 the editors of the Patriot celebrated the conclusion of the Transvaal armistice by printing their newspaper in blue ink. They had cause to rejoice, for it was their attitude to the British annexation of the Transvaal, more than any other single factor, which earned them the support of the Colonial Dutch. On 2 February 1877, eleven days after Shepstone's arrival in Pretoria, the Patriot had crisply warned the Transvalers to watch for their independence, and advised them to choose Paul Kruger rather than T. F. Burgers at the forthcoming presidential election. Throughout the period of the British occupation, the paper's editors kept their fingers on the pulse of the Transvaal, advising, criticizing, restraining, and finally helping to unleash their energies, in a manner which gave no doubt of their fellow-feeling, and with a buoyance resting on the certainty that sooner or later the Republicans would regain their independence. At a time when the Transvaal papers, even the Volksstem, gave the opponents of the annexation little lead, the Republican leaders often looked

to the Patriot for guidance<sup>27</sup>. The du Toit brothers built their policy round Kruger, and momentarily lost faith in him when he returned empty-handed from London in 1878. Why had the Deputation produced no report of their visit, when they addressed the meeting at Mooi River on their return? - they could still write one "for the historical record". Had the delegates received money from Carnarvon? - then let Kruger say so openly, and have it publicly sent back<sup>28</sup>. Passive resistance was their counsel for the time being, as it was that of the Zuid Afrikaan, and so it remained until 1880. But in April and May that year, Kruger, Jorissen and Piet Joubert visited the Western Province to build up opposition to the Sprigg policy of confederation, and they received a warm welcome in Paarl. The Patriot intensified its campaign, counselling more active defiance of British rule as soon as it became apparent that Gladstone's Government was not prepared to fulfil the expectation aroused by the British prime minister's Midlothian speeches. At last, on 8 October, came a call to some real but unspecified active resistance:

Ons het nog altoos geseg lydelik verset. Mar nou nie langer nie. Lydelik verset word nou ydelik verset. Uit die laaste behandeling van die Transvaalse sake voor die ryksparlement in England is dit duidelik te sien, dat daar geen kans of hoop is om onafhankelikheid te kry nie, tensy daar iets gebeur wat 'n verandering in die politieke toestand van Transvaal en Suid Afrika veroorsaak. Mar om langer stil te sit en daarop te wag is enkel nadeel ver die Boere, want hulle kan nie met hart en siel werk tot verbetering van landbou en vooruitgang van die land nie; terwyl die Engelse almeer invloed win deurdat gedurig meer Setlaars instroom en party Afrikaners onverskillig word.

The Patriot therefore rejected the advice proffered by the Zuid Afrikaan and the Volksblad for another deputation to London to seek a qualified independence, and continued:

Met die wapens hulle land terug eis. Wel oorlog

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27. J. D. du Toit discusses the influence of the Patriot in the Transvaal in S. J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, c. xi. He is followed by J. A. Coetzee, Politieke Groepering, p.75. For personal reasons, it seems, neither Leyds nor Jorissen acknowledged this influence in their memoirs.
28. Patriot, 22 Feb. 1878.

het ons altyd afgeraai, kan, mag en wil ons oek nou nie anraai nie; omdat ons vooruit siet dat die Transvaal onbewoonbaar sal kom, al word die kwaje dag oek weer met 'n Deputasie verskuiwe.

Dit is nou mar 'n opsomming om ider te lat nadink. Later hoop ons op die saak terug te kom. Lat ons intussen op die Here bly wag. Syn hand kan nog uitkoms ge voor die vergadering<sup>29</sup>, wat ons bid, hoop en wens. Alleen dit seg ons nou: Langer kan dit so nie bly nie. Dit moet nou tot 'n punt kom. Lydelik verset word nou ydelik verset.

No wonder that from this month onwards copies of the Patriot were filed in the Colonial Secretary's office in Cape Town!

The Patriot did not organize the outbreak of the first Anglo-Boer War. That erupted in its own way, at a moment determined by events in the Transvaal, though Nicolaas Smit later said that he had given his men orders to clean their rifles on the strength of this editorial<sup>30</sup>. But whereas the other Dutch papers in the Colony and the Transvaal had been restrained by fear or propriety from advocating extreme courses, the Patriot had not. It could point to its record during the whole period of the British occupation, from before the annexation to the moment when the British were defeated by force of arms, and claim in retrospect to have been unerringly right. The blue issue of 1 April really celebrated a double victory, and gave the Patriot a standing in the Republics and Colony alike, which would hold much significance for the political developments within Afrikanerdom during the next few years.

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29. A meeting due to take place on 8 January 1881.

30. Du Toit, pp. 222-6.

## III

Before the War of Independence, the progress of the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape Colony had been negligible. Afterwards it was rapid, in both the Colony and the Orange Free State, and within a very short time it had spread to the Transvaal as well.<sup>30a</sup>

Let us consider the developments in the Colony first. Between the beginning of April 1881 and the end of the year, a large number of Bond branches came into being, nearly all of them in the north and east. They stretched from the Kimberley region in the extreme north, and most of them lay to the east of a broad arc drawn through Hope Town, Britstown, Aberdeen and Somerset East, reaching southwards into Albany. The spread must be attributed largely to the enthusiasm of local branches, which carried their propaganda into the surrounding districts and began at an early stage to build up district organizations. The outstanding example of this took place in the Colesberg electoral division, from which there came several reports of combined meetings of delegates from widely scattered centres. Thus on 3 August a meeting was held at Philipstown, attended by delegates from Bond branches in the wards of Onder Zeekoe Rivier, Petrusville, and Rietfontein (Hanover) as well as the local branch, and a decision was taken to set up a District Bestuur.<sup>31</sup> Hope Town and Britstown were drawn into the orbit of this group, but its influence was unable to penetrate far to the south owing to opposition or indifference to the Bond's aims in the districts of Richmond, Middelburg, Maraisburg, Murraysburg and Cradock, in the last four of which Boeren Vereenigingen were established<sup>32</sup>.

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31. There was no provision for District Besturen in du Toit's Ontwerp van Bepalings; but Bond branches tended to look to the Free State Bond constitution to provide their organizational model. See du Toit, p.172.

32. See above, pp.64, 66-7

30a. See Map 1.

The spread of the Bond into regions where the eastern Vereenigingen already existed engendered some political friction. The difficulty experienced by Murraysburg in making up its mind has already been noted<sup>33</sup>. The Philipstown District Bestuur refused to admit the Colesberg Vereeniging because it refused to drop the impressive designation of "Boerenbeschermingsvereeniging vereenigd met den Afrikaner Bond"<sup>34</sup>. No new Bond branches were formed in the Albert division as rivals to van den Heever's local Vereeniging, which was already developing its strength; but the pull of the Bond was

33. See above, pp. 66-7

34. The story of Onder Zeekoe Rivier and Colesberg is complex. As noted, the Onder Zeekoe Rivier Bond was formed in January 1881. At about the same time, a Boeren Vereeniging was established in the Colesberg district (the Zuid Afrikaan of 3 Feb. 1881 referred to it as being in existence), and it apparently encountered strong English-speaking opposition within the dorp. On 14 May 1881 it had to meet in a private house, being denied public facilities, "omdat die Boeren anti-Engelsch waren" (Zuid Afrikaan, 26 May 1881). A writer to the Patriot of 16 September claimed that a Bond branch was needed in Colesberg because the English in the dorp "werk altoos teen ons", and he added that the Boeren Vereeniging "hou vergaderings met geslote deure, en 'n mens weet nooit wanneer hulle by mekaar kom en dan hou hulle dit in 'n klein kamertje waar 'n mens jou nie kan draai nie. Dit lyk dat hulle bang is dat die Engelse sal sien dat hulle vergaderings hou". A Vereeniging spokesman later denied this assertion, but Bond pressure increased (see Zuid Afrikaan, 5 May, and Patriot, 27 May, 1 July 1881 for early signs of it).

In March 1882 the Colesbergers decided to go over to the Bond, but not to drop "Boeren Vereeniging" from their official title (Zuid Afrikaan, 13 Jul. 1882). Other Bond branches in the division, notably Philipstown, objected, but failed to carry their point at a meeting at Hamelfontein, Onder Zeekoe Rivier, on 9 August (see report in the Afrikaansche Boerenvriend of 19 August, turned into more respectable Dutch by the Zuid Afrikaan on the 24th). A trial of strength followed, between the Colesbergers on the one side, and the men of Philipstown, Petrusville and Onder Zeekoe Rivier on the other. The outcome of this was that the Colesberg delegate, I. J. van der Walt, was refused the right to sit at a combined meeting at Hamelfontein on 17 January 1883 (Afrikaansche Boerenvriend, 3 Mar. 1883 - the description is van der Walt's). The Colesbergers therefore met on 3 February and, considering themselves to be a branch of the Bond, elected their own District Bestuur. The schism was only healed when the Afrikaner Bond and the various Colonial Boeren Vereenigingen amalgamated at Richmond in May 1883. When delegates from the District Besturen in the Colesberg division met to choose a parliamentary candidate on 29 August 1883, I. J. van der Walt was not only invited but voted into the chair (De Tolk, 12 Sept. 1883).

felt strongly in this region too, the Albert, Steynsburg<sup>35</sup> and Aliwal North<sup>36</sup> Vereenigingen all deciding to unite with it in due course.

The decision of the Albert Vereeniging proved in the long run to be the most consequential. There is almost no sign in the reports of D. P. van den Heever's visit to the Western Province in January 1881 that he went to explore the possibility of affiliation with the Bond. But at the meeting held in Burghersdorp on 12 March, at which he reported on his visit, a resolution was taken

dat de vereeniging voortaan den naam zal dragen van 'De Boerenbescherminingsvereeniging van Albert, vereenigd met den Afrikaanschen Bond'<sup>37</sup>,

amended rules having already been drawn up by the Sub-Committee of the Vereeniging for approval. Oom Daantje, who had certainly gone to the west looking for signs of interest in the advancement of the Taal and of nationaliteitsgevoel, was himself well satisfied with the decision, and the new regulations were adopted on 14 April<sup>38</sup>. The Albert Vereeniging, in choosing to affiliate with the Bond, did not however break off its connection with the Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging of the west.

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35. Steynsburg had a Boeren Vereeniging which was closely associated with that of Albert, its chairman, A. S. du Plessis, being one of the founders of the latter body. This Boeren Vereeniging joined the Bond in the period September-November 1881, but the terms on which it did so are debatable because the slender reports in the Zuid Afrikaan and the Patriot conflict. The former stated on 18 Oct. 1881: "... werd besloten dat de Boerenbescherminingsvereeniging behoort ingesmolten te worden met den Afrikaanschen Bond"; the latter, on 18 Dec.: "... Die vergadering ag dit 'n geskikt tyd om die B.B. Vereniging te verwissel met 'n Afrikaner Bond", and its correspondent continued: "So is dan die B.B. Comité an die tering oerlede en dit sonder testament, nou weet ons nie wat hy gedaan het of wat hy nalaat. Ons sal egter nou 'n bietje na die nuwe liggaam kyk. Pas op!" (My italics)

It is a case of the word of one correspondent against that of the other; but the Patriot man evidently felt he had something to be happy about!

36. Aliwal North did not join the Bond until April 1882.

37. Zuid Afrikaan, 24 Mar., 9, 14 Apr. 1881; Patriot, 1 Apr. 1881

38. The text is given in Appendix B.

So far we have considered the spread of the Bond in the areas of the north-eastern Cape where the farming population was predominantly Dutch-speaking. But branches were also established in the regions of English settlement further south, where Farmers' Associations had existed for a number of years and were already in possession of an efficient organization of their own. The appearance of Bond branches in their midst was bound to raise important questions in the minds of these English-speaking farmers, coming as it did at a time when popular feelings had been aroused by events in the Transvaal. On the whole, their suspicion overcame any desire which they might otherwise have had to co-operate in a movement for cultural emancipation which was external to themselves.

Very many [English settlers] appreciate some of the aims of the Bond, as far as they can understand them [said the East London Despatch]... but they find some of the views developed at Bond meetings so radically opposed to enlightened principles that they can have nothing to do with them<sup>39</sup>.

The occasion for this statement was a meeting of the Cathcart Farmers' Association, held shortly before the Cradock congress of the Bond in September 1882, at which this body tried to make up its mind whether to go in with the local branch of the Bond or not. It decided not to do so. This hesitancy was typical, another instance being provided by the case of Queenstown, where there was undoubted friction though it was

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39. East London Despatch, 9 Sept. 1882, quoted by Y. P. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, 1884-98.

mellowed by a certain amount of give and take<sup>40</sup>.

Greater tension accompanied the developments in the Bedford district, where the local situation has a peculiar importance for the present study because the Bedford Bondsmen did more harm to the cause of amalgamation between the Bond and the Boeren Vereenigingen in 1882 than anybody else. Bedford was a Settler district; its Dutch-speaking community was small and did not yet possess a local Dutch Reformed Church. They succeeded however in setting up branches of the Bond in two of the wards in July and August 1881<sup>41</sup>, and it was only when a third attempt was made, to establish a branch at Klipplaat, that opponents of the Bond arrived in sufficient numbers to defeat their purpose and set up a Farmers' Association instead<sup>42</sup>. The Bondsmen took umbrage when faced with opposition of this kind, and maintained their cohesion chiefly through a sense of being persecuted, as was reflected in a letter from one of them to the Patriot:

40. Bond branches were formed in the Queenstown district at Sterkstroom in October 1881 (Patriot, 18 Nov. 1881), Cathcart a short while earlier (Zuid Afrikaan 26 Nov. 1881) and Balotwa on 16 November (Patriot, 2 Dec. 1881). These formed a District Bestuur on 23 December at a meeting in Queenstown (Patriot, 13 Jan. 1882). Shortly afterwards, interest in the Bond was also shown at a meeting of farmers from the Upper Swart Kei (ibid.), while further branches were soon formed in the Bradford, Whittlesea and Mapassa wards (Patriot, 17 Feb., 24 Mar., 21 July 1882).

In the early months of 1882, there is evidence of concern among the English-speaking farmers. At Whittlesea, their opposition was said to have been sharp at first, but to have declined. Towards the end of the year, Dutch and English farmers were present in about equal numbers at a meeting called in order to set up a Farmers' Association at Imvani, and proposals to join the Cathcart Farmers' Association and the Afrikaner Bond were both defeated. Eventually a Farmers' Association was formed, which the Dutch members would not join (Zuid Afrikaan, 21 Oct. 1882), though the whole affair was conducted with great good humour.

41. Zuid Afrikaan, 12 July; Patriot, 26 Aug. 1881.

42. Patriot, 7 Oct., quoting Volksbode; Zuid Afrikaan, 27 Oct. 1881.

... Oom, dit spyt my veel om te sê dat dit met ons Afrikaner Bond nie van die beste gaan nie. Ons het laas op die dorp vergadering gehad, toen was daar rooinekke ook by wat teen ons wil werk ... Ek is bly dat ek nie rooinekagtig is nie<sup>43</sup>.

To make matters more difficult, none of the three Bedford newspapers took kindly to the Bond<sup>44</sup>. The Bondsmen therefore started a fourth, the Opregte Afrikaner, edited by the secretary of the Bedford branch, N. P. van der Meulen, a very convinced Afrikaner nationalist of the Patriot school of thought who was later to give Hofmeyr considerable trouble. The moderation of the Cradock Congress in September 1882<sup>45</sup> induced some of the members of the Association to adopt a more tolerant attitude towards the Bond, but this only had the effect of making the local Bondsmen intolerant of the moderation of the Cradock congress, an attitude of mind which was not in any way appeased by the wholesale defeat, which the Bondsmen suffered at the hands of the Association's candidates, in the divisional council elections at the end of the year<sup>46</sup>.

Most of the opposition to the formation of Bond branches occurred, however, in the western half of the Colony, the region which Hofmeyr's Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging tended to look upon as its own political preserve. Patriot and Zuid Afrikaan, which had differed over Transvaal policy since October 1880, continued to disagree over the terms of the proposed settlement, and du Toit, confident that he possessed the psychological initiative, determined to outbid Hofmeyr in a competition for Afrikaner support everywhere. On 18 March he threw down the gauntlet with an editorial which castigated the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging. Its name, he said, was too long: Afrikaners could not even pronounce it, let alone spell it. It had no all-embracing object. No nationaliteits-

43. Patriot, 16 Sept. 1881.

44. This is clear from Bedford Guardian, 11 Feb.; Volksbode, 24, 31 May; and Bedford Advertiser, 16 Sept., 1882.

45. See below, p. 120 ff.

46. See Opregte Afrikaner, and Volksbode, 22 Nov. 1882.

vorm could develop in a body limited to farmers, for the support of professional and commercial men was essential. The Vereeniging's rules made no mention of the need for working up national feeling, while they even included a clause which barred participation in party politics, which was not good enough for a movement whose aim was "Afrika ver die Afrikaners - ver die wat Afrika ver hulle land aangeneem het". Turning to the Vereeniging's organization, du Toit contended that there was no satisfactory link between the Hoofdbestuur and the local committees, since Hoofdbestuur elections were fast becoming a monopoly in the hands of members from the Peninsula, Paarl and Stellenbosch. Finally, the Vereeniging lacked drive ("werkkrag"); it was not making progress, and the chief reason for this was that the few leaders upon whom the work devolved already had their hands too full with their own affairs. These criticisms were exaggerated, but there was truth enough in them to hurt, especially as du Toit decided not to stand in the way of the attempts to form Bond branches in the western Cape which were soon to be made.

It has sometimes been suggested that by a sort of gentlemen's agreement du Toit left the western districts to the Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging, while Hofmeyr gave the Bond unrestricted freedom to spread in the east<sup>47</sup>. But it seems improbable that any agreement of this kind was ever reached. Until about March 1881, there was no problem, because the Bond was not strong enough to be considered as a serious opponent of the Vereeniging; but as soon as it did feel strong enough, it hesitated no longer, while Hofmeyr had already taken steps to reach a working arrangement with the Boeren Vereenigingen in the east, even though it was not his intention to exercise direct control over them.

The first head-on collision occurred at Oudtshoorn in July 1881. A by-election had taken place in this constituency in the early part of the year, resulting in the victory of

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47. See, e.g., Hofmeyr, p.201.

Herman van der Spuy over his English-speaking rival, Melville. Van der Spuy had been adopted by the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging as its candidate, and he had received strong support in the Patriot as well as the Zuid Afrikaan<sup>48</sup>. Neither the Vereeniging nor the Bond had a branch in the Oudtshoorn district at the time, but the stimulus of the election campaign galvanized the sponsors of both bodies into activity. The Patriot of 29 July carried a report of a meeting at Hazenjagt, outside Oudtshoorn, at which preliminary steps had been taken to set up a branch of the Bond, and the report made special mention of the fact that no objections had been raised to such a course, as if such might have been expected. A further meeting was duly planned for 12 August, at which the rules would be adopted, and it was resolved in the meantime that all the members were to attend another meeting which was due to take place in Oudtshoorn, "om te sien om 'n Afr. Bond daar ook op te rig". This Oudtshoorn meeting which they were to attend in force, can only have been that which took place on 6 August<sup>49</sup>, which, according to the Patriot, had been advertised several months beforehand with the object of setting up a branch of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging. The parliamentary session was over; Hofmeyr had set off on a branch-forming tour, Oudtshoorn being on his route, and the meeting had been arranged to coincide with his visit. It was a large meeting, van der Spuy himself was present, and a decision to set up a local Boeren Vereeniging was taken without opposition. The men from Hazenjagt, if they were present, evidently decided to hold their peace. They met again on the 12th, however, as arranged, and formed their Bond branch<sup>50</sup>; but this branch failed to take root. When the Vereeniging next met, on 10 September, the man whom the Bondsmen had elected as their chairman was present as a member of the Boeren Bescher-

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48. Zuid Afrikaan, 10 Mar., Patriot, 11 Mar. 1881.

49. Reported in Zuid Afrikaan, 11 Aug. 1881.

50. Patriot, 9 Sept. 1881.

mings Vereeniging<sup>51</sup>. In this instance, the Bond supporters had attempted to steal a march on the Vereeniging, but their plan had miscarried. Elsewhere, however, they achieved greater success. On 2 August, for example, Hofmeyr visited Prince Albert and restored the local branch of the Vereeniging to life. On the 27th, a meeting was held there to set up a branch of the Bond<sup>52</sup>. On 10 September, a branch of the Bond was also set up in du Toit's home district of Daljosaphat, north of Paarl<sup>53</sup>. There is no more than a suggestion of local friction in the press reports of these other foundations, but it would be unreasonable to suppose that it was not there<sup>54</sup>.

Du Toit, meanwhile, continued to provoke the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging in his editorials, urging on 4 November that it had failed to take root among the people, and was kept going by the touring activities of "invloedryke en wel-sprekende persone" who wound the engine up only for it to run down again after their departure - all this in contrast with the Afrikaner Bond, which

groei ... stadig mar gesond op, onder miskenning en teenstand, sonder anwending van buitengewone middels, uit die hart van 'n gewillige volk uit.

Hofmeyr was extremely conscious of these weaknesses, and he tried hard to immunize the Vereeniging from the scurrilous attacks to which it was being subjected. Thus at the annual meeting on 21 September 1881, he proposed a constitutional amendment which would enlarge and alter the basis on which the Vereeniging had been founded. His proposal was to amend the second article so that it would read:

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51. Zuid Afrikaan, 17 Sept. 1881.

52. Zuid Afrikaan, 4 Aug. 1881; Patriot, 9 Sept. 1881.

53. Patriot, 16 Sept. 1881.

54. A possible exception was Uniondale. Hofmeyr arrived there on 17 August 1881, and it was resolved at a public meeting that evening to form a Boeren Vereeniging, and to choose a committee at another meeting on 17 September (Zuid Afrikaan, 18 Aug. 1881). On 9 September a Bond branch was set up at a meeting at Wagebooms Rivier, after the chairman, G.B.W. Wehmeyer, had insisted on the desirability of establishing both types of organization (Patriot, 23 Sept. 1881). Shortly afterwards, Wehmeyer was himself elected to the committee of the Boeren Vereeniging (Zuid Afrikaan, 24 Sept. 1881).

Het doel dezer Vereeniging is om behoudende allen eerbied voor de gevestigde overheid, te waken over de nationale zoowel als over de stoffelijke, de in-direkte zoowel als de direkte belangen onzer Boeren-bevolking en die te beschermen<sup>55</sup>.

This was appropriate enough to the changed outlook of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, which was beginning to lose its earlier unanimity over the excise<sup>56</sup>, while several of its branches had been occupied in pressing for the permissive use of Dutch in Parliament, courts and schools, in support of the campaign which Hofmeyr had begun to carry into the parliamentary arena<sup>57</sup>. But Hofmeyr's proposal was clearly motivated primarily by the idea that it was becoming necessary to erect defences against the Patriot's attacks, with a view either to keeping the Afrikaner Bond out of the field, or to reaching some sort of accommodation with it<sup>58</sup>. The meeting refused, however, to commit itself to Hofmeyr's proposals. Early in the new year, Hofmeyr tried again. A special meeting of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging was due to be held on 10 March 1882, to give members an opportunity for discussing current political issues before the parliamentary session, and as if to anticipate this meeting, Hofmeyr made further proposals for the reform of the Vereeniging's constitution in the Zuid Afrikaan on 18 and 25 February. These repeated verbatim his suggestion for the amendment of the aims and objects to make room for the fostering of "national interests", held out an olive branch to "andere vereenigingen" which might be prepared to co-operate, and contained two further recommendations which would make

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55. Notulen, Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, 21 Sept. 1881. Hofmeyr proposed to add the words in italics.

56. This lack of unanimity was shown at a special meeting called on 10 March 1882. Wellington, Worcester, Uniondale, Riversdale and Robertson still wanted the total abolition of the tax; Paarl and Stellenbosch wanted brandy distilled with grape spirit to be tax-free, and the duty doubled on brandy distilled with imported spirit; Swellendam wanted only the abolition of excise officials, and the collection of the duty turned over to the farmers' friends, the field cornets; Beaufort West wanted the tax to remain, with a doubling of the duty on brandy made with other than grape spirit.

57. See below, p. 156

58. On 16 September, the Patriot had proposed the amalgamation of Bond and Vereeniging.

the constitution more democratic: one was to remove the constitutional rule that the Hoofdbestuur must be situated in Cape Town, and the other was for the election of the members of the Hoofdbestuur at a special meeting of accredited delegates from the branches, on a basis of one vote for every £5 contributed by the respective branches to central funds during the preceding year. These proposals were not even discussed at the meeting, however, and one is left with the impression that the members of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging as a whole were not prepared to give ground in the face of the Patriot's attacks.

By the end of 1881, the Afrikaner Bond had very few branches in the western half of the Cape Colony, and it had antagonized the western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging; but it had frightened Hofmeyr into taking up a position nearer to that of the Bond than the Vereeniging as a whole was prepared to accept. In the English-speaking districts in the south-east Cape, the Bond was weak but full of a narrow zeal for the cause, while a belt of politically moderate Boeren Vereenigingen separated these branches, in turn, from the districts along the Orange River between Hope Town and Aliwal North, where the main strength of the Bond still lay, and where its relationship with the Boeren Vereenigingen was usually harmonious.

The Bond began to take root in the Orange Free State as soon as Carl Borckenhagen, the editor of the Bloemfontein Express, started to take an interest in it. Borckenhagen was a German, and apparently not fully in tune with all the sentiments which inspired the founders of the Bond in the Cape. His editorial policy while affairs in the Transvaal were mounting to a crisis at the end of 1880 was not in advance of the Dutch papers in Cape Town, and when the Patriot issued its appeal for active resistance

in October, he ignored it. It was not, in fact, until January 1881 that he committed himself to supporting an "African" political movement, which would have as its object the building up of opposition to the "organised anti-African party", to which he attributed the responsibility for the troubles in the Transvaal and Basutoland<sup>59</sup>. He appealed to South Africans to organize themselves "throughout the whole country", to achieve control of their own affairs by constitutional means:

Disregardful of nationality and creed, independent of position and place, free from private motives, let all those who have the future of South Africa at heart unite.

There was no racialism in this vague appeal; but equally, there is no indication in the editorial columns of the Express that Borckenhagen realized that du Toit's aims were not precisely the same as his own.

Borckenhagen's main contribution to the growth of the Bond was to provide both the Colonial and the Free State branches with an extremely tidy proposal for a constitution, which appeared, without any direct indication of its authorship, in the issue of 7 April<sup>60</sup>. The Express constitution, even more than du Toit's Ontwerp van Bepalings on which it was apparently based, lacked the sort of features which would brand it as a sectional document. It set out the aims of the Bond in the broadest of terms, without any reference to the fact that the Afrikaner had special interests to protect. Its chief importance lay in its provision of an integrated system of committees, from that of the Ward at the base of the pyramid, rising through those of the District and the Province, to a Central Bestuur at the apex. But its fundamental assumption, derived from the Ontwerp van Bepalings,

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59. Express, 20 Jan. 1881. Quotations are drawn from the English edition.

60. Hereafter referred to as the Express Constitution, which is described in Appendix C. Hofmeyr, p.199, states that it was drawn up by Borckenhagen, in collaboration with Messrs Voigt and Esselen (men who had left their studies in Edinburgh to attend to the wounded in the Transvaal war) and Chief Justice F. W. Reitz.

was that the structure of the Bond should assume the existence of a South African nationality which transcended the existing barriers between the States. Existing frontiers were indeed taken into account in the organization of the Bond into provinces; but the Central Bestuur of five members, two from the Cape Colony and one each from the two Republics and Natal, was to meet annually in each territorial capital in rotation, receive and spend money, and direct the main lines of policy for the Bond as a whole. Borckenhagen was apparently blind to the constitutional impropriety of an arrangement of this sort, and to the suspicion which it was likely to arouse in the minds of the existing constitutional authorities. The Free State Bondsmen came to realize his error in time, and when the constitution came up for review at a meeting in Bloemfontein in December 1882, the powers of the Central Bestuur were much reduced in scope; but by this time most of the damage had been done, and it seems fair to conclude from developments in the Free State itself that Borckenhagen's original proposal did the Afrikaner Bond in this State more harm than good.

Though some Bond activity had taken place in the Free State before the publication of the Express constitution<sup>61</sup>, the events which really set the movement going took place in Bloemfontein in May. A branch was formed in the capital on the 11th, and five days later a meeting took place in the Grey College to inaugurate the movement in the Free State as a whole<sup>62</sup>. Those involved in these proceedings included the acting Moderator of the N.G. Kerk in the Republic, and the entire Free State Bench. The Chief Justice, F. W. Reitz, was elected chairman of the Bloemfontein branch and presided over the meeting at Grey College; Judge Gregorowski was elected to the committee of the Bloemfontein

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61. A branch was formed at Kroonstad at the end of February (Patriot, 4 Mar. 1881; du Toit, p.157), and there was considerable activity in the Heilbron district from February onwards.

62. Express, 12, 19 May; Patriot, 3 June 1881.

branch; and Melius de Villiers participated in the Grey College proceedings. There was nothing covert about this action of the judges, and it is inconceivable that they did not realize they were taking part in politics. Nor did Reitz's actions end there. At the end of May, he visited Smithfield on circuit, and while he was there he took the opportunity, in the words of a correspondent of the Bloemfontein Friend,

to see whether the public here were in favour of the establishment of a Ward Committee of the Africander Bond ... In the morning printed copies of the Constitution were distributed in the town, and in the afternoon a circular from the Landdrost was carried round, inviting the public to meet to consider the meaning of the Constitution, at 8 p.m. in the Court Room<sup>63</sup>.

Opponents of the Bond were able, when the evening came, to defeat a motion for the setting up of a local branch. Their chief spokesman, C. Orpen, regarded the aims of the Bond as verging on treason, and asked how the President, who was at the time engaged on mediating between the Transvalers and the British, could possibly permit the existence of such an organization in his own State. At the end of June, however, the supporters of the Bond were able to establish their branch<sup>64</sup>.

On 19 October, President Brand paid a visit to Smithfield, and he was presented with an address of welcome by the Landdrost, in the name of the local Bondsmen. Its tone was respectful enough, but it drew from Brand a stinging rebuke:

... het was mij niet aangenaam dat gij in uw welkomsgroet den Afrikaner Bond zoo sterk op den voorgrond hebt geplaatst. Daar dit evenwel geschied is, mag ik nu niet daarover zwijgen en vordert mijn pligt dat ik u waarschuw tegen de gevaren die ik vooruitzie, opdat er geen tweedragt gestrooid wordt waar eendragt moet wonen.

Ik ben een volbloed Zuid Afrikaner. Mijn loopbaan toont aan dat ik den Vrijstaat liefheb en steeds getracht heb deszelfs welvaart te bevorderen. Gij zijt Vrijstaters en inwoners van Zuid Afrika.

Dichters onder alle natien hebben de vaderlandsliefde bezongen. Teregt zegt Vondel, 'De liefde tot zijn land is elkeen aangeboren'.

63. Friend, 9 June 1881.

64. Express, 30 June; Patriot, 8 July 1881.

Behoeft dan gij, behoeft ik, leden van den 'Afrikaner Bond' te wezen om onze geboortegrond lief te hebben? Hebt gij, hebben al de inwoners van den Oranje Vrijstaat niet in de moeilijke tijden van den oorlog in 1865-6 getoond, dat gij een van zin en getrouw tezamen verbonden waart om voor onze rechten te strijden en die te handhaven?...

Volgens mijn inzien schijnt de constitutie van den Afrikaner Bond en de organisatie, die men in het leven wil roepen, wel het voorkomen te hebben als of de Afrikaner Bond zich boven de gevestigde regering wenscht te verheffen en eene regering in eene regering wenscht daar te stellen<sup>65</sup>.

There can be no doubt that Brand had a strong case, a fact which is now generally recognized<sup>66</sup>, though at the time Borckenhagen contested his view with a piece of very specious reasoning:

The Africander Bond must either be looked upon... as a national or a party move[ment]. In case of the former, it seems anomalous that any statesman or leading politician should adopt a hostile position towards it; in case of the latter it is indeed without precedence [*sic*] that the Head of a State should violate 'the Majesty of his exalted position' to join in or oppose a party movement<sup>67</sup>.

Borckenhagen no more appreciated the real point at issue than did Reitz, when he participated actively in the proceedings of the Cape Colonial Bond congress at Richmond in May 1883, even though he was the Chief Justice of another State<sup>68</sup>.

It is a legitimate surmise, however, that the effect of Brand's reply was to hasten rather than delay the spread of the Bond in the Free State, especially because it became linked in people's minds with a similar utterance by J. X. Merriman to the Bondsmen of Graaff-Reinet a few days later<sup>69</sup>. The Smithfield Bondsmen were unrepentant, the Patriot was scornful, and even Oom Daantje van den Heever tried to provoke the Free State President into making a further statement after an interval of a few months<sup>70</sup>. By the end of September, there were one or more Bond branches in the magisterial

65. The address of the Smithfield Bondsmen, and Brand's reply, were given in the Express, 27 Oct. 1881.

66. E.g. by J. A. Coetzee, pp. 104, 213-5.

67. Express, 3 Nov. 1881. The English was halting, but the meaning was plain.

68. See below, pp. 140, 144.

69. See below, p. 158

70. Patriot, 4 Nov. 1881, 24 Feb. 1882.

districts of Bloemfontein, Smithfield, Philippolis, Fauresmith, Jacobsdal, Winburg, Kroonstad, Heilbron, Harrismith and Ladybrand<sup>71</sup>, and the growth thereafter was steady. Its Provincial Bestuur met for the first time at the end of 1882, again under the chairmanship of Reitz, a good six months before the Bond in the Cape was able to bring such a body into existence<sup>72</sup>. But events would show that the Free State Bond could not maintain the influence which it had acquired with such remarkable ease, partly because it continued to cross the path of President Brand<sup>73</sup>.

The foundation of the Bond in the Transvaal occurred slightly later than in the Free State, though General Piet Joubert had urged that this should be done as early as April 1881, at a meeting of burghers in Heidelberg<sup>74</sup>. The proposition did not receive serious consideration, however, until a meeting of interested people in Potchefstroom on 30 July decided to appoint a committee of three to examine the question, "want de Bond kan goed zijn voor den Vrijstaat, maar misschien niet voor de Transvaal"<sup>75</sup>. The first branch was formed in August, at Rustenburg<sup>76</sup>. The sponsors of the idea then decided to take advantage of the presence of the Volksraad members in Pretoria to call a meeting on 17 October, on lines similar to that which had been convened in Bloemfontein on 16 May. J. F. Celliers, the editor of the Volksstem, was the moving spirit, while Joubert was chosen to preside. This meeting was sympathetic towards the Bond, and

71. Express, 29 Sept. 1881; Die Afrikaanse Almanak vir 1882, pp. 52-6. A total of twenty Ward Besturen had been elected by that date, out of a possible fifty-one.

72. Coetzee, p.215, has observed that "die verslag van hierdie kongres ontbreek", and that he discovered that Reitz presided "uit verwysings by andere geleenthede".

73. See below, p. 214.

74. J. A. Mouton, Generaal Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis, p.111, quoting Volksstem, 8 June 1881.

75. Volksstem, 17 Aug., Patriot 26 Aug. 1881; Coetzee, p.222.

76. Patriot, 19 Aug., Volksstem, 2 Nov. 1881; Coetzee, p.222.

the members of the Volksraad undertook to work for the establishment of branches in their constituencies when they returned home<sup>77</sup>. But the same enthusiasm was not in evidence when discussions were resumed on the 22nd. The attendance was much poorer - on account of bad publicity, according to Joubert, who went on to outline the aims of the Bond in very general terms which would have been acceptable to Borckenhagen and were apparently intended to reassure the strangers in the gate:

Hij die de belangen van Zuid-Afrika ter harte neemt, afgezien van welke nationaliteit hij is, is welkom bij ons, en is lidmaat van den Afrikaner Bond.

A decision was taken to draw up a constitution in keeping with these rather vague sentiments; but no progress in this direction was made until the following year<sup>78</sup>.

Nevertheless, the Bond had the support of the leaders of the State, including the Triumvirate<sup>79</sup>, and there is no reason to doubt that the appointment of S. J. du Toit as Superintendent-General of Education was made partly with the object of strengthening the movement in the Republic. The call for the formation of a Provincial Bestuur was first made by "ou Jacob Middel", secretary of the Komatie branch and one of the keenest of the Republican Bondsmen, and it was through his influence that the members came together in Pretoria on 16 May 1882, to discuss a draft constitution which Middel and S. J. du Toit had in the meantime drawn up. It was probably the best attended meeting which the Transvaal Bondsmen ever held, with over a hundred people present and nine centres represented<sup>80</sup>; but although the constitution was discussed and

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77. Volksstem, 19 Oct., 2 Nov. 1881; Hofmeyr, p.200; Coetzee, p.222; Mouton, p.111.

78. Coetzee, p.224; Hofmeyr, p.200.

79. Mouton, p.111.

80. Library of Parliament Bond MSS., p.85; Volksstem, 24 May 1882; Coetzee, p.225. The centres represented were: Zoutpansberg, Rustenburg, Heidelberg, Pretoria, Wakkerstroom, Standerton, Makwassie, Potchefstroom, Lydenburg and Utrecht.

approved article by article<sup>81</sup>, no Provincial Bestuur was set up, perhaps, as Coetzee suggests, because many of those who attended did not represent Bond branches<sup>82</sup>. This Bestuur did not meet officially for the first time until 12 January 1884, and then it was attended by delegates from Lydenburg, Standerton, Pretoria, Middelburg and Potchefstroom only<sup>83</sup>. Like its Free State counterpart, the Transvaal Bond failed to maintain the impetus with which it had started, and before long its political fortunes would recede with those of its leaders, Joubert and du Toit. Kruger, like Brand, would find it an embarrassment, and his opposition would prove harder to overcome<sup>84</sup>.

### III

A year after the Transvaal had liberated itself from British rule, the du Toit brothers could look with some satisfaction on the way in which their political movement had taken root in the Colony and the two Republics. In proportion as the Bond grew, so they were encouraged to broaden their appeal by offering the Afrikaner a wider range of objectives, some of which had been foreshadowed in the aims of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners but had not been emphasized for tactical reasons between 1879 and 1881. Our consideration of the early growth of the Bond may conveniently be brought to a close with an account of the more important of these extended aims: the attempt to encourage the Boer to become economically independent by establishing his own trading co-operatives and his own banks, and the attempt to saddle the Bond with a Neo-Calvinist

81. Du Toit, pp. 172-3, quoting the Patriot. The text of the constitution is summarised in Appendix C.

82. Coetzee, p.225.

83. Library of Parliament Bond MSS., p.65; Volksstem, 15 Jan. 1884; Coetzee, p.227.

84. See below, pp. 208-9, 214.

programme of principles (Program van Beginsels).

Opposition to the Imperial banks was by no means new in South Africa in the early 'eighties. They had long been looked upon by some people as leviathans with large appetites and a special taste for small banks and Colonial money. The dividends paid by the Standard Bank had shown a remarkably steady increase from 2½ per cent in 1865 to 17 per cent in 1881<sup>85</sup>, and it was not difficult to present this fact to the Colonial public in the form of an argument that steps should be taken to keep Colonial money in the Colony. The Patriot did so, carrying a succession of editorials on the subject in March and April 1882, which led up to the publication of a specimen act of association for a National Bank on 30 June. (It had first canvassed the idea in general terms on 27 June, 1879.) The burden of the Patriot's argument was that the National Bank should be owned and directed in South Africa, that it should be formed out of an amalgamation of a large number of local banks which were to be set up by local initiative, in the same way as Bond branches were set up, and that it should take the place of the Standard Bank as the Government Bank of the Colony, just as the National Bank of the Orange Free State had achieved that position with the aid of the proceeds from the Diamond Fields compensation and the legislative eviction of its rivals. These bold suggestions were accompanied by a direct attack on the Standard Bank, both as an agent of imperialism, and on the ground that its operation under conditions of limited liability constituted a threat to the security of Colonial depositors:

'n Beperkte bank bring di aandeelhouders in veiligheid en 'n onbeperkte digene wag daarin geld sit. En wi is di aandeelhouders van di Standard Bank? Meestel Engelse, dus di Londoners word in veiligheid gebrag terwyl di Afrikaners eintlik di resiko van di spekulasies moet staan<sup>86</sup>

85. G. T. Amphlett, History of the Standard Bank of South Africa, Limited, 1862-1913, pp. 202-3.

86. Patriot, 24 Mar. 1882.

The detailed proposals contained in the Patriot's scheme were not remotely practicable under the conditions of 1882, when money was tight<sup>87</sup>, and the Zuid Afrikaan criticized them severely on 12 October. But by this time the principle of a National Bank had already been warmly acclaimed at the Cradock Congress,

dat het daarstellen van een Nationale Bank met vertakkingen door de geheele Kolonie hoogst wenschelijk is en dat eenig middel daartoe aangewend, alle ondersteuning verdient<sup>88</sup>.

If there was any issue over which Afrikanerdom was united, the Zuid Afrikaan had to admit, it was the desirability of founding a National Bank<sup>89</sup>.

Du Toit had found a talking point around which the indignation of hard-pressed farmers could be rallied. This was perhaps all, from his point of view, that really mattered. But having struck the right chord, he encouraged the volume of protest to develop, by keeping alive a number of subsidiary issues, such as the desirability of setting up in every dorp a Boerewinkel (farmers' co-operative store) to bring goods to the farmer at cheap prices, thus defeating the alleged exploitation of the farmers by the retailers and the grasping merchants at the ports. The locus classicus for the exposition of this idea (an idea which really seems to have originated with the men of Albert, not with the men of Paarl) was the Patriot editorial of 29 April 1881, with its slashing attack on Britain's empire-builders, the soakers, the robbers and the reds ("nattes, rowers en rojes"). The first characteristic of these people, said the Patriot, was their tendency to drink:

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87. On 7 April 1882, the Patriot suggested that local banks be formed on the basis of a nominal capital of £30,000, of which one third would be paid up!

88. Notulen, Cradock Congress, p.22. The editor of the Uitenhage Times, who was present at Cradock, observed that "one burly orator who would turn the scale at sixteen stone said that the Standard Bank had torn the flesh from their bones and now wanted to grind the bones to send away. It was ludicrous to see how the lean members of the Congress appreciated the absurdities of this simile: while the round faces of the well-conditioned ones became elongated with the imaginary pangs of emaciation".

89. Zuid Afrikaan, 12 Oct. 1882.

Dis dan oek 'n historiese feit, toen die Engelse die Kaap oergeneem het, was hier geen hotels in die land nie. En nou net waar hulle deurtrek is die teken van hulle beskawing kantiene en hotels en stukkende bottels.

Their second and much more dangerous characteristic was a habit of fleecing the Afrikaner:

Net nou staat langs die hotel en kantien 'n winkel. Na die eerste sal ons Boere nie loop nie. Mar na die winkel sal hulle gaan. En daar is die Engelsman so vrindelik, dat hy die boer laat koop en koop, tot hy naderhand half kaal is ... Op die manier steek die rowers net nou al ons geld in hulle sak en gaat na Engeland terug,

to spend the money founding English newspapers and schools in the Colony, or in sending more robbers to South Africa to take their place. After the soakers and the robbers, came the reds; but - the article was written shortly after Majuba - the reds had seen how the Boers could shoot, and there was no longer anything to fear from them. There followed a summons to action:

En daarom seg ons ronduit: dis nou die plig van elke regte Afrikaner om nou gen oulap te besté by 'n Engelsman as hy dit kan verhelp nie. Dis ons dure verpligting om gen Engelsman en gen ondersteuners van Engelse te help nie. Nix koop nie by 'n Engelsman nie, of by 'n Engelsgesinde Afrikaner nie; of selfs by iemand wat in 'n Engelse koerant adverttee nie.

Instead, the Boers should form "kleine handelsmaatschappien" all over the Colony, and thus secure their economic independence. This was a proposal to which the Patriot frequently returned, and one which even Hofmeyr was inclined to support, provided the accent lay on the achievement of independence and not on the boycott<sup>90</sup>.

The Patriot's agitation produced some results, but no more than the economic realities of the day might have been expected to allow. A prospectus for the forming of a Hope Town Bank appeared in the paper on 1 September 1882. It was to have a nominal capital of £30,000 in three thousand £10 shares, half of which was to be called up, though only ten shillings per share were to be demanded immediately.

A provisional list of directors was also published. But the

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90. Du Toit, pp. 212-8, has summarised much of the Patriot material. For Hofmeyr's view on Boerenwinkels, see Zuid Afrikaan, 13, 16 Aug. 1881.

project did not materialize and the idea does not seem to have been taken up anywhere else in the Colony. "Boere-winkels het menigvuldiger voorgekom", wrote J. D. du Toit; but he exaggerated. There is evidence of activity in this direction in the Albert district<sup>91</sup>, at Petrusville<sup>92</sup>, Middelburg<sup>93</sup>, Sutherland<sup>94</sup>, and perhaps in some other places. But the practical difficulty involved in the establishment of farmers' co-operatives lay not only in raising sufficient capital to set them up as working concerns, but in making them in the proper sense independent. For little advantage would have been gained if they were set up in opposition to the existing retail stores in the towns, yet remained dependent on the same wholesale merchants at the coast. E. J. Koch, a director of the Zuid Afrikaansche Handels-Maatschappij of Amsterdam, visited South Africa at the end of 1881, and expressed his willingness to enter into commercial relations with "Boeren-Winkelverenigingen, om hen de benoedigde goederen te leveren ... even goedkoop als Engelsche"<sup>95</sup>. But his Company was primarily interested in the Republics, where a number of such stores had already come into being and were fighting a losing battle against real trading difficulties<sup>96</sup>, and he would have needed some evidence that the Colonial ventures were a sound investment before entering into large contracts with them.

The du Toit brothers found an important point of contact with Afrikaner opinion through their encouragement of local banks and farmers' co-operatives, and probably imagined that because there had been considerable enthusiasm for the principle behind such institutions, as well as for the Afrikaans

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91. Zuid Afrikaan, 23 Nov. 1880; Burghersdorp Gazette, 19 Aug. 1881; Patriot, 16, 23 Dec. 1881.  
 92. Patriot, 11 Mar. 1881.  
 93. Patriot, 15 July 1881; Middelburg Gazette, 5, 12 July 1881.  
 94. Patriot, 17 Mar. 1882; De Tolk, 25 Apr. 1883.  
 95. Patriot, 23 Dec. 1881. On the Z.A. Handels-Maatschappij, see P.J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, vol. I p.91.  
 96. Van Winter, vol. I p.54.

language and the Bond itself, Afrikanerdom as a whole would be ready to subscribe to the series of theological and political propositions which were circulated in S. J. du Toit's name in February 1882, as a proposed Program van Beginsels for the Afrikaner Bond<sup>97</sup>.

S. J. du Toit evidently sought Oom Daantje van den Heever's advice before launching the proposal, for the covering letter which he sent to the Patriot with the Program was written from the latter's home at Ventersburg, while he was on his way to take up his governmental post in the Transvaal. In this letter, which was dated 11 February 1882, S. J. du Toit expressed the hope that the Program would be discussed at a congress scheduled to take place at Graaff-Reinet at the beginning of March<sup>98</sup>. He described the document as

het Program der anti-revolutionaire of christelijk historische partij in Nederland .... gewijzigd naar onze omstandigheden,

and recommended it as a basis for discussion on the ground that

de grondtoon van ons volkskarakter veel overeenkomst met dat van het Nederlandsche volk<sup>99</sup>.

The Program consisted of twenty articles, and has to be studied in conjunction with a series of press commentaries written subsequently by S. J. du Toit, which were published in pamphlet form as the Program van Beginselen van de Nationale Partij, Opgesteld, Verklaard en Toegelicht, the last of these articles bearing the date 21 February 1884.

The Anti-Revolutionary or Christian Historical Party in the Netherlands was led by the Dr Abraham Kuyper whose theological views S. J. du Toit shared. The political philosophy

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97. Text in Appendix G below.

98. It was raised but not discussed. See below, p.118.

99. The Patriot, 3 Mar. 1882, stated that the Program was "die vrug van jare oerdenking, van manne van talent en bekwaamheid. 1 Jan. 1878 werd dit in Holland in lig gege deur die Centraal Comité [of the Anti-Revolutionary Party], wat by verkiesings ver die Tweede Kamer geraadpleeg werd, as grondslag ver verkiesings. As sodanig werd dit oek deur verskeie kiesverenigings oergenome, terwyl Professors in die regte hulle goedkeuring daaraan geheg het".

which the Program expounded was Neo-Calvinist through and through, and on all major points of principle du Toit acknowledged his debt to Kuyper<sup>100</sup>. It laid stress on the Divine origin of political authority, denying ultimate sovereignty to the will of the people:

De Volkswil is voor ons niet het hoogste gezag.  
Dat toch is het beginsel der revolutie ... want wat is wispelturiger en veranderlijker dan de Volkswil, welke op den eenen dag onzen Zaligmaker als Koning begroet met een 'Hosanna; gezegend is Hij die daar komt in den naam des Heeren!' en den volgenden dag Hem verwerpt met een smadelijk: 'Kruis Hem! Kruis Hem!'

The law, being an expression of the popular will, was likewise fallible. Government in fact rested on Divine permission. It should acknowledge God in its public acts and create proper conditions for public worship, for example by providing and enforcing a Sunday observance law. On the other hand, it should resist a tendency towards caesaropapism, leaving the propagation of religion to the churches ("kerkgenootschappen"), and allowing freedom of religious and anti-religious propaganda. Even atheists should be allowed to form their own society, and there should be no discrimination on grounds of religious faith, and no violence done to consciences.

Sovereignty, wrote du Toit, was based on the Divine will, and it was both absolute and indivisible. It belonged to the executive authority. The "revolutionair staatsrecht", with its doctrine of the separation of powers, was rejected by him:

Zoodra toch de Wetgeving met overheidsmacht bekleed wordt en zich dien ten gevolge als overheid begint te gedragen, wordt ze lid van de firma wier handelingen ze juist controleeren moest. In plaats van de rechten des volks te verdedigen, zal zij er dan van zelf op uit zijn om, ten koste van het volk, haar eigen macht uit te breiden.

The extent to which the people ought to be allowed to advise the Government should depend on the degree of their political maturity; but the highest position to which a representative legislature could aspire was that of a "pleitbezorgster van de volksrechten", before a Government which ruled by its conscience on the authority of the Divine will.

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100. See A. Kuyper, Ons Program, pp. 1-6. A considerable proportion of du Toit's Program was verbally identical with Kuyper's.

These arguments formed the core of the political philosophy argued by du Toit on the basis of Kuyper's Program. The Program set out by du Toit, however, did not confine itself to the theory of government, but went on to outline the objectives towards which the Afrikaner Bond ought to work. The starting point here was the principle that the powers that be are ordained of God, expressed thus in the second article:

Zij erkent in de Kaapkolonie en Natal de Britsche Souvereiniteit van Godswege langs historischen weg geworden, en in de Oranje Vrijstaat en de Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek de Republikeinschen Staatsvorm als onder de leiding Gods in onze geschiedenis geworteld, door de Uitgeweken Boeren tot ontwikkeling gebracht, door Britsche Traktaten erkend, en door de Grondwet van beide Republieken als zoodanig bevestigd.

But to acknowledge the divine origin of the status quo was not to preclude either the possibility of change or the desirability of working for it. Du Toit himself indicated a direction in which the current dispensation might be improved, and the method for doing this, in the sixth and seventh articles of the Program:

Op zichzelf geen enkele Staatsvorm den eenig bruikbare keurende, en de alsnu bestaande vormen erkennende, zoo meent zij toch, dat het einddoel onzer nationale ontwikkeling zijn moet, EEN VEREENIGD ZUID AFRIKA ONDER EIGEN VLAG<sup>101</sup>.

De bestaande constitutien van de Kaapkolonie en van Natal, en de Grondwetten van de Oranje Vrijstaat en de Z.A. Republiek aanvaardt zij als uitgangspunt om langs wettige weg, door hervorming van bestaande instellingen, tot dat einddoel te geraken.

These say little in themselves, and it is necessary to turn to du Toit's commentaries in order to grasp his full meaning - or rather, his full meaning as it was in April 1883, over a year later, when this part of the commentary was published. Though not attached on principle to any form of government, he wrote,

101. Compare the corresponding article in Kuyper's Program: "Op zichzelf geen enkelen staatsvorm den eenig bruikbaren keurende, erkent zij het aan de grondwet gebonden koningschap, gelijk zich dit ten onzent geleidelijk uit de republiek der vorige eeuw heeft ontwikkeld, als den voor Nederland meest geschikten regeeringsvorm."

he claimed affinity with Calvin in his preference for the republican principle, and asserted that it suited South Africa as no other form did:

De republikeinsche regeeringsvorm is geworteld in onze volkshistorie. Elke poging tot afwerping van een vreemd juk, en tot ontwikkeling van een eigen nationaliteit, liep uit op de stichting eener republiek...

De Republiek komt het best overeen met onzen Volksaard. Wij zijn een vrijheidslievend volk. En toch de nuchtere Hollandsche geest, die nog steeds in ons voortleeft, gepaard met den beteugelenden invloed der Calvinistische leer door ons algemeen beleden, biedt genoegzamen waarborg tegen de bandelooze vrijheid der democratie ...

Maar eigenlijk is ook de Republiek de eenig denkbare staatsvorm voor een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika. Wat toch anders? Eigen vorsten-telgen hebben wij niet om op den troon te plaatsen, al zouden wij zulks ook wenschen. Uit een Europeesch vorstenhuis een regent voor ons te kiezen, - zoo iets behoeft slechts genoemd te worden om den tegenzin der gansche natie op te wekken. Neen, wanneer wij ons een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika voorstellen, dan denken wij aan een Republiek en niets anders: hetzij een Republiek onder een President als de Vereenigde Staten van Amerika, of met een Bondsraad als in Zwitserland.

Du Toit also suggested how the republic was to be achieved. The aim of "een vereenigd Zuid Afrika onder eigen vlag" should be proclaimed boldly so as to avoid any chance of misunderstanding, and it should be proclaimed with equal boldness that this was to be achieved "langs constitutioneelen weg en zonder gewelddadigheid", so as to avoid the stigma of being dubbed a rebel nation. A general petition should be sent to the Queen by her Colonial subjects, affirming their present loyalty, urging the confederation of the South African States and Colonies, drawing attention to its desirability "in betrekking tot onze Naturellenpolitiek", and pointing out that the British flag was the sole obstacle in the way of such a step. The Queen was therefore to be asked to take her flag away "en ons vrijheid te laten onze eigene zaken onderling te regelen en te besturen". The petition should also stress that the Colony did not wish to cut itself off entirely from the Imperial Government. On the contrary,

de te vormen Vereenigde Staten van Zuid Afrika zullen staan onder Britsch Protectoraat, waaronder begrepen is onzer zijds dat wij onze havens openstellen voor de Britsche zeemacht, en in elken haven eene militaire

bezetting der Rijksregeering toelaten, waarvoor Engeland op zich neemt ons tegen aanvallen van buitenlandsche, overzeesche mogendheden te beschermen dat zoodanige bezettingen echter in geenerlei opzicht den vrijen handel mogen belemmeren, anders dan in tijden van oorlog.

The petition was to be presented through Parliament, and the function of the Bond was to educate public opinion to this end, and to see that the right steps were taken at the right time.

Hofmeyr's printed copy of this Program van Beginsels has survived among his papers. At some time, probably in 1886 when D. F. du Toit drew up a revised version of his brother's Program<sup>102</sup>, he marked those parts of it which raised questions in his mind. Thus, in the first article, he underlined the phrase "voornamelijk Hollanders en Huguenoten" in a sentence defining the European settlers who had laid the foundations of the volkskarakter. In the second, his attention was caught by the expression "wederrechtelijke vreemde overheersching". He also queried the final aim of the Bond as expressed in the sixth article, and the method for its realization in the seventh. The Program indeed contained assumptions which Hofmeyr would never have accepted, and it will be appropriate to note some of these assumptions by way of bringing our discussion of du Toit's approach to politics to a close.

First of all, there does not seem to be much room for doubt that when S. J. du Toit used the term Afrikaner or its equivalents at this stage of his development, he limited its application in his own mind to white South African-born people of Dutch or Huguenot descent. From his point of view, the South African Volk came into existence when the fusion of Dutch settler and Huguenot refugee was completed, as a study of the Geskiedenis van ons Land as well as of the Program van Beginsels makes abundantly plain, despite the contra-

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102. See below, p. 255.

dictory affirmation in the Ontwerp van Bepalings, and it was subjected to no further biological change or blood transfusion thereafter. The Cape was a Dutch colony, he wrote on another occasion, and a British possession. One has to look far in his writings of this early period for suggestions that people of British or other 'non-Afrikaner' origin had any rightful place in South African society, and he usually failed to draw the distinction which Hofmeyr invariably made between Britishers who came to South Africa to settle and those who arrived as birds of passage or as representatives of the Imperial Government. The nearest he seems to have got to such a differentiation was in a Patriot editorial of 13 May 1881, in which he consented to modify his remarks about the soakers, robbers and reds made in the previous issue, so that they applied, not to the British people as a whole, but only to "de leger waarme England lande en volke verower".

A second point of considerable importance is that S. J. du Toit revealed a consistent dislike for liberal institutions of the British type during these early years of his political activity. In the theological field this is easy enough to understand. He had become accustomed to think of liberalism as an emanation of the "Revolution", which stood in a general sense for the anarchical principle, and in a more particular sense for the abandonment of the faith of his fathers in favour of the heresy of free thought, as encouraged by a non-dogmatic system of religious education. Did he project his abhorrence of theological liberalism into the political sphere? We have noted that the Geskiedenis van ons Land practically ignored the story of the growth of representative government in the Cape Colony, and that the Patriot manifested a singular lack of interest in the activities of the Colonial Parliament, which it treated as exotic and inconsequential, at least down to the end of 1877. If du Toit thought it was important that Afrikaners should organize them-

selves for the purpose of fighting elections, this is to say no more than that he was prepared to play according to the rules of the political game as he found them, and he certainly did not commit himself to an acceptance of the principle of a sovereign legislature. On points such as these, his position was different from that of Hofmeyr, who had ceased to blow hot or cold on theological issues, was himself the product of a liberal education, and held the British parliamentary system in great respect.

Unlike Hofmeyr, who planned to limit his political movement to the Cape Colony, du Toit took cognizance of Afrikanerdom beyond the Colonial frontiers. It was in keeping with the rest of his outlook that he should do so, for his plans did not stop short with the formation of a political movement. Political independence for the Afrikaner people was indeed part of his goal, but he was even more concerned that the Afrikaner Volk should find itself in relation to his own idea of its culture, its religious past and its linguistic present as well as its political future. But events would show that he had been lured away by a will-o'-the-wisp, for the Colonial Afrikaners in general were sceptical towards his flights of fancy.

## CHAPTER FOUR

SAMESMELTING

Had the sentiments expressed by S. J. du Toit in his Program van Beginsels commanded the general support of the Afrikaner Bond, fusion (samesmelting) between the Bond and the various Boeren Vereenigingen would probably have been impossible to effect. But the movement in favour of fusion was successful, and this is a safe indication that the main body of Colonial Afrikaner opinion was not prepared in the early 'eighties to take its stand on either a narrow theological or an exclusive racialist platform. The S. J. du Toit whom most of the Bondsmen followed was not, in other words, the du Toit of the Program van Beginsels, but the du Toit of the Ontwerp van Bepalings, who welcomed as a political partner

elkeen wat Afrika tot syn vaderland gekies het,  
en Afrika's welvaart bedoel, onverskillig wat syn  
nasionale afkoms is, of tot watter kerkelike of  
burgerlike party hy origins behoer.

The Ontwerp van Bepalings implicitly, and the Transvaal and Free State Bond constitutions explicitly, made a white skin an essential qualification for membership; but apart from this very substantial limitation, the three foundation documents of the Afrikaner Bond aimed at comprehensiveness, at least for the sake of the record.

To understand the inner history of the movement towards amalgamation, therefore, it is important to look beyond the sometimes dramatic clashes of opinion which took place between the leaders of the various movements, and which received full publicity in their respective newspaper organs, and attempt to gauge the temper of Afrikaner public opinion as a whole. If this is done, several important facts emerge. One is that the names 'Afrikaner Bond' and 'Boeren Bescherms Vereeniging' did not stand in practice for two types of organization whose members held clear-cut and readily distinguishable views. There were many shades of sentiment and opinion among politically-minded Afrikaners, and although

there were certain aspects of Bond policy which most Vereeniging men, especially in the west, could not agree with, their doubts were usually shared by an appreciable number of the Bondsmen as well. Thus the line of division did not usually correspond with that of group membership when key questions to do with amalgamation were put to the vote. Another fact of importance is that in all the political groups which sought to amalgamate, the desire for a sinking of differences was overwhelmingly strong. The very few extremists who wished to block amalgamation for the sake of what they regarded as principles, and their opponents looked upon as prejudices, were not only unrepresentative of Afrikaner opinion as a whole, but usually came from districts where the Bondsmen were a small minority, out of step with public opinion in their neighbourhood. Few though they were, however, they wielded an influence quite out of proportion to their numbers, partly because they were enthusiasts, and partly because they were usually able to rely on the support of the Patriot. For this reason, it would be wrong to underrate the diplomatic achievements of those who led the movement for amalgamation, among whom the name of Jan Hofmeyr stands out, as they carried it to success through several eventful congresses, notably those held at Cradock in September 1882 and Richmond in May 1883.

Amalgamation involved the fusion into a single organization of three main groups, each with varying degrees of unity within itself: the western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, the most highly centralized of the three, which could express itself through its Hoofdbestuur; the eastern Boeren Vereenigingen, separate autonomous associations for the most part, with no central committee which could speak for them all; and the Afrikaner Bond, which was still in an embryonic stage of its constitutional development, composed mainly of independent Ward Besturen, a few of which had amalgamated to form District Besturen, but whose central

committee or Provincial Bestuur, as laid down in the *Ontwerp van Bepalings* and the Express constitution, did not yet exist. Much of the difficulty involved in achieving amalgamation would flow from the fact that the Bondsmen desired to complete the structure of their own organization by setting up a Provincial Bestuur, before they treated with the *Vereenigingen*. The eastern *Vereenigingen* did not raise the same sort of issue, but facilitated the movement considerably by agreeing to associate themselves with Hofmeyr's body for practical purposes.

The present chapter traces the history of the movement towards fusion in 1882-3, and the story hinges mainly upon four congresses: those at Graaff-Reinet in March, Cradock in September, and Richmond in November 1882, and another at Richmond in May 1883, at which fusion was provisionally, and as events turned out, finally achieved. The scope of the chapter is limited to events within the Cape Colony; but this limitation itself needs further comment, because the *Afrikaner Bond* was, in terms of all its primary constitutions, a pan-South African movement, which aimed, not merely at affiliation, but at integration between what were referred to as its three constituent "provinces" of the Cape, the Free State and the Transvaal. These were to be united in due course under a common Central Bestuur, and the Colonial Bondsmen would not amalgamate with the *Vereenigingen* except on this condition. They won their point, and in due course obtained their Central Bestuur, which met at Bloemfontein in February 1886 for the first and only time. The Central Bestuur failed to survive for reasons which will appear in due course; but it was only at the Bloemfontein meeting of 1886 that the constitution of the united body was officially promulgated.

## I

The unfriendly rivalry between Hofmeyr and S. J. du Toit during most of 1881 did not provide an auspicious background for a movement towards closer union between their respective organizations, yet signs were not lacking even in this year of conflict that each would have welcomed amalgamation on his own terms. Du Toit even suggested a merger from time to time, though never in such a way as to indicate that he would sacrifice the more controversial elements in his own programme for the sake of such a result<sup>1</sup>. Hofmeyr, though he disagreed with the Bond leadership, was prepared to speak in defence of a Bond branch when he felt that it had been slighted by one of his Cabinet colleagues in October<sup>2</sup>. But it is to the Albert Boeren Vereeniging that we have to look for the only serious attempt made in 1881 to bring the two organizations together.

The Albert Vereeniging had established an informal relationship with the western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging in January, and affiliated with the Afrikaner Bond in April. On 27 May, van den Heever published a letter in the Patriot urging people to write to him with regard to "het houding eener groote byeenkomst der verschillende B.B. Vereenigingen dezer Kolonie", requesting that suggestions should reach him by 1 August<sup>3</sup>. He later informed the Patriot that he had enlarged his appeal to include other interested bodies in the Cape, Free State, Transvaal and Natal, and the Patriot supported his idea to the full, with the proviso that the date of the general national congress proposed by van den Heever should be deferred until such time as the Transvaal Bondsmen were in a position to send delegates, which would not be before September<sup>4</sup>.

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1. E.g. Patriot, 29 July, 16 Nov. 1881.

2. On Merriman's Graaff-Reinet speech, see below, p. 158

3. The date of the letter was 1 May.

4. Patriot, 10, 17 June 1881. The Transvaal Bond was not formally inaugurated until October.

The implementation of van den Heever's proposals did not follow the lines which he had planned. On 16 July, representatives of several north-eastern Boeren Vereenigingen<sup>5</sup> met at Ventersburg to welcome Jotham Joubert on his return from Parliament, and the opportunity was taken to discuss the idea of a congress. The press reports of this meeting do not agree on all particulars as to what happened,<sup>6</sup> but it is apparent that the possibility of joining the Bond was discussed, and that the representatives of the Vereenigingen were reluctant to take the step without fuller knowledge, despite the protestations of the Philipstown delegate and the assurance of van den Heever that "het is een nietsbeduidend Afrika als het zonder Afrikaanschen Bond is". Turning to van den Heever's congress proposals, the meeting decided, in the words of the Patriot report, "'n centrale plaas te bepaal waar en wanneer verteenwoordigers van die B.B. Vereniginge en Afr. Bond by makkaar sal kom". The Zuid Afrikaan's correspondent did not indicate the exact purpose of the proposed meeting; but both reports agree that the decision was taken to appoint a committee, presumably with the object of convening a congress of the type proposed, and the Zuid Afrikaan expressly states that van den Heever was empowered to nominate whom he chose. He picked Hofmeyr, "Lokomotief" du Toit, Daniel de Waal of Stellenbosch, M. J. Herholdt (chairman of the Murraysburg Bond), J. J. Janse van Rensburg (chairman of the Cradock Vereeniging), Gerrit Bekker of the Maraisburg Vereeniging, and himself<sup>7</sup>. It seems doubtful, however, if this well scattered committee ever met.

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5. Albert, Aliwal North, Colesberg, Philipstown, Maraisburg and Steynsburg. The Philipstown representatives were almost certainly Bondsmen.

6. Patriot, 29 July; Zuid Afrikaan, 4 Aug. 1881. The Burghersdorp Gazette, 19 Aug. 1881, took over the Zuid Afrikaan's report.

7. I.e. two members of the western Vereeniging; two members of eastern Vereenigingen, and two Bondsmen (one of whom was a member of the Western Vereeniging as well), with van den Heever presumably to act as convener.

Over seven months elapsed between the Ventersburg meeting and the calling of the Graaff-Reinet Congress which met on 1 and 2 March 1882. They were months in which the Bond and the Boeren Vereeniging hardly moved closer to one another, and whatever negotiations took place during this time have apparently gone unrecorded. All that may be said with certainty is that on 17 February 1882 an advertisement appeared in the Patriot, unsigned, but dated from Graaff-Reinet on the 8th, and that its contents were as follows:

Hiermede wordt vriendelyk ieder dorp of distrikt waar de Afrikaner Bond of de Boerenbeschermings-vereeniging opgerig is vriendelyk [sic] uitgenoodigd hun afgevaardigden te zenden naar Graaff-Reinet op den eersten dag van Maart 1882 op welke vergadering verschillende belangryke zaken tot welvaart van land en volk besproken zullen worden; derhalve worden alle afgevaardigden dringend uitgenoodigd tegenwoordig te zyn.

The Graaff-Reinet Congress was therefore open to delegates from branches of the Afrikaner Bond and of the Boeren Vereenigingen, and was technically a combined meeting of both<sup>8</sup>,

This Congress was not, as Hofmeyr's biographer implies, the first step taken by "Onze Jan" to infiltrate into the Afrikaner Bond and guide its policy from within<sup>9</sup>. He was not present himself, nor apparently was his newspaper represented, for the report in the Zuid Afrikaan was dependent on the Graaff-Reinetter. Further, it is perfectly plain that despite the comprehensive nature of the invitation, only Bondsmen were actually present. Van den Heever and A. S. du Plessis represented the Albert and Steynsburg Boeren Vereenigingen, but these were already united with the Bond; the Middelburg Vereeniging appointed delegates, but they failed to arrive<sup>10</sup>; and all the other twenty-two delegates represented branches

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8. It is important to note this, in view of disputes which were to arise later as to what sort of meeting the Graaff-Reinet Congress really was.

The following sources on the congress have been used: Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Mar., Middelburg Getuige, 11 Mar., Patriot, 17 Mar. 1882. The Graaff-Reinetter's report, on which those of the Zuid Afrikaan and the Middelburg Getuige were based, may no longer be extant. There is also a useful editorial in the Uitenhage Times of 9 Mar. 1882.

9. Hofmeyr, pp. 202-3.

10. Middelburg Getuige, 18 Feb., 11 Mar. 1882.

of the Bond<sup>11</sup>.

Yet although Hofmeyr had nothing to do with the convening of the Congress, there can be no doubt that its outlook and its decisions conformed very closely to his own ideas. It lavished compliments upon him, stood to carry a unanimous motion expressing confidence in him as the "leider der Afrikaner party in de Kaap Kolonie" and urging that he should not accept the vacant Transvaal presidency, and it looked to him to place its resolutions before Parliament. The Congress acted as if it were a meeting of the Bond and set up a committee to investigate the setting up of a Central Bestuur<sup>12</sup>; but apart from this internal matter, the other subjects which it talked about could have been aired at any meeting of a Boeren Vereeniging without incongruity: among them the Dutch language, Basuto policy, the raising of the franchise, the masters and servants law, and education. The debate on these and other subjects was severely practical, and the delegates showed a clear reluctance to become involved in ideological discussions. The best example of this reluctance was to be seen in their refusal to bind themselves to S. J. du Toit's Program van Beginsels. They acknowledged the receipt of this embarrassing document with thanks, postponed discussion of it to another meeting owing to shortage of time, and referred it to the branches. Finally, the Congress took a further step towards the unification of the Afrikaner Bond and the Boeren Vereenigingen, by carrying the following, moved by R. P. Botha from the chair:

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11. The districts represented were: Graaff-Reinet, Sneeuwberg, Camdeboo, Albert, Steynsburg, Bedford, Somerset East, Pears-ton, Aberdeen, Britstown, Murraysburg and Bethesda. They are all in the eastern and central Cape. There are slight discrepancies as to the total number of delegates. The Patriot on 17 March listed 25. Hofmeyr's biographer, p.203, gives 18. At all events, it was not a large congress, and had been convened at very short notice.
  12. The reports fail at this point. How the Central Bestuur was to be set up is not at all clear, especially as in terms of the Bond constitutions such a body would only come into existence through the action of the several Provincial Besturen. The Patriot rightly queried this point on 17 March.

Deze vergadering acht het wenschelijk en noodig, daar eendracht magt maakt, om te trachten de Z.A.B.B. Vereeniging en den Afrikaner Bond te vereenigen, en ten einde een gezamenlijk fundament te leggen, zullen de Wel. Ed. heeren J. H. Hofmeyr jun., L.W.V., D. du Toit, D. de Waal en du Preez uitgenoodigd worden om tegenwoordig te zijn bij de Algemeene Vergadering van afgevaardigden, die in September zal gehouden worden.

The delegates decided that the general congress referred to should be held at Cradock on 12 September, and it was left to a working committee to make the arrangements<sup>13</sup>.

When the Graaff-Reinet Congress ended, the prospects for union between the Bond and the Vereenigingen looked reasonably good. Hofmeyr, who had hitherto doubted the wisdom of such a union, appeared to be much more favourably disposed towards it, and encouraged by the moderation shown by the Bondsmen at the congress. He expressed the hope that the Bond would complete its own constitutional arrangements and create a responsible body which could negotiate with the Boeren Vereenigingen. Two days later, after the special meeting of the western Vereeniging on 10 March, he suggested that the eastern Boeren Vereenigingen should also establish their own Hoofdbestuur, ostensibly so as to avoid the sort of bungling which had resulted in the wrong candidate being returned to Parliament unopposed during a recent by-election in the North-Eastern Circle<sup>14</sup>. But if the Zuid Afrikaan was in a conciliatory mood, the Patriot, now in the hands of D. F. du Toit, began to fight shy. Its editor sensed that something had gone wrong at Graaff-Reinet, and he asked some unsettling questions: what had the Congress meant by recommending the establishment of a Central Bestuur with authority to make regulations for the districts? Why had the Free State and the Transvaal been excluded? Why was it necessary to pass a motion of confidence in Hofmeyr? Why had the Congress not passed a resolution in favour of the voluntary

13. This was the same committee which had been entrusted with the consideration of a Central Bestuur. It consisted of: R. P. Botha, M. J. Herholdt, D. P. van den Heever, J. J. Boucher of Bedford, Thomas Theron of Britstown, and J. J. Janse van Rensburg of Cradock. The first five were present. Van Rensburg, who was chairman of the Cradock Boeren Vereeniging, was not a Bondsman.

14. Zuid Afrikaan, 9, 11 Mar. 1882.

principle in schools? He hoped that the branches would see that these deficiencies were put right<sup>15</sup>.

## II

It was therefore against a background of some uncertainty that the official notice calling the Cradock Congress appeared in the Colonial press towards the middle of July, over the signature of Thomas Theron, acting on behalf of the committee of six appointed at Graaff-Reinet. This notice summoned "al de verskillende Takken der Afrikaner Bond en Boerenbescherminings Vereeniging door de gansche Kolonie" to an "Afrikaansche Nationaal Congres ... ter bespreking en overweging van onze belangen ten opzichte van Land en Volk"<sup>16</sup>. It has sometimes been suggested that this notice was incorrectly worded, and that Theron ought to have convened a meeting of Bondsmen alone, because to do otherwise was to exceed the instructions given by the Congress of Graaff-Reinet. This argument, however, rests on a false assumption, and it can be shown that Theron

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15. Patriot, 17 Mar. 1882. The term 'voluntary principle', as applied originally to Saul Solomon's campaign for the disendowment of the Churches, was taken over by the advocates of Christian National Education to signify the disendowment of public education, so that schools giving confessional instruction would be able to compete on equal terms with the public schools which were not allowed to do so.

16. Patriot, 14 July 1882, and subsequent issues.

acted correctly<sup>17</sup>.

Malcontents later claimed that the Bondsmen at Cradock were swamped by Vereeniging men<sup>18</sup>. This was not true; but in

17. J. A. Coetzee has written, with regard to the Cradock notice "Hierdie oproep was nie heeltemal in ooreenstemming met die besluit van die Bondskongres op Graaff-Reinet nie, want daar is besluit om 'n Bondskongres in September te hou om vereniging te probeer verkry, en tot daardie Bondskongres moes die heer Hofmeyr en drie ander here uitgenooi word." (Politieke Groepering, p.114) This statement errs in the affirmation that a Bond Congress was ordered by the fathers of Graaff-Reinet, for in terms of Botha's resolution, the working committee were instructed to call an "algemeene vergadering", the precise nature of which was unspecified (see above, p.119 ).

Had the Graaff-Reinet Congress been officially a congress of Bondsmen, Coetzee's case would still have some substance; but it is clear that, although only Bondsmen and representatives of affiliated Boeren Vereenigingen attended, the Graaff-Reinet Congress was technically open to other Boeren Vereenigingen as well. In the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, the working committee set up at Graaff-Reinet could only be expected to summon a congress constituted like the Graaff-Reinet Congress to Cradock.

The question then arises as to the capacity in which the four men enumerated in Botha's resolution - J. H. Hofmeyr, D. F. du Toit, Daniel de Waal and H. P. du Preez - were expected to attend the Cradock Congress. This was not explained in Botha's resolution, and though it is plausible to assume (as Coetzee does) that they were to be invited, as representatives of the western Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging, to negotiate with a representative congress of Bondsmen, it cannot be shown that this was the case. It is equally likely that they were invited in their personal capacities.

Finally, it should be emphasised that this apparent quibble had great procedural importance. If a Bond congress had been summoned to Cradock, it could have set up a Provincial Bestuur with plenary powers to negotiate with the Boeren Vereenigingen, which is what Hofmeyr at first thought had happened at Graaff-Reinet, and what the Pat-riot (11 Aug. 1882) hoped would happen at Cradock. This was, in fact, the procedure adopted at Richmond in May 1883. It might have been adopted earlier, with advantage.

18. Especially N. P. van der Meulen of Bedford, whose protest is described below. In spirit, his case has been accepted by Coetzee, who argues, p. 114, that if the Cradock Congress had been limited to Bondsmen, "sou die gewig in die skaal nog aan die kant van die Bond gewees het en sou daar minder geleentheid vir die uitoefening van invloed deur B.B. Verenigingsmanne gewees het".

view of the uncertainty as to who was supposed to be there, it is of some importance to know who actually was. Most of the contemporary press accounts of the congress gave lists of the delegates and these contain a very large number of minor inconsistencies; but there can be no question that the Bondsmen present substantially outnumbered the representatives of both the western and the eastern Boeren Vereenigingen together<sup>19</sup>. The evidence <sup>however/</sup>points strongly to the absence of rigid party alignments at Cradock. Had the Bondsmen agreed among themselves, they could have carried any proposal they liked. The western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, though small in numbers, was strong in parliamentarians (who, in virtue of their status, were given seats of honour on the platform and denied the right to vote). It was probably disproportionately strong in debating skill as well; but it is not true that the representatives of the western Vereeniging went to Cradock determined to force amalgamation through. They had no mandate to do that, for the annual meeting of the Vereeniging, which had taken place at Stellenbosch a short while before, had only carried a guarded motion on the subject, blessing co-operation between the two bodies, but reserving judgment on the matter of fusion until its own branches and the Cradock Congress had declared themselves. Of the branches, it seems that only Woreester and Oudtshoorn had so far approved of fusion in principle<sup>20</sup>.

Reports of the proceedings at Cradock are unusually plentiful. At least half a dozen newspapers sent their representatives to cover the debates, which is itself an indication that contemporary public opinion looked on the

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19. An analysis of the delegates has shown that there were between 9 and 13 representatives of the western Vereeniging present, and between 20 and 23 representatives of other Vereenigingen, giving all Boeren Vereenigingen a total representation of between 29 and 36 delegates. Against these, there were between 60 and 67 Bondsmen.

20. Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Aug., 2 Sept. 1882. None of the other branch meetings between May and September expressed themselves clearly on the subject of fusion. Contrast Hofmeyr, p.203; Coetzee, p.114.

Congress as a significant event<sup>21</sup>. The editor of the Uitenhage Times, who was present in person, described how the opening of the Congress was

announced to the public at an early hour by a black boy bearing the usual 'bell and board'. Some time before that hour, however, ninety-six delegates ... had taken their seats at long tables covered with green baize, each delegate being accommodated with a sheet of creamlaid foolscap and a black lead pencil ready sharpened.

The English-speaking journalists evidently expected worse than they got, and gave high praise to the conduct of the meetings. "There was a remarkable absence of what might be called 'twaddle'", wrote the representative of the Cradock Register. "A more orderly, decorous or earnest assembly we never attended", ran the account of the Uitenhage man; "A more impartial, patient, good-humoured Chairman than Mr Janse van Rensburg we have never seen".

The conference was opened with a prayer, which was already becoming a normal practice at Bond meetings. The agenda was long, and covered a wide range of subjects of immediate interest to the Afrikaner and the Boer; but the points on which controversy was likely to arise were few, and they appeared at the head of the list. Chief among these were the Program van Beginsels of S. J. du Toit and the question of amalgamation. The latter was taken first, and discussed with reference to two contradictory motions, both of which focussed attention, not on the desirability of fusion or otherwise, but on the name which the combined organization should bear. One, sent in by four branches of the Bond, insisted that there should be no amalgamation "tenzij

21. The report in the Uitenhage Times said that the journals represented were the Cape Times, Uitenhage Times, Volksblad, Zuid Afrikaan, and the Cradock journals. These last were the Cradock Register and the Cradocksche Afrikaner. The report of the last of these was taken over by the Middelburg Getuige. The Patriot was not represented, but derived its information from the Zuid Afrikaan and the Volksblad, and gave space in three issues (20, 27 Oct., 10 Nov. 1882) to the account of a dissatisfied member of the congress. A full report, though not a first-hand one, appeared in De Tolk on 29 Sept. These press accounts have been considered in the following narrative, along with the official Notulen van Het Afrikaansch Nationaal Congres gehouden te Cradock, which do not give details of the debates.

de Afrikaner Bond zijn naam en constitutie behoude". The other, contributed by the Murraysburg Boeren Vereeniging, referred to "de wenschelijkheid van het ineensmelten der twee Vereenigingen ... onder een anderen naam". This concern about the name, as something of seemingly greater import than the substance of unification, was no idle idiosyncrasy of a few, but represented the heart of the problem for both learned and simple minds. For the devoted reader of the Patriot or De Tolk, the name "Afrikaner Bond" was more than a convenient label for an organized body of men. It had symbolic value as a part of the mystique: it possessed the "aard en smaak van het volk"; or rather, to employ the analogy which the Bond's loyal versifiers would use again and again, it was the tree beneath which true Afrikanerdom found shelter:

Di Bond, di Afrikaner Bond,  
Aart goed in Afrikaanse grond,  
Hy skiet syn wortels nes 'n boom  
Geplant by frisse waterstroom.

Di Bond, di Afrikaner Bond,  
Versprei syntakke oral rond;  
Hy maak ons eensgesind en sterk,  
En spot met vyands tegenwerk.

Di tyd sal seker eenmaal kom,  
Dat al syn haters sal verstom;  
Dan Afrikaners! - tot besluit -  
Dan rus ons in syn skaduw uit<sup>22</sup>.

It is difficult to read the reports of local Bond meetings, especially in the period between the Cradock and Richmond Congresses, without receiving the impression that loyalty to the name "Afrikaner Bond" was not only widespread, but inspired by sentiments of a semi-religious kind<sup>23</sup>. From the point of view of the non-Bondsman, of course, the opposite was the case, though the objection to retaining the name

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22. This doggerel was composed anonymously to welcome the appearance of De Tolk, which formed the subject of one of the stanzas not reproduced here. See De Tolk, 11 Aug. 1882.

23. See, for example, De Tolk, 11 Apr., 23 May 1883 (reports of meetings at Fraserburg and Vlekpoort, Cradock, respectively), for some quite remarkable reasons why the name "Afrikaner Bond" should not be given up.

"Afrikaner Bond" was usually based on less mystical premises. There was the fear that, in losing their own name, the Boeren Vereenigingen might lose more than their identity. Others again felt that to retain the name "Afrikaner Bond" would be to stigmatize the new united body in the eyes of the English-speaking section, and thus reduce the chance of building any sort of bridge between the two white groups. As one of the delegates to Cradock said, "vele Engelschen waren in zyn district en die schriekten voor den naam, Bond"<sup>24</sup>.

The Cradock Congress did not remove this rock of offence: it circumvented it. Several speakers, Hofmeyr among them, suggested that as a temporary solution the two names should be strung together, until they grew tired of them and thought of something better<sup>25</sup>. Speakers were, on the whole, more concerned to devise ways and means of effecting fusion, and set a high standard of debate. Hofmeyr helped to set the tone, in a well-conceived speech which emphasized the necessity of building up a right relationship between the two white language groups, without treading on the toes of the Bondsmen. He could find nothing to object to in the constitution of the Bond. The Bond had been accused of incitement to rebellion, he said, but that was far from the case - on the contrary, it made Afrikaners loyal because it made them satisfied. There was no question of the Bond trying to drive the English out of the land: the national feeling of English- and Dutch-speaking people had to be developed and welded together. Yet one thing was essential: their English friends had to learn to respect the Afrikaner, above all his language. If the Bond caused ill feeling between Afrikaners and Englishmen, it would be a curse not a blessing; but there could be no question of abandoning the English flag, at least for fifty or a hundred years, though they could not

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24. Volksbode, 4 Oct. 1882. C.f. N. F. de Waal's advice in the Middelburg Getuige, 12 Aug. 1882.

25. They never did, so "Afrikaner Bond en Boeren Vereeniging" remained the official title after amalgamation.

always remain attached to England's apron strings<sup>26</sup>. Oom Daantje van den Heever also stood up and spoke as a full-blooded supporter of both Bond and Boeren Vereeniging, as befitted a son of Africa; and by sons of Africe he meant

Allen alhier te lande geboren. Ja, allen op Zuid Afrika's bodem [roep ik] toe: kyk, broeders, hier is myn arm, kom Engelschman, kom Duitsche, kom Italiaan, kom, haak in, broeders, haak in!<sup>27</sup>

There was loud applause.

The final outcome of a long debate, which had taken up much of the afternoon and evening of the 12th, was the adoption of a resolution that the meeting, "het wenschelijk achtende dat de A. Bond en de B.B. Vereeniging zullen worden vereenigd", should appoint a commission to draw up a constitution on the basis of the rules of both bodies, and that a further congress of plenipotentiaries should be called to bring amalgamation about. This was carried by a large majority,<sup>28</sup> and its implementation was left to two commissions. The first, consisting of Hofmeyr, D. F. du Toit, and J. M. Hoffman, a doctor from Paarl, was entrusted with the drafting of a new constitution. The other, which was referred to as a standing executive committee, was charged with the organizing and convening of another congress as soon as the constitutional commission had done its work. Its members were D. P. van den Heever, Jeremias van Heerden<sup>29</sup>, and T. P. Theron.

No sooner had the constitutional commission been appointed, than Theron rose to move the abandonment of the first item on the agenda. This was S. J. du Toit's Program van Beginsels. He urged that the constitutional commission was the proper body to look into this, and there is no suggestion in any of the reports that this proposal called forth audible opposition. But the Patriot's unhappy correspondent clearly

26. Hofmeyr, pp. 203-4.

27. Volksbode, 4 Oct. 1882.

28. Several of the sources state that seven votes were cast against the motion, but none indicate whose they were.

29. This was J. A. van Heerden of Murraysburg. There were three other J. van Heerdens present.

suppressed his own disappointment:

Eers is dit uitgestel tot di aand sitting en toen is dit weer in di doofpot gedaan<sup>30</sup>.

### III

The reaction of Bond and Vereeniging branches to the Cradock proposals for amalgamation was generally very favourable; but one outcome of the Congress was the early emergence of an opposition group, scattered geographically yet united in the main points of their argument, whose hostility to the Cradock decisions became the subject of much interest during the next few months.

The lead came from D. F. du Toit and the Patriot, the last of whose editorials before the Cradock Congress argued against fusion in a manner which must certainly have caused Bondsmen furiously to think. Du Toit came out in support of his brother's Program van Beginsels and against fusion except on terms whereby the Bond kept its name and its constitution, and he advocated co-operation rather than fusion as the more desirable course<sup>31</sup>. After the ending of the Congress, he criticized its decision with regard to the constitution, asking whether this meant that the Bond constitution was not broad enough to comprehend the Vereeniging as well, or whether a marriage was intended between the two bodies,

soos tussen Zuid Afrikaan en Volksvriend geslote is, waarby eersgenoemde wel syn naam behou het, mar feitelik in laasgenoemde opgelos is<sup>32</sup>.

By November, "Oom Lokomotief" was still more positive in his condemnation:

Om kort te gaan, di Bond het, op di Kongres, 'n vol-slage neerlaag gely en di Vereniging 'n grote oerwinning behaal. Bondsmanne daar teenwoordig het alles prys gege ... Ons herhaal dat ons di noodsakelikheid van aneensluiting ni insiet ni; daar gen goeds van

30. Patriot, 20 Oct. 1882.

31. Patriot, 8 Sept. 1882.

32. Patriot, 15 Sept. 1882.

verwag ni, en reeds nadeel deur di besluit gely het<sup>33</sup>. His attitude invites the question why he had not been present at Cradock in person to present the case against fusion, for it was no secret that the issue was going to be brought up. His own explanation, given in the Patriot on 8 September, was that his teaching duties and his editorial responsibilities would prevent him from going. But in view of his brother's departure for the Transvaal and the firmness of his own convictions, not to mention his personal standing in the Bond and the weight which his presence would have carried, the historian must be forgiven for conjecturing that the reasons which he gave for his absence do not tell the whole story. He may have realized that his brother's Program had failed to win the support of conservative Afrikaner opinion in the Colony, either in its theological garb or in its advocacy of a united South Africa under its own flag; or alternatively that his insecure position on the Hoofdbestuur of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging would tell against him in the event of a clash between Hofmeyr and himself<sup>34</sup>; or he may have calculated that his future position would be a stronger one if he were able to criticize the Cradock decisions as one who had not, by his presence, been implicated in their making. At all events, criticize them he did, though it has not been proved that he was personally involved in stirring up the opposition which began to appear in other centres.

It was at Ceres that the first serious friction took place. Hofmeyr went there on 29 September 1882, and according to his biographer his intention was to found a branch of the Boeren Vereeniging; but "immediately after his departure one finds other counsels prevailing and a Bond branch established instead"<sup>35</sup>. Two reports in the Patriot, however, make it

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33. Patriot, 3 Nov. 1882.

34. Votes cast in the Hoofdbestuur elections show that D. F. du Toit, who had been near the top of the list in 1879, had received the lowest poll of all those elected in 1882.

35. Hofmeyr, pp. 201-2.

clear that on this occasion Hofmeyr was defied to his face<sup>36</sup>. According to the second of these, Onze Jan advised his audience that it would be invidious to form a branch of Bond or Vereeniging alone, because the Cradock commission was trying to unite them. He then slipped in a good word for the Vereeniging, stressing its strong financial position and pointing out that in the whole electoral division of Worcester there was only one branch of the Bond. His persuasiveness, however, failed. A local man waited for him to finish and then moved the formation of a Bond branch. Hofmeyr countered with the suggestion that a joint Bond and Boeren Vereeniging should be set up, and when this was rejected he publicly expressed his disappointment. A branch of the Bond was duly established, and at a meeting on 16 October it decided to oppose the plan for amalgamation accepted at Cradock<sup>37</sup>.

Of rather more consequence was another meeting on 12 October, at which N. P. van der Meulen reported on the Cradock Congress to the Bond branch at Bedford, about sixty of whose members came to hear what he had to say. The editor of the Opregte Afrikaner told his audience, quite correctly, that he had previously attended the Graaff-Reinet meeting, and quite incorrectly that he had seen at that meeting "even zoo veel leden van B.B. Vereenigingen als Bondsmannen"<sup>38</sup>, though he had supposed it to be an exclusively Bond meeting. He had regretted at the time that no Provincial Bestuur had been set up at Graaff-Reinet, and was amazed when the suggestion had come up that the Bond should merge with the Boeren Vereenigingen and change its name. His audience no doubt appreciated the force of this remark in the light of their own local situation. However, van der Meulen continued, he had relied on the subsequent Congress at Cradock to put matters right. But at Cradock came

36. Patriot, 6, 13 Oct. 1882. J. D. du Toit, p.165, has put the record straight.

37. Patriot, 24 Nov. 1882.

38. See above, p.117, where it is argued that all the delegates at Graaff-Reinet were Bondsmen.

further disillusionment, for there was "een ver van vriendschappelijke houding jegens den Bond" even among those who said they were its supporters, even indeed among some who had joined as members.

Korſom, ik kan maar zeggen, dat er eene adder in het gras verscholen lag, en dit kwam duidelyk uit, vooral toen het punt van de naamsverandering besproken werd. Ik verzettede my met alle kracht tegen elke verandering in den naam van den Afrikaner Bond en toonde aan dat dit hoogst ongerymd zouden wezen, terwyl ik in dien geest een voorstel aan de vergadering deed; maar toen ik hoorde dat er een Commissie zou worden benoemd om dit punt in overweging te nemen en later omtrent haar resultaat al de takken van den Bond bekend te maken, zoodat de meerderheid dan kon beslissen, moest ik my hiermede te vrede stellen.

He therefore urged Bondsmen to work together "zonder eenige vreemde invloed" to make their organization a means of prosperity for land and volk, which was its proper destiny, and he made a proposal to the following effect: that a further congress of the Bond in the Cape Colony should be held not later than 27 November, at either Hanover or Richmond, for the purpose of setting up a Bond Provincial Bestuur; and that this new Bestuur should then send to delegates to the forthcoming festival at Paardekraal in the South African Republic, which was due to be held on 16 December, with the object of bringing into being a Central Bestuur for the whole Bond in South Africa<sup>39</sup>. Van der Meulen's proposal was greeted with applause by the meeting, and its author immediately set about putting it into action. He assumed the role of convener of this Congress, and on 14 November he placed an advertisement in the press to the effect that it would meet at Richmond on the 28th.

It was about this time, apparently, that Hofmeyr determined, in the words of his biographer, "to effect from within

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39. The full text of this resolution, which was a long one, was published in De Tolk, 3 Nov. 1882 and the Zuid Afrikaan, 2 Dec. 1882. Sources for the Bedford meeting are: Opregte Afrikaner, 18 Oct. 1882, taken over in the Zuid Afrikaan, 24 Oct. and De Tolk, 27 Oct. 1882.

the Bond what it seemed impossible to accomplish from without"<sup>40</sup>. The founding of a branch of the Bond was simplicity itself, and Hofmeyr, after taking a few moderate Englishmen into his confidence to safeguard himself against any possible misconception of his motives, established one in Cape Town on 28 October. Among those who joined was F. J. Dormer, editor of the Cape Argus, and Victor Sampson has related how "Dormer explained privately that their intention was to get hold of the organization and control it"<sup>41</sup>. Hofmeyr was elected chairman on 2 November, and the new branch immediately adopted the aims and objects set out in the Free State Bond constitution, pending the drafting of their own<sup>42</sup>. It was a clever move, and seems to have been made with the primary object of enabling Hofmeyr to attend van der Meulen's Congress as a delegate, and thus put a stop to the "wild work" of which Sampson said he disapproved.

Van der Meulen's plan got a mixed reception. Some branches of the Bond, for example Queenstown<sup>43</sup>, considered the invitation to be in conflict with the Cradock resolution, while the Congress even stood in danger of being disowned by the branch which had been asked to act as host. The Richmond Bondsmen objected not only to the political unwisdom of the Bedford resolution, but also to the decision to hold the meeting "terwijl de oogst op handen is in dit distrikt"; but when van der Meulen refused to be put off by their protests, they agreed to co-operate<sup>44</sup>. The Komgha branch, and others, were in sympathy with the Bedford resolution, but found that they had not been given sufficient time to choose delegates.<sup>45</sup> Even the Patriot was put out by van der Meulen's haste, and used the information that the Paardekraal festivities were to be postponed to urge that the Congress too should be deferred; but "Oom Lokomotief" fully endorsed the reasons given

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40. Hofmeyr, p. 202.

41. V. Sampson, My Reminiscences, p.59.

42. Zuid Afrikaan, 28 Oct., 4 Nov. 1882.

43. Patriot, 17 Nov. 1882.

44. Zuid Afrikaan, 21 Nov. 1882; De Tolk, 10 Jan. 1883.

45. Patriot, 1 Dec. 1882.

for calling it<sup>46</sup>. Hofmeyr, apart from regretting the undue haste, feared that the ground gained at Cradock might be lost, especially if an unrepresentative minority of the Bond took control at Richmond and constituted themselves as a Provincial Bestuur<sup>47</sup>. Under such circumstances the Bond itself might easily split. His prompt action in founding the Cape Town Bond branch so as to be able to attend at Richmond in person has been represented by both friendly and hostile writers as a clever move on his part to extend his personal influence, which it undoubtedly was; but to do Hofmeyr justice, it also needs to be said that his intervention may well have saved the Bond from itself. Intervention was not the only course open to him. A press campaign against van der Meulen could quickly have made the sponsors of the new Congress look silly; but though he would certainly have gained the upper hand if he had chosen to pick a quarrel, such action might have seriously marred the movement towards samesmelting on which his mind was now set. As events turned out, his action enabled the procedure agreed upon at Cradock to be followed with only a minor hitch.

Van der Meulen's Congress took place, and it was nearly a sorry fiasco. It was poorly attended<sup>48</sup>, and almost immediately after the start of proceedings its constitutionality was contested, it being apparent that a good proportion of the delegates doubted either van der Meulen's right to call it or the right of the meeting to take any decisions repugnant to those agreed upon at Cradock. J. S. O. Brink of Richmond ruled from the chair that the meeting was indeed lawful because it consisted of accredited delegates, but that it was bound by the Cradock decisions - a ruling which

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46. Patriot, 27 Oct., 3, 10, 24 Nov. 1882.

47. Zuid Afrikaan, 16 Nov. 1882.

48. Two district besturen (Bedford and Carnarvon) and fifteen branches (Sterkstroom, Rietfontein, Hanover, Philipstown, Oost Uitvlugt and Zuid Winterveld (Richmond), Richmond dorp Hamelfontein (Colesberg), Cape Town, and the six wards of Graaff-Reinet) were represented. The Notulen of this congress were published in the Zuid Afrikaan, 7 Dec. 1882.

was contested by several speakers on both sides. It was only after the debate had reached something like a stalemate that Hofmeyr intervened with a lengthy motion which broke away from the unprofitable discussion of the meeting's legality and contained the following substantive proposal:

Deze vergadering thans uiteen gaat, maar het opdraagt aan haren voorzitter, den assistent-voorzitter en den secretaris, zamen met de heeren Thomas P. Theron, [Jeremias van Heerden]<sup>49</sup> en D.P. van den Heever, om in den loop der maand Maart e.k., op zoodanige plaats als zij zullen goedvinden, eene Provinciale Vergadering te beleggen van een lid van elk Distriktsbestuur, ten einde daarop eene Constitutie aan te nemen, en leden te kiezen van het Centraal Bestuur.

In other words, the three office-bearers of the Congress, J. S. O. Brink (chairman), Paul J. van der Merwe (vice-chairman) and Daniel F. Berrangé (secretary), were to smooth out the difficulties in consultation with the standing executive committee appointed at Cradock. The proposal was accepted by fifteen votes to five, the minority consisting of van der Meulen and his supporters, who had throughout taken their stand on the necessity of electing a Provincial Bestuur there and then; and the acceptance of Hofmeyr's proposal brought the formal business of the Congress to an end.

The fact which emerges most clearly from these proceedings is that Hofmeyr made no attempt to thwart van der Meulen's main purpose, which was to complete the constitutional structure of the Afrikaner Bond by bringing its Provincial Bestuur into existence<sup>50</sup>. He prevented a congress of the Bond which was far from representative from claiming an authority which it obviously did not possess; but he called for the summoning of a properly constituted Bond congress after a suitable interval, which would establish a Provincial Bestuur and even - a point which he had

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49. Hofmeyr omitted Jeremias van Heerden on the supposition that he was not a Bondsman, but on being assured to the contrary agreed to include his name.

50. Hofmeyr's biographer, p.205, has therefore misrepresented Onze Jan's intention. Coetzee, pp. 117-8, has correctly taken him to task over this.

never accepted on principle before - appoint delegates to a Central Bestuur whose authority would extend to the Bond in the Republics. This was a major concession, and brought Hofmeyr into line with the brazen spirits in Paarl and Bloemfontein who planned to turn the Bond into an organic inter-territorial movement. His purpose in bringing the office-bearers of the Richmond Congress into contact with the Cradock executive seems to have been to prevent the possibility of the two committees working at cross purposes. But it had the unexpected result of a protest from T. P. Theron, who thought that the Richmond Congress had arbitrarily increased the size of the Cradock Committee. Hofmeyr explained that this was not his purpose at all, and that the three men appointed at Richmond were a separate committee whose job was to convene a meeting of the Bond, and that their relationship with the Cradock committee was to be purely consultative<sup>51</sup>.

This explanation the Cradock executive committee declined to accept, and on 10 January 1883 they took it upon themselves to summon a Bond congress as soon as the formation of ten District Besturen had been reported to Theron, naming February as the month in which this congress ought to meet<sup>52</sup>. Hofmeyr answered back. How, he asked, could the differences within the Bond be resolved if two authoritative committees issued contrary instructions? At Richmond it had been agreed that each District Bestuur should send one representative to a Provincial Bestuur in March; but now the decision had been taken that each District Bestuur should send two representatives to a rival Provincial Bestuur in February. This, he urged, was a slap in the face for the Cradock Congress, which had not authorized the executive committee to summon any congress from which the Boeren Vereenigingen were excluded; and what made their action still worse

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51. Zuid Afrikaan, 14 Dec. 1882. The Patriot supported Hofmeyr's plan on 12 Jan. 1883.

52. De Volk, 10 Jan. 1883.

was that it had been taken before the Cradock constitutional committee had published its recommendations<sup>53</sup>. Theron replied to Hofmeyr's arguments on 25 January, denying that the committee elected at Richmond had any standing<sup>54</sup>. His committee, however, had second thoughts, and on 7 February they met at Hanover to reconsider their proposals. The outcome of their deliberations was a fresh circular, which urged the rapid grouping of Bond branches into District Besturen, so that when a sufficient number of District Besturen had come into being, the secretary of the committee could invite an equal number of their representatives and of members of the Hoofdbestuur of the western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging to meet at a place which he would determine, under an impartial chairman, to consider the draft constitution which had by this time been published. All reports of the formation of District Besturen were to reach Theron by 15 March for this purpose<sup>55</sup>.

Hofmeyr was still not satisfied. He raised a number of objections on technical points which the executive committee had overlooked, chiefly by failing to indicate how much of their instruction of 10 January had been superseded by the Hanover circular, and how much of it still stood. He liked their new proposals better, however, and was prepared to treat the Hanover circular as the basis for a modus operandi, adding a few further suggestions to make up its deficiencies. The most important of these was that for the purpose of the proposed conference the eastern Boeren Vereenigingen should seek representation through the secretary of the western Hoofdbestuur<sup>56</sup>. Even this, however, was not the end of the story. The Congress which was originally planned for March did not open until 22 May<sup>57</sup>, and by that time the principle of equal representation for the Bond

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53. Zuid Afrikaan, 16 Jan. 1883.

54. Published in the Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Feb. 1883.

55. The Hanover meeting was reported in the Volksblad, and taken over by De Tolk, 21 Feb. 1883.

56. Zuid Afrikaan, 15 Feb. 1883.

57. The executive committee's summons was dated 6 April. (cont.)

and the Vereeniging, as laid down in the Hanover circular, had been abandoned for administrative reasons in favour of a more sensible proposal that each party should send as many delegates as it thought fit, but that all decisions on the matter of fusion should have binding effect only if carried by a majority vote within each organization. The idea of holding a separate Bond Congress before the combined meeting still held, and both Congresses were arranged to meet at Richmond, the Bond on 22 May, and the combined meeting on the 24th. The Bond would thus be able to set up its own Provincial Bestuur before negotiating with the Vereeniging. The Hoofdbestuur of the western Vereeniging had in the meantime arranged to hold its annual general meeting much earlier than usual, on 29 May at Beaufort West. It would thus be able, if the Richmond Congress went according to plan, to complete the process of fusion by dissolving the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging as an independent organization.

## IV

An excess of zeal on the part of N. P. van der Meulen, supplemented by the fumbings of an executive committee more conscious of its dignity than its terms of reference, had made the problem of convening a congress rather more complex than it need have been. Hofmeyr would yearn at a later date for greater legal brain-power in the Bond's parliamentary ranks; but a small number of clear-thinking lawyers would not have been an embarrassment during these early months of party-building either. Under Hofmeyr's guidance,

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57 (cont.) The delay was due to several causes: the western Vereeniging required six weeks' notice of the congress; the organization of Bond branches into district besturen took longer than expected; April was the ploughing season, etc.

however, the leaders managed to muddle their way through the intricacies of the procedural problem until at last a satisfactory solution was found. It remained only to be seen how strong the desire to unite now was, and the answer to this question was bound to depend very much on the skill and harmony of the Cradock constitutional commission.

This commission had completed their work by 20 January, and their report was made available for public consideration on 3 February<sup>58</sup>. They brought five existing documents under contribution,<sup>59</sup> drawing upon them all, and produced as a result of their labours two separate instruments: a general constitution for the Afrikaner Bond, and a provincial constitution for the Cape Colony. They left no detailed record of their proceedings, but their report indicated that there had been unanimity on all but a few important points; and it may be assumed (though this is nowhere stated) that on the issues over which the commission held divided views D. F. du Toit was in the minority. The main points at issue concerned the organization and the aims of the united body, and the draft constitutions are therefore most suitably considered under these two heads.

The commission looked to the various Bond constitutions, with their correlation of Ward, District, Provincial and Central Besturen, to provide the organizational pattern, in preference to the less adaptable structure of the western Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging. They went some way towards meeting the special needs of the various "provinces" by allowing each to have its own local constitution, and, in

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58. The members, it will be recalled, were J. H. Hofmeyr, D. F. du Toit, and Dr J. M. Hoffman (chairman). See the Rapport van den Commissie over de Ineensmelting van den Afrikaander Bond en de Boerenbescherminingsvereenigingen.

59. These were the Bepalingen en Regulatien of the western Boeren Bescherminings Vereeniging, the Patriot Ontwerp van Bepalings, the Express constitution, the Transvaal Bond constitution of 16 May 1882, and the current Free State Bond constitution of 2 December 1882. For the text of these documents, see Appendices B and C.

the case of the Cape, by allowing it to retain the name "Boeren Vereeniging" in its official title. But the commission's proposals were essentially unitary in form despite these concessions to local particularity, and when D. F. du Toit later argued that the proposed constitution was too decentralized, he had no real case. This fact may be seen best of all in the extremely vague authority granted to the Central Bestuur to amend the general constitution "met toestemming van eene meerderheid der Provinciale Besturen"<sup>60</sup>. The clause, so worded, could have committed the Colonial Bond to an arrangement formulated by the Bond in the Republics against its own judgment. Even at the Richmond congress, where the wording was changed to "met inachtneming van het gevoel en der lagere besturen"<sup>61</sup>, the residual authority of the Central Bestuur in the matter of constitutional amendment was not disturbed, and the conditions for its exercise were rendered even vaguer. The Central Bestuur would abuse these powers before very long<sup>62</sup>.

The commission chose to describe the aims and objects of the combined Bond and Vereeniging in words taken almost verbatim from the Express constitution, as follows:

De Bond kent geene nationaliteit hoegenaamd, dan alleen die der Afrikaanders, en beschouwt als daartoe te behooren, een ieder, van welke afkomst ook, die de welvaart van Zuid-Afrika beoogt.

Het doel van den Afrikaander Bond is: het vormen van eene Zuid-Afrikaansche nationaliteit, door de aankweeking van ware vaderlandsliefde.

Naar dit doel zal de Bond streven, door de Afrikaanders aan te moedigen zich zoowel op staatkundig als op maatschappelijk gebied te doen gelden als een natie<sup>63</sup>.

These statements were rooted in that broad conception of Afrikaner nationality, as something definable in terms of will rather than of race, which was to be found in the letter of all the background documents; but they were very vague in regard both to the nature of the Bond itself - was it

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60. Draft general constitution, Art. XIII.

61. General constitution adopted at Richmond, Art. XIV.

62. See below, pp. 194-6.

63. Draft general constitution, Arts. I-III.

supposed to be a cultural association or a political party? - and to the specific course of action which the Bond intended to pursue. There were those, like the editor of the Patriot, who wanted the statement of aims to be rather more robust, and who therefore derived greater satisfaction from the equivalent sections of the Transvaal Bond constitution, which read:

De Bond vestigt zich onder de blanke bevolking van geheel Zuid Afrika. Hy neemt in zich op allen, die Zuid Afrika als hun vaderland erkennen, en de Beginsels van den Bond aannemen, hetzy zy in Zuid-Afrika geboren zyn of van buitenlands derwaarts gekomen.

Het naaste doel van den Bond is de vorming eener Zuid Afrikaansche Nationaliteit; door aaneensluiting en samenwerking, als voorbereiding tot bereiking van het einddoel: een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika onder eigen vlag<sup>64</sup>.

It was, in fact, around this statement of aims in the Transvaal constitution that opposition to the Cradock commission's report began to grow. It contained a lucid political objective, a firm affirmation of a colour bar, and an implicit acceptance of S. J. du Toit's Program van Beginsels. The only other major issue was a point on which D. F. du Toit had been outvoted in the constitutional commission. This was the inclusion of the word "christelijk", which appeared in none of the existing constitutions, in the section of the general constitution dealing with the encouragement of "doeltreffend en degelijk onderwijs"<sup>65</sup>.

The fact that D. F. du Toit had subscribed to the greater part of the draft constitutions, and that the documents carried his signature, did not prevent him from using his influence to secure their rejection. He seems to have been attracted to the Transvaal constitution in toto, though he would doubtless have wished to add some reference to a Central Bestuur which this document lacked. The influence of the Patriot resulted in the growth of some opposition to the proposed constitutions between their publication and the

64. Transvaal Bond constitution, Arts. 1, 2.

65. The Patriot constitution omitted all reference to education; the Express and Free State constitutions (Art. 3 in both cases) and the Transvaal constitution (Art. 5(d)) used the phrase "degelijk en doelmatig".

opening of the Richmond Congress, nearly always on the points indicated above; but although the volume of protest was now greater than it had been at the time of the Cradock Congress, there is no room for doubt that the opponents of the Cradock commission's proposals made up only a small fraction of the total Bond membership<sup>66</sup>, whilst there was no instance of any branch of the western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging rejecting the commission's recommendations<sup>67</sup>.

## V

The Bondsmen were the first to arrive in Richmond, thirty-nine of them representing twenty-three District Besturen, and including in their number D. F. du Toit, Oom Daantje van den Heever, and Onze Jan<sup>68</sup>. The Free State Bond was represented in the persons of its imperturbable Chief Justice and one other, and the Transvaal Bondsmen would doubtless have been represented as well had they been able to set up their own Provincial Bestuur. S. J. du

66. The attitude of the Patriot may be gleaned from editorials and special articles on the following dates: 2 Feb., 9, 16, 23 and 30 Mar., 6 and 13 Apr. 1883. For D.F. du Toit's attitude immediately before the Richmond congress, see the account of a Bond meeting in Daljosaphat (Patriot, 18 May 1883).

The only Bond branches to reject the commission's proposals on principle seem to have been: Prince Albert (De Tolk, 10 Jan. 1883); Ceres (Patriot, 24 Nov. 1882), Bedford (Zuid Afrikaan, 29 May 1883), all of which rejected fusion on principle without waiting to see what the commission's proposals were like; some or all of Fraserburg (De Tolk, 11 Apr. 1883), Vlekpoort, Cradock (ibid.), Daljosaphat (Patriot, 18 May 1883), West Uitvlugt, Richmond (De Tolk, 23 May 1883), and possibly a very few others. Such branches usually wanted the adoption of the Transvaal document. A larger number of branches expressed a preference for D.F. du Toit's views on education, or the Program van Beginsels or the colour bar, without rejecting the constitutional proposals on principle.

67. This may be confirmed with reference to reports of meetings of the Vereeniging's branches in the Zuid Afrikaan between 3 and 22 May 1883. A preference for "christelijk onderwijs" was expressed, however, by the branches at Tulbagh and Uniondale (Zuid Afrikaan, 10 May 1883).

68. The official Notulen of the Eerste Provinciale Bestuurs Vergadering van den Afrikaander Bond gehouden te Richmond

were printed together with the Notulen eener (cont.)

Toit, however, sent his greetings to the Congress in a letter which expressed the hope that a Cape Provincial Bestuur would be set up,

alsook dat er een weg tot vereeniging of samenwerking tusschen den Afrikaner Bond en B.B. Vereeniging alsdan moge gevonden worden, en dat uw Provinciaal Bestuur ook er toe moge overgaan om uwe Koloniale vertegenwoordigers te kiezen voor het Centraal Bestuur, daar de gemeenschappelijke belangen van Zuid Afrika ons de spoedige vorming van dit laatste Bestuur ernstig schijnen te vorderen.

The meeting on 22 May had little business to do beyond declaring itself to be properly constituted as a Provincial Bestuur, and choosing its office-bearers, which it did. It had been the usual practice in the past to vote the chairman of the branch which was acting as host into the chair, which was done on this occasion too; but this time the election seems to have been treated as a trial of strength. P. J. van der Merwe received only a bare majority over D. F. du Toit, with Hofmeyr a poor third, while the secretaryship was given to one of du Toit's followers, J. P. Toerien of Paarl.

The important business began with the opening of the combined meeting on the 24th. An unexpected snag occurred before the opening. It was the Queen's birthday, and the delegates were informed that the magistrate's office, where the initial Bond meeting had been held, would not be available because it was required for a public celebration. A strong deputation accordingly visited the magistrate to request the use of the hall, according to D. F. du Toit, "met di belofte om dri Hoerahs te ge vir di Koningin". The bargain was not acceptable, and the combined meeting had to be held after all in the public school building; but this did not stop the delegates from giving tongue to their loyalty<sup>69</sup>, after according

68. 68 (cont.) Vergadering van den Afrikaner Bond en de Boerenbeschermings-vereeniging, gehouden te Richmond, and a copy exists in the Hofmeyr Collection. The Patriot, Zuid Afrikaan and Volksblad, as well as other newspapers, had reporters present. The following account is based mainly on the Zuid Afrikaan, 29, 31 May 1883, and De Tolk, 6 June 1883. The fullest published account is that given by J. A. Coetzee, pp. 123-33. See also Hofmeyr, pp. 205-8.

69. "Di loyaliteit van di vergadering was van so 'n anstekelike aard, dat selfs honde wat daar teenwoordig was saam juig - exkuus, saam blaf! Wi sal nou nog beweere dat di Afrikaner

Bond ni loyaal is nie!" So wrote D. F. du Toit.

a similar welcome to the ever-present delegates from the Free State. By this time the number of Bondsmen had risen to forty, while twenty-four delegates represented thirteen branches of the Boeren Vereenigingen, nine of these branches belonging to Hofmeyr's western association. Bond delegates sat on the right of the chair, Hofmeyr among them, and Vereeniging delegates on the left. The chair itself was occupied by J. J. Janse van Rensburg, whose success at Cradock resulted in his being put there again by an all but unanimous vote. D. F. du Toit was elected as his deputy, and Thomas Theron was given the secretaryship, which he would continue to hold for many years to come.

After a few preliminaries, the meeting gave its attention to the two draft constitutions, taking the general one first. Each was discussed clause by clause, and an amended version of both received the approbation of both groups of delegates. This meant that the meeting not only accepted the principle of amalgamation but also reached agreement on all practical details connected with its consummation. But how easily was all this achieved, in the light of the differences which had been building up over the preceding months, and was it accompanied by a sufficient amount of good will?

The evidence points to the fact that even the strongest opponents of fusion expected the Richmond Congress to succeed. Du Toit's Patriot expected on 18 May that amalgamation would be "deurgedrewe".

Ons verwag [the article continued] dat 'n meerderheid, ja waarskynlik groote meerderheid, sig voor aneensluiting sal verklaar.

At the Congress, the tactics adopted by the opponents of the draft constitution were not to move its total rejection, but to attempt to amend it in various particulars, generally so that the final result would resemble the Transvaal constitution on the points that mattered. They did not seek a debate on the general principles underlying the drafts, and had not in any case prepared themselves for this by submitting

an alternative document. There were not many clauses on which real argument was expected. Article 12 of the general constitution, which gave the Colonial Bond the right to include "Boeren Vereeniging" in its title, was considered by du Toit to be a likely stumbling block, but he miscalculated:

Hier was nou di punt [he wrote], waar almal gereken het hier sal seker 'n skerpe stryd gestrede worde. Hier by di artikel moes di vereniging deur gaan, of anders was di skydslyn nog skerper dan voorheen. En tog wat siet ons gebeur? Sonder slag of stoot was di artikel aangenomen. Gouver dan eenig ander artikel was nommer 12 afgehandel, en met 35 Bondstemme en 20 B. Vereenigingstemme was di vereeniging 'n volbrag werk.

He thought that the meeting had disposed of the point too hastily, and that opponents had hardly been given a chance to state their objections, though the Zuid Afrikaan reported that A. S. le Roex of Fraserburg was allowed to move an amendment for the deletion of "Boeren Vereeniging". Oom Lokomotief continued:

Dit was as of almal bang was om 'n woord te spreek wat kwaad kan werk, en cito, cito bring di voor-sitter di saak tot stemming en haas eenparig stem almal daarvoor dat di naam sal wees 'Afrikaner Bond en Boerenvereeniging'.

The opponents of the draft constitution thus lost their point over the name. They failed, after an extensive argument when minds were still fresh, to secure the incorporation of a colour bar - and failed by the impressive margin of forty-nine votes to six; but the discussion centred on political tactics rather than political principle, and for that reason the defeat had comparatively little importance. Nobody seriously thought of admitting to the Bond a person who was not "white"<sup>70</sup>. Du Toit's supporters did not, however, go away empty-handed. They obtained their "christelike onderwijs", and went a long way towards securing the Transvaal formula covering aims and objects.

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70. The question of non-white membership of the Bond is discussed more fully below, pp. 229 ff.

This last was really the most controversial topic of all. The article in question, as set out in the draft general constitution, read:

Het doel van den Afrikaander Bond is: het vormen van eene Zuid-Afrikaansche nationaliteit, door de aankweeking van ware vaderlandsliefde.

To this, Chief Justice Reitz proposed to add:

als voorbereiding tot bereiking van het einddoel, een vereenigd Zuid Afrika,

while D. F. du Toit proposed to complete this quotation from the Transvaal Bond constitution with the addition of the words

onder eigen vlag.

J. S. Marais, of the western Boeren Vereeniging, and D. P. van den Heever both rose to object to these amendments. The debate became acrimonious and personal after van den Heever had charged Reitz with indelicacy "om hier in di Engelse gebied so 'n voorstel te kom maak", as the report in De Tolk put it. Reitz retorted that he was not afraid to say what he wanted anywhere, even in the presence of the Queen herself. As at the earlier Richmond Congress, Hofmeyr waited for the right moment and then entered the debate on wings of peace: let Reitz substitute the words "final destiny" (eindbestemming) for "final object" (einddoel), and thus meet his own supporters half way. Reitz agreed to do this. Eindbestemming was a less provocative word to use, and it satisfied those who, like Marais, had opposed Reitz's amendment for tactical reasons. When the matter was eventually put to the vote, du Toit's amendment was rejected by an overwhelming majority<sup>71</sup>, and Reitz's amendment, incorporating Hofmeyr's verbal change, agreed to by each delegation.

Procedure for the amalgamation of the Bond and the Vereenigingen was clarified at Richmond, and rather clumsily incorporated in the provincial Bond constitution, from which it

71. According to De Tolk, eight delegates voted in favour of du Toit's amendment; and according to the Zuid Afrikaan, thirty-four Bondsmen and twenty-one Vereeniging men voted against it.

would later have to be removed when that amalgamation had taken place. Once the draft constitutions had been accepted by the combined meeting, the Bondsmen ratified them under their own chairman, and admitted the members of the Vereenigingen present as members of the Bond, on a proposal by D. F. du Toit. The following morning a new election of office-bearers for the Bond Provincial Bestuur resulted in the choice of Janse van Rensburg as chairman by a large majority of votes. D. F. du Toit was chosen as vice-chairman, narrowly defeating Hofmeyr, who was elected to the treasurer'ship, while Thomas Theron was re-elected secretary. Hofmeyr and du Toit were then chosen as the representatives of the Cape Province on the Bond Central Bestuur, with van Rensburg and Theron as their respective deputies. The remainder of the time available to the delegates was devoted to a discussion of a small proportion of the beschryvingspunten submitted by the branches. The Congress ended that evening, the process of amalgamation being complete, save in two details: the western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging still had to accept the new constitutions and wind itself up, and the Bond branches, which could not be denied the last word, still had to register their assent.

The Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging went through the motions of dissolving itself, without any fuss, at Beaufort West on 29 May<sup>72</sup>. The actual deed of dissolution was performed by the Hoofdbestuur, which reconstituted itself as a public meeting and then turned its attention to general matters. The reports of Bond branch meetings in De Tolk between June and December 1883 indicate overwhelming support for the Richmond decisions. A few branches dissented, as was to be expected - Bedford, Prince Albert, Klein Drakenstein, Fraserburg, and Gouph No. 5, Beaufort West, to name some of them. But in view of the general support which the Richmond

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72. Zuid Afrikaan, 2 June 1883.

decisions received, there was no effective course left for these branches save secession. Prince Albert apparently did secede, for the Bond statistical records mention no further branch there until 1892; but the action of this branch does not appear to have precipitated a general movement. For every report which indicated some sort of dissent there were ten or more which showed either that the combined name had been accepted without dispute, or that the Richmond decisions were acclaimed.

The Richmond Congress had achieved two things: it had united the Colonial Bond and the Boeren Beschermings Vereenigingen, and it had given the united body a properly constituted Provincial Bestuur. The organization of the Colonial Bond had thus caught up with that of its Free State counterpart, and as soon as the Transvaal Bondsmen were able to tie up their own organization, it would be possible to establish a Central Bestuur and thus bring the structure to completion. At Richmond, the delegates accepted a proposal by Chief Justice Reitz that the Colonial members of the Central Bestuur should consult with their Free State and Transvaal counterparts with a view to holding a meeting at Bloemfontein on 15 October. It was chiefly the unpreparedness of the Transvaal which prevented this proposal being followed up, and the Central Bestuur was further away in 1883 than the Bondsmen at the time imagined. By the time of the next Colonial Bond Congress, at Graaff-Reinet in March 1884, the Transvalers had put their house in order and elected their central members. Hofmeyr and D. F. du Toit were re-elected at this Congress, but the first meeting of the Central Bestuur was not held until February 1886<sup>73</sup>. It was the only meeting

73. Piet Joubert and P.J. Naude were elected as the Transvaal's central representatives on 12 Jan. 1884 (Library of Parliament Bond MSS., p.65). S.J. du Toit was in Europe at the time, and it was decided on the initiative of the Cape to postpone the meeting of the Central Bestuur until such time as he could represent the Transvaal (*ibid.*, pp. 74-5. T.P. Theron to Jakob Middel, 22 Feb., 19 Apr. 1884).

of its kind to occur, and took place at a time when the prospect of co-operation between the Colonies and Republics of South Africa was brighter than it had ever been since the birth of the Bond, or was to be again until after the South African war. This meeting of the Central Bestuur represents the high water mark of the Bond's influence as an inter-territorial political movement; but, for reasons which will appear later<sup>74</sup>, it failed to make use of the opportunity which it was then given to build up that spirit of South African unity to which it was dedicated on principle.

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74. For the later influence of the Central Bestuur, see below, pp. 194-6, 202-3, 210, 224.

PART TWO

THE BOND IN ACTION

University of Cape Town

## THE ASSAULT ON THE IMPERIAL FACTOR, 1878-86

## I

The western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging was barely in existence before it found itself involved in strenuous general elections for both Houses of Parliament. The Council election was the first to be fought on the basis of the Seven Circles Act of 1874<sup>1</sup>, which had amended the system of representation in the Upper House by dividing the Colony into seven large electoral provinces, each returning three members, in place of the previous arrangement under which eleven members had been sent from the western Cape and ten from the eastern. The law had been drafted by J. H. de Villiers, then Attorney-General, whose aim had been to favour the country districts and "remove the predominance of the towns"<sup>2</sup>. Because of this, it is arguable that the farming interest would have increased its numerical strength in the Council of 1879, even if the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging had not come into being; but it would be unreal to discount the influence of Hofmeyr's organization in view of the public agitation over the excise, which became the main issue in the western constituencies. The Vereeniging's successes were confined to the three western and the midland circles, in which eight of the successful candidates were at least favourably disposed towards it, while only four were not. In the eastern Cape, on the other hand, only one candidate was returned whose victory was welcomed by the Zuid Afrikaan<sup>3</sup>. The Vereeniging and its allied thus secured nine seats in a House of twenty-one. There can be little doubt that with more time to organize, and with better management

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1. Text in G. W. Eybers, Select Constitutional Documents, p. 64.
  2. E. A. Walker, Lord de Villiers and his Times, p. 63.
  3. This was J. A. Vermaak, who was successful in the North+ Eastern circle. See Zuid Afrikaan, 23 Oct. 1878.

of the plural vote in the Western and South-Western circles, they could easily have secured a bare majority<sup>4</sup>, a goal which still eluded them in the subsequent by-elections of 1880-3.

The Assembly elections of 1879 did not give the Vereeniging and its allies a corresponding position of strength in the Lower House, though they acquired nearly one-third of the total seats. The successful candidates included twelve members of the Vereeniging<sup>5</sup>, among them Jan Hofmeyr, who was returned by Stellenbosch, in addition to a number of men who are not recorded as having belonged to the Vereeniging, but were either sponsored as candidates by it, or belonged to a kindred association<sup>6</sup>. Subsequent by-elections added slightly to the strength of Hofmeyr's nominal following in the Assembly, but not sufficiently to bring it within reach of controlling the House<sup>7</sup>.

The Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging had taken part in the elections with the primary object of ousting Sprigg's Government. This Government, having risen to power under the cloud of Molteno's dismissal, survived Merriman's motion of censure during the session of 1878, and was still in power after the elections of 1878-9, devoted to the twin causes of confederation and the extension of the railways, as well as to the energetic pursuit of rebellious African

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4. See editorial comment in the Zuid Afrikaan, 27 Nov., 4 Dec. 1878. In the Western and South-western circles, supporters of the Vereeniging failed to respond on polling day to telegraphic instructions from the Hoofdbestuur to plump for the Vereeniging candidate who was falling behind.
  5. These were: H. Wilman (Beaufort West), M.J. Louw (Cape Division), L.H. Goldschmidt (Clanwilliam), M. Bergh and T.A.J. Louw (Malmesbury), J.S. Marais and J.J. Proctor (Paarl), J.Z. Human (Piketberg), P.A. Myburgh and J.H. Hofmeyr (Stellenbosch), and R.N. Aling and J.I. de Villiers (Worcester).
  6. In this list must be included: Ds. W.P. de Villiers (Beaufort West), M.J. de Villiers (Caledon), C.J. Manuel (Cape Division), B.J. Keyter (Oudtshoorn), J.J.W. van Zyl (Richmond) and J. J. Barry (Swellendam).
  7. The following supporters of the Vereeniging were returned: H.H. van der Spuy (Oudtshoorn), J.R.G. Luttig (Beaufort West), A.H. du Toit and H.P. du Preez (Swellendam), A.B. de Villiers (Victoria West), J. Joubert (Albert) and J.J. Janse van Rensburg (Cradock). But the first three replaced men who were Hofmeyr's supporters.

tribes. It enjoyed the confidence of the Governor, Sir Bartle Frere, who shared its federal aims, for all its collective mediocrity. The members of the Vereeniging hated Sprigg's brandy excise. They had no objection on principle to his native policy, but they disliked the Peace Preservation Act of 1878, which gave the Government power to relieve African tribes of their recently acquired fire-arms, chiefly because they did not think that the Act could be enforced without creating major disturbances among the Africans. They disliked his confederation policy, again not on principle, but because they felt strongly that it was unreasonable to talk about confederation until the independence of the Transvaal was restored. Their objection to his railway policy was not one of principle either, but they would come to favour retrenchment, a need which the Government never really admitted, as soon as money became tight.

Although they were generally out of sympathy with the Sprigg regime, however, Hofmeyr and his supporters were unable to do more than cause it inconvenience, except with regard to its confederation proposals. Confederation appeared to offer a way of escape to the Imperial Government, whereby it could extricate itself from its difficulties in the Transvaal without either reversing the annexation or admitting its error. But Hofmeyr and his followers were adamant. In response to an appeal from the Transvaal Volks Committee in April 1879, the Zuid Afrikaan, Volksblad and Patriot circulated a memorial urging retrocession, signed by over seven thousand people, and seventy yards long according to the Patriot<sup>8</sup>. It was not sent to Whitehall until 8 July, however, and by then Sir Michael Hicks Beach, successor to Lord Carnarvon in the Colonial Office, had already intimated his adherence to the policy of confederation and expressed the hope that the Cape Parliament would come forward with concrete proposals<sup>9</sup>. Hofmeyr and a strong deputation called on Sir

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8. Quoted by J.D. du Toit, S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, p.229.

9. C. 2374, p. 142. Quoted by Hofmeyr, p. 167.

Bartle Frere in November and offered terms: they would cooperate with the Government's efforts to obtain confederation provided Frere would call a freely elected convention as a means of proving that the annexation was popular in the Transvaal<sup>10</sup>. Frere rejected these overtures, being under no illusion as to the state of feeling among the Transvaal and Colonial Dutch<sup>11</sup>, and the deputation went away empty-handed. The following March, however, under the inspiration of Gladstone's Midlothian campaigns, the Dutch papers of the Western Province combined with the Cape Argus to draw up an address to Gladstone in person, which again put the case for retrocession in eloquent terms<sup>12</sup>. In April and May the members of the Transvaal Volks Committee toured the Cape, made contact with the leaders of the Afrikaner movement in Paarl and Cape Town, held a series of successful meetings and effectively stole the initiative from the advocates of confederation<sup>13</sup>. Sprigg, however, was undeterred. On 22 June he moved in the Assembly

that ... it is expedient that a Conference of Representatives be assembled to consider the Existing Relations of the British Colonies in South Africa to each other and to the Native Territories adjoining, and to ascertain the practicability, or otherwise, of a Legislative and Administrative Union of such Colonies.

He urged that such a conference should be attended by delegates from the Cape, Griqualand West, Natal and the Transvaal, under the presidency of the Governor of the Cape, and that its report should be considered by the various legislatures, which alone would have the power to bind their respective Colonies to a line of action. The motion was defeated without a division on 25 June. Lobbying by the

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10. Zuid Afrikaan, 12 Nov. 1879. The deputation contained several Vereeniging men, included among representatives of both houses of Parliament and the Cape Town city council.
11. W. B. Worsfold, Life of Sir Bartle Frere, pp. 287, 296, quoting Frere to R.W.G. Herbert, 29 July 1879, and Frere to Sir H. Ponsonby, 3 Apr. 1880.
12. Text in Hofmeyr, pp. 645-9. This author attributed the address to Onze Jan; but Sir J.G. Kotze, Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, vol. I p. 694, thought that the idea originated with the Patriot.
13. Worsfold, pp. 329-30.

Boeren Vereeniging's representatives under Hofmeyr's leadership had much to do with this result. Sprigg chose not to make the conference proposals an issue of confidence, and clung to power in the hope that better days might come; but his failure necessitated the recall of Frere, who had been sent to make confederation work, while the barrenness of the policy itself became apparent six months later when the Transvaal revolt broke out.

We have already noted the central importance of the Transvaal revolt for the growth of the Afrikaner political movement within and without the Colony<sup>14</sup>. A wave of sympathy for the Transvaal burghers swept through the Colony from October 1880 onwards, tempered merely by the fact that only a small minority with implicit confidence in the partisanship of the Lord of Hosts expected armed resistance by the burghers to succeed. Hence most of the public meetings which were called in the Colony at the end of 1880 and the beginning of 1881 expressed the urgent hope that violence would cease without delay, and that the Transvaal grievances would be impartially examined by a Royal Commission<sup>15</sup>. The success of the Transvaal arms therefore exceeded the average Dutch colonial's wildest hopes. It filled him, not only with pride of race, but also with a profound contempt for the arrogant and unimaginative diplomacy of the Imperial authorities down to the outbreak of the war. The second of these facts was as important as the first, for in spite of Gladstone's decision to agree to a truce after Majuba, which most Boers warmly applauded, one legacy of the Transvaal crisis was the emergence among Afrikaners of a very understandable suspicion of Imperial motives in after years, above all in the period down to 1886. They were years in which a much chastened Imperial Government continued to play a role,

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14. See above, pp. 80-2

15. A very large number of public meetings took place all over the Colony, especially in January 1881, and were fully reported in the Zuid Afrikaan.

albeit a subdued one, in a succession of South African crises, beginning with the revolt in Basutoland which had already broken out.

The unwisdom of Sprigg's attempt to disarm the Basuto has been generally recognized. It would have been better, as de Kiewiet has said, "to take away their grievances and leave them their guns than to take away their guns and leave them their grievances", for the Basuto were, with good reason, in a state of chronic disaffection<sup>16</sup>. The disarmament proclamation was not applied in Basutoland until July 1880, but very soon after that the stiff resistance of the tribesmen compelled Sprigg to send considerable numbers of Colonial troops into the territory, not merely to enforce the proclamation, but to keep law and order<sup>17</sup>. Sprigg desired, and would in any case probably have been obliged, to fight the Basuto with Colonial forces alone<sup>18</sup>. Co-operation between the Colonial and Imperial contingents had not been happy during the Gaika-Gcaleka war of 1877-8; but Sprigg, profiting from the experience gained in these campaigns, had reorganized the Colonial forces during his first year as premier, and no doubt expected them to be able to deal with the situation. Provision had been made for the establishment of the Cape Mounted Riflemen as a permanent force to replace the existing Frontier Police, for the raising of a Colonial force of Yeomanry and another of Volunteers, and for the further raising, if necessary, of a conscript Burgher Force, to be called upon in an emergency as a last line of defence<sup>19</sup>. Almost as soon as the Basuto War broke out, however, the Burghers were called up, and though many of them who disapproved heartily of the war pocketed their resentment, and went,<sup>20</sup> some did not last the

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16. C.W. de Kiewiet, The Imperial Factor in South Africa, p.266.

17. C.3708, p.1. Ministers' Minute, 30 Apr. 1883.

18. De Kiewiet, pp. 267-8.

19. Acts 5,7,9 and 16 of 1878. E.A. Walker, History of Southern Africa, p.371.

20. Each magisterial district was assessed at a fixed number, and the conscripts were chosen locally by lot.

distance. In the early part of 1881, the press was full of reports of groups of Burghers who, for one reason or another, had become dissatisfied with conditions at the front and returned home without leave<sup>21</sup>. The most sensational desertions were those of the burghers of Cradock and Colesberg. By February 1881, however, the Basuto had also grown weary, and asked for peace terms. An offer by Sprigg was refused, but they accepted the mediation of the new Governor of the Cape, Sir Hercules Robinson, who published an award on 29 April, requiring the Basuto, in return for a complete amnesty, to pay a fine of 5,000 cattle, to compensate white traders for damage incurred, and to surrender their guns, which they could receive back again on payment of an annual licensing fee of one pound<sup>22</sup>. Before having to face the ordeal of enforcing the Governor's award, however, the Sprigg Government went out of office.

The parliamentary position of the insecure Ministry had been strengthened early in 1881 by the grant of representation to the newly incorporated province of Griqualand West, whose three members, Stead in the Council and Rhodes and Orpen in the Assembly, first took their seats in the session of that year. They supported the Ministry in the vote on Scanlen's motion of censure on 27 April, thus enabling it to survive defeat. But respite for Sprigg was brief. After the censure debate the Griqualand West members told him, Rhodes at their head, that they objected to his disarmament policy (had not the Basuto bought their guns with honest labour at the diamond fields?), and intended to withdraw their support because Sprigg had failed to extend the railway to Kimberley<sup>23</sup>. Sprigg, realizing that he no longer commanded a majority, resigned early in May. Persistent pressure

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21. For examples of such desertions, see the Burghersdorp Gazette, 25 Feb. 1881, Cradock Register, 4 Mar. 1881, Zuid Afrikaan, 24 Mar. 1881, etc.

22. C.2964, pp. 10, 12-13, 20-1.

23. B. Williams, Cecil Rhodes, p. 63.

by Hofmeyr's followers had helped to bring this about, but they could not have achieved it without the support of the still diminutive diamond lobby.

## II

At the beginning of the 1879 session the leadership of the Opposition had fallen to T. C. Scanlen, senior member for Cradock<sup>24</sup>, and it was he who undertook to form a new administration in May 1881. The team which he brought together was stronger than Sprigg's<sup>25</sup>, and it assumed office with the backing of Hofmeyr and his followers, an eventuality which Scanlen was careful to ensure by offering Hofmeyr a post in his Cabinet, which the latter, to his almost immediate embarrassment, was persuaded to accept. The Vereeniging members therefore trooped across to the Government benches, and began their first experiment at co-operation with a Ministry the bulk of whose members stood outside their own political movement.

"It is imperative that at least one sound Africander should go in", Hofmeyr wired to J. S. Marais, his parliamentary colleague from Paarl<sup>26</sup>. He had so far resisted pressure from "friends" to enter the Cabinet himself, but evidently reconsidered his position following a refusal by Marais. Four days later he was Minister without Portfolio, and took great pains to justify his acceptance to the readers of his newspaper:

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24. Hofmeyr, p.184. Sir P. Laurence, Life of J.X. Merriman, p.59. The leadership had been offered to Merriman, J.W. Sauer, Saul Solomon, T.E. Fuller, L.A. Vintcent and Jan Hofmeyr, before Scanlen accepted. Hofmeyr had turned it down, in the words of his biographer, "because he felt that, if the party succeeded in defeating the Ministry, he would be called on to form an Africander Ministry in its place, and for this the time was not yet ripe".
25. Premier and Attorney-General: T.C. Scanlen. Colonial Secretary; Sir J.C. Molteno. Treasurer: C.W. Hutton. Commissioner: J.X. Merriman. Secretary for Native Affairs: J.W. Sauer. Minister without Portfolio: J.H. Hofmeyr.
26. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 9. Telegram book (green back). (cont.)

Bijzondere aandrang werd op hem uitgeoefend, om als Koloniale Secretaris in het ministerie op te treden. Doch hij had bijzondere redenen, om zich met geen Departement te beslommeren. Maar men meende, dat het van zoo groot belang was, dat hij zich niet geheel aan het Ministerie zou onttrekken, dat hij ten laatste er in consenteerde, Minister zonder Portefeuille te worden, d.i. zonder kantoorwerk en zonder salaris. In die hoedanigheid zal hij deel hebben aan al de ministerieële beraadslagingen, en ook het zijne er toe kunnen bijdragen, dat er regt geschiede aan de inzigten der Afrikanen. Omtrent die punten, waarmede zijn naam meer bijzonder is vereenzelvigd, behield hij zich vrijheid van beweging voor<sup>27</sup>.

Such concern to stress his continued independence, when linked with his current plans for the parliamentary session, and with his worsening position at the head of the Afrikaner political movement, leaves the explanation of Hofmeyr's hesitancy beyond reasonable doubt.

Three days after this article appeared, Hofmeyr gave notice of a motion in the Assembly, to permit the use of the Dutch language in either house. The eighty-ninth section of the Constitution Ordinance, which laid down that "all debates and discussions, ... journals, entries, minutes and proceedings" should be in English, had been assailed in petitions since the 'fifties, the most recent of them coming from the Albert Boeren Vereeniging in July 1879, but all had been turned down. None had been presented during the session of 1880, but in that year the synod of the N.G. Kerk had fathered the cause, which was also receiving the strong support of the Patriot, and in 1881 a flood of petitions poured into both Houses as part of an organized campaign. Hofmeyr, however, was unable to secure Cabinet agreement over his motion, and was therefore obliged, when the time came, to entrust its introduction to one of his supporters, Ds. W. P. de Villiers, who moved in favour of the use of Dutch in Parliament on 7 June. But the session was drawing to its close, and at least one member of the Cabinet, Merriman, was opposed to the idea. The debate was adjourned

26 (cont.) Hofmeyr to J.S. Marais, 6 May 1881. Quoted in Hofmeyr, p.188.

27. Zuid Afrikaan, 10 May 1881. Italics in original.

without a decision being taken.

Meanwhile the Patriot had begun a sustained attack on Hofmeyr, his newspaper, his policy, and his new position. If it be recalled that the middle months of 1881 were those in which the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging and the Afrikaner Bond began their open struggle for the conquest of Afrikaner public opinion, Hofmeyr's sensitivity to the Patriot's shafts will need no explanation. On 20 May, du Toit's paper inferred that the Zuid Afrikaan supported a renewal of the Basuto War, though Hofmeyr, as his biographer makes plain, was trying hard to persuade the Cabinet not to commit itself to a definite statement on this very issue<sup>28</sup>. On the 27th, at a moment when Hofmeyr was embarrassed by the lack of Cabinet support for his language motion, the Patriot informed its readers that it was the only paper "wat werk ver Hollans". In an editorial on 3 June which approved the new Government's radical pruning of Sprigg's railway plans - a pruning for which Hofmeyr himself was largely responsible - the Patriot discounted the support given by the Zuid Afrikaan with the explanation that

die blad is nie meer volksorgaan nie, mar regeringsorgaan, nou die redakteur self in die Ministerie sit.

The following week it asserted that Hofmeyr and President Brand had been working in the interest of the British in their efforts to procure a truce in the Transvaal, and thus unleashed a controversy which Hofmeyr dealt with, under the circumstances, with remarkable restraint<sup>29</sup>. The cares of office were indeed heavy, even without portfolio or pay.

Nor did Onze Jan's troubles end there. His plans for Dutch in Parliament temporarily defeated and his reputation blackened, he devoted his attention after the end of the session to restoring the weakened position of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging in the country districts<sup>30</sup>. Merri-

28. Hofmeyr, p. 189.

29. Patriot, 10, 17, 24 June; Zuid Afrikaan, 16, 21 June 1881.

30. See above, pp. 89 ff.

man, also on tour in October, was presented with an address of welcome at Graaff-Reinet by the local branch of the Afrikaner Bond on the 26th. These Bondsmen stressed two things: that they wanted Dutch in Parliament, and that they were not a revolutionary organization but intended to get what they wanted by constitutional means. Merriman, not altogether without justification, saw red. He was not in favour of Dutch in Parliament; he was not interested in the means which the Bond intended to use, so long as he disapproved of their ends; and he had probably not taken the trouble to draw a distinction between the mild Graaff Reinet Bondsmen, led by Hofmeyr's friend Dolf Botha, and the fire-eaters in Paarl. He unbosomed himself of a written reply which Laurence and others have thought impetuous, but which, if considered by itself, reads like a sane warning against the dangers of racialism<sup>31</sup>.

Unfortunately Merriman's reply could not be considered out of its context. Though he and Hofmeyr travelled back by sea together from Mossel Bay, a rift developed between them. The Zuid Afrikaan of 1 November showed that Hofmeyr took Merriman's attack personally, intimating that the Graaff-Reinet Bondsmen's address was "precies zulk een als de Z.A. Boerenbeschermingsvereeniging had kunnen onderteekenen", though it did not miss the opportunity to lash out at the Paarl leadership of the Bond for having put such mistaken ideas into Merriman's head. The next day an article appeared in the Argus, inspired so Hofmeyr thought by Merriman, which, while not disapproving of Hofmeyr's efforts to build up the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging, charged him with a breach of constitutional etiquette in "conducting a political campaign which aims at altering the law, while he was a

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31. The Graaff-Reinet Bond address was published in the Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 29 Oct. 1881. The part of Merriman's reply which gave offence is quoted in Hofmeyr, p. 191. See also Laurence p.60. An undated memorandum in the Merriman Papers (1882/133) indicates that Merriman himself drew a clear distinction between the aims of the Bond and those of Hofmeyr's Vereeniging at about this time.

Minister of the Crown, ... without first assuring himself that he has the concurrence of his colleagues"<sup>32</sup>. The writer can only have had Hofmeyr's advocacy of Dutch in Parliament in mind, though he did not explicitly say so. The Zuid Afrikaan answered the charge on the 3rd, suggesting that membership of the Cabinet had brought Hofmeyr no advantage to offset the weakening of his support among Afrikaners. Taunted by a further leader in the Cape Times, the paper denied on the 5th that there was any disunion in the Cabinet; but this was not likely to convince many. Scanlen returned to Cape Town from the Eastern Province towards the end of the month, earlier than expected. By the 28th, Hofmeyr had decided to resign, and drew up a confidential Cabinet memorandum explaining his reasons, which his biographer has published in full<sup>33</sup>. This has to be compared with his published reasons for resigning, which were given in the Zuid Afrikaan on 3 December. They differ, though they are not mutually contradictory.

Wij zullen niet aan de publieke nieuwsgierigheid gaan voldoen [began the newspaper, not very promisingly]. Maar toch, tot het voorkomen van een misverstand dat aanleiding zou kunnen geven tot heel wat nationale verbittering, willen wij melden dat noch de quaestie van Hollandsch en Engelsch, noch de Graaff Reinetsche ontboezeming van den heer Merriman, bij de quaestie te pas komt. Zijn wij wel geïnformeerd, dan heeft het Kabinet zich in geen deele met die onderwerpen bezig gebonden, en heeft de heer Hofmeyr alzo geenen de minste reden om zich aan de houding van het Kabinet daaromtrent te ergeren. Geen tegenstander van de Afrikaanderbeweging heeft alzo reden, de resignatie te beschouwen als eene overwinning, en geen Afrikaander om zich die als een nederlaag aan te trekken.

The article went on to say that Hofmeyr's resignation did not mean that he was going to oppose the Ministry, for the "Afrikaander partij" was not yet strong enough to form a government of its own, and must continue to collaborate with well-disposed Englishmen, more of whom were to be found on the Government benches than among the Opposition. (Onze Jan,

32. Cape Argus, 2 Nov. 1881. Part of this article is quoted in Hofmeyr, pp. 192-3.

33. Hofmeyr, pp. 193-4.

in the heat of his quarrel with his colleague, had not forgotten to be a tactician. Dutch in Parliament had to come, and only the Scanlen Government could bring it. Therefore it was impolitic to precipitate a public breach.) The Cabinet memorandum made two main points. On the one hand, Hofmeyr turned the charge of improper conduct against Merriman, by asserting that he had violated Cabinet secrecy by communicating to the editor of a newspaper "intelligence, which is calculated to brand me as unworthy of a seat in the Cabinet". On the other, he argued that since "it is impossible for both of us to remain in the Cabinet", the onus was on himself to resign, because Merriman "endorsed the Premier's utterance<sup>34</sup> in the House of Assembly, which I did not". It was a matter of collective responsibility, and the issue at stake was not the Dutch language or the Graaff Reinet address, but Basutoland. Hofmeyr knew that any further association with the policy to which the Government was now committed in Basutoland would lose him the leadership of the Afrikaner movement in the Colony; but he could not say so in public for two reasons. One was the necessity of not embarrassing Scanlen. The other stemmed from the fact that neither Hofmeyr nor the body of his supporters either inside or outside Parliament had any constructive Basuto policy to offer. All they were sure about was that a continuation of Sprigg's methods was wrong.

Hofmeyr's refusal to embarrass Scanlen paid two important dividends, for the Ministry chose not to stand in his way over the important questions of the brandy excise and the Dutch language. At the end of March 1882, adhering still to the fiscal arguments which had brought the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging into existence, Hofmeyr moved the

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34. This refers to a statement on Basuto policy made against Hofmeyr's advice. See Hofmeyr, p. 189.

total repeal of the excise, even though the brandy distillers were no longer unanimous in condemning it on principle. His fellow member from Stellenbosch moved an amendment whereby the duty would be doubled on brandy distilled with imported materials, and remain unaltered on home-grown. He feared, not the excise, but the growing competition of those who were making an inferior product, dopbrandewijn, from imported sugar, grain or maize; but eventually Hofmeyr and Myburgh reached a compromise under which the excise on ordinary brandy should be removed altogether, and that on the inferior product remain at one shilling. The House accepted these proposals, rejecting by a substantial majority an amendment by Saul Solomon which would have invalidated them. The Government was reluctant to part with a sure source of revenue for its depleted treasury, and supported Fuller's amendment on 17 May to refer the Bill to a commission; but the amendment was lost and public opinion would brook no delay, so the premier agreed to appoint a select committee, which included Hofmeyr, to draft a Bill which would give effect to the changes proposed, and this passed into law during the same session. The Cabinet did not treat the question as a matter of confidence, and it was certainly not the intention of Hofmeyr's supporters that it should. It manfully resigned itself to a reduction in the tax receipts and never dared to touch the question again, though the following Ministry would be compelled for a short while to raise the excise to an unprecedented level<sup>35</sup>.

As with the excise, so with the language question, the Scanlen Government gave Hofmeyr what he wanted. During the session of 1882, no longer tied by membership of the Cabinet, Onze Jan returned to the attack, and in a masterly speech delivered on 20 March he put the case for Dutch in Parliament in moving terms, and expressed the hope that the motion would be carried unanimously<sup>36</sup>.

35. See above, p.45 n.28 for excise statistics, 1878-86. The debates of 1882 are briefly described in Hofmeyr, pp. 227-8.

36. Hofmeyr, pp. 223-4.

There was a little opposition in the ensuing debate, but the motion was accepted without a division, and the Government, suppressing such reluctance as it still had, introduced a Bill to give effect to Hofmeyr's resolution, which was law by 9 June<sup>37</sup>.

The importance of this decision for the subsequent development of the Afrikaner political movement was immense. Henceforth, rural electors would no longer be influenced in their choice of parliamentary candidates by a consideration which ought, in fairness, to have been irrelevant. The ability of candidates to speak English had not always been a decisive criterion in the past, and several members of Parliament were in fact unmuzzled by the new law, which was the first step in a long development leading eventually - after some real setbacks - to the establishment of effective parity in the use of Dutch and English in public life. This first step was, undoubtedly, the most important, for if the use of Dutch were permitted in Parliament it could not logically be debarred in other fields; but the concession of 1882 by no means reached the heart of the problem. The right to use Dutch in the courts of law, the obligation on the part of public servants to show a knowledge of Dutch, more especially those who came in contact with the Dutch-speaking public, and the right of parents to have their children educated through the Dutch medium in public schools above the primary level, without prejudice to their careers, still had to be gained. And these privileges, once obtained, had to be effectively and continuously used before real equality could be said to exist.

Some of the inequalities could be removed by legislation. Thus, in the same parliamentary session, the work of J. S.

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37. After the passage of this Bill, some time would still elapse before parliamentary papers appeared in both languages. Not until 1898 did the bilingual order paper become the rule.

Marais secured an amendment of the public school regulations, so that the medium of instruction in first and second class public schools became a matter for the individual governing bodies to decide. This was in conformity with the wise advice of the de Villiers Commission of 1880; but it would be some time before the change meant anything in practice<sup>38</sup>. In the case of the public service, a Commission appointed in 1881, of which Hofmeyr was a member, heard evidence which suggested that a knowledge of Dutch by civil servants was necessary, or at any rate desirable. When its report was debated in the session of 1883, the furthest the Government would go was to make a knowledge of Dutch (or, in the case of the Native Affairs Department, "Sesuto or Kaffir") obligatory for third class clerks in the higher division<sup>39</sup>. This was a beginning, and if the Colonial Dutch were in earnest about their demands, it would eventually be possible to insist upon a knowledge of Dutch by all public servants, and its optional use in all kinds of public business. They were in earnest<sup>40</sup>, with the result that the Upington, Sprigg and Rhodes Governments of 1884-93 carried a further series of measures which advanced the cause of Dutch language rights in a substantial way. The use of Dutch was made permissive in the higher courts, at the discretion of the presiding judge, and fully optional in the lower, by an Act of 1884<sup>41</sup>. Dutch was made a compulsory subject for civil service candidates in 1887, and in the following year the raising of the standard resulted in a correspondingly higher proportion of failures<sup>42</sup>.

Most of the legislative changes needed to place the Dutch language on an equal footing with English had been enacted before 1890. They were made, for the most part, without

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38. G.75 of 1880. Report of the Commission on the Working of the Education Acts in force in this Colony, para. 17. See also, Anna de Villiers, Die Hollandse Taalbeweging in Suid-Afrika, p.113; E.G. Malherbe, Education in South Africa, 1652-1922, p.414.
39. De Villiers, p.114; Hofmeyr, p.226.
40. See the Bond Congress Notulen, 1885 pp.15-16; 1886, p.10; 1887, p.8; 1888, p.10.
41. De Villiers, pp. 115-6; Hofmeyr, p. 266.
42. De Villiers, pp. 118-9.

parliamentary friction, for no Government which valued the support of the Bond was prepared to alienate the Bondsmen on an issue over which they had very strong feelings. The language movement thus helped to strengthen the position of the Bondsmen in the House, and in its early stages directly affected the relationship between Hofmeyr's Vereeniging and the Scanlen Ministry, for once Scanlen had taken the first important step, Hofmeyr's dependence on his good offices was immediately diminished. If Scanlen's policy failed to measure up to the Boers' needs in other respects, it would be easier now for Hofmeyr to abandon him.

### III

Scanlen, faced with the problem of carrying out the High Commissioner's award in Basutoland, which the people had shown little inclination to accept, announced during the session of 1881 that he intended to enforce it with the continued use of Colonial troops, even though Hofmeyr, who knew a great deal about the unpopularity of the war in the Colony, had warned him against an early declaration of policy for political reasons.

The spate of desertions from the Burgher Forces during the early months of 1881 revealed widespread dissatisfaction with the Colonial military system. A year later, at the time of the Bond's first congress at Graaff-Reinet, when Basuto policy still hung very much in the balance, the Bondsmen had made up their minds why they did not like it, and issued a statement which was confirmed in its essentials at the Cradock congress in September<sup>43</sup>. They felt that the

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43. See Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Mar. 1882, for the Graaff-Reinet Congress's attitude to the Burgher Law, and Notulen, Cradock Congress, p. 15.

conscripted burgher should not be made to suffer the inconvenience of having his own servants called up as well, or his wagons commandeered. They thought that the Burghers should only be called out during real invasions of the Colony "tot aan de Oranjerivier". They wanted the Levies (ligtelingen, who were in practice though not by legal definition Coloured), placed under the kommandant of the district instead of under special officers appointed by the Governor, while generations of commando warfare lay behind their further suggestion that instead of cash payment the Burghers should receive two-thirds of the land confiscated from the beaten tribes, with a double share for the kommandants. They had made bad soldiers, it was urged in effect, because they had been denied their traditional organization and their traditional incentives for fighting.

Lack of success against the Basuto was accompanied by, and perhaps helped to create, further misgivings as to whether Colonial forces ought to be in Basutoland at all. When trouble had first arisen with the Basuto in the 'sixties, there had been much indignation within the Colony at the intervention of the Imperial Government in what many Dutch-speaking Colonials regarded as a Free State affair. This feeling was not dead in the early 'eighties, and had been revived by the Sprigg Government's action in stopping the passage of ammunition into the Free State during the Transvaal war, to which the Free State Volksraad had replied by denying the Colonial burghers engaged in the fighting in Basutoland the privilege of marching through its territory<sup>44</sup>. It was partly out of this feeling that there developed in Bond circles the notion that the Colonial frontier ought to be the Orange River, "vanwaar hy uit Drakensberg kom tot waar hy in die see val"<sup>45</sup> - an ingenious slogan, for it would not only discharge the Colonial obligation of fighting

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44. Hofmeyr, p.189. Onze Jan was called on to iron out this dispute.

45. Patriot, 24 Feb. 1882, quoting a resolution of the Albert Vereeniging.

in Basutoland, but require also the disannexation of Griqualand West, while at the same time throwing open to white settlement the fertile southern slopes of the Drakensberg which many farmers in the north-eastern Cape were casting covetous eyes upon. The idea was in fact too clever, and it made no allowance for the Free State's reluctance to be burdened with either West Griqualand or the Basuto problem; but it often became the theme of a resolution at Bond meetings.

When it came to suggesting a practical solution to the Basutoland difficulty, the Afrikaner political organizations had nothing substantial to offer. The western Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging first discussed it at their congress in March 1882, and admitted defeat:

Deze vergadering is tegen alle maatregelen die kunnen leiden tot een algemeen Basuto-oorlog, maar wil overigens de keus van de in de Basuto kwestie te volgen gedragslijn aan het Parlement en de Regering overlaten<sup>46</sup>.

The Graaff Reinet Bond congress in the same month did little better:

Deze vergadering is van gevoelen dat door het Parlement aan de Rijksregering verzocht dient te worden om de annexatie van Basutoland te herroepen, - doch aan de loyale onderdanen van Hare Majesteit regt te laten wedervaren, en dat voortaan de Oranjerivier, van haar oorsprong af tot waar zij in de zee loopt, verklaard zal worden de Noordelijke grens der Kolonie te zijn<sup>47</sup>.

At the annual meeting of the western Vereeniging in August, the delegates excused themselves from making a pronouncement on the ground that the next session of Parliament was a long way off<sup>48</sup>, while the Cradock congress of both bodies the following month affirmed

dat onder de bestaande omstandigheden de zaken van Basutoland in de handen van de Regering worden gelaten; doch dat het wenschelijk is de annexatie te herroepen<sup>49</sup>.

What possibilities had been considered? The Robertson

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46. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 2. Notulen, Speciale Vergadering der Z.A.B.B. Vereeniging, 10 Mar. 1882.  
 47. Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Mar. 1882.  
 48. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 2. Notulen, Vierde Alg. Jaarlijksche Vergadering der B.B. Vereeniging, 25 Aug. 1882.  
 49. Notulen, Cradock Congress, pp. 20-1.

branch of the western Vereeniging, showing a fine spirit of accommodation, thought that the Imperial Government should allow the Colony to fight in and dispose of Basutoland in the way it thought best, but that if this were refused, the country should either be handed over to the Imperial Government or restored to the Basuto<sup>50</sup>. The Worcester Vereeniging favoured direct occupation by the Colonial Government and the removal of Imperial influence<sup>51</sup>. The Steynsburg Bond thought that Basutoland should be given to the Free State<sup>52</sup>. All that can usefully be said about the Afrikaner Bond's reaction to the problem is that those who favoured a Colonial withdrawal were probably more numerous than those who were prepared to accept a continuation of the war. Against this, they had to weigh the probability that any withdrawal of Colonial responsibility would be followed by a return to Imperial control, and to that most Afrikaner politicians were opposed on principle.

Such indecision did not make the position easy, either for Scanlen or for Hofmeyr. During 1882, however, Scanlen trimmed his sails. The Basuto ignored an ultimatum of 15 February to accept the Governor's award within a month under penalty of its withdrawal<sup>53</sup>. Scanlen, aware by this time that it would be impossible in the existing state of Colonial opinion to renew the war with Colonial troops, then decided to withdraw both the award and the disarmament proclamation and maintain a skeleton force in Basutoland to keep order while tempers had a chance to cool. On 27 March he announced these decisions in the Assembly, adding that he would appoint a commission to look into the claims of the loyal Basuto and

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50. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 2. Notulen, Speciale Vergadering der Z.A.B.B. Vereeniging, 10 Mar. 1882.

51. Zuid Afrikaan, 10 Feb. 1881.

52. Zuid Afrikaan, 29 Nov. 1881.

53. C.3112, pp. 107, 120-1, 124-5, 129-30. This correspondence between the Scanlen Ministry and the Colonial Office indicates how far the ministers were prepared to go to press the claims of their parliamentary allies. They would not ask Parliament to authorize a renewal of the war unless the Imperial Government would give them a free hand over the post-war settlement (which Lord Kimberley would not agree to), and they persisted in a demand that the territory south of the Orange River (the Quthing area) should be at their complete disposal.

traders, and that he intended to seek the co-operation of the Free State<sup>54</sup>. Hofmeyr, in accordance with the congress resolutions, decided to trail along behind him, and the Vereeniging's parliamentarians rallied to his support. They voted against an Opposition motion on 4 April, which would have required the Government to enforce the proclamation under the Peace Preservation Act, and all but one of them voted for the rejection of a Basutoland Annexation Repeal Bill on the 14th (though the same unity was not apparent among their colleagues in the upper house). But unfortunately, both for Scanlen and the Vereeniging, the policy did not work. Nothing came of the proposed collusion with the Free State, whose Government considered itself well clear of the problem<sup>55</sup>. The inclination of the paramount chief, Letsie, to submit to Scanlen's easy terms was not followed by all his subordinates, while further troubles broke out at the end of the year in the Leribe district between two contestants for tribal succession rights. To deal with these new difficulties, Scanlen summoned a special session of Parliament in January 1883.

He now proposed that the Colony should recall its magistrates from Basutoland, thus abandoning the internal administration of the territory, but retain a Resident there to supervise its external relations, more particularly to keep order on the Free State frontier, which the Colony was bound to do in terms of Imperial commitments under the Convention of Aliwal North of 1869. He no doubt expected the support of political Afrikanerdom for this new policy; but Hofmeyr thought otherwise. He argued that a Resident under such conditions would be powerless, and that what would amount to an abandonment of Basutoland should not even be considered, both on account of the Aliwal

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54. C.3717, p.34. Robinson to Kimberley (telegram), 28 Mar. 1882.

55. C.3717, p.48. Brand to Robinson, 23 Mar. 1882. The Free State Volksraad was concerned only that Colonial or Imperial authority should remain in Basutoland.

Convention and because such a step was likely to lead to the establishment of an Imperial Crown Colony there, with the probability of further friction between the Imperial authorities on the one side and the various South African states on the other, over the explosive question of native policy. He therefore thought the Ministry should

go to the British Government and claim the right to regulate the native question according to our own pleasure, and for that purpose, if necessary, to enter into alliances with other States and races in South Africa<sup>56</sup>.

The imperial factor, Hofmeyr was now saying, was more to be feared than a renewal of the war, and he was casting around for a new approach to the Basuto problem, the basis of which would be an alliance with the Free State so as to compel the submission of the tribesmen under the threat of combined force. The Richmond congress approved this new approach in May, with a resolution supported by a substantial majority that

aan de [rijks-] Regering worde verzocht Basutoland geheel en onvoorwaardelijk aan de Koloniale Regering over te geven, opdat onze regering in de toekomst naar bevind van zaken er mede handelen kan<sup>57</sup>,

and it was approved in spite of Hofmeyr's visit to Bloemfontein at the beginning of the month, during which he had tried and failed to secure the co-operation of the Free State Volksraad in his policy of joint action<sup>58</sup>.

Scanlen, however, had reached the conclusion that abandonment of the territory was the only way out, after he and the Secretary for Native Affairs, J. W. Sauer, had met President Brand and made a tour of Basutoland in March. The

56. In a speech at Stellenbosch on 16 Jan. 1883, quoted in Hofmeyr, p. 231. Compare Zuid Afrikaan, 28 Dec. 1882, in which he advocated the treatment of the Basuto question "als een deel uitmakende van een groote Zuid Afrikaansche en niet slechts Koloniale Naturellenquaestie; en dat wij de vrijheid zullen erlangen om ... in bondsgenootschap te treden met andere Zuid Afrikaansche magten die mede belang hebben bij de zaak ..."

57. Notulen, Richmond Congress, Item 7.

58. Hofmeyr, p. 235. Cf. C.3717, p.117. Scanlen to Merriman (from Rouxville, O.F.S.), 13 Mar. 1883. "The President is most cordial, but most cautious, and avoids committing himself. Our impression is that, anything in the nature of an alliance, such as Hofmeyr advocated, is quite out of the question. Nothing would be done [sc. by the Volksraad] to weaken the hold the [Free] State has under the Aliwal Treaty..." See also C.3855, pp. 19-20 (cont.)

ministers therefore informed the Imperial Government on 30 April that the Colony's existing relations with the Basuto "will no longer be continued", and suggested that if the Imperial authorities intended to fill the void left by the proposed repeal of the Annexation Act, it would be advisable for them to do so before Colonial authority were withdrawn<sup>59</sup>. Merriman went to London to ask for money and apply pressure at close quarters, while President Brand, acting independently, reminded the Colonial Office in a well timed despatch of its obligations under the Aliwal Convention. Three days after its arrival, Lord Derby wrote to the acting Governor of the Cape, intimating that the Imperial Government would resume responsibility for Basutoland provided the Basuto were willing to co-operate, that the Free State would take its proper share in the policing of the border, and that the Cape would make over to the High Commissioner an annual sum of money equivalent to the customs duties levied on goods destined for Basutoland<sup>60</sup>. After the arrival of Derby's dispatch, Scanlen introduced a Disannexation Bill in the Colonial Parliament, in terms of which the Colony was to make good any short fall in the revenue of the territory up to an annual maximum of £20,000<sup>61</sup>. Hofmeyr dissented, and moved an amendment on 13 July which called for an appeal to the constituencies before such a momentous decision was taken; but this attempt to scotch the Government's plan by delaying tactics failed. The amendment was thrown out by forty-two votes to twenty-one, and the 'Noes' included five members of the Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging<sup>62</sup>. Hofmeyr therefore fell back on his second line of defence by supporting a further amendment moved by Uppington that

no Legislative Measure for the Disannexation of Basutoland should be accepted which contains any provision other than one for the Repeal of the Basutoland Annexation Act.

58 (cont.) Brand to Officer Administering, Cape, 5, 12 July 1883.

59. C.3708, pp.1-3. Ministers' Minute, 30 Apr. 1883.

60. C.3708, pp.14, 35, 37: Merriman to Derby, 29 May; Brand to Derby, 12 May; Derby to Officer Administering, Cape, 14 June 1883.

61. Text in C.3855, pp.24-5.

62. These were R.N. Aling, M. Bergh, L.H. Goldschmidt, M.J. Louw and H. Wilman.

In other words, if disannexation had to come, there were to be no financial strings attached to a measure which would in any case bring back the imperial factor. This time the margin was narrowed to ten votes, but none of the Vereeniging's rebels returned to the fold. On the contrary, they allowed the Disannexation Bill to pass through all its stages. When Uppington failed by the margin of one vote to introduce a clause into the Bill during the committee stage to terminate all Colonial liabilities in Basutoland, the opposition of these rebels saved the Government's plan<sup>63</sup>, and the measure was eventually confirmed, in a form acceptable to the Imperial Government, by a Royal Order in Council of 2 February 1884<sup>64</sup>. The Afrikaner politicians had paid the penalty for their inconsistency, for, as Janse van Rensburg said at Graaff Reinet in March 1884 (though he was the only speaker to admit this), Scanlen's Government had been obliged to renounce responsibility for Basutoland on account of the Cradock Congress vote.

Having decided to abandon Basutoland, the Scanlen Government was prepared to go further and hand over to the Imperial authorities, if they would accept it, the administration of the entire Transkei: but when Merriman made the suggestion the Colonial Office declined to take it up<sup>65</sup>. The notion of a solid block of Imperial territory from Basutoland in the north to Port St Johns at the coast was attractive to those, like Saul Solomon, who considered that white colonials were bad governors of African tribes. It was not attractive to Scanlen for this reason, but it appeared to provide a solution to an intractable problem which he had inherited from the previous regime, at a time when affairs in Basutoland were

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63. Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, 27 July 1883.

64. Text in A.P. Newton, The Unification of South Africa, vol. I pp. 92-4.

65. C.3708, pp. 14, 22. Merriman to Derby, 29 May, 11 June 1883.

going badly and the Colony's financial resources were desperately low. The idea did not commend itself, however, either to Hofmeyr or to the Boers on the north-east frontier.

After the frontier war of 1877-8, a small tract of land had been cleared of hostile Tambookies who had fought under Gungubele against the white men, but most of the tribesmen in the Glen Grey and Xalanga districts had been left undisturbed. During the Basuto rising in 1880, however, many of the Tambookies took up arms again<sup>66</sup>. They were then subdued by the Burghers of Barkly East and Dordrecht, a number of whom took advantage of the fact that these Tambookie lands were still largely unoccupied to settle there in the middle months of 1882. The Scanlen Government was prepared to issue grazing permits to those who applied, but soon found itself faced with a situation in which homes had been built and land brought under the plough, by men who gave themselves a sort of prescriptive right to the conquered land and obviously had no intention of leaving<sup>67</sup>. These squatters received the warm support of Hofmeyr, in whose imagination there grew the idea of a broad belt of white settlement from Queenstown to Kokstad, separating the Basuto in the north from the Tembu and the Pondo in the south, as a means of bringing order to the tribal areas and extending the opportunities for the white farmer<sup>68</sup>.

The tact of Scanlen and of the civil and military administration persuaded the squatters not to take the law

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66. A.3 of 1892. Report of the Glen Grey Commission, p.2.

67. "Families packed their goods and started off with much of the spirit of the old Voortrekkers ... quickly building up homesteads which, although of humble proportions, were fairly comfortable", according to Sir Walter Stanford (J.W. MacQuarrie, ed., The Reminiscences of Sir Walter Stanford, vol. I, p.178).

68. See editorials in the Zuid Afrikaan, 4 May, 1 Aug. 1882.

into their own hands, but to await the findings of a commission which the premier undertook to set up, with a view to regularizing the de facto position by putting the land up for sale<sup>69</sup>. A commission was appointed<sup>70</sup>, and the Cradock Congress expressed dissatisfaction with its membership because it contained no representatives of the squatters' point of view; but when Scanlen wired to the chairman of the Congress, Janse van Rensburg, inviting him and Jotham Joubert of Albert to join the commission, the delegates applauded his prompt compliance with their wishes<sup>71</sup>. But there the good will between Scanlen and the Bondsmen ended. The Richmond Congress in May 1883 received indignant letters from the squatters, complaining over the sale of these lands at a price they thought too high, without their being given a right of first refusal, and at the presence of armed police in their midst<sup>72</sup>. The Congress resolved in favour of the squatters and agreed to help them send a deputation to Parliament, while Hofmeyr and D. F. du Toit were commissioned to draft petitions, over twenty of which were sent to the House of Assembly during the session of 1883<sup>73</sup>. Parliament, however, could take no decision on the Tembuland Commission's report on account of an adverse Speaker's ruling on a major technical point. Although Colonial magistrates operated in the territory, it had never been formally annexed to the Colony, but lay in the Governor's jurisdiction under a separate commission<sup>74</sup>. The only action open to the House, therefore,

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69. C.3493, pp. 11 ff. Telegraphic correspondence between Scanlen and General Gordon, June 1882.

70. On 17 Aug. 1882. Its report, G.66 of 1883, was dated 31 July 1883. It recommended that most of the lands settled by the squatters be set aside for white settlement (p.2) and annexed to the Colony (p.12).

71. Notulen, Cradock Congress, pp. 17, 25.

72. Cf. G.66 of 1883 (Continuation Report), p.1. The Bondsmen approached the Commission on 26 Apr. 1883 with a request for the withdrawal of the farms advertised for sale on the following day, which was refused. "After the sale of farms had taken place, it was found that many persons who had been in occupation on grazing licences had not become the purchasers owing to poverty. As a considerable area of land remained unsold, these persons made application to the Commission for permission to occupy this vacant land temporarily. To this the Commission saw no grave objection..." (ibid., p.2).

73. Notulen, Richmond Congress, under Item 25.

74. The High Commissioner was appointed Governor of (cont.)

was a petition to the Queen to implement the recommendations of the Commission report, and a private member moved accordingly. But in spite of repeated appearances on the order paper, Irvine's motion was never taken to a vote. The Government had decided to leave the territory in the hands of the Imperial Government, husband its meagre resources by arranging for the recall of its magistrates, and stand on this decision at the forthcoming general election, even at the risk of covering its head with coals of fire.

The Graaff Reinet Bond congress in March 1884 was very angry indeed. No speaker defended the Government. A letter was read from the Tembuland Trekkers' Committee, complaining of their powerlessness "onder Kaffers Magistraten en Kaffers wetten", and demanding the incorporation of Tembuland and Griqualand East in the Colony and the enfranchisement of the settlers. The fact that the territory was legally within the jurisdiction of the Imperial Government was admitted by Oom Daantje van den Heever and not seriously contested by anyone, but the delegates preferred to take their stand on the de facto occupation by Colonial settlers, and their views found typical expression in the words of Dolf Botha:

De Transkei nooit geheel formeel aan de Kolonie was gehecht, maar, beter dan dat, het werd door haar bezeten en regeerd, en er bestond volstrekt geen gevaar dat de Rijksregering er zich mede zou bemoeijen als men het land wilde houden<sup>75</sup>.

The meeting thought that the cession of the Transkei to the Imperial Government would be both shameful and dangerous, and appealed to Parliament not to let such a contingency occur. Scanlen and the Bondsmen had clashed head on, over an issue that was wreathed in legal ambiguity and aroused the elemental instincts of the Colonial frontiersman.

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74 (cont.) Tembuland and Emigrant Tembuland by Royal Sign Manual on 14 Nov. 1881. For the Speaker's ruling, see Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, 30 Aug. 1883.

75. Minutes, 1884 Congress, pp. 26-8.

A Colonial party energetically backing the claims of its fellow-countrymen to settle in a region outside the borders of the Colony was not likely to stand in the way of blood relations in a neighbouring state who were trying to do the same thing. The basic similarity between the situations in the Transkei and in Bechuanaland deserves some emphasis, for it helps to explain the attitude of the Bond when the latter issue achieved the proportions of a crisis during 1884; but the events connected with the establishment and disestablishment of Stellaland and Goshen were of greater immediate significance in the developing maelstrom of South African politics, because they threatened to cause a revival of hostility between the Imperial Government and the Transvaal, and took place in a region of great strategic and commercial importance.

The problem of the western border of the Transvaal, which had not been solved by the Keate Award of 1871, was set when Colonel Moysey made his report on the subject in December 1880. He discovered that no proper survey had been carried out, that the same piece of land had in some cases been granted to several different claimants, that enterprising settlers were laying claim to extensive tracts of territory on the basis of legally suspect agreements with the chiefs of the region, and that the area of paper claims had far outrun the zones of effective white settlement. Confronted with this lawless situation, Moysey had proceeded on the eve of the war of independence to draw a western border for the Transvaal which ignored paper titles however impressive, but recognized effective European possession even where the original native inhabitants had been dispossessed. His aim was that the frontier should be fixed, so that further penetration by white settlers into these tribal lands could be prevented. The Moysey Report, unpopular though it was among the Republican leaders, became the basis of the frontier

settlement under the Pretoria Convention<sup>76</sup>.

Trouble in these western areas, however, broke out before that Convention was signed. The pattern which soon emerged was that of a conflict between two pairs of rival chiefs, of whom two, Moshete and David Massouw, looked to the Transvaal for protection, and the other two, Montsioa and Mankoroane, looked to the Imperial Government. Each of these chiefs had his retinue of European concessionaires, variously described as "volunteers" or "freebooters" according to the point of view, some of whom came from the Transvaal, others from the diamond fields, and yet others from as far away as the western Cape.

In the course of 1882, plans were set on foot by the Transvaal "volunteers" to set up independent states to the west of the Moysey line. They drove Mankoroane, despairing of help from his Imperial patrons, to appeal to the Transvaal for protection in June. President Kruger, after testing the British Resident in Pretoria, declined to take him under his wing, but, in company with President Brand and the Cape Government, also rejected the British High Commissioner's suggestion of a four-power police force for the area unless the frontier provisions of the Pretoria Convention were first amended to the Transvaal's advantage. Meanwhile Montsioa capitulated to a kommandant of the South African Republic in October. Before the year was out, the Republic of Stellaland, based on Vryburg, and the Republic of Goshen, based on the farm Rooigrond near the Transvaal border, were in being, and the Government of the South African Republic was ready to absorb them both as soon as conditions were favourable for it to do so<sup>77</sup>. They lay across the only road to the north which did not cross Transvaal territory, however, which meant that missionary and commercial interests at the

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76. See J.A.I. Agar-Hamilton, The Road to the North, c. VIII, for a full account of the Moysey Report.

77. Agar-Hamilton, pp. 250-1. J. A. Mouton, Generaal Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis, p. 90.

Cape were alarmed over the safety of their communications with the interior, while Her Majesty's Government in London feared they might have to deal with a covert breach of the Pretoria Convention.

The Imperial Government had not provided itself, under that Convention, with a ready method of employing sanctions against the Transvaal, and when Lord Derby took over the Colonial Office in January 1883 he soon showed a disposition to favour the sort of solution to the problem which would cause his own Government the minimum of trouble. Once his proposal for a joint police force had been turned down, he suggested that Mankoroane and Montsioa might be provided with an alternative home in the Cape; but pressure from the Colony and from those interests which desired above all else to keep the northern road open soon drove this suggestion out of court. At the end of the year, when the Transvaal delegation visited London to negotiate for the amendment of the Pretoria Convention, he had come sufficiently under the influence of **these** interested people to reject the proposal which the delegation put forward that the Transvaal should annex Stellaland and Goshen and in return neutralize the northern road. He proposed to give the Transvaal "as much of this territory as can be given without including the road", and made acceptance of this offer a condition for the reopening of other questions under the Pretoria Convention. What Derby would have liked best of all, however, was that the disputed territory should be taken over by the Cape<sup>78</sup>.

The Cape Government had viewed the mounting crisis from the sidelines, divided as to the course which it ought to pursue, under pressure from the missionary and commercial interests on the one hand, and from the Bond on the other. It was Rhodes, the new member for Barkly West, who campaigned most strenuously for the annexation of Bechuanaland by the Cape. He was already thinking in terms of opening up the

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78. Agar-Hamilton, c. XII.

interior, and regarded the maintenance of the northern road as a vital prerequisite for such a scheme. He therefore secured his own appointment to a commission which investigated the northern border of the Colony in May 1883, and soon determined on a policy "of dividing the free-booters, bribing those of the south with the promise of their lands to acquiesce in the expulsion of their northern neighbours"<sup>79</sup>. He corresponded with Scanlen over the telegraph in May and June, urging him to stop Derby from giving the Transvaal the right to expand, and to "have the courage" to take Bechuanaland for the Colony<sup>80</sup>. His efforts reached their climax with his "Suez Canal" speech to the Cape House of Assembly in August. But Scanlen would not yield to his demand for the seizure of the "neck of the bottle".

In November and December the Colonial Office tried its hand, urging Scanlen first to take over Bechuanaland in the name of the Cape, or alternatively, after he had declined to do this, to share the burden of establishing a protectorate there with the Imperial Government. Scanlen refused the latter request unless the Transvaal Government participated, though he subsequently modified his condition and insisted only on the Republic's acquiescence<sup>81</sup>. The acceptance of the London Convention by the Transvaal delegation in February 1884, on terms which gave them those parts of the new republics which were nominally governed by Moshete and Massouw but denied them the northern road, did not bring about any change in Scanlen's policy. He was still reluctant to annex, and the Ministry, through Merriman, declined on 16 February to send an armed force to the troubled area, partly on the ground that the employment of a Cape force

79. Agar-Hamilton, p.231.

80. An account of Rhodes's communications with Scanlen is given in Agar-Hamilton, pp. 229ff. See also/documents in the Cape Archives, Acc. 375B. Rhodes/

81. The very full account of Scanlen's correspondence with Lord Derby in Agar-Hamilton, pp. 272ff., draws extensively on dispatches published in the British Parliamentary Paper

"would be entirely misunderstood, and might cause prejudicial complications"<sup>82</sup>. When the Imperial Government appointed the missionary, John Mackenzie, as Resident Commissioner in Bechuanaland, Scanlen had no part in the appointment, which he in fact regarded with disfavour.

There seems to be no reason to reject the argument, advanced by authorities as diverse as Hofmeyr's biographer and Agar-Hamilton, that it was primarily pressure from the Bondsmen which led Scanlen to refuse to move into Bechuanaland, or the further argument that by bringing Rhodes, the arch-annexationist, into his Cabinet after the general election of 1884, when his Treasurer, C. W. Hutton, lost his seat, Scanlen finally alienated the sympathies of the Bond for all his efforts to keep in step with it over the Bechuanaland crisis down to that moment. But Agar-Hamilton has read more into Hofmeyr's policy during 1883-4 than the evidence warrants<sup>83</sup>. He states that throughout the crisis Hofmeyr acted as a secret and willing agent of the Transvaal Government, obedient to "perhaps almost the instructions" which it passed on to him regarding the line which he should follow in the Cape House. Onze Jan "believed [as his biographer has put it, that] the solution of the Bechuanaland difficulty ... was for the Transvaal Government to assume control", and held this view at least until August 1884, when the Transvaal Government ratified the London Convention; but his attitude was hardly conspiratorial<sup>84</sup>. He liked the Imperial factor no more than Rhodes did. It had fallen foul of the Transvaal in very recent memory; its tentacles ap-

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82. Quoted by Agar-Hamilton, p. 279.

83. In his chapter with the engaging title, "The Mole, the Bug, the Warming-Pan and the White House".

84. Hofmeyr, p. 253. Agar-Hamilton has misrepresented Hofmeyr's biographer as saying that "as soon as the London Convention was signed [Onze Jan] abandoned the idea of annexing Bechuanaland to the Transvaal in favour of control by the Cape" (Road to the North, pp. 364-5). But Hofmeyr's biographer says explicitly (p.257) that Hofmeyr continued to support the annexation of the territory to the Transvaal until that Convention was ratified (in August, as distinct from the signing, which took place in February). There is therefore no mystery about Hofmeyr's policy between February and August of the sort which Agar-Hamilton suggests

peared to be reaching out in the direction of Basutoland again, and perhaps of the Transkei as well, and he saw no advantage to be gained from its restoration on the Transvaal's western border, either in its sole majesty or in conjunction with the authority of the Cape Government. He was not personally concerned, as Rhodes was, with the security of the northern road, but he urged that the road stood at least as good a chance of remaining open if it ran through the South African Republic, as if it passed through unstable satellite states which depended on transit dues for their revenue. Rhodes had no quarrel with the latter part of this sentiment, for his policy was based on the necessity of depriving Stellaland and Goshen of their independence. He mistrusted the Transvaal in a way in which Hofmeyr did not, for the very good reason that the Transvaal was already beginning to raise its tariff wall against imported Cape goods;<sup>85</sup> but in view of the subsequent influence of claustrophobia as a primary source of Republican intransigence, it would be rash to say that Rhodes was entirely right. Then why did Hofmeyr not advocate the sole occupation of Stellaland and Goshen by the Cape, eliminate the imperial factor, untie Scanlen's hands, and obviate a difficulty which plagued South Africa during the whole of 1884? His motives may be inferred, perhaps, from the Zuid Afrikaan's comment on Rhodes's "Suez Canal" speech, which urged that the loss of the road was a reasonable sacrifice to make if it could buy the Transvaal's good will without prejudice to genuine commercial and missionary interests:

Te streven naar een werkkring in de landen bewesten en benoorden de Transvaal zoo als de heer Rhodes er een aan de Kaapkolonie toedenkt, is even dwaas als gevaarlijk. Gevaarlijk omdat het onfeilbaar tot een strijd met de Republiek moet leiden. dien de heer Rhodes waarschijnlijk even gaarne vermijden wil als de sterkste voorstander van het Afrikaanderisme. Dwaas omdat men een land moeilijk van uit de verste beschaaft, en de ware beschaving der Naturellen veel beter door een volk van de zeden en denkwijze der Transvalers dan door die vrijboute en ongelijksoortige elementen kan worden bevorderd waaruit onze Kaapsche maatschappij bestaat<sup>86</sup>

85. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies in South Africa, p.17, quoting Rhodes's speech in the Assembly, 16 July 1884.

86. Zuid Afrikaan, 18 Aug. 1883.

The validity of such arguments was a matter of opinion; but Hofmeyr held strong views, because he was involved in a problem of loyalty, not so much to the Transvaal as to the Afrikaner Bond, whose internal developments were peculiarly bound up with the Bechuanaland crisis.

The prevailing attitude within the Colonial Bond favoured abstention from the affairs of Bechuanaland, as is well illustrated by the resolution taken at the congress of 1884:

Dat het Koloniale Gouvernement zich niet met eenige bemoeijng van wege de Rijksregering met Stellaland zal inlaten, aangezien wij onze handen meer dan vol hebben met onze eigene naturellenzaken en aangezien een groot gedeelte der Stellalanders mannen zijn van ons eigen bloed; en dat de inlating met de Stellalanders berekend is om groot onheil aan Zuid Afrika te berokkenen<sup>87</sup>.

The Transvaal Bondsmen were themselves deeply committed to an expansionist policy on their western border. Piet Joubert had invested his career and his reputation in the project. In August 1882 he had written to Hofmeyr that the inclusion of the satellite Republics in the Transvaal was a necessary part of the process of South African unification, "de grootste leuze mijner ziel"<sup>88</sup>, and he took it upon himself to supply the Republican "volunteers" with the sinews of war<sup>89</sup>. Mouton adds that "die vrywilligers op die grense het hy aangeraai om by die Bond aan te sluit", for a letter which he wrote to this effect to N. C. Gey van Pittius, president of Goshen, has survived. It was dated August 1883. The Land Goosen branch of the Bond was in existence at the beginning of October 1883, centred on Rooigrond, according to an undated report in De Tolk, and there was a branch at Rietvallei in the Molopo district of the Transvaal, of which N. C. Gey himself was chairman, in December<sup>90</sup>.

87. Minutes, 1884 Congress, pp. 29-30.

88. Mouton, p.112, quoting Joubert to Hofmeyr, 31 Aug. 1882.

89. Agar-Hamilton, pp. 256-8, quoting G.J. van Niekerk to Joubert, 24 Sept. 1883, 3 Mar. 1884; Mouton, p.90, quoting Joubert to the Landdrost of Lichtenburg, June and Aug. 1884.

90. De Tolk, 10 Oct., 26 Dec. 1883. In February 1884, N.C. Gey van Pittius attempted to resign the chairmanship of the Rietvallei Bond branch, "aangezien hy lid van het bestuur is in het land Gosen en als zoodanig vele bezigheden heeft"; but he agreed to remain if a vice-chairman were elected to act in his absence, should his activities in Goshen prevent  
(cont.)

The Transvaal Bondsmen were playing for high stakes, and it would have been difficult for Hofmeyr and the Colonial Bondsmen to take the sort of action in Parliament which would have split their organization on territorial lines in the first flush of their new-found unity.

The further development of the Bechuanaland crisis belongs to the period of Upington's Ministry. Like the question of Tembuland, it was unsolved at the moment when, to general surprise, Scanlen elected to go out of office "on a bug". Without consulting his colleagues,<sup>91</sup> he resigned in May 1884, after a defeat in the Assembly over his relaxation of earlier measures to prevent the appearance of phylloxera among the Cape vines. This was hardly an issue of confidence in itself, important though it was to a sectional interest, and historians have not been wrong in regarding the incident as a pretext for his action rather than its cause. Scanlen had performed useful services for the Afrikaner party during his first two years of office, and, aware of the need for their support if he was to maintain his position in the House against the opposition of Sprigg and his followers, he had been prepared to pay for it. Hence his willingness to grant their request over the language question, his anxiety not to lose their support over a secondary matter like the repeal of the excise, and his willingness to allow them to call the tune, to begin with, over the Basutoland, Tembuland and Bechuanaland questions. But Scanlen was leading an untrained horse, strong, wilful, and not always endowed with good judgment. Hofmeyr was still under

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90. (cont.) his attending meetings (see De Tolck, 25 Apr. 1884). Another Bond branch at Vrywilligersrust, Land Goshen, was in existence in March 1884 (De Tolck, 9 May 1884).

91. Laurence, p.99.

forty when Scanlen went out of office, reasonably secure in the saddle, but only by dint of allowing his mount a good deal of free rein, and inclined at times to relish a canter where a gentle trot would have been more judicious.

By the middle of 1884, Scanlen and Hofmeyr had mutually abandoned each other. To call Scanlen an imperialist, as the Bondsmen began to do, was to misrepresent the main springs of his policy. He was the victim of hard times, and of Sprigg's mismanagement, which had left him with intractable problems in Basutoland and the Transkei which ought to have been avoided, and his appeal to the Imperial Government was in both cases an admission of defeat rather than a declaration of principle. From the Bond's point of view, and from Hofmeyr's, Scanlen had proved too willing to abandon his difficulties to the Imperial Government, the exclusion of whose influence from the internal affairs of South Africa was still a cardinal point of policy. It was not that they had to deal with imperialism rampant. The Wolseley era was over and the Warren expedition not yet conceived, and Gladstone was still in office, though he was heading for a fall. But the Bond was in a buoyant mood, with strong branches in the Cape, Free State and Transvaal, and it was encouraged to press all the harder for a united and independent South Africa by its success in the Colonial elections of 1884.

## IV

The general election of 1883-4 was the first which the Bond and Boeren Vereeniging fought as a united body, and it had good reason to be satisfied with the results. The Council elections, completed in December 1883, gave it a nominal majority of twelve against ten, while in the new Assembly Hofmeyr's followers numbered nearly half the House, without taking into account the personal following of whoever stood at the head of the Government - provided that person was not Hofmeyr himself.

When Scanlen resigned, the Governor sent for Hofmeyr to form a Ministry, and he declined, "because, if I formed a Ministry, my opponents would raise the racial issue, and I hate racial issues"<sup>92</sup>. He was quite right. Within six months affairs in Bechuanaland would cause a resurgence of emotional jingoism among English-speaking colonials, directed against Hofmeyr even though he was not in office, and the demonstrations would assuredly have been more vigorous had their target been prime minister. Ill health was a contributory cause of Hofmeyr's refusal, but it is unlikely to have been the main one, and it would be unreal to ignore the consideration of party interest, which always weighed with Onze Jan<sup>93</sup>, more especially since on this occasion he found in Thomas Upington, a Cape Town lawyer and member for Caledon, a willing ally against the Scanlen policy.

Upington assumed office in May, and brought the Irishman's mistrust of Downing Street to his defence of Colonial authority in South African affairs. Basutoland was lost<sup>94</sup>; but Upington agreed with the Bondsmen that the Transkei should belong to the Colony, and that Bechuanaland should remain within the sphere of influence of the Transvaal. In his first session as premier, he secured the annexation to

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92. Hofmeyr, p.247.

93. See J.H.H. de Waal, Die Lewe van D.C. de Waal, p.110.

94. Basuto policy had first brought Hofmeyr and Upington together. See above, p.170, and Hofmeyr, pp. 237-8.

the Colony of the region of the Umzimvubu mouth, including Port St Johns, and extended the legal authority of the Colonial Government over the whole of Tembuland in 1885. He also made a determined but ultimately disastrous attempt to follow the Bond's policy on the northern border, refusing to agree to take over Stellaland until developments in that region had reached such a pass that a reluctant Imperial Government decided to take charge of its own interests without relying on Colonial support.

Lord Derby had made the tactical mistake of placing the missionary, John Mackenzie, as Resident Commissioner in Bechuanaland under the authority of the High Commissioner at the Cape; and Mackenzie, going beyond the terms of the London Convention which made no mention of a British protectorate there, followed the advice of a group of Vryburg settlers and raised the Union Jack, but aroused the opposition of other Stellalanders on a multitude of grounds<sup>95</sup>. By August the situation in Stellaland and Goshen had dissolved into near anarchy. Mackenzie was accordingly recalled by the High Commissioner, and Rhodes was sent up to succeed him. But Rhodes, whose chief aim was to get the Transvalers out of the disputed territory, clashed with Piet Joubert, who was equally determined that they should remain, and it was Joubert, with force at his back, who got the better of the encounter.<sup>96</sup>

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95. No attempt is made here to evaluate the case made against Mackenzie by some writers against that made for him by Agar-Hamilton, cc. XIII, XIV, and (independently) by W.B. Campbell, The South African Frontier, 1865-1885, c.XIV. Derby's error was to place a Resident Commissioner, who believed in the extension of British authority in Bechuanaland, under the orders of a High Commissioner who was under the influence of Rhodes.
96. C. van der Walt, S.J. du Toit in die Diens van die S.A. Republiek, p.63, writes as though Rhodes and Joubert co-operated without friction. But this is not the view of Agar-Hamilton, c.XV; Williams, Rhodes, p.82; and Mouton, pp. 91-2, who attributes some of the blame to Joubert for his failure to co-operate with Rhodes.

The expansionist aims of Joubert have been well authenticated, and there can be little doubt that they had the support of the Government in Pretoria, which at least assumed the credit for Joubert's success in a cable which it sent to the Colonial Office in September:

Our Commandant Joubert has brought about peace on western border. All parties laid down arms on Transvaal Government taking them under its protection and jurisdiction. If Her Majesty's responsibility be handed over to us effective measures will promptly be taken to restore and maintain permanent peace subject to Her Majesty's approval, the rights of all native chiefs being respected. Matter urgent, and requires immediate reply<sup>97</sup>.

The occasion for this telegram was the receipt by Joubert of a letter from Montsioa, dated 30 August, in which he asked to be brought "under the protection and law of the Transvaal"<sup>98</sup>, and the Transvaal Government was trying to take advantage of Montsioa's submission to secure control of his territory, without appearing to infringe the terms of the London Convention which the Volksraad had just ratified. Chief Justice Kotzé was among the President's advisers when they met to discuss the 'follow-up', after a sequence of telegraphic messages from Pretoria had failed to convince Whitehall of the necessity for an immediate reply. Should the Government take unilateral action and annex Montsioa's lands? Kotzé warned them that even a provisional annexation would "amount to a direct breach of the Convention". Kruger rejected the advice and replied that a proclamation taking over the lands was necessary on the ground of humanity, and S. J. du Toit agreed with him, using the same argument. A proclamation was accordingly drawn up, dated 16 September, and published in the Staatscourant on the 18th<sup>99</sup>. It announced the annexation of the troubled area, subject to the Queen's consent, and on 17 September S. J. du Toit set off for the western border to put it into force. The political predikant would try to succeed where, from the other

97. Quoted by Sir J.G. Kotzé, Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, vol. II, p.54.

98. The text is given in Kotzé, vol. II, pp.55-6.

99. Kotzé, vol. II, pp. 56-7.

side, the political missionary had failed.

The departure of du Toit occurred two days after the recall of Joubert, who resented his recall, which he regarded as a sign that the Government had lost confidence in him<sup>100</sup>. There is, however, no indication that the change of Commissioner signified a change of policy. Du Toit was provided with a copy of the instructions given to Joubert, and he was required to carry out the terms of the proclamation of the 16th.<sup>101</sup> He arrived at Rooigrond on 22 September, concluded a treaty with Montsioa on the 25th, taking him over in the name of the South African Republic, and on 3 October ran up the Vierkleur at Rooigrond to the accompaniment of what Agar-Hamilton has called "a passionate oration beside which the most flamboyant utterance of contemporary Jingoism seems pale and flaccid"<sup>102</sup>. Kruger, however, ordered him to pull the flag down on the 6th, recalled him on the 10th, and issued a further proclamation in an extraordinary Staatscourant on the 13th, which cancelled that of 16 September on the ground that the Government's "object of establishing peace on the western border had been attained, and ... the way was now open ... for the establishment of a permanent peace, [which] the said provisional proclamation of 16th September may retard ..." <sup>103</sup>.

The reputation of S. J. du Toit suffered as a result of the action which he took on this occasion, the gravamen of the charge against him being that his hoisting of the

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100. Joubert was officially recalled because, having been re-elected Kommandant-Generaal on 28 August, he was required to take the oath of office in Pretoria on 22 September, while he was also told that his presence was required on the Zulu frontier. But personal animosity was also involved. Joubert resented his exclusion from the London delegation; he suspected his fellow Bondsman, S.J. du Toit, of poisoning Kruger's mind towards him, etc. See Agar-Hamilton, p.352; Mouton, pp.92-8 (the fullest discussion of Joubert's motives); Walker, De Villiers, pp.182-3, quoting Kotzé to de Villiers, 27 Oct.1884; van der Walt, p.63.

101. Van der Walt, p.65.

102. Agar-Hamilton, p.353; van der Walt, pp.70-2. The Patriot, 17 Oct. 1884, gave a full report of this speech.

103. Kotzé, vol. II, pp.58-9.

flag was a contravention of his instructions<sup>104</sup>. Yet du Toit's biographer was told by an unnamed correspondent that

die opdrag aan uw fader was, om die vlag te hijs op Rooigrond en Stellaland en dan af te wag om te sien wat Engeland sou doen<sup>105</sup>,

and it certainly seems that the action of the Transvaal Government in sending a man with instructions to establish a provisional protectorate, and then recalling him three weeks later for hoisting a provisional symbol over it, was hardly above suspicion<sup>106</sup>. Du Toit, who made no public defence of his conduct at the time, perhaps because he regarded himself as bound to secrecy by his oath of office<sup>107</sup>, stated in his old age, with characteristic casuistry, that his raising of the flag had a totally different purpose:

Gnl. Joubert werd teruggeroepe en ik naar die westergrens als spesiale kommissaris gestuur, met instruksie om dadelik onder beskerming van die Transvaalse vlag 'n end te maak aan die vegterij tussen die vrywilligers en Montsioa, sodat albei partije hul stil moes gedra totdat die kwessie gereël was.

Die hijsing van die Transv. vlag op Rooigrond deur mij als spesiale kommissaris was dus g'n anneksasie van grondgebied nie, maar enkel om beide partije onder beskerming van die vlag te plaas<sup>108</sup>.

This affirmation that the raising of the flag did not involve annexation cannot be reconciled with the fact of annexation at the time. What seems to have happened is that the Kruger Government lined itself up behind the policy of annexation, but in such a way as to deny the credit for it to Joubert,

104. Leyds, Transvaal Surrounded, p.168, quoting E. Bok to S.J. du Toit, 6 Oct. 1884.

105. J.D. du Toit, S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, pp.256-61.

106. Van der Walt, p.65. The provisional nature of the annexation was not by any means stressed in du Toit's Rooigrond speech, in which he referred to the Transvaal's original title to Goshen by right of conquest; but if his instructions were to annex, he had a prima facie case for hoisting the flag.

107. C.f. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2b. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 12 Nov. 1900: "... As you are aware, I was Kruger's confidential adviser from 1881 to 1885 and of course know a great deal about the secret machinations of the Pretoria oligarchy ... Thus far I have kept everything a dead secret, considering myself bound by my oath of allegiance to the Republic in whose service I was. But the Republic is no more. Don't you [think] the time has arrived for an exposé? If so how, where and when? ..."

108. J.D. du Toit, p.240. My italics.

and to give itself a safe line of escape (the "provisional" nature of the annexation) in case the Imperial Government were to react vigorously, as it subsequently did. Du Toit, whose quarrel with Joubert led him to accept the responsibility for putting the proclamation into effect, had not the wit to see that the flag demonstration, which was not detailed in his instructions, enabled his enemies in Pretoria to turn him into a scapegoat for a policy which had failed, and he was powerless to prevent their doing so<sup>109</sup>. His private feud with Joubert, whatever its cause, was soon over; but the fact that both he and Joubert had quarrelled with the real rulers of the Transvaal damaged both their reputations, and incidentally had a calamitous effect on the growth of the Afrikaner Bond in the Republic, on account of its deep involvement in the Goshen adventure.

The Transvaal Volksraad had ratified the London Convention in August, and the Executive Council, after trying in a guarded manner to defy it in September, reverted to a policy of honest adherence on 13 October. The Republican leaders were now prepared to accept the annexation of the lands of Montsioa and Mankoroane by the Cape, if only as a pis aller.

It is not our object to possess Land Goshen [wrote Leyds to Hercules du Preez in November 1884]. We would be perfectly satisfied if it were annexed to the Cape Colony with Stellaland and on the same conditions. Then at least we would be rid of the continual disorders on our borders; and we shall not get rid of them if Gey's men come under the Imperial Government. The Government of this Republic will be willing to co-operate in bringing about annexation to the Cape Colony<sup>110</sup>.

Hofmeyr's hands were freed, perhaps, from the moment of the ratification of the Convention, and he too began to press

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109. The evidence that E.J.P. Jorissen, for example, did his best to discredit du Toit (not without considerable provocation) is overwhelming. See his own Transvaalsche Herinneringen, pp.128-30; Walker, De Villiers, pp.182-3; P.J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, vol. I pp. 45-6; and van der Walt, pp.27-36.

110. Quoted in Leyds, Transvaal Surrounded, pp.500-1.

for the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape Colony. The German proclamation of a protectorate over Namaqua-Damaraland on 7 August helped to confirm his change of view, just as the attitude of the Transvaal Government was being transformed by the evident intention of Whitehall to insist on observance of the Convention by commissioning General Warren to lead an army into Bechuanaland and make a show of military force. If the Cape took over the road, as Hofmeyr now saw the position, the Germans would be unable to cut it from the west, and the Warren expedition would not be necessary. Lack of Imperial zeal in one quarter, and a superabundance of it in another, could be requited at a single stroke, and allow all Afrikanerdom to breathe more freely.

The policy which Upington followed in attempting to avert the Warren expedition accorded therefore with Bond plans. It was, under the circumstances, a difficult policy to pursue, on account of the stirring of British colonial sentiment which followed the news that Warren was on his way, and the evident antagonism between the Colonial Ministry and Sir Hercules Robinson, the Governor<sup>111</sup>. On 17 October, the Cape Ministers told Robinson that the expulsion of the Goshen "volunteers" by force would make the subsequent annexation of Bechuanaland by the Colony difficult, and they proposed that the premier and one of his colleagues should go to Rooigrond and negotiate a settlement with Gey van Pittius's men. Robinson gave his reluctant approval, cautioning the Ministers that they should on no account sacrifice the lands of Montsioa, who had come under severe pressure from the Goshenites. The Imperial Government agreed to hold up military operations, but not preparations, for six weeks, pending the outcome of their visit, and on 4 November

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111. Agar-Hamilton, pp. 372ff., gives the fullest account of the developments discussed below, though he writes from a point of view hostile to the Upington Government. Leyds Transvaal Surrounded, c. XXIV, wrote from the opposite point of view.

Upington and Sprigg set out for Goshen. The terms which they made with the Goshenites, however, were unacceptable to Robinson, and the year ended to the tune of rising party cries, as Warren duly set foot in Cape Town to carry out his assigned task.

An Imperial League had been founded in the capital at a meeting on 23 October, in opposition to the conciliatory policy of the Government, under men of such divergent stamp as T. E. Fuller, J. L. M. Brown and Alfred Ebdon (all Cape Town parliamentarians), James Rose Innes, Victor Sampson, and Dormer of the Argus<sup>112</sup>. It was an ephemeral thing, confined almost entirely to the western Cape, and its bubble would be pricked by the antics of Warren himself before many months were out; but the excited temper of public opinion can be gauged from the fact that Hofmeyr received threatening letters through the post, purporting to emanate from the League, while Sprigg of all people suffered arraignment at the hands of his East London constituents on a charge of disloyalty<sup>113</sup>. The Cape Town Bondsmen, meeting on 28 October, that is, five days after the formation of the League and a week before Upington and Sprigg set out for the north, worked hard to counteract the League's influence by carrying resolutions in favour of ministerial policy, and affirming their own loyalty to the Empire<sup>114</sup>; but no efforts on their part could prevent the Warren expedition setting out.

Warren encountered no resistance. Kruger restrained the Goshen "volunteers", and gave way to Warren's show of force when the two met in conference at Fourteen Streams in January 1885<sup>115</sup>. But Warren's conduct of affairs in Bechuana-

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112. Y.P. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, 1884-1898, pp. 15-23.

113. Hofmeyr, p.261; J.A. Coetzee, Politieke Groepering in die wording van die Afrikanernasie, quoting East London Dispatch, 20 Dec. 1884.

114. Notulen, Cape Town branch, Afrikaner Bond.

115. Agar-Hamilton, pp. 390-5. Kruger still hoped and worked for annexation by the Colony. See his letter to Robinson quoted in Leyds, pp. 218-9.

land quickly alienated the parties which had been interested in sending him there. Rhodes, who had attempted to commit him in advance to a recognition of the Stellaland settlers' claims, was required to leave Bechuanaland in March, and had his doubts about the imperial factor confirmed, especially when Warren began to insult Dutch-speaking South Africans in his public statements. Sir Hercules Robinson, who was Warren's superior in administrative matters, soon came to the conclusion that Warren did not know how to set limits to his empire-building, and was offended when the Colonial Office took sides with Warren against himself. He too began to have serious second thoughts. There was consternation in Downing Street, too, once it became apparent that, so far from preparing the way for the Cape to take over the administration, Warren was in fact laying the foundations of a Crown Colony. This Colony was a fact by September, as far north as the Molopo River, while the vast tract of land to the north of it, with whose rulers Warren had made treaties, was accorded the Queen's "protection". In that month, Robinson received a new commission as Governor of the southern portion, or British Bechuanaland. A Land Commissioner brought the disputed claims of chiefs and settlers under review, confirming the native inhabitants "in at least the remnant of their land" the following year, and leaving them with much more than they would have been allowed under the Stellaland and Goshen regimes<sup>116</sup>. This was a noteworthy contribution which brought peace to a much harrowed land, and went far towards atoning for a settlement which was unpopular with the Transvaal, the Cape Government and the Afrikaner Bond.

The Transvalers were alarmed at the establishment of Imperial rule along their western border. Upington's Cabinet,

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116. Agar-Hamilton, p.444.

piqued by the rejection of its negotiated settlement in December 1884, declined to relieve the Imperial Government of its new commitments when subsequently asked to do so. The Bondsmen, who expressed regret at the rejection of Upington's settlement and anger at Warren's activities at Beaufort West in 1885, did not even discuss the subject at Grahamstown in 1886<sup>117</sup>. In Bechuanaland, as in Basutoland, their concern for the territorial interests of their Republican neighbours, combined with their fear of the consequences of any extension of Imperial authority, had produced a vacillating policy which led in both cases to the extension of British rule and therefore to the defeat of their object.

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117. Notulen, 1885 Congress, pp. 5, 16-7.

general constitution approved at Richmond not only to ratify that constitution but to amend it, bringing back the contentious word "einddoel" to qualify the Bond's official attitude to South African union, in place of Hofmeyr's compromise word "eindbestemming". The voting even tied over the suggestion of introducing the still more controversial phrase, "onder eigen vlag", because D. F. du Toit, though representing a Provincial Bestuur which had firmly rejected these words, decided to vote in favour of their inclusion.

Doch de leden [ran the Notulen], ziende dat die woorden niet gevonden worden in de Constituties van den O.V. Staat en de Kaapkolonie, onderwierpen zich, om der eensgezindheids wille, en lieten de woorden uit, met aantekening van hunne tegenstemming krachtens hunne opdracht<sup>2</sup>.

After giving their blessing to the stalwart Transvalers who were at that moment establishing the New Republic in the north of Zululand, and to the current movement for closer union between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the Bestuur then composed a pastoral letter (Bondsbrief) for circulation to all branches, in which they summarised their conclusions not only on these points, but on the desirability of a South African customs union, in terms which criticized the tariff policies of the Cape<sup>3</sup>.

The Cape Grahamstown Congress reacted sharply, taking its cue from the Zuid Afrikaan. This paper, in a very critical editorial, had raised the question whether so small a Bestuur ought to have as much uncontrolled authority as the constitution allowed it, for there was no rule of construction to say how it should interpret its power of constitutional amendment "met inachtneming van de gevoelens der Provinciale Besturen"<sup>4</sup>. The Murraysburg branch took to Grahamstown a proposal that the Central Bestuur should be abolished and replaced by liaison committees (Correspondeerende Comit es)

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2. Verslag van de Eerste Zitting van het Centraal Bestuur, printed as Bylage C in the Notulen, 1886 Congress (Cape).
  3. The Bondsbrief described Cape port duties as <sup>an</sup>"onrecht", and the tax on goods entering the Cape from the interior as a "schreiend onrecht". For the Central Bestuur's Tolverbond resolution, see below, p. 202
  4. Zuid Afrikaan, 27 Feb. 1886.

in the various "provinces". The proposal received considerable support in the course of a long debate, and the resolution eventually adopted by the Congress showed that the Colonial Bondsmen had set their faces tactfully but firmly against any dictation from the north<sup>5</sup>. They were motivated, now, less by a concern for the furtherance of Afrikaner unity across the internal frontiers of South Africa than by a desire to safeguard their interests as Colonial farmers, for these had received a severe blow during the economic depression of the previous few years.

The manner in which the depression had hit the Cape farmer may be gleaned from the following facts: wool exports, which had exceeded £3 millions in value in the early 'seventies, had fallen from £2.4 millions in 1880 to £1.4 millions in 1885; ostrich feather exports, which had reached a record value of £1.0 million in 1882, had fallen to barely half that figure in 1886; wheat imports, which varied inversely with the Colonial crop, rose to the unusually large quantity of over 40 million lbs. in the years 1882-4, and reached a record figure of 52 million lbs. in 1885; the importation of agricultural implements and machinery, which had reached a peak in 1880, struck the doldrums in 1884, in which year no heavy machinery was imported at all<sup>6</sup>. The wool farmers had been unable to maintain their rate of productivity on account of drought and their failure to combat the ravages of burr-weed (Xanthium

5. Notulen, 1886 Congress, p.12. "Deze vergadering hecht haar vertrouwen aan het Centraal Bestuur, en is verder van gevoelen dat wij nimmer confedereren zullen, als wij het Centraal Bestuur afschaffen, ofschoon deze vergadering in geen geval het Confederatieplan met kracht zou willen doordrijven, maar acht het noodzakelijk dat de drie staten zamen werken, om daardoor een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika te verkrijgen, onder Britsche Protectoraat, en besluit dus in geen geval het af te schaffen."

6. The figures in this paragraph are derived from the Cape of Good Hope Blue Books and Statistical Registers.

spinosum) and scab. The ostrich-farmers had over-produced, a fact which is illustrated by the sudden increase of insolvencies in the Oudtshoorn district in 1882, the year in which feather exports reached their peak. The wheat farmers were the victims of a series of bad seasons, during which the crops gathered were sometimes hardly comparable with the quantity of seed sown<sup>7</sup>.

One consequence of the depression was the imposition of a sudden credit squeeze by the banks, whose discounts were reduced in 1881-4 by nearly fifty per cent, leading to a threefold increase in the Colonial insolvency rate<sup>8</sup>. Most Dutch farmers had been brought up under a subsistence economy, requiring little in the way of goods from the outside world and paying for what they did need with livestock and various simple home-made products. But it should not be imagined that they were totally untouched by the system of easy credit which had grown up in the 'seventies. The newspapers of these years carried large pictorial advertisements of expensive agricultural machinery in both languages, and when Oom Daantje van den Heever set off on his visit to Cape Town in January 1881 he was given a brief to visit "alle invoerders van koopwaren in eigenhandel, vooral invoerders van machinerie, die tot welvaart van het land dienen kan"<sup>9</sup>. Moreover, farmers were as often the victims of other people's speculations as their own, as the Argus indicated in January 1882:

We have been accustomed to say that commercial disturbance was purely local, and strictly confined to the circle of those affected by speculation in diamond scrip; but we are sorry to see disproof of that position in the very large proportion of farmers to be found amongst the insolvents. The immediate causes of these agricultural insolvencies are twofold - pressure from the storekeepers, who in their turn have been pressed by the town merchants, and unexpected pressure

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7. Cape Argus, 17 Feb. 1882. An editorial describing crop losses in the Malmesbury district, where the increase in voluntary insolvencies was even more sensational than at Oudtshoorn (see table below, p. 198 ).
8. On 31 Dec. 1881, the total discounts on issue by the banks amounted to £1.05 millions. This figure was steadily reduced to £0.31 millions by 31 Dec. 1886. Insolvencies, which had always totalled less than 400 in the years 1876-81, rose to 1000 in 1883.
9. See above, p. 61

from the banks who had hitherto made advances freely upon what may be called ostrich scrip<sup>10</sup>.

In the first quarter of 1883, the Zuid Afrikaan published the names of some 320 insolvents. Of the 250 whose occupations were stated, 113 were farmers, and it seems unlikely that Dutch farmers fared any better than their English-speaking counterparts if the insolvency rate in some of the worst hit and predominantly Dutch farming districts is taken into account:

Voluntary Insolvencies (selected districts), 1876-85<sup>11</sup>

<u>District</u>	<u>1876</u>	<u>'77</u>	<u>'78</u>	<u>'79</u>	<u>'80</u>	<u>'81</u>	<u>'82</u>	<u>'83</u>	<u>'84</u>	<u>'85</u>
Beaufort West	3	2	7	4	10	4	28	18	13	19
Fraserburg	1	3	2	9	6	15	31	10	21	12
Malmesbury	22	24	16	14	20	27	72	40	33	30
Oudtshoorn	8	5	1	8	8	12	34	33	30	67
Paarl	21	25	18	8	14	33	69	63	30	17
Richmond	4	1	6	4	7	3	23	7	9	9
Swellendam	10	4	3	3	4	10	43	21	7	1

To add to the difficulties of the farmers, the pressure on the land was also becoming more acute. The impoverishment of farmers consequent upon repeated sub-divisions of the original farms had become noticeable at least since 1870, and the poor white problem, to which references were made by speakers at the Bond Congress of 1884, began to exercise the minds of Bond politicians to an increasing extent. The farmers' hunger for land can be seen also in the continued strength of the trekking spirit among them. By this is meant not simply the seasonal trek in quest of water in times of drought, but the urge to move into new areas and settle there. This, of course, was not so easy to do in 1880 as it had been in 1830; but Boers continued to move out into areas of marginal rainfall, where circumstances compelled them to lead a nomadic existence, so that when opportunities occurred for the

10. Cape Argus, 14 Jan. 1882.

11. From the Cape of Good Hope Blue Book, 1882, p. 806; Statistical Register, 1885, p. 479.

occupation of good farming land - as on the Cape's eastern frontier in 1882 - these were usually seized upon with alacrity<sup>12</sup>.

The farmers recovered rather more slowly from the depression of the early 'eighties than did the commercial firms, and they continued to preach retrenchment as late as 1887, at a time when these other interests were being quickened by the gold discoveries on the Rand. Their doctrine of retrenchment did not stand alone, but was accompanied by a persistent demand that the farming interest ought, like a poor relation, to be the recipient of special favours: of government loans on first mortgages, drawn on the security of their farms and repaid on sinking-fund principles, as urged at the congresses of 1886 and 1887, and in Parliament by M. M. Venter<sup>13</sup>; of state-aided irrigation schemes; and - a hardy perennial - of railway branch lines.

The Bondsmen desired the protection, in general, of anything made or grown within the Colony against similar products made or grown outside. The split within the Bond ranks over the excise was in essence a split between those who looked upon it as an unfair tax and those who looked upon it as potentially a protective tariff, and the principle of the protective tariff derived much support from Colonial farmers on account of the stringent protective policy indulged in by the Transvaal from 1881 onwards. The Republican Government raised tariff walls against imported produce of many kinds, and linked these with an internal system of monopolies, among them a brandy monopoly sold to one A. H. Nellmapius for the annual payment of £1000, in return for which

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12. See P.J. van der Merwe, Trek, pp. 241-2, for illustrations from the latter part of the nineteenth century.

13. Notulen, 1886 Congress, p.18; 1887 Congress, p.15. Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, 10 June 1886. A motion by M. M. Venter to this effect was rejected.

the Government raised a duty of 6s. per gallon on brandy produced outside the Republic<sup>14</sup>. Transvaal brandy, distilled from non-grape products and excise-free, threatened to impinge on Colonial markets at a time when the Colonial producers of the genuine article were having to face competition from the local producers of dop. No wonder that when the Cape Bond congress of 1884 debated the issue of protection, speakers drew special attention to the item of imported liquor. There was some opposition among the Bondsmen to a tax on essential foods, and the principle of a sliding scale found some support among them; but the corn producers were in a precarious position, and agitated strongly for protection from foreign competition at the Congress of 1887 and in Parliament the same year<sup>15</sup>. The wool producers sought to safeguard their position by urging the establishment of a local textile industry through the encouragement of skilled immigrants, at the Congresses of 1886 and 1888; but this project got nowhere, partly owing to the opposition of Rhodes<sup>16</sup>. The ostrich farmers, apprehensive with good reason for the future, were successful in obtaining an export duty on birds in 1884.

The idea of a South African customs union became more attractive to commercial interests at the Cape when the Transvaal began to increase its bid for economic independence in 1883-4 by entering into negotiations for the construction of a railway from Lourenço Marques. But the Colonial treasury was dependent on revenues from goods landed in and conveyed across its territory to inland states, not least for the purpose of financing its own railway programme. It was therefore reluctant to abandon such a nest-egg, and hesitated to encourage a system of free trade because this would have sacrificed its own ports to the interests of Durban, which enjoyed the advantage of

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14. J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, c.II, where the history of the Transvaal liquor monopoly is discussed.

15. See below, pp.204-5

16. Notulen, 1886 Congress, pp. 6-7; 1888 Congress, p.15. See also Rhodes's speech of 6 May 1886, quoted in "Vindex", p.132ff.

shorter routes to the Republics. The Cape Government even established a customs house on the border of Griqualand West in 1883, to keep Natal goods out of the Kimberley market, and in the following year instituted a system of rebates to level the cost of Cape and Natal goods for the Free State purchaser.

## II

Before the discovery of gold on the Rand, the will for economic federation between the states of South Africa was never sufficiently universal to make the prospect of its achievement appear probable. Natal and the Cape each tried in their several ways to bring the Free State within their respective spheres of influence, to the exclusion or at least embarrassment of the other. The Free State, meanwhile, obliged to pay duty as well as freight charges on its own imports without benefit to its treasury, was only interested in a system of internal free trade which neither coastal Colony would have. President Brand's call for a customs conference in 1884 therefore met with no response from the Colonial Governments, while Kruger was busy negotiating for his own railway elsewhere. There was, however, some doubt in the middle of 1885 whether Kruger's Delagoa Bay railway project would materialize, and the Transvaal President gave evidence of his concern by sending Samuel Marks to sound the Cape Government over the possibility of an agreement in July that year<sup>17</sup>, following this with a concrete offer to remove the duty from Colonial brandy and wagons if the Cape would reciprocate by giving free entry to Transvaal tobacco<sup>18</sup>. Upington's reply was extremely cautious; but in January 1886

17. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies in South Africa, p.22; E.A. Walker, Lord de Villiers and His Times, p.188.

18. J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, pp. 324-5; G.42 of 1886; telegraphic correspondence between State Secretary, Pretoria, and Premier, Cape Colony, 30 July - 4 Aug. 1885.

he was subjected to pressure from both the Free State and the Transvaal. Brand wrote to Sir Hercules Robinson on the 8th, suggesting a conference of commissioners to discuss a South African Zollverein, on the basis of an equitable distribution between the various governments of customs dues collected at the ports in respect of goods destined for the Republics. Meanwhile Kruger had commissioned his Chief Justice

privately to interview Sir Hercules Robinson and the Cape Ministry ... and suggest to them a reciprocal arrangement whereby the produce of either country should be free of duty when imported into the other. He also wished me to intimate to them that he was favourably disposed to an extension of the line of railway from Kimberley to Pretoria<sup>19</sup>.

Kotzé has related how, on arrival in Cape Town, he received a cautious reaction from Robinson, Uppington, on the other hand, "assured [him] that he was in favour of the President's proposals", but he "met with opposition from Sir Gordon Sprigg, the Treasurer-General". Sprigg had the same difficulties as the High Commissioner in respect of the claims Natal, Mauritius and Jamaica might be expected to make with regard to their sugar, and "did not seem at all keen on early extension of the railway line from Kimberley to Pretoria<sup>20</sup>". "To my surprise and disappointment", continues Kotzé, "when I again saw Uppington some days later, I found him by no means so enthusiastic as at our first meeting, and it was plain to me that he had been influenced by Sprigg".

The Central Bestuur of the Afrikaner Bond, meeting at Bloemfontein the following month, placed on record a unanimous resolution warmly supporting the idea of a customs union on the broadest possible basis:

Aangezien er maatschappelijke en politieke moeilijkheden of verliezen ontstaan door de bestaanden toestand van onevenredige invoerbelastingen, de volslagen afwezigheid van de zamenwerking van landen aan elkander grenzende en van elkander afhankelijk;

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19. Sir J.G. Kotzé, Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences, vol. II pp. 68ff.
20. Presumably out of concern for the prosperity of the Eastern Cape lines.

Aangezien zoodanige toestand in strijd is met die beginselen van gezonde staatshuishoudkunde, alsook drukkend, en dientengevolge onhoudbaar is geworden; en

Aangezien de zoo wenschelijke toekomstige nauwe verbintenis van de Staten en Kolonien van Zuid Afrika zijnen grondslag heeft in eene wederzijdsche wijze, verstandige en voordeelige regeling van alle zaken betreffende zoowel binnenlandsch verkeer als buitenlandschen handel;

Zoo besluit het Centraal Bestuur van den Afrikaner Bond alle besturen en takken te verzoeken om door middel van memories bij hunne respectieve Wetgevende vergaderingen er op aan te dringen dat er eene Conferentie van afgevaardigden der Kaapkolonie, Z.A. Republiek, den Oranje Vrijstaat en Natal zal worden gehouden om zoowel de zaak van binnenlandsch verkeer als die van buitenlandschen handel te regelen op een rechtvaardigen, staatkundigen en vriendschappelijken grondslag, voorziening makende in de rechtmatige vorderingen en werkelijke behoeften van alle Staten en Kolonien, meer bijzonderlijk wat betreft de zaak van spoorwegtarieven, telegrafien, posten, bruggen en wederzijdschen binnenlandschen vrijhandel, en eene vaste en billijke schikking te treffen aangaande de invordering en verdeeling van de invoerbelasting geheven op artikelen uit het buitenland ingevoerd<sup>21</sup>.

The Bondsbrief which the Bestuur sent out to branches in all three states urged that pressure should be brought to bear on the respective legislatures on the matters enumerated in this resolution.

To outward appearances, therefore, the Bond was in favour of a customs union in the fullest sense of the word. But the declaration of the Central Bestuur did not represent the view of the Bond in the Cape "Province". All the Provincial Besturen had asked the Central Bestuur to discuss the subject; but the Cape had given no directive regarding the desirability of such a union. Hofmeyr had served personally on the select committee which recommended the rebate policy in 1884; but this committee had then reached no conclusion on the question of a customs conference, "Mr Hofmeyr maintaining, that the wise policy for the Colony was first to secure the support of the Free State, and then to go forward hand in hand with it towards the general settlement of South African Customs"<sup>22</sup>. His attitude was thus cautious,

21. Notulen, 1886 Cape Congress, Bylage C.

22. Hofmeyr, p. 323.

at a time when the Colonial Bond was prepared to do no more than approach the subject with an open mind<sup>23</sup>. We are then told no more about Hofmeyr's attitude to a customs union by his biographer until "at the beginning of 1887, we find Mr Hofmeyr coming prominently forward". There is no suggestion in the biography that he had been at all prominent in the two preceding years (during the first of which he had spent several months in England), or that he or any other Bondsman tried to influence the Government in favour of a customs union during the parliamentary session of 1886. The Colonial Bond would have had time, before its Congress opened on 22 March that year, to place the Central Bestuur's resolution of 17 February on its agenda. But this was not done, and the subject was not even discussed.

During the session of 1886 a Bond member for Malmesbury, Thomas Louw, asked the Prime Minister on 4 May

whether the Government is aware that large quantities of grain are imported into this Colony, duty free, over the border, which has the effect of completely flooding the market at the Diamond Fields, to the detriment of the producers and dealers of this Colony, and whether any steps will be taken to prevent this ruinous proceeding.

Upington replied that he was aware that "a great deal of grain is introduced ... from the Orange Free State ... and from Basutoland"<sup>24</sup>, tabled papers which had passed between the Colonial and the two Republican Governments on the subject

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23. Minutes, Graaff-Reinet Congress, p. 59; Notulen, 1885 Congress, p. 19.

24. According to the Statistical Register for 1886, 156,000 lbs. of maize, 34,000 lbs. of wheat, and 20,000 lbs. of flour entered the Colony from Natal in that year. From "states across the border" (a new category introduced in the Statistical Register in 1886), the quantities were infinitesimal. The quantity of wheat imported from the Free State and Basutoland in and before 1885 was not published.

of tariff policy<sup>25</sup>, and undertook to make certain proposals when members had had a chance to study them. The outcome was Upington's motion of 20 May, for which he took good care to obtain Bond acquiescence by persuading Theron to act as his seconder:

That the Government be empowered to appoint a person or persons who shall be authorised to act with persons appointed by the neighbouring States and Colonies in any inquiry which may be held into the question of Border Customs and Duties: Provided that such person or persons so appointed by the Government shall not have authority to bind this Colony, but shall report to Parliament, for its decision thereon, the result of such inquiry.

The non-committal form of this motion was matched only by the equivocal tone of Upington's speech. He ruled out the subject of customs duties at the ports as excluded from the motion, and defended their exclusion on the ground that the Cape had never admitted the principle that the inland States had any claim on these, thus rejecting entirely the main argument on which the Free State case was based<sup>26</sup>. All he was prepared to empower Colonial representatives to argue about was the adjustment, removal, or possibly even the increase,

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25. Printed as G.42 of 1886. See also G.42A of 1886, which contains a letter from R. Trower, a Basutoland magistrate, to the Resident Commissioner, Maseru, protesting against a recent utterance by Upington to his Caledon constituents, in which he had "mooted the possibility of the application of the Customs tariff to Free State and Transvaal grain entering Kimberley, in order to place Cape Colony growers in a more advantageous position than hitherto". Upington did not repent of this utterance, for he endorsed the argument of his "famous Caledon speech" in the Assembly a year later, on 20 July 1887.

The grain farmers agitated for tariff protection at Bond congresses (e.g. Notulen, 1887 Congress, p.16), and thanks largely to the efforts of David de Waal, they secured a resolution in the Assembly in 1887 (enlarged by Arthur Douglass of Grahamstown to include all farming interests) for the safeguarding of grain producers in the event of a customs union being established (Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, 12 July 1887).

The wheat interests of the Colony were by no means confined to the Western Province, as can be seen from the list of twenty-two wheat-producing districts in the Statistical Register for 1886, p.294, which expected a yield of 50,000 bushels or more in the harvest of 1886-7. A campaign to protect the wheat farmer would thus have drawn support from all over the Colony. See A. Wilmot, History of our own Times in South Africa, vol. II, pp. 271-2.

26. C.f. the Ministerial Minutes printed in G.42 of 1886, in which Upington even refused to admit the existence of any customs profit to which the Free State could lay claim.

of border dues, affecting only that part of the trade between the South African States which concerned goods grown or produced inside South Africa - Transvaal and Free State tobacco, for example, Colonial brandy, and, most important, Colonial and Republican wheat. It was unfortunate for the economic growth of South Africa that at a time when there was a movement afoot for the breaking down of internal tariff barriers, a counter-agitation should have developed for the protection of Colonial grain, fostered by the Prime Minister of the Cape Colony who himself represented a grain-producing district.

The debate on Upington's motion afforded a golden opportunity for those who disliked the premier's cautious attitude to speak out in favour of a full-blooded customs union. Some speakers, notably Scanlen and Rhodes, expressed the view that Upington's motion was so cautious as to be practically valueless, and would have preferred a conference to place the whole tariff structure of South Africa on a basis of agreement between the respective States. But these speakers were not sufficiently convinced of their case to call for a division, while no Bondsman spoke at all.

Rhodes contradicted himself. He argued that the Kimberley-Pretoria railway should be built as quickly as possible in order to prevent the Delagoa-Pretoria line from coming into operation. This necessitated coming to terms with the Transvaal Government, acknowledging that their tariff policy was dictated by one thing only, their desperate shortage of money, and offering to satisfy their anxieties on this score by being conciliatory on the matter of port customs and abolishing internal duties. But on 6 May he had argued cogently for a protective tariff on corn, with his mind not on Malmesbury but the Vaal-Harts area, which he hoped to convert from "a barren desert into a fruitful cornfield", and on 21 June he was shortly to expound the subject of agricultural protection again to an audience in Paarl. This curiously inconsistent attitude can only be explained as an attempt to do two irreconcilable things at the same time: to woo the Colonial farmers, and to wheedle Kruger into letting him have his railway to the

Rand<sup>27</sup>.

Hofmeyr was no longer editor of the Zuid Afrikaan, and it would therefore be unjust to attribute its opinions at this time to him. But there is no reason to suppose that the editorials of 22 and 26 May did not reflect his own point of view. The former article disagreed with Rhodes's argument concerning the proposed Kimberley-Pretoria railway:

Nu ontkennen wij niet dat, als men in de Republiek voor dien Spoorweg was, de Kaapkolonie welligt bij magte zou zijn om door haar krediet iets er voor te doen; maar men is er niet voor, en President Kruger zelf heeft herhaaldelijk te kennen gegeven dat hij voor den Delagoabaai Spoorweg ijvert.

The latter article developed this point by saying that to insist on a Kimberley extension was to fly in the face of reality, for

Delagoabaai is en blijft de natuurlijke haven der Z.A. Republiek.

The writer was, however, in favour of Upington's motion. If the Government chose as their commissioner someone who sympathized with the Government and people of the South African Republic, much could be gained,

al weet men vooruit dat de Kolonie op enkele punten van hare tegenwoordige politiek niet kan afwijken.

He did not specify what these immutable features of the existing Colonial policy were, but he could only have meant the protection of certain producer interests, such as brandy and grain. Further, although the second of these editorials bore the hopeful title, "De Unie van Zuid Afrika", the greater part of it was devoted to a theme totally irrelevant to the subject under discussion: it drifted into the topic of native policy. After acknowledging Rhodes's point that the bonds of sentiment would contribute to South African union, and after rejecting his further point that something constructive should be done to tie the commerce of the Cape and the Transvaal together, the writer went on to argue that if only the

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27. Rhodes's speeches are best consulted in "Vindex", pp. 132-44, where the reports are fuller than in Hansard. See also Michell, Rhodes, vol. II, pp. 218-22. "Vindex" erroneously dates the Vaal-Harts speech 7 May.

Cape Government would shed a tradition of native policy associated with the names of Wilberforce and Burke, it would be able, after losing the commercial, to assume the moral leadership of South Africa in the one big question which concerned all States, namely, "wie er baas zullen zijn, Kolonisten of Naturellen". No wonder the Bond had nothing to offer, if its most responsible newspaper evaded the issue like this<sup>28</sup>.

## II

After the end of the parliamentary session, the Government set about implementing the resolution of 20 May, by requesting the High Commissioner to communicate with the heads of the Free State, Natal and Transvaal Governments, seeking their co-operation over the holding of a customs conference. These overtures however failed. The Free State was vaguely interested, Natal not at all; while the Transvaal, in a position to bargain as never before, for gold was now known to exist in large quantities on the Witwatersrand, treated the Cape to a blunt refusal<sup>29</sup>.

Hofmeyr still declined to add his weight to Colonial pressures in favour of a rail link with the Transvaal, and blessed Kruger's negotiations with a Dutch-German syndicate for the building of the Transvaal section of the Delagoa Bay railway. On 17 July the Zuid Afrikaan advised the President, whose negotiations with this syndicate had met with opposition in the Volksraad, that he was better off in their hands than in those of the Kimberley firm of Lewis and Marks, which was clamouring for the right to build its own line from the Cape. The Transvaal Bond leaders, meanwhile, were doing their best to undermine Kruger's policy. The branches had been conducting a campaign against his concession policy at least since the beginning of 1835<sup>30</sup>. The personal opposition

28. The writer excused himself by declaring that he had recently been reading Theal on Basutoland.

29. J. van der Poel, pp.25-6. Contrast the emphasis in Hofmeyr, pp. 325-6.

30. Library of Parliament, Bond Mss., pp. 53-7, 97.

of S. J. du Toit, which had stemmed from the Stellaland episode of October 1884, developed in proportion as Kruger came to rely on a "Hollanderkliek", whose activities filled the dominie with gall, the more especially at this time, when the Netherlands South African Railway Company was being entrusted with the construction of the Transvaal section of the Delagoa Bay railway, in opposition to the Lewis and Marks venture in which du Toit and Piet Joubert were personally interested<sup>31</sup>. Hofmeyr, however, refused to accept du Toit's criticism of the Netherlands Company. His paper rebuked the Patriot on 23 October for suggesting that the Kruger regime was tottering to its fall, and repeated its argument that the railway ought to be constructed by the Netherlands Company, not by Lewis and Marks. The leaders of the Bond in the Cape and the Transvaal were consciously pursuing opposite policies, and of the two, Hofmeyr's stood closer to that of the Transvaal Government.

Time and the gold discoveries, however, worked a change in the outlook of the Colonial Bondsmen, Hofmeyr included. It was under these very different circumstances that Hofmeyr "came prominently forward" at the beginning of 1887 as an advocate of closer economic union. The Cape Town Bond carried a motion in its favour and sent a deputation to call on the leaders of the Government, "to urge the necessity of entering upon immediate negotiations with the Transvaal on the matter of railway extension Northwards, and the duty-free admission of Colonial produce into the Republic, these steps to serve as preliminaries to a general Customs Union"<sup>32</sup>. Sprigg, who had succeeded Upington

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31. The tangled web of personal animosities around the Transvaal presidential throne has been unravelled in some detail by P.J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, esp. vol. I c. VII. For the connection between S.J. du Toit, Piet Joubert and the Lewis and Marks venture, see J. van der Poel, p.30; van Winter, loc.cit.; C. van der Walt, S.J. du Toit in die Diens van die S.A. Republiek, pp.88-92; and Merriman Papers 1886/117, 119. Duncan Clark to Merriman, 3, 14 Dec. 1886.

32. Hofmeyr, p. 326; Notulen, Cape Town Bond, 18 Jan. 1887.

as premier, needed no convincing, and decided to send a deputation to Pretoria. Hofmeyr could not go himself because he was about to leave with Uppington for London to attend the Colonial Conference; but Colonel Schermbrucker, the Commissioner of Crown Lands, was chosen to negotiate, and David de Waal was appointed as his interpreter, no doubt with a watching brief over the interests of the Colonial farmers.

The change of heart which had occurred within the Cape Town Bond was matched by a more constant enthusiasm in the Central Bestuur, which issued a Bondsbrief on 17 February, over the signatures of S. J. du Toit and Thomas Theron, interpreting the signs of the times to its no doubt confused provincial bodies, with an air of unmitigated optimism. The Bestuur had held no meeting, "wegens vele en velerlei beletselen", but it was moved to state that the gold discoveries in the Transvaal would not threaten the Bond's "jeugdige veelbelovende nationaliteit" or divert it from its goal of a united South Africa. They had striven hard towards such a goal in the past, without much apparent success; but

nu komt een Hooger Hand, die het lot van Volken en Staten regelt, en wil ons met een gouden keten aan elkander verbinden.

The correct policy, it said, was to work for a customs union, covering at least the internal trade of South Africa. If one could be devised which embraced overseas trade as well, this would be even better, though there were certain practical difficulties in the way which would first have to be overcome. Meanwhile the Bond should press for the building of a single line of railway, "van zee tot aan zee, van de Kaap tot aan Delagoabaai", passing through the Cape Colony, the Free State and the Transvaal, to which other junction lines could be added in due course<sup>33</sup>.

The Cape Provincial Bestuur did not exhibit the same enthusiasm for a railway when it met in March; but it considered the formation of a customs union, to include even an

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33. This Bondsbrief is printed in the Notulen, 1887 Congress, Bylage D.

agreement for the more equitable distribution of the customs revenues at the ports, "niet alleen wenschelijk, maar noodzakelijk"<sup>34</sup>. In April the Transvaal Provincial Bestuur followed suit<sup>35</sup>.

In explanation of the change of attitude within the Colonial Bond, it needs to be said that not much time elapsed after July 1886 before several of its more prominent members began to attach themselves to the Rand with bands of gold. S. J. du Toit told his son how

toen die Randse goudvelde opgang maak, is in die Paarl 'n syndikaat gevorm, wat twee afgevaardigdes naar Transvaal stuur en wel direk naar mij om mij 'n gratis aandeel te bied, met reg om ook betaalde aandele te neem mits ik hul help om goeie eiëndomme te krij. Die plase op die Rand was toen almal in hande van Engelse spekulateurs, net één helfte van Langlaagte was nog in hande van ou mnr. Oosthuizen, wat met g'n mens wou onderhandel nie. Maar hij het mij met gesante van die syndikaat afgehaal en bij Pres. Kruger gebreng en in sijn teënwoordigheid het ons die plaas van hom gekrij vir £8000, wat in klinkende munt moes betaal word<sup>36</sup>.

The Paarl-Pretoria Company and the Langlaagte Estate Mines were floated on the basis of this transaction. Charles Kohler, later of the K.W.V., who was then practising as a dentist in Paarl, tells how he and a local farmer formed a syndicate, visited the Rand, and on their return "began arranging a second, larger and more powerful syndicate" which "Lokomotiev du Toit, editor of Die Patriot, ... and I finally agreed to form". He relates how he and Oom Lokomotief sold shares at £100 each, and as joint managers of the new venture with a capital of £6000, moved to the Transvaal. There they quarrelled. Du Toit tried to secure Kohler's dismissal but failed, because when two lawyers went north to investigate,

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34. Notulen, 1887 Congress, p.11.

35. J. A. Coetzee, p.229, quoting Volksstem, 22 Apr., 1887.

36. J. D. du Toit, S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, p. 240.

I proved to them that while I went out every single day on syndicate business, ... Lokomotiev had remained in his wagonette to write articles for Die Patriot.

It was du Toit, not Kohler, who therefore had to return, and Kohler remained to collect unto himself the managership not only of their syndicate, now called the National Gold Mining Company, but that of the Aurora and the Paarl-Pretoria as well<sup>37</sup>. The speculation fever seems to have gripped Colonial Bondsmen quickly and widely. Daniel Malan, father of F. S. Malan, went from Paarl to the Rand with two friends in 1887, to study the prospects<sup>38</sup>. Thomas te Water, whose home was in Graaff Reinet, bought shares in Paarl-Pretoria, for which he paid the last instalment in April 1888<sup>39</sup>. When evidence first comes to light regarding Hofmeyr's interests, at the end of 1888, he already possessed a number of well spread investments on the Rand and a knowledge of the share market which suggests that he was not new at the game. He was investing through a broker in Kimberley, and in collaboration with Rhodes<sup>40</sup>. There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that these transactions by Bondsmen were to the discredit of their authors; but the knowledge that they were made, and that the leadership of the Bond was involved, provides an important signpost if we are to get proper bearings on the influences which began to shape Bond policy from the beginning of 1887 onwards.

For all their increased interest in economic federation and the Rand, however, the Colonial Bondsmen had played their cards too late, as can be seen only too plainly from the pages of Schermbrucker's report,<sup>41</sup> made on his return from Pretoria

37. A. Joelson (ed.), Memoirs of Kohler of the K.W.V., pp. 32-8.

38. B. Cloete, Die Lewe van Senator F.S. Malan, pp. 26-7.

39. Te Water Papers, vol. 59. T. te Water to M. Taylor, 12 Apr. 1888.

40. Rhodes Papers, vol. 27. J.W. Sauer to Rhodes, 12 Dec. 1888. ("My dear Rhodes, Hofmeyer [sic] showed me your note to him saying what he was to get for the £200.0.0. for which you gave him an interest ..."). Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 9. Telegram book (green back): draft telegrams, Hofmeyr to Henry Mitchell, Kimberley, and Rhodes, 30 Dec. 1888 to 26 Jan. 1889.

41. G.37 of 1887. Schermbrucker's telegraphic progress reports made during this mission are in the Sprigg Papers. See also J.H.H.de Waal, Die Lewe van D.C.de Waal, pp. 116-21.

and Bloemfontein in April 1887<sup>41</sup>. He and Kruger had found little difficulty in reaching a basis for negotiation on the subject of lowering the tariff wall between the Cape and the Transvaal; but Kruger refused either to enter into any sort of customs union or to countenance the extension of any Cape railway into his country, for the Delagoa line, stimulated into life by the gold discoveries, appeared to be moving ahead at last. The Colonial deputation then met the usual courtesy and the usual hard bargaining from President Brand, who insisted on complete free trade across the border, and would only meet the Colonial desire to build a railway through the Free State if he were given an equal share in the port customs on goods destined for his country. The Cape had lost the initiative, and would be best advised to concentrate its energies on preventing the Free State from falling in behind the Transvaal, even at the price of making considerable concessions, if it was not to find itself out in the cold.

When therefore Sprigg's Government pursued its efforts for a railway and customs convention, the Bond in the Colony backed him up. In August 1887 the Cape Town Bondsmen approached Kruger and the Bond in Pretoria with a memorial in support of free trade between the Colony and the Transvaal. They intimated that, while not wishing to stand in the way of the building of the Delagoa Bay railway, they also desired the President's permission to construct another line through the Free State<sup>42</sup>. Kruger turned down their overtures on both points in his reply, dated 21 September, and nothing that the Transvaal Bond leaders could do would induce him to change his mind. S. J. du Toit and Piet Joubert obtained an interview with the President the day before his reply was sent off, and when they failed to gain their point they called an extraordinary congress of the Transvaal Bond to

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41. De Wet, *op. cit.* (1927).

42. Quoted extensively in Hofmeyr, pp. 330-1.

meet in Potchefstroom on 16 November. But <sup>at</sup> this congress, although a majority of the Bondsmen gave their support to the principle of a customs union, they came out in favour of Kruger's railway policy against that proposed by the Cape Bondsmen and S. J. du Toit, to the latter's great chagrin<sup>43</sup>. The Transvaal Government then turned down Sprigg's invitation to send representatives to a conference in Cape Town in January 1888, which was called with a view to working out a basis for an agreement on tariff and railway policy.

This Cape Town conference, which was attended by delegates from the Orange Free State and Natal, made some progress in spite of the Transvaal's attitude. It reached tentative agreement on tariff rates, and recommended a plan for railway development under which lines from the Cape and Natal should enter the Free State from Colesberg and van Reenen's Pass respectively, meet at some point north of Bloemfontein, and proceed from there in the direction of the Vaal. To these proposals the Cape Bondsmen gave their agreement at Paarl in May<sup>44</sup>. But the Natal Legislative Council, inspired by the Durban Chamber of Commerce, backed out because it considered the tariff rates proposed in Cape Town were too high - protectionists in the Cape thought them barely high enough - while the proposals were placed in further jeopardy by the emergence of unexpectedly stiff opposition in the Free State.

The Free State Bondsmen had become wedded, not unnaturally, to the idea of closer union with the Transvaal. They had given support to a proposal of this sort at Heilbron in December 1886; but in January 1888, at Kroonstad, they not only approved closer union with the Transvaal, but voted

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43. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 9. Kruger to A.B. Hofmeyr, 21 Sept. 1887. According to J.A. Mouton, Gen. Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis, pp.115-6, Joubert and S.J. du Toit were sent a copy of the Cape Town Bond resolution. Their decision to call the Potchefstroom congress was opposed by the Volksstem on 31 Oct. 1887. In the same month Kruger had led a Transvaal deputation to Bloemfontein to persuade Brand not to allow the extension of any railway northwards from Bloemfontein for ten years. On this mission, see van Winter, vol. I pp. 221-2.
44. Notulen, 1888 Congress, p.8. Hofmeyr, p.337, referred to this as a "somewhat cold resolution". It is not clear why he did so.

against the building of railways on their territory and decided "dat het voor het tegenwoordige niet raadzaam is een Tolverbond te sluiten"<sup>45</sup>. The Bondsmen were not strong enough to control the Free State Volksraad; but they were strong enough to create a feeling of great uncertainty in the Colony over the Free State's reliability in the matter of its railway undertakings assumed in January. A fair majority in the Volksraad declared in favour of a customs union; but a motion to authorize even the carrying out of a railway survey from the Orange River to Bloemfontein was passed only with the chairman's casting vote<sup>46</sup>. Meanwhile President Brand died in office, and his death weakened still further the cause of economic federation with the Cape.

Not only had a majority of the Transvaal Bondsmen refused to support the Cape Government's plans, thus adding strength to Kruger's position, but the Free State Bondsmen were opposing them as well, to the embarrassment of their own Government. Sprigg was placed in a quandary. He secured, without difficulty, the support of both Houses for a Bill to give effect to the conference recommendations for a customs union: that was no problem. But with the railway it was different. Should a line be constructed from Colesberg to the Orange, if the forces in the Free State opposing its continuation were so strong? Could pressure be applied to the Free State by extending from Kimberley to the Vaal, thus threatening to establish a direct line with the Rand which would circumvent the southern Republic? The latter undertaking might also be used to put pressure on the Transvaal, for it could be extended into Bechuanaland if Kruger continued to be awkward, and the Exploration Company which had begun to operate in Matabeleland was keen for such an extension. Sprigg proposed that both lines should be taken in hand. Hofmeyr, with the backing of most

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45. J.A. Coetzee, pp. 216-7. Opposition to railway continuation was inspired partly by the transport riders, who were afraid that they would lose business.

46. J. van der Poel, p.37; and, more especially, van Winter, vol. I p. 223.

of the Bondsmen, was more concerned with the establishment of free trade between the Cape and the Transvaal, and after making very careful soundings of responsible opinion in both Republics, reached the conclusion that to proceed with the Kimberley extension would be to risk the loss both of a railway through the Free State and of a customs agreement with the South African Republic<sup>47</sup>. On 18 July, therefore, during the debate in committee, he attempted to insert a proviso into the railway bill, whereby, should the Transvaal Government obtain authority to introduce free trade with the Colony by 1 October, the Kimberley extension would be held up pending further consideration by the Cape Parliament. He subsequently withdrew this proposal in favour of an alternative proviso by T. P. Theron, aimed at applying pressure not only on the Transvaal in respect of free trade, but also on the Free State in respect of its own railway undertakings, and giving both Republics until 31 December to make up their minds. Rhodes, in cautious mood, also supported Theron's proviso<sup>48</sup>; but it was rejected in committee and again at the third reading by a margin of twenty-four and sixteen votes respectively<sup>49</sup>. Sprigg and the majority had decided that Kruger's hand could be forced by a firm decision.

This was also the view of S. J. du Toit, who, in response to a request by Hofmeyr, set out his own arguments in a private letter:

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47. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 13. A sub-file contains Hofmeyr's correspondence with the Republican leaders, including a series of telegrams to and from President Kruger.
48. For the substance of the arguments put forward by Hofmeyr and Rhodes, see Hofmeyr, p.342; "Vindex", pp.182-9. While the former argued that the Kimberley extension would damage the cause of free trade, Rhodes urged that time was on the side of the Colony, in view of the current difficulties of the Delagoa Railway, and that if patience were exercised by the Colony for a few more months Kruger would be forced by necessity to come to terms.
49. Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, 18, 23 July, 3 Aug. 1888. Nine Bondsmen voted against the Theron proviso on the first occasion, six on the second.

Waarde Vriend,

De uwe van 10 dezer ontvangen. Het spijt mij dat ik zoo volkomen verschillen moet van die politiek door onze voormannen gevolgd, daar ik het volkomen eens ben met Sprigg, en zijne politiek als de eenig mogelijke beschouw. Al de mooie plannen van Rhodes en Hofmeyr zouden, nadat zij eerst Sprigg's politiek omvergeworpen hadden, totaal mislukken, want daar was Kruger met zijn Hollanderkliek eens zoo sterk ... Als er pogingen gedaan worden om door middel van de Bond Sprigg's politiek tegen te werken, dan zal di Patriot aan Sprigg's zijde gaan staan en mijn broeder en ik zullen, als ontwerpers van de Bond ... een Adres richten aan alle Bondsmannen en Bondstakken, reden gevende waarom wij van de motie Theron verschillen en het met Sprigg eens zijn.

Geloof mij vrij, wij doen zulks niet uit oppositiezucht. Maar eer Paul Kruger's politiek die nek gebroken is zijn al uwe mooie plannen zoo vele zeepbellen. Sprigg's politiek zal die van Kruger ondermijnen; maar die politiek nu onder onze mannen gevolgd maakt Kruger met zijn Hollanderkliek tot Dictator niet slechts over Transvaal, maar over heel Zuid Afrika. Alle pogingen om Z. Afrika's eenheid te bevorderen stuiten hierop af ...<sup>50</sup>.

Kruger, indeed, did not like the strong line followed by the Sprigg Government. The thought of a railway outside his control, running along the western border through Bechuanaland and tapping the western Transvaal trade, was not pleasant to him, especially in the year in which Colonial concession hunters, Rhodes among them, were beginning to show an active interest in the resources of Matabeleland. He therefore appealed to the Cape Government not to begin operations on this line until he had been given a chance to persuade the Free State Volksraad, which was due to meet in January 1889, to authorize the extension of the Colesberg line to Bloemfontein, or possibly beyond<sup>51</sup>.

Before the end of the year, Sprigg had abandoned the project of the Bechuanaland railway, in spite of the support which he had received for it in the Colonial Parliament. In

50. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 21 Aug. 1888. Hofmeyr's telegraphic correspondence with du Toit which preceded this letter may be seen in vol. 13 of the Papers, Railway and Customs sub-file. See also Library of Parliament, Bond Mss., p.100, for a still more outspoken criticism of Hofmeyr's policy by S.J. du Toit. It is the draft of an article warning Colonial Bondsmen: "gaat in elk geval niet mee met eenige poging om het Sprigg Ministerie omver te werpen, en een Rhodes-Hofmeyr Ministerie op het kussen te helpen."

51. There is some doubt whether Kruger was prepared to allow an extension of the Free State line to the Vaal or not. On this see J. van der Poel, p.38, quoting C.5918, p.26. Robinson to Knutsford, 17 Oct. 1888. Cf. van Winter, vol.I p.225 note 2, quoting Hofmeyr (English edn. p.348). This writer (cont.)

addition to the pressure of Kruger and the Colonial Bondsmen, Sprigg was confronted with the stiff opposition of people in England who were finding fault with the Exploration Company's aims and objects on humanitarian grounds<sup>52</sup>, and Rhodes did not reach England to counter the influence of such people, headed by the Aborigines Protection Society, until March 1889. It was, perhaps, the opposition which he encountered in connection with his own Matabeleland concession which led Rhodes to change his policy regarding the railway - this, rather than Kruger's renewed obstructionism in the same month, when Rhodes was no longer in South Africa<sup>53</sup>. At any rate, despite his support for the Theron proviso in August, which would have had the effect, if carried, of suspending a decision regarding the Kimberley extension until the following year, it is fairly certain that Rhodes began to look upon the Bechuanaland railway as a necessity at least as early as September 1888. At all events, Hofmeyr thought it necessary to warn him on 3 October:

It strikes me that your Bechuanaland-Zambezie policy is very much the same as Sprigg's and I doubt very much whether you'll find 'the National Party' as a whole endorsing it, as one to be carried into immediate effect, now that Germany need not be feared in that direction<sup>54</sup>.

Rhodes and Hofmeyr were feeling for each other's support; but it appears that, except in a rather more literal sense, they were not yet in each other's pockets. It was a critical time, with a general election imminent, and though Hofmeyr freely confided his policy to Rhodes - not all of it, unfortunately, on paper - he would not come out in support of the Bechuanaland extension.

Bondsmen in the Colony still wanted a line into the Free State, if possible up to the Vaal, and that alone.

But would the Free State agree? Opposition to railway

51 (cont.) urges that Robinson misunderstood Kruger's intentions, and that extension beyond Bloemfontein was not proposed.

52. Williams, Rhodes, pp.130-5; J. van der Poel, p.38.

53. Pace J. van der Poel, p.41.

54. Rhodes Papers, vol. 26. Hofmeyr to Rhodes, 3 Oct. 1888.

extension among the Free State burghers, even to the proposed line through their own territory, was formidable in the closing months of 1888, and the new President, F. W. Reitz, was known to be a strong Transvaal sympathizer. When the special session of the Free State Volksraad, summoned to instal the new President, met on 9 January, a people's congress was held in the capital on the same day, which urged the Volksraad to abandon the railway proposals or leave them over until the ordinary session. But at the right moment a telegram from Kruger himself tipped the scale against the anti-railway faction. He told the Free Staters that an immediate decision by their Volksraad to allow the construction of a railway from Colesberg to Bloemfontein would be pleasing to his own Government. The anti-railway group put up their usual defence in the Volksraad; but Kruger's message took the wind from their sails, and motions in favour of a customs union and in support of a railway to Bloemfontein were carried by substantial majorities. It was on the strength of these resolutions, and of a successful visit by Sprigg to Bloemfontein in the same month, that Reitz sent out invitations to a customs conference to be held in Bloemfontein in March. The decisive factor in these developments was Kruger's telegram, which, according to Onze Jan's biographer, had been sent on the instance of Hofmeyr, through the medium of an undisclosed "friend in Pretoria"<sup>55</sup>.

But if Sprigg's forward policy had helped to make Kruger more amenable, the abandonment of the Kimberley extension under the joint influence of Exeter Hall and the Colonial Bond, combined with inside information that the Portuguese Government were about to clean up the incompetent railway company responsible for their end of the line and enable the Delagoa railway to advance once more, enabled

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55. Hofmeyr, pp. 349-51. See also Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 13 (Railway and Customs sub-file), Ewald Esselen to Hofmeyr, 15 Jan. 1889. Esselen was presumably the friend through whom Hofmeyr worked.

the doughty President to put on a bold front again. Freed from the danger of a railway along his western border, he now resumed his efforts to block the approach of a line through the Free State. He met President Reitz at Potchefstroom on 4 March and concluded a defensive alliance and a commercial treaty with the Free State, as well as a railway agreement under which both States undertook to act in consultation with each other, and not to permit any other rail links through their territories save the Delagoa, Harrismith and Colesberg lines, while Kruger made it clear that he did not want the Colesberg extension to proceed beyond Bloemfontein until the Delagoa line was sufficiently well advanced to reach Pretoria first<sup>56</sup>. Only then would he agree to a further advance by this railway, and allow Cape products into the Transvaal free of duty. Reitz could not persuade him to send a delegation to the Bloemfontein customs conference in which the other South African states had agreed to take part towards the end of the month.

The Colonial Bondsmen, meeting at Middelburg from the 4th to the 8th, still wanted a customs union and the extension of the Colesberg railway "zonder verzuim naar Transvaal", and made no statement concerning the Kimberley extension which the Government had decided to abandon<sup>57</sup>. They stood four-square behind Sprigg's modified policy, and gave the Cape delegation a strong hand when it met those from the Free State and Natal on the 20th. Accord between the Cape and the Free State had never been higher, more especially since the Free State was now certain of not being circumvented by a railway to the Rand which skirted its western borders. The Natalians refused to enter a customs union because the Cape and the Free State insisted on too high a transit tariff, and on too large a share of that tariff for

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56. J. van der Poel, pp. 40-1; Michell, Rhodes, vol. I pp. 269-70; C. Headlam, Milner Papers, vol. I c. 7.

57. Notulen, 1889 Congress, pp. 15,17.

the inland Republic; but the Cape and the Free State decided to ignore this objection and reached an agreement between themselves on the basis of the conference resolutions of January 1888, while provision was made for the admission to their customs union of other South African states, should they wish to come in at a later date.

### III

The customs convention of 1889 affords a convenient resting point. At long last the negotiations for the economic federation of South Africa had produced one small fruit, though few could pretend that this achievement offered very bright prospects for the future. Natal had elected to go its own way. The South African Republic had not yet deviated from its policy of isolation, though its attempts to bring the Free State over into some sort of partnership vis-à-vis the coastal Colonies had achieved only partial success. Though satisfied that one of its railways would now be extended into the Free State, the Cape had little assurance that this line would one day reach the Rand, and it had been obliged to forego the extension of its other line in the direction of Bechuanaland and the Zambesi, a region already marked out for exploitation. For these reasons, it would soon become clear that the convention of March 1889 was no more than an episode in the railway and customs struggle, a struggle which would soon be further complicated by the intrusion of extraneous issues. But it is important at this stage to reach some conclusion over the use which the Bond had made of its opportunity to bring about that union of South Africa in the achievement of which it has expressed so emphatic an interest.

The outstanding fact here is that it had achieved very little, and the incidental reasons for this have been noted in

the course of the foregoing narrative. Before the discovery of the Witwatersrand's gold, Republican Bondsmen were interested in a customs union and Colonial Bondsmen were not. After this discovery, the Colonial Bondsmen became federal-minded, the Free State Bondsmen found an affinity with the Transvaal which they hardly knew they possessed before, and turned their backs on the Cape, while too many of the Transvaal Bondsmen found peace of mind in the isolationist policy of their President to support the cause of South African unity to which they were in theory committed.

Lack of statesmanship among the Bond leaders is a fair verdict, provided the Bondsmen are made to share neither more nor less of the criticism than was due to the other corporate interests in the respective States. To throw all or most of the blame on Upington for the Colony's reluctance to seize Kruger's offer of 1886, as has often been done, will not stand the test of scrutiny. Most Colonial producer interests were opposed or indifferent to a customs union at the time, and of these one of the most influential was the Colonial "province" of the Afrikaner Bond.

In a sense not usually intended, Hofmeyr deserved the epithet of 'Blind Man'; but he was in good company.

Criticism of the policy pursued by the Government of the Orange Free State under Brand and Reitz is difficult to make, because there, in a way in which it was true nowhere else, local needs and the essential requirements for a pan-South African railway and tariff agreement went hand in hand. But even under these circumstances, the showing of the Free State Bondsmen was not impressive. They threw up no leaders during these crucial years, and conducted themselves in a manner hostile to Brand, which suggests that the antipathy between them which followed the Smithfield episode of October 1881 had not been allowed to die down. They sought to throw in their lot with the Transvaal in 1887-8, at a time when Brand and his successor were trying to reach an agreement which satisfied wider interests, and nearly

succeeded in blocking the presidential policy.

In the Transvaal, the situation is of unusual interest, for here the Bond leadership maintained a consistent opposition to the fiscal, concession and railway policy of the Kruger regime, but failed in the long run to retain the support of the rank and file, as became evident at the Potchefstroom congress of November 1887. This was fatal to S. J. du Toit's position in the counsels of the State. Two months later the Volksraad resolved to deny offices of profit to company directors. Du Toit, as the chairman of ten companies, was squeezed out. He would have earned greater respect by resigning before being forced to do so. Kruger reinstated him on the eve of his departure for Europe the following year; but while he was in Holland, attending mainly to his business interests, instead of having it out with the Dutch directors of Transvaal enterprises, he tried to ingratiate himself with them. Kruger continued to treat him with moderation, perhaps because he realized that his bubble was pricked, and allowed him to resume his administrative post on his return in 1890. But in November, by which time his activities in Europe had given rise to a smear campaign directed against him, he deemed it wise to retire from the Transvaal service and return to the Cape, not only discredited but also penniless. The volatile du Toit was no rival for the ox-like Kruger, who matched him in religiosity and more than matched him in constancy<sup>58</sup>.

The Bond was unable, owing to its internal divisions, to direct the course of South African affairs along the channels it had marked out; but these events made a lasting

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58. This account of the decline of S.J. du Toit's influence and fortune is based on J.D. du Toit, pp.263-6 ; C. van der Walt, pp. 97-103; and P.J. van Winter, vol. I pp. 238-9, who draws also on A.H. Lugtenburg, Geskiedenis van die Onderwys in die Suidafrikaanse Republiek, 1836-1900.

impression on the Bond. They demonstrated, in particular, how insubstantial the desire for South African unity really was, even among Bondsmen, and turned the Bond into a Colonial political party by destroying the effectiveness of the provincial organizations in the Republics and liquidating the Central Bestuur.

The Central Bestuur never met again. The Cape continued faithfully to elect its central members in 1888 and 1890, but decided not to continue the practice in 1892, and again in 1896, when the issue was raised for the last time<sup>59</sup>. The main reason given on this last occasion was that the Provincial Besturen had ceased to exist in the Transvaal and the Free State. The collapse of the Bond in the Republics has gone largely unrecorded. In the case of the Free State, it was a gradual decline, followed by a partial recovery after 1894 during the presidency of M. T. Steyn<sup>60</sup>. In the Transvaal the Bond had all but ceased to exist in 1890, and never recovered. Even in the Cape, where Bondsmen pretended to be little more than farmers, and Englishmen (if they were not themselves Bondsmen) tended to prefer a 'colonial' to an 'imperial' approach to local problems, the unusually fluid state of politics threatened to destroy <sup>such</sup> distinctiveness as the Bond had succeeded in maintaining.

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59. Notulen 1888 Congress, p.6; 1890 Congress, p.15; 1892 Congress, p.24; Minutes, 1896 Congress (De Paarl edn.), p.3.

60. J. A. Coetzee, pp. 219-21.

## THE CONSOLIDATION OF A CAPE COLONIAL PARTY

## I

The Bond's Grahamstown Congress in March 1886 not only criticized the Central Bestuur for the manner in which it had handled the party's general constitution, but also made friendly overtures to the Congress of English-speaking Farmers' Associations, which had assembled a week before them in Port Elizabeth. On the strength of a resolution taken at Beaufort West the previous year, Thomas Theron had written to Arthur Douglass, the chairman of the Farmers' Congress, inviting the general co-operation of the Associations<sup>1</sup>. Douglass duly placed the letter before the Port Elizabeth Congress. The secretary then related how he had first approached Hofmeyr in 1883 and received from him an assurance that he was prepared to co-operate; but Hofmeyr had not suggested an amalgamation "as he stated that would be impossible on account of the differences of language". Onze Jan had promised, however, to "draw up a document" as a basis for joint action, but owing to the untimely death of his wife this had never been done<sup>2</sup>. When informed by the secretary of these earlier negotiations, several speakers at the Farmers' Congress expressed concern over the close relationship existing between the Colonial Bond and its branches in the Republics, and over its attitude to the flag, and for these reasons the meeting decided to return a guarded answer to Theron, suggesting only that the respective presidents should arrange the "preliminaries ... for a conference of a deputation from each", without either side being committed to anything. The Bondsmen accepted the proposal, and a small conference took place in Grahamstown between five Bondsmen and three Congressmen after the Bond Congress itself was over<sup>3</sup>. Here agreement was reached that each organization should send representatives to the other's congresses, with the power to speak but not vote. The delegates also discussed the idea of

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1. Notulen, 1886 Congress, Bylagen D, E, F and H.

2. P.E. Telegraph, 18 Mar. 1886.

3. Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Apr. 1886.

amalgamation; but neither group had been empowered to make any concrete proposals in this regard, though the Bondsmen went out of their way to reassure the Englishmen that they had no intention of getting rid of the Union Jack, while Theron went so far as to say that "de Bond was thans niet eenmaal een eigenlijke politieke vereeniging meer, maar een tot handhaving van boerenbelangen". The establishment of a white farmers' party appeared to be on the horizon.

The farmers had been drawn together by a common anxiety over tariff policy, and by the effects of the depression, which had greatly increased the day to day difficulties confronting all farmers irrespective of their home language. Rural crime, more especially stock-thieving, was on the increase, and prosecutions under the master and servant and pass laws had reached abnormally high levels in the early 'eighties<sup>4</sup>. The degree of their concern over these questions was reflected in the enormous amount of time set aside for their discussion at both the Bond and the English Farmers' congresses. The amalgamation of the Bond and the Farmers' Associations would have been a logical step to take if it was the intention of the farming community to remedy their difficulties through parliamentary action. Yet although no English-speaking political movements inspired by any appreciable degree of racial fervour came into existence between the collapse of the Imperial League in 1885 and the

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4. According to the Cape of Good Hope Blue Books and Statistical Registers, convictions for stock thefts (all races) rose from 1132 in 1880 to 6016 in 1885, falling again to below 2000 in 1887-90. Prosecutions under the master and servant laws in the eleven years 1880-90 averaged 470 a year in the case of white men and 3224 in the case of "black and coloured". Annual fluctuations were less, but convictions reached their peak in 1881-2, with figures of 3885 and 3508 (all races). In the case of pass law offences, 1406 persons were convicted in 1880, rising steadily to 7503 in 1883, and falling gradually to 1576 in 1890. In 1883, 191 white people were prosecuted and 8716 "black and coloured" (the highest figure in each case). Only 6 white people were prosecuted in the whole period 1887-90.

formation of the first Progressive Party in 1893<sup>5</sup>, and although fraternization regularly took place between the Bond and the Farmers' Congress in the years 1886 to 1891, no amalgamation took place. The embers of mutual suspicion between people of Dutch and British origin, which had been aroused by the events of the previous decade, had not really been allowed to die down. By 1886 there is reason to believe that the Boer's fear of British imperialism, and the English-speaking colonial's fear of exclusive Afrikaner nationalism, were on the wane; but they continued to keep each other at arm's length owing to the influence of other less tangible differences which stemmed from the very roots of their different cultures. Neither the Bond nor the Farmers' Congress followed up the Grahamstown overtures by encouraging the free use of both official languages at its own meetings, though in this respect the Bond went further than the English farmers<sup>6</sup>. Bond representatives were sometimes made to feel unwanted at Farmers' Congress meetings, notably in 1889, when a delegate from the Zwartruggens Association queried the right of Dolf Botha and Thomas te Water to speak and vote. When the same person later wrote to te Water inviting him to join the Zwartruggens Association, the latter declined for fear of introducing a "discordant element"<sup>7</sup>. Boer and Settler each set much store by their

5. The Grahamstown Political Union of 1886 and the Frontier Party of 1888 rose and fell on a basis of regional and economic interests. See Y.P. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, 1884-98, pp. 25-35.
6. The 1888 Bond Congress resolved (Notulen, p.10) "dat in vervolg van tijd de Engelsche en Hollandsche talen gelijke rechten zullen worden toegestaan in hare beraadslagingen"; but this decision was revoked in 1889 (Notulen, p.9), and the rule adopted by 31 votes to 23 that those who could not speak Dutch should be allowed to speak in English and have their speeches translated. A year later, the Bondsmen decided that the Officiële Stukken should be translated into English but not into Afrikaans (Notulen 1890 Congress, p.20). I have found no evidence that the Farmers' Congress made any reciprocal gesture in favour of Dutch at this time.
7. Bedford Enterprise, 21 Mar. 1888; Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 18 Mar. 1899. Te Water Papers, vol. 56, G. Lee to T. te Water 17 July 1890. The issue seems to have arisen because the recommendation of the Grahamstown conference of 1886 that delegates should be permitted to speak but not vote had been abandoned at Bond and Farmers' Congress meetings: delegates had in practice voted as well as spoken.

group loyalties, and each, in his own way, betrayed a feeling of insecurity by doing so. The Boer, aware of his comparative lack of sophistication, and mistrustful of his ability to hold his own in debate with the self-confident Englishman, found safety of a sort in group isolation behind the protective shield of his own resurgent culture, focussed on the campaign for the extension of Dutch language rights. The Englishman, on his part, feared numerical swamping, and expressed this fear in a tendency to belittle the Boer as a narrow, unenlightened person who could not be trusted to govern the country. Furthermore - and this topic will be discussed more fully in the following pages - the play of colour attitudes upon this sensitive lens of white group relationships exposed those relationships to too fierce a glare, and exaggerated the contrasts in an unfortunate way. The very existence of Afrikaner nationalism often forced the English colonial, for reasons of self-defence, into the position of the kafferboetie, and invited him to enjoy the advantages of a liberalism which in most cases may well have been a pose. To reap these advantages without assimilating the philosophy was to play Tartufe, as the Boer did not hesitate to remind him. But the Bondsman who assumed as a matter of course that the man of colour was his political adversary, and refused to question those social attitudes which had led to this result, had no real cause for complaint.

## II

The dichotomy between the egalitarian legal and political system of the Colony on the one hand, and the traditional social values of Boer society on the other, bred tensions in the mind of the rural Afrikaner which his English counterpart, for various reasons, was more easily able to avoid. The Farmers' Associations were not faced with the necessity of deciding whether Coloured or African people should be admitted to membership, because they were not, strictly speaking, political organizations, and only set out to cater for the needs of landowners<sup>8</sup>. The Bondsmen, by contrast, could not avoid the question, for the non-white voter inevitably had a place in their electoral calculations from the start.

When faced with a decision whether to admit the kleurling into their organization or to exclude him, the Bondsmen almost invariably thought it best to leave him out. The Colonial Bondsmen were fully aware that to do so was to cut themselves off from an important source of political strength, and it was for this reason alone that the Cape Bond constitution, unlike those of the Transvaal and Free State "provinces", never contained a colour bar<sup>9</sup>. This should not be taken to

8. Hence the practice of the Farmers' Congress, in the 'eighties of refusing to debate such questions as the imperial connection or the alteration of the franchise, on the ground that these might arouse political feelings (see below, p.247).

It was not until the late 'nineties that English-speaking political organizations were faced with the question of whether to admit non-whites. The South African League considered the formation of separate non-white branches at its Congress in 1897, which was one very small step further along the road to racial integration than the Bondsmen were prepared to go; but hardly any such branches were formed, and the proposal aroused considerable feeling in the minds of members of the League. See M.F. Bitensky, The South African League, pp. 129-32.

9. The constitution of the Transvaal Bond declared in unequivocal terms that "de Bond vestigt zich onder de blanke bevolking", and although the meeting which adopted the original constitution declared that "als kleurlingen willen en kunnen zamenwerken, hun gerust toegelaten kan worden met ons zamen te werken", the colour bar was retained when that constitution came up for review in 1885 (Transvaal Bond constitution, Art.1; Library of Parliament Bond Mss., p.3; J.A. Coetzee, p.213; and see below, Appendix C.

The Free State Bond constitution began without a colour bar, but ended by including one (Express constitution, Art.1; (cont.)

mean that the Cape Bondsmen ever really considered that non-whites should be permitted to join their organization. When the draft constitution was considered by the branches before the Richmond Congress in 1883, a number of them expressed a preference for a clause limiting membership to whites, often on the ground that it would be dishonest not to do so<sup>10</sup>. Reports of meetings at which the decision was taken to vote against a colour bar in the constitution are rare, though one took place at Cape Town on 15 March 1883, when the members resolved

geene zinspeling op de kleur dergenen die leden mogen worden, in de Constitutie op te nemen, meenende de vergadering dat art.4(a) van die Provinciale Constitutie een genoegzamen waarborg verschaft wat betreft de zamenstelling van den Bond<sup>12</sup>.

A discussion of the problem two months later by the Aberdeen Bondsmen gives some idea of the difficulty which the members had in making up their minds. On this occasion a certain B. du Plessis stated that the District Bestuur had recommended the inclusion of a colour bar,

maar door latere overdenking was hy tot de overtuiging gekomen, dat zou niet goed zyn om de deur voor kleurlingen geheel en al te sluiten; hy dacht dat moest aan de respectieve Comité-leden overgelaten worden of zy kleurlingen als leden van hunne takken wilden opnemen of niet.

De heer D. Pienaar spreekt beslissend tegen het opnemen van kleurlingen.

De heer J. Daniells zegt, als kleurlingen ook Bondsleden wilden worden en waarlyk ook medewerken tot heil en welvaart van Zuid Afrika, dan konden zy aparte takken oprigten.

De heer Naude zegt, als men kleurlingen geheel uitsluit zou het misschien oorzaak geven tot opstoking en verleiding.

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- 9..(cont.) Bloemfontein Revision, Art.1; J.A. Coetzee, p.213; and see below, Appendix C).
10. See De Tolk, 7,17,21 Mar., 11 Apr., 23 May 1883, for decisions in favour of a colour bar in the constitution by the following branches: Fraserburg; Boschberg (Somerset East); Koms kloof, Zwarttruggens and Ward 3 (all Aberdeen); Rietfontein (Hanover); Ward 2, Camdaboo; and Burghersdorp.
11. Art.4(a) of the Cradock commission's draft constitution, which is referred to here, stated that "De Wijksbesturen zullen belast zijn met het toelaten en afwijzen van nieuwe leden."
12. Zuid Afrikaan, 17 Mar. 1883. C.f. Notulen Boek van de Afrikaner Bond, Kaapstad, under 26 Apr. 1883.

Na eenige verdere discussie werd voorgesteld door den heer H. du Plessis, dat dit punt overgelaten worde aan de beslissing van het Provinciaal Bestuur. Gesecondeerd door den heer D. van Niekerk, sen. Als amendement werd voorgesteld door den heer S. Erasmus, dat kleurlingen geheel uitgesloten worden. Gesecondeerd door den heer Koen. Tot stemming gebracht werd het voorstel van den heer du Plessis met meerderheid van stemmen aangenomen<sup>13</sup>.

So the question was left in the air, and the appeal to the judgment of the Provincial Bestuur resulted in a decision against a formal colour bar.

There was nothing to stop a coloured man from becoming a member of the Colonial Bond, save the insuperable obstacle of the Ward Committee. On the one recorded occasion which has come to the notice of the present writer, when a Coloured man actually tried to join a branch, the members refused him the privilege and expelled his white proposer for trying to admit him under false pretences. The incident, which was treated as an object lesson by the editors of De Tolk, concerned a meeting of the Geelhoutboom branch, near Humansdorp:

Nadat de vergadering door den Voorzitter, M.J. Olivier, met eene aanspraak geopend en de notulen der voorgaande vergadering waren gelezen en goedgekeurd, vroeg de Voorzitter of er onder de aanwezigen waren die lid van den Bond wenschten te worden, dan konden ze hunne namen opgeven.

Hierop vroeg Michael van Niekerk, een boer, wonende te Driefontein, of ieder lid van den Bond kon worden. Toen hem dit in bevestigenden zin werd beantwoord, riep hy eensklaps uit: 'Jan Krap, kom in!' Een Hottentot, luisterende naar den naam van Jan Krap, trad onmiddellijk, als op een afgesproken teeken, de voordeur binnen en stapte in de vergadering. 'Kom nader, teeken je naam', zeide van Niekerk. Men maakte Jan Krap zyn beschermer echter duidelyk dat volgens de Bondsconstitutie, men de toestemming van het Wyksbestuur moest hebben om lid van den Bond te kunnen worden. Verder waren in het byzyn van hem, Michael van Niekerk, de notulen voorgelezen, waarin uitdrukkellyk verklaard werd dat iemand, geen lid van den Bond zynde, zonder toestemming van den Voorzitter geen recht van spreken in de vergadering had. Zyne introductie van den neger steunde by gevolg op valsche gronden, door iets te willen doen, waartoe hij onbevoegd was.

De Voorzitter nam nu het woord en bracht Jan Krap onder het oog, dat men nog geene behoefte gevoelde hem als lid van den Bond aan te nemen, daar men nog niet tot de overtuiging was gekomen dat er geen

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13. De Tolk, 23 May 1883.

grens meer bestond tusschen wit en zwart, waarop Jan Krap zich verwyderde. De Voorzitter wendde zich daarna tot Van Niekerk, en gaf namens den Bond en den heer Piet Rademeyer [the host] zyn misnoegen te kennen over zulk een handelwyze. Na de terechtwyzing ontvangen te hebben, gaf Jan Wasserman hem te verstaan dat hy de vergadering kon verlaten, waaraan Van Niekerk onmiddellyk deed. Zyn toeleg was deerlyk mislukt en het zou waarschynlyk beter voor hem zyn op zyn eigene plaats onder zyn volk een Bond te vestigen, met Jan Krap als Voorzitter, terwyl hy dan als Secretaris kan ageeren<sup>14</sup>.

This attitude undoubtedly cost the Bond a great deal of Coloured support, but it is difficult to estimate exactly how much. The chairman of the Graaff-Reinet Congress in 1884, Janse van Rensburg, gave it as his opinion that the Coloured vote was a threat to the farmers of the Western Province, while a Patriot editorial immediately after the general election of 1888 expressed the view that

In di Westelike Provinsies het di gekleurde oek  
baing mag, en stem dikwils te'en di boere,

though it added that the Coloured people were not possessed by "di boere haat wat di kaffers besiel"<sup>15</sup>. Hofmeyr, who claimed to draw support in his own constituency from Coloured voters, noted on 4 November 1882 that in recent by-elections, including one at Swellendam, non-white voters had been reluctant to support Dutch candidates. The next issue of his paper attempted a diagnosis:

Waaraan is dat te wijten? Wij antwoorden, aan het feit dat onze Boerenvereeningingen, onze takken van den Afrikaander Bond, onze staatkundigen, bij electiën en bij andere gelegenheden niet genoeg rekening houden met, niet genoeg de aandacht besteden aan, onze kleurlingen als een politieke magt in het land<sup>16</sup>.

But Hofmeyr did not give away much. The force of social custom prevented him from doing so, for although the Coloured man usually spoke the same language as the Boer, whose long history he so intimately shared, convention required that the two groups should remain apart, as separate organisms in the social hierarchy. Boers were no doubt able to exert consi-

14. De Tolk, 5 Dec. 1883, culled from the Humansdorp Re-Echo.

15. Minutes, 1884 Congress, p.47; Patriot, 13 Dec. 1888.

16. Zuid Afrikaan, 4, 7 Nov. 1882. C.f. the anecdote recounted by Hofmeyr's biographer, p. 309.

derable pressure on their Coloured labourers to vote for their own candidates in elections, especially in the period before the introduction of the secret ballot; but their age old social taboos were no basis for a political alliance in a society where one man's vote was as good as another's.

The attitude of the Bondsmen towards the administration of justice in the country districts was integrally bound up with their hierarchical view of society, and the necessity of maintaining the position of the white man above his non-white labourer or fellow-citizen. Branches frequently urged that the field cornet ought to have powers of petty criminal jurisdiction. This was a matter to which the Colonial legislators had given considerable thought, on account of the sheer inaccessibility of justice in the remoter parts, resulting, in the words of a select committee appointed in 1880, in a situation where "much crime goes unpunished, ... and there is a strong temptation to farmers ... to take the law into their own hands, or to compromise with accused"<sup>17</sup>. Parliament had attempted to alleviate the difficulty in 1876, with a law authorising the appointment of special justices of the peace, who were eventually given the power to adjudicate in petty cases affecting masters and servants in 1882<sup>18</sup>. But the House felt that the field cornets, who were untrained officials closely tied to the farmers by bonds of sympathy and kinship, would have made bad judges in inter-racial disputes as their predecessors had done before 1829<sup>19</sup>. The Bondsmen nevertheless pressed their case at nearly every congress between 1884 and 1889, albeit with diminishing hopes of success. In 1886 and 1887, Jotham Joubert asked for legislation in Parliament, but confessed on the latter occasion

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17. A.13 of 1880. Report of the Select Committee on District Justice Courts.
18. Acts 10 of 1876 and 40 of 1882.
19. For early instances of miscarriage of justice at the hands of farmer officials, see H.A. Reyburn, "Studies in Cape Frontier History", in The Critic, Oct. 1934; I.E. Edwards, Towards Emancipation, pp.75-7; J.S. Marais, The Cape Coloured People, p.18.

that "if his Bill were accepted a great revolution would take place in the present mode of administration of justice", a revolution which he well knew would not be permitted to happen<sup>20</sup>. The English Farmers' Congress, on the other hand, did not demand that field cornets should be given judicial powers, but rather that their terms of service should be improved and the dignity of the field cornetcy enhanced "by appointing proper persons to the office"<sup>21</sup>.

The Bondsmen seem, on the whole, to have been less wedded than the Settlers to the divisional police system which operated in the Colony. If an offence had been committed, they often preferred to be allowed to catch the offender themselves, administer summary justice upon his body, and send him about his business without further delay. They often thought that they could do this work better than the local police forces, whose abolition was sometimes demanded by Bond branches<sup>22</sup>. The Farmers' Congress, on the other hand, periodically asked for

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20. Minutes, 1884 Congress, pp.49-50; Notulen, 1886 Congress, p.8; 1887 Congress, p.9; 1888 Congress, p.14; 1889 Congress, p.11. Assembly Debates, 1887, p.225.

21. E.g. report in E.L. Dispatch, 16 June 1883.

22. A classic exposition of this point of view comes from the minutes of a Bond meeting at Aberdeen in 1883: "De heer P. Joubert kon het nut van eene politie-macht niet inzien; hy was bykans zestig jaar oud, maar hy was tot dusver nog altyd zyn eigen politieman geweest. Hy had vele schelmen en kwaaddoeners gevangen, somtyds hun spoor volgende op grooten afstand, en wanneer hy eenen dief aan het geregt overgeleverd had was hy nooit met schande daarvan afgekomen. Hy woonde op 8 uren afstands van den Magistraatszetel; als hy eerst zoo ver politie moest laten halen en zy er op de plek aangekomen waren, zoude het spoor naar alle waarschyndykheid al verdwynen zyn. Hy stelde dus voor dat er hoegenaamd geen politiemagt in deze Afdeeling gehouden worde" (De Tolk, 4 July 1883).

For other instances of demands for the abolition of local police forces, see the Middelburg Gazette, 19 Apr. 1881 (report of memorials from Willem Burgers Rivier and Zuurberg to the Middelburg Divisional Council), and the Frontier Guardian, 2 Apr., 22 Oct. 1881, 26 Aug. 1882 (discussion of a demand by the local Boeren Vereeniging for the abolition of the Wodehouse divisional police, where information is also given that in a period of two years this force had brought about 700 offenders to justice at a cost to the Division of about £3000 a year).

Congress took no firm resolutions respecting the police forces during the 'eighties; but a strong move developed in the middle 'nineties, echoed in several resolutions of Congress, that the Government should pay the police and the Divisional Council control them. Parliament thought otherwise. (See Notulen, 1895 Congress, pp.7-10; 1897 Congress, pp.6-10.)

the increase of divisional police forces, with special emphasis on improved methods of detecting crime and the grant of wider powers of search<sup>23</sup>.

There was wide agreement among the farmers of both language groups that when an accused servant had been found guilty in the magistrate's court he should be given corporal punishment rather than the statutory sentence of a fine or imprisonment. They claimed, with a good deal of justification, that the existing penalties were liable to hurt the farmer without having an obvious corrective value for the miscreant; but they sometimes ruined a good case by arguing that the lash was suitable for the black man but unsuitable for the white<sup>24</sup>, or by contending that the courts interpreted the law to the disadvantage of the white man<sup>25</sup>. It would be invidious, and probably unjust, to draw a hard distinction between the attitudes of the Bond and Farmers' Congresses on this question of the punishment of guilty persons, whether labourers or stock-thieves, for whereas extremely savage proposals were made at both types of meeting, the decisions actually taken by the congresses, which represented the view of the majority in each case, were usually restrained<sup>26</sup>. But it remains true that when P. J. du Toit introduced his notorious "Strop Bill" in the

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23. See resolutions on these lines at the Fort Beaufort, Bedford and Graaff-Reinet Farmers' Congresses (E.L. Dispatch, 13,16 June 1883; Bedford Enterprise, 28 Mar. 1888; Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 25 Mar. 1889).
24. The view of N.F. de Waal (Middelburg Getuige, 23 Dec. 1882), and of O'Brien of the Burghersdorp Gazette (issue of 3 Oct. 1879), to name only two instances.
25. See the interesting debate on stock thefts at the Port Elizabeth Farmers' Congress, quoted in P.E. Telegraph, 20 Mar. 1886, when it was argued by one speaker that a certain G. King, who had shot and killed a sheep stealer and been acquitted on a charge of murder, ought not to have had such a charge brought against him.  
See also the debate on the masters and servants law at the Graaff-Reinet Bond Congress of March 1882, where one speaker drew a comparison between the summary methods of justice employed in the Orange Free State and those used in the Colony, to the disadvantage of the latter, and argued passionately that the Cape farmer was badly treated (Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Mar. 1882).
26. As illustrations of the tendency towards savagery, see Minutes, 1884 Bond Congress, pp.56-7, at which W. van der Vyver and D.C. Bowker advocated branding for stock thieves, and, from the Farmers' Congress side, a recommendation for the transportation of such people (P.E. Telegraph, 20 Mar. 1886), for the introduction of the treadmill, and for hanging after the third offence (Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 21 Mar. 1889). In neither case did the respective meetings associate themselves with these wild proposals of exasperated men.

session of 1890, no English-speaking farmer voted in favour of it, whereas nearly all the Bond members did<sup>27</sup>.

The discussion so far has turned, in a general sense, on the attitude of Bondsmen and English farmers to people whose skins were not white. Where the Coloured people were concerned, the Boer had the benefit of a long tradition of cultural contact, which gave him good reason to expect the political support of such folk; but he did much to neutralize these advantages by excluding the kleurling from his political movement and failing to adjust his social attitudes to the political realities of the society in which he lived. A different sort of dilemma confronted the Bondsman when he was brought face to face with the necessity of declaring his attitude towards the native African. There were no cultural ties binding Boer and African together, only a memory - and that a very recent one - of conflict over land and stock, which merged into an actual fear of further hostilities in the future. The English settlers had learned during their sixty years of frontier experience that the fear of the Kafir was the beginning of wisdom, and tended to share the basic anxieties of their Boer compatriots; but their different circumstances and background generally led the Settlers to approach the "native problem" from a different standpoint, and to disagree with the Bond over steps to be taken for its solution.

There were, of course, important points of agreement: among them, the desire of farmers of both language groups to maintain and improve the pass laws. This type of legislation, which had first been instituted to protect Colonial natives from the disabilities imposed on tribesmen from beyond the frontier (or, as the title of the first pass law for Africans put it, to "prevent loyal Fingoes from being

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27. On the Strop Bill, see below, p.302. Rhodes supported it. Hofmeyr abstained.

mistaken for Kaffirs, and thereby aggrieved"), had developed gradually into an instrument "for the better protection of property"<sup>28</sup>, and white farmers were in general agreement that it should continue in existence for this purpose. Their chief object was to devise some easy means of telling whether an African seen driving cattle was on bona fide business or absconding with somebody else's stock<sup>29</sup>.

On the whole, however, the Bondsmen were less willing than the English farmers to accept the white man's burden of turning the African into a civilized westerner. They were more inclined to regard the latter's attachment to tribal ways as an adequate reason for not extending the benefits of civilization, and for reducing his participation in public life to the minimum level consistent with existing law. They took little trouble to examine the salient features of native policy on their merits, and failed to evolve a policy which deserved the name of coherence because of their natural but excessive preoccupation with the bearing of such a policy on their own group interests.

Their attitude to the problem of squatting on farms affords an illustration of the inability of Bond congresses to see certain problems in their totality. The difficulties involved in dealing with squatting arose mainly from the fact that the needs were very different from one district to another, as may be seen from the magisterial reports in

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28. See Acts 24 of 1857, 17 of 1864, and 22 of 1867. Pass legislation had been instituted with respect to the African, initially for humane and administrative reasons, in spite of the fact that it had been abolished in respect of Coloured persons in the 'twenties.

29. For the Bond's view on pass legislation, see Minutes, 1884 Congress, p.53; Notulen, 1885 Congress, p.14; 1886 Congress, p.7 and Bylage G, in which the support of the Farmers' Associations is indicated; 1887 Congress, p.9; 1888 Congress, p.17; 1889 Congress, p.11; 1890 Congress, p.20.

For the view of the Farmers' Associations, see congress reports in the E.L. Dispatch, 16, 23 June 1883; Bedford Enterprise, 15 Mar. 1888.

the Blue Book for 1882. These showed that there were some districts, such as Calvinia and Carnarvon, where squatting was directly linked with the prevalence of stock thefts; that there were others, notably in Griqualand West, where many of the squatters were white men ("farmers from Hope Town, Victoria West and Carnarvon, driven from their homes on account of drought"); that in some areas, as at Humansdorp and Fort Beaufort, farmers accepted squatters with all the attendant risks to four-footed property in order to make sure of a labour supply. Labour was undoubtedly short in many areas and had become scarcer, especially in the Western Province, since the opening up of the diamond fields and the start of the railway building programme, and farmers therefore had to be careful not to kill the proverbial goose. The Congress of Farmers' Associations appreciated this point in its debate of 1889<sup>30</sup>. The Bond, on the other hand, carried a resolution in 1884 to the effect that squatting should only be permitted in cases where the landowner could show the means of livelihood of squatters living on his land, and provided the landowner himself was made legally liable for stock losses incurred in the neighbourhood. In the same year an Act of Parliament made it unlawful to establish new locations without the agreement of the Divisional Council and the permission of the Governor<sup>31</sup>. But the Bond congresses wished to go further and abolish private locations which already existed, a subject to which they returned with renewed interest in the 'nineties without attempting to answer the question how bywoners turned off private land were to be provided for<sup>32</sup>.

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30. See report in Graaff-Reinet Advertiser, 25 Mar. 1889.

31. Act 37 of 1884.

32. Minutes, 1884 Congress, pp. 51-2. On the Bond's attitude to squatting in the 'nineties, see below, pp. 300-2

Bondsmen consistently and fervently demanded a reduction in the amount of public money expended on native education<sup>33</sup>. Their attitude was governed by the argument that, as the education budget was limited, a greater proportion of the funds available ought to have been diverted to the third class rural and district boarding schools, upon which many sons of Boers were dependent for such education as they were able to receive. According to the Report of the Superintendent-General of Education for 1881<sup>34</sup>, there were then only 75 third class and 13 district boarding schools in the Colony, catering for a total of 3185 pupils, as against 370 mission and 225 aborigines' schools with a total of 56,781 pupils. The apparent inequality of treatment to the advantage of the non-white pupil was mitigated by the fact that the mission schools received half their funds from private sources; that the annual cost to the state per pupil was 7s.8d. in the case of mission schools, £1 in the case of aborigines' schools, £1.10.0 in the case of the (unofficially white) public schools, and £5.12.2 in the case of district boarders; and that according to Dr Dale, then Superintendent-General, in a total budget of £88,000 for education in 1881, approximately £50,000 had been spent on the education of white children<sup>35</sup>. Despite these mitigating factors,

33. Notulen, Cradock Congress, pp.18-20 ("het Kongres aanbeveelt scholen onder de Naturellen en vooral over de Kei grootelijks te verminderen"); Notulen, 1885 Congress, p.19 ("...dat er te veel gelden aan Inboorlingen scholen besteed worden"); 1887 Congress, p.12 ("De Regering en Parlement worden gevraagd om ... op de uitgaven op Naturellenscholen te bezuinigen").

34. G.39 of 1882, especially pp.2,23.

35. In reply to a complaint by the Cradock Congress of the Bond, quoted in Zuid Afrikaan, 9 Nov. 1882.

however, it can hardly be doubted that the son of the rural white farmer received less education than was desirable from every point of view, even when the difficulties involved in providing schooling for him were taken into account. The English Farmers' Congress took up the case, sometimes positively by recommending an increase in the grant for rural white schools<sup>36</sup>, and on one occasion by adopting the Bond's negative approach and recommending a reduction in the mission school vote<sup>37</sup>; but they do not seem to have approached the question with the same intensity of feeling as the Bondsmen. Underlying the Bond's grievances - and this was a feeling which the English-speaking farmers shared, but not to the same extent - was a repugnance felt towards the educated African, especially if such a person held a position of authority in relation to the white man and thus disturbed the accepted white supremacy myth<sup>38</sup>. Both Bondsmen and English farmers expressed the view from time to time that the African child at school represented a direct loss to the farmer's labour supply<sup>39</sup>. But what mattered most of all to many Bondsmen was that the natives should receive less education.

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36. E.L. Dispatch, 20 June 1883.

37. Bedford Enterprise, 15 Mar. 1888. See also Jabavu's comment in Imvo Zabantsundu, 28 Mar. 1888.

38. The type of the educated African who impressed himself on the minds of the Bondsmen with greatest frequency was the court interpreter who stood between the white farmer and the magistrate. It may be impossible to say how many were thus employed; but for evidence of their unpopularity, see Hofmeyr, p.235; Notulen, 1893 Congress, p.34 (a recommendation by a Congress committee that the employment of Africans in this capacity be prohibited); and Te Water Papers, vol. 58. W.F. Juhre to T. te Water, 16 Apr. 1898 (A letter from Aberdeen to the Colonial Secretary, relating that "an educated Caffir from Lovedale was sent here ostensibly as Police Constable, but he really acts as clerk to the Resident Magistrate and is continually employed in registering the births and deaths ... It is hardly necessary for me to mention what deep-rooted objections the respectable mass of Dutch farmers have to be catechised, as it were, about their private family concerns by a Caffir". Te Water took steps "to put an end to the grievance complained of").

39. E.L. Dispatch, 23 June 1883 (A Farmers' Congress committee, while agreeing that the education of African children was desirable, expressed the wish for an educational policy designed "rather to inculcate industrial habits than to cram the native scholars ... in the higher class of subjects").

For the Bond's position, see Notulen, 1893 Congress, p.20 (A Congress resolution recommending the limitation of education in mission and aborigines' schools to Standard II, (cont.)

Fear for the security of their own group, rather than a studied attempt to arrest the civilization of the African, explains the Bondsmen's attitude over native education. They looked upon the African as a minor, and they were in no hurry to elevate him to adult status; but it is unlikely that they calculated deliberately to keep African society permanently on the primitive tribal level. Thus they considered the break-up of tribal organization to be desirable for military reasons. They held, like many of their English-speaking contemporaries, to a comfortable Benthamite view that the civilization of the African was a natural by-product of a social order designed to promote the greatest good of the white farmer. There were, moreover, certain aspects of tribal custom which deeply offended the Bondsmen's moral sense, and which they wished to see removed. African polygamy and the lobola system (vrouenhandel, as they termed the latter practice) were cases in point. Education in school, for a totally different set of reasons, might not be the proper way to get rid of these practices; but congress after congress believed that they could be removed by some sort of legislative action<sup>40</sup>. In the late 'eighties the feeling grew among the Bondsmen that the African who had more than one wife ought to be denied the vote. With regard to land tenure, there were some Bondsmen who saw the value of encouraging the African to obtain land under individual freehold title. The Zuid Afrikaan, for example, supported "het toekennen van persoonlijke eigendomsregten aan den grond aan Naturellen van betere soort"<sup>41</sup>. But here,

39. (cont.) a special tax on the hut of every school-going African, and the combination of manual labour with book learning).

40. Minutes, 1884 Congress, p.60; Notulen, 1885 Congress, pp. 21-2; 1886 Congress, p.8; 1887 Congress, p.17; 1888 Congress, p.14; 1894 Congress, p.29.

The Farmers' Associations approached these customs with rather more understanding. While they dissented in 1883 from the view of the Native Laws Commission that legal recognition be given to African polygamy, they considered and withdrew a motion condemning lobola (E.L. Dispatch, 23 June 1883), and endorsed this latter view in 1889 (Gräaff-Reinet Advertiser, 25 Mar. 1889).

41. Zuid Afrikaan, 28 Mar. 1882.

as with so much of their native policy, the Bondsmen tended to approach the question in a crab-like manner. They talked about African land tenure, but they were thinking about its relation to something else. Thus the 1887 Congress carried a motion to deny legal recognition of communal land titles, not with the object of encouraging individual freehold, which they did not wish to force upon the African, but in order to limit the number of Africans possessing the property qualification for the franchise<sup>42</sup>. When the Glen Grey legislation came before Parliament in 1894, the Bond gave its support to the idea of individual tenure, again with a reservation concerning the franchise, and with a further insistence that there should be no restrictions on the African freeholder's right to re-sell, either to black men or to white<sup>43</sup>. Without the same fear of the African vote, the Farmers' Associations were inclined to encourage individual tenure by Africans, sometimes with the object of forcing them either to accept it or vacate their holdings (to the advantage of prospective white buyers), but on at least one occasion to the accompaniment of more responsible arguments<sup>44</sup>.

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42. Notulen, 1887 Congress, p.14, which should be considered with the first of three resolutions carried at the 1886 Congress (Notulen, p.11), quoted below p. 248

43. See below, pp. 327-8

44. See the 1886 Farmers' Congress debate on squatting (P.E. Telegraph, 23 Mar. 1886), when interested motives came to the fore. But at Graaff-Reinet two years later, a motion in favour of individual title for Africans was carried, the main arguments given in its favour being that it would weaken the authority of the chief, educate the owners themselves, and enable more Africans to qualify for the vote.

## III

The real test of Bond native policy, however, concerned the question of the franchise, which became a major divisive factor in Colonial politics during the middle 'eighties, separating the Bondsmen not only from the Africans but from a prominent section of the English-speaking colonials as well. For this situation the Bondsmen were not entirely to blame; but their failure to adapt themselves to a colour-blind franchise law was the main cause of their troubles.

The qualifications for the franchise under the Constitution Ordinance were non-racial and gave the vote to male adults who could show an income qualification of £50 or an occupational qualification of £25 a year. This was an easy test, easy enough to permit large numbers of illiterate Whites Africans and Coloureds to find their way on to the voters' roll, and it gave a standing invitation to unscrupulous politicians to use bribery at election times. To raise the franchise was at least a plausible way of dealing with a real problem, on account of the desirability of an educated electorate, especially in a plural society. The solution was, however, beset with difficulties. In Great Britain, it was the enlargement of the electorate that did more than anything to defeat the political influence of beef and beer. In the Cape Colony, where votes were cheap<sup>45</sup> and the constituencies never too large in population to daunt the determined buyer, a reduction in the number of voters would not necessarily have reduced the amount of bribery. Thus, even at the theoretical level, the wisdom of amending the franchise qualifications may be said to have been an open question. Practical

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45. For the price of votes in the 1891 Council election, see Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 3. A.B. Vanes to Hofmeyr, 23 Feb. 1891 (Vanes told Hofmeyr he had authorized his agent "to secure votes at £7.10 per cent in Hankey and I fancy we should have 150"). See also Te Water Papers, vol. 56. H.J.H. Claassens to T. te Water, 14 Mar. 1891 (Claassens applied for £2.7.0 because "eenige kleurlingen moest ik eenige Bottels Bier te drinken geven, omdat de Heer Auret [Opposition agent] ... te drinken heeft gegeven").

considerations made a decision even more difficult. As things stood, a nice balance of power existed in the early 'eighties between the Bondsmen and their opponents, and any attempt to alter this in favour of one side or the other was bound to meet with strong resistance. The elimination of the African or Coloured voter through the introduction of a racial qualification was unthinkable to the opponents of the Bond, who were guided not only by liberal sentiments but also by a concern to keep their own dark supporters on the voters' roll. The Bondsmen for their part were driven by practical considerations to favour a white electorate, since qualifications of a non-racial kind, however mild, were likely to exclude from the vote at least a section of the poor whites, who, even at this early stage, were an element in their political calculations<sup>46</sup>. It would therefore have been surprising if the Bond's opponents had not supported the principle of non-racial qualifications, and equally surprising if proposals for some form of racial discrimination had not been made in the course of Bond congress debates.

Before we consider the manner in which the Bondsmen dealt with the franchise question, it is necessary to realize that they tended to assume as a matter of course that the African vote would normally be cast against their candidates. What was worse from their point of view, they suspected that their English-speaking opponents, regarding the African vote as a necessary counter-weight to offset their numerical inferiority, deliberately sought to turn the receptive minds of the Africans against the Colonial Dutch. In December 1881, at a time when feelings ran high, the P.E. Telegraph tried to do just this. After arguing against the legalization of the Dutch language on practical grounds, and defending the right of the African to enjoy the franchise because it would give him "an opportunity of cultivating an intelligent interest

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46. References to the poor whites were made during the debate on the franchise at the 1884 Congress.

in public affairs", the paper went on to state:

We have continually expressed our conviction that if the Africander Bond is to be well beaten it will have to be done by the assistance of the black vote. Look at the question as we may, we always come back to the fact that the Dutch in the colony are to the English as two to one, and that if they combine they can outvote us, and inflict upon us all the absurdities of their national and economic prejudices. We earnestly hope that the attempt may not be made, ... but we shall not be forced into retrogression without using every legitimate opposition .....<sup>47</sup>

The Zuid Afrikaan reacted sharply to this frank statement of aims<sup>48</sup>. Yet Hofmeyr and his followers knew that the Bond's policies were not likely to attract the support of the Africans, a fact of which they would in due course be constantly reminded by the editorial activities of Tengo Jabavu. Jabavu's Imvo Zabantsundu (Native Opinion), which first appeared in November 1884 and was then the only African newspaper in the Colony, was consistently hostile to the Bond from its inception until the eve of the Assembly elections of 1898.

The Natives of this Colony [Jabavu wrote, shortly after the Bond's Beaufort West Congress] can no longer have any doubt but that the tender mercies of the great Afrikander Bond as regards them are cruel<sup>49</sup>.

Though he was prepared to give Hofmeyr credit for a humane native policy from time to time, Jabavu considered the Bond to be untrustworthy, and taunted it by making outspoken demonstrations of loyalty to the British Crown<sup>50</sup>. With regard to the English Colonials, Jabavu gave himself some free rein; but his essential accord with liberal English Colonial opinion may be seen in the political support which he gave to men like James Rose Innes, and in editorial comments of this type:

History shows unmistakably that the votes of the natives have been used discreetly in the best interests of the country and of civilization, and that they have steadily and consistently been employed to strengthen the English or the party of right and justice in the House<sup>51</sup>.

The Bondsmen's complaint that African voters could normally

47. P.E. Telegraph, 27 Dec. 1881.

48. Zuid Afrikaan, 5 Jan. 1882.

49. Imvo Zabantsundu, 27 Apr. 1885. For the change in Imvo's politics, see below, p.387.

50. Imvo Zabantsundu, 22 Dec. 1884, 13 July 1887, 9 Feb. 1888, 2, 16 May 1889.

51. Imvo Zabantsundu, 2 May 1885, 30 Mar. 1887; Innes, pp. 50-3.

be expected to support their opponents was considered by contemporaries of all shades of opinion to reflect the actual situation. The African voters held the balance in several of the eastern constituencies. Thus in the case of the 1888 general election, the liberal farmer W. J. Warren headed the poll in Kingwilliamstown on the strength of their support, on the testimony of Imvo; Mackay won at Uitenhage for the same reason, on the testimony of the Uitenhage Times; and Orpen won in Wodehouse with the aid of a solid African vote, on the testimony of the Zuid Afrikaan<sup>52</sup>. The Patriot's review of the election results included the following:

... Di eerste les is: Di groote mag van di Kafferstem, en di gebruik wat van di stem gemaak word ... In dri distrikte is di stryd geheel deur di kafferstem beslis, en het di boere verloor. In Aliwal Noord stemde di inboorlinge as één man vir di firma Sauer en Companji. In Wodehouse het di kafferstemme Meneer Orpen ingebring. Hulle het daar mar vir één man gestem. In Fort Beaufort is Meneer Hutton deur di kaffers en hottentots alleen ingekom. In andere distrikte het di kombërs stem mee gewerk om party lede in te bring<sup>53</sup>.

The next issue pointed the moral:

Ons moet net ons beginsels vas hou, en di moed ni opge, en op die manier bly ons baas in di land. Ons baas of di kaffer baas, dit is di vraagstuk. Laat alle bondsmanne daaro'er nadenk. Di tyd van speul is virby<sup>54</sup>.

Bond congresses, resigned to the fact of African opposition to their policies, usually sought to devise a formula which would exclude Africans from the vote in practice without appearing to do so in theory<sup>55</sup>. At Cradock in 1882, they propose

52. Imvo Zabantsundu, 15 Nov. 1888; Uitenhage Times, 6 Dec. 1888; Zuid Afrikaan, 4 Dec. 1888.

53. Patriot, 13 Dec. 1888.

54. Patriot, 20 Dec. 1888.

55. This was matched by a sustained attempt at various times and places to obtain the actual removal of registered African voters from the roll. Imvo Zabantsundu, 18 Jan. 1888, referred to "the proceedings of our Dutch neighbours (in this respect) in Herschel, Queenstown, Wodehouse, Tembuland, Victoria East and Fort Beaufort", as if they were common knowledge. See A.19 of 1888, Report of the Select Committee on Queen's Town Registration, in which the majority (Innes dissenting) accepted the Bondsmen's case that their opponen had placed large numbers of unqualified Africans on the roll (The Civil Commissioner had struck off 133 out of 426 names

There is much evidence of this sort of activity by Bondsmen in the Hofmeyr and de Water Papers, relating to Uitenhage in 1891-3. "The native vote has been splendidly pared down", Arthur Vanes (then a Bondsman) told de Water on 20 Sept. 1893.

"dat geen naturel stemgeregtigd kan worden verklaard tenzij hij land eigenaar is in deze Kolonie en zijn naam kan teekenen"<sup>56</sup> - a resolution which implied racial discrimination, for they did not suggest that this test should be made a general one. At Graaff-Reinet in 1884, on the other hand, though the raising of the franchise was recommended by all speakers, there was a marked disposition to refrain from making proposals on racial lines<sup>57</sup>. Upington's incorporation of the Transkei in the Colony in 1885, however, placed the whole question in a different perspective. It now seemed to many that, unless the electoral law were changed, the voters' roll would be swamped by "blanket voters", and white supremacy threatened, at least in the Transkei itself, where there were enough white settlers to make the total exclusion of the territory difficult, and a vastly greater number of potential African voters<sup>58</sup>. Upington raised the question of franchise reform in Parliament that year, but a proposal for the establishment of a Native Council for the Transkeian territories was withdrawn after the second reading<sup>59</sup>.

Before Parliament reassembled in 1886, the Bondsmen had met in Grahamstown and the Farmers' Associations in Port Elizabeth. The Farmers' Congress decided that the matter was outside their competence, and a motion to raise the qualifications for the franchise and include a literacy test was withdrawn on the ground that (in the words of one speaker) "it was only likely to excite race animus"<sup>60</sup>. The Bondsmen, however, displayed no such inhibitions. They approved higher franchise qualifications and a literacy test. They accepted the substance of Upington's proposal that Africans in the Transkei who paid the hut tax should elect a local

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56. Notulen, Cradock Congress, p.15.

57. Minutes, Graaff-Reinet Congress, pp.45-7.

58. Sprigg estimated in 1887 that there were then nearly 10,000 whites and nearly 350,000 Africans in the Transkei and Griqualand East (Assembly Debates, p.281).

59. Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, 1885, pp.27, 126.

60. P.E. Telegraph, 25 Mar. 1886.

naturellenraad, and proposed to exclude all Africans from the common roll, "in en buiten de Transkei", save those who possessed considerable property ("zeg £1000"), who alone should be entitled to vote both for the native council and for a member of Parliament. More significantly, they foreshadowed subsequent legislation in a resolution which asserted an incompatibility between franchise rights and primitive forms of tenure:

Deze vergadering is van oordeel dat er voor de Kolonisten groot bezwaar is in een staat van zaken waarin naturellen in reserves of locaties wonende; en dus, wat het grondbezit betreft, voorregten genietende, die de kolonisten van een deel van den grond uitsluiten, en hen zelve veroorloovende op hun oude barbaarsche wijze te leven, bij verkiezingen grooten invloed kunnen uitoefenen<sup>61</sup>.

When Upington faced Parliament later in the year, he had elaborated his proposals further. The Transkei was to be given two members, one to be elected by white men possessing the ordinary qualifications and by Africans owning land worth £100 in individual tenure, the other to be chosen indirectly by a Native Elective Council, itself elected by all male Africans who paid the hut tax. The Bill satisfied the Bondsmen, though Hofmeyr was troubled by the element of racial discrimination which it contained, and supported it only as a "temporary measure"<sup>62</sup>. The Opposition, however, was up in arms. They objected in particular to the fact that the Bill, if carried, would debar the African from qualifying on any other ground if he was unable to satisfy the proprietary conditions. "By the arbitrary movement of this Bill", protested J. W. Leonard of Oudtshoorn, "if a native interpreter ... possessed either an intellectual or salary qualification he would be debarred from voting". Warren of Kingwilliamstown raised a protest against taxation without equal

61. Notulen, 1886 Congress, p.11.

62. Assembly Debates, 1886, pp.67-73; Hofmeyr, pp.283-4.

representation, while Vintcent of George

did not know why we should now depart from the principle which had worked so well in this Colony, that, no matter what a man's creed or colour, he should suffer no political disability<sup>63</sup>.

The Bill survived the second reading and the committee stage, but as a result of what Hofmeyr's biographer has described as a "catch vote"<sup>64</sup>, the Opposition was able to muster a narrow majority for a significant amendment before the third reading, whereby, to the disgust of Upington, "a large number of natives could be placed on the roll under a different qualification from that of the possession of land"<sup>65</sup>. The colour-blind franchise was saved by a margin of three votes, and the Government, supported by the Bondsmen, decided to discard the amended Bill in Another Place.

When Sprigg, who had resumed the premiership in the meantime, returned to the question of franchise reform in 1887, he prepared his ground more carefully. He first asked Parliament to accept a new Registration Bill, which cut some of the ground from under the liberals' feet by re-interpreting the franchise provisions of the Constitution Ordinance without altering the strict terms of the Ordinance itself, in such a way as to exclude a share in communal property as a qualification for the vote, either in the Colony or in the Transkei<sup>66</sup>. Having secured the agreement of Parliament to this, with some difficulty, and obtained the Governor's assent on 21 July, he then introduced a Transkeian

63. Assembly Debates, 1886, pp.70 (Leonard), 73, 396 (Warren), 396 (Vintcent).

64. I have been unable to discover why Hofmeyr's biographer (p.284) introduced this qualifying comment.

65. Assembly Debates, 1886, pp.428-9; Votes and Proceedings, House of Assembly, pp.438-9. The amendment was carried by 31 votes to 28.

66. Act 14 of 1887. The operative section was the seventeenth: "No person shall be entitled to be registered as a voter by reason of his sharing in any communal or tribal occupation of lands or buildings unless he shall be in actual occupation for the period required by the eighth section of the Constitution Ordinance, of a house or other building, whether situated or not situated on land held on tribal or communal tenure, which house or building separately or together with land occupied therewith held upon other than tribal or communal tenure shall be of the value of twenty-five pounds sterling."

Representation Bill to give Griqualand East and Tembuland one member each, which became law on 5 August. Sprigg claimed that he had laid his plans without consultation with the Bond; but the Uitenhage Congress of the Bond had already given its blessing in advance<sup>67</sup>.

The franchise reforms of 1887 were in essence a compromise. The Bondsmen obtained a safeguard against the likelihood of the voters' rolls being swamped in the foreseeable future by African voters, but, as the elections of 1888 indicated, did not thereby gain any immediate increase of strength in the constituencies. The liberal section of the English Colonials had failed to prevent a potentially serious limitation in African voting strength, but could at least claim that they had frightened the Government from introducing an explicit form of discrimination on racial grounds. The balance had been held by English and other members of the Government party who were not Bondsmen, of whom Sprigg himself was representative<sup>68</sup> - men, for the most part, who shared the Bondsmen's fear of the African vote, were less troubled by fear of the growing strength of the Bond itself, and perhaps looked upon political collaboration with the Africans as for some reason unrespectable. These were the people whom Jabavu had in mind when he urged, with a mixture of exaggeration and prophetic insight, that Sprigg's proposals had been put forward

to weaken and silence the English party in the Legislature by disfranchising its devoted allies, the Natives, and, moreover, to seal the supremacy of the Bond in the land<sup>69</sup>.

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67. Notulen, 1887 Congress, p.13: "Deze vergadering keurt het nieuwe Wetsontwerp door de Regering te worden ingediend bij de volgende sessie van het Parlement, goed, en verzoekt de leden de Regering daarin te steunen." This refers to the first of Sprigg's Bills.
68. Another was the Stephen Johnson who successfully contested the Victoria East seat and entered Parliament as James Rose Innes's colleague in 1884. See *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 2 May 1885, for a classic description of this type of Colonial Englishman, written from an African point of view.
69. *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 30 Mar. 1887. "By eliminating the native factor", Jabavu had written on the 23rd, "...Sir Gordon Sprigg establishes the ascendancy of the Dutch in the Colony for ever." But the "native factor" was not yet eliminated to the extent which Jabavu feared.

## IV

Sprigg, the caretaker par excellence, held on to office during the closing months of 1888, uneasy in his dependence on the Bond, yet unable to shake that dependence off. A general election was approaching. The formation of a Frontier Party in the eastern Cape, and of a Tariff and Excise League in the western, appeared to offer an alternative basis for his power; but Sprigg does not appear to have been confident in the potential usefulness of either as substitutes for the support which he derived from the Bond<sup>70</sup>. His position was not made easier by the reluctance of both the real leaders of Colonial political opinion, Cecil Rhodes and Jan Hofmeyr, to assume the responsibility of office themselves. J. W. Sauer wrote to Rhodes on 10 September:

I shall be glad ... when you ... give some time to other things than mining. I mean, of course, the politics of this Colony and the States adjoining<sup>71</sup>.

Five days earlier, Dormer had also written to him, describing

an intensely unsatisfactory conversation I had with Hofmeyr a day or two ago. I told him I would stand for Cape Town as a Hofmeyrite, and undertake to get in hands down if he would be Chairman of my Committee and sport his colours like a man. He then said that I was quite mistaken in supposing that he had any desire to get such a following as would give him a majority. He did not want the Government to be too strong, still less [did] he want the Opposition to be strong enough to turn out the Government, and least of all did he want to be very strong himself: he wanted to create a compact third party, which should hold the balance between the contending factions, but without the desire or intention to become responsible for the management of affairs itself<sup>72</sup>.

This was an attitude which Dormer deplored:

70. On the Frontier Party and the Tariff and Excise League, see Y.P. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, 1884-98, pp. 29-32.

71. Rhodes Papers, vol. 26. Sauer to Rhodes, 10 Sept. 1888. Quoted also in Williams, Rhodes, p.183.

72. Rhodes Papers, vol. 26. F. J. Dormer to Rhodes, 5 Sept. 1888.

I feel more strongly every day that what this poor Colony wants is a strong government, that shall be able to travel along one road or the other - I do not very much care which - without having to ask itself at every turn and corner, not what the verdict of the country will be, but what will be the thought of some irresponsible member of Parliament whose shadow is always interposed between the country and itself ... I regard it as treason to the Colony - treason to the Crown I do not care one fig about - for a man in Hofmeyr's position to endeavour to keep our Executive weak, never knowing whether it stands or falls, when the Executive in the republics is so strong. I did not stay to tell him all this, but I take the liberty of unburdening my soul to you ...

Sauer thought much the same:

If Hofmeyr will in no case take office we must act in the future with that knowledge as we think best. If that is Hofmeyr's decision I regret it exceedingly as it must tend to make government very difficult in this country. Assuming that the relative strengths of parties will remain as at present it will mean that office and power are separated. I wish you were nearby so that you could look in and talk the matter over ...

Rhodes must have informed Hofmeyr of the contents of these letters, for Hofmeyr felt called upon to justify himself before the lord of de Beers:

My dear Rhodes,

Many thanks for your letter and enclosures. Dormer's account of his conversation with me is not quite correct. There are reasons for my declining to be chairman of his proposed Cape Tn. Committee independent of any absence of desire on my part to have a majority in the next House. As a matter of fact, whether I am prepared to take office or not, I would be delighted to have a majority. But I never have had a majority in the House and I do not expect to have one next session. There is too much narrow localism and personal feeling in the Africander ranks being exhibited in the course of the present elections for that .... I now only advise my friends to vote for men with good sound Africander views and independence of feeling who will not pin their faith to either opposition or ministry, but judge for themselves ... Am getting a friend of mine returned for Caledon, Upington's efforts to run another man notwithstanding. Am trying to get another friend in for Riversdale (though I am doubtful of success), and am making similar efforts at Richmond and elsewhere. I am now giving a little lift to Dormer for Victoria East and Peddie, and hope you'll keep him in hand if returned. My final attitude will depend on the issue of the elections ... I see that you will not take office because you would be subject to an 'irresponsible majority'. Well, that is very much my position. However do your best and I'll do mine.

J. H. Hofmeyr<sup>73</sup>.

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73. Rhodes Papers, vol. 26. Hofmeyr to Rhodes, 3 Oct. 1888. His italics.

The general election took place at the end of the year and the Bond failed, as Hofmeyr had anticipated, to improve its parliamentary strength as a result of it. The chairman's report on the election results at the Middelburg Congress was largely a tale of woe. It had been a case of "kracht in getal en invloed, maar zwakheid in doorzicht en eendracht", and Congress was invited to give some attention to setting right the things that had gone wrong<sup>74</sup>. The campaign in the Uitenhage constituency had been badly mismanaged, and the Bondsmen thoroughly outwitted by their opponents<sup>75</sup>. At Graaff-Reinet the two Bond candidates had won seats, but this was in spite of six months of acrimonious bickering between officially supported Bondsmen and others, like Ds. Barend Pienaar, who had put themselves forward as their opponents<sup>76</sup>. The Rietfontein branch had been excluded from the nomination meeting in the Richmond constituency because it lay partly in the Colesberg division, and had then decided to oppose the candidates nominated at that meeting (without prejudice, as it happened, to the Bond's eventual double victory). Inefficiency on the part of the chairman and secretary of the Cradock District Bestuur, however, had resulted in that division returning only one Bond member instead of the two whom they could have elected: they had published the notice for the nomination meeting too late, with the result that branches which had not received it in time defied their authority and cast their votes against the official Bond candidates. In another case Bondsmen had cast their votes against a man who had been properly nominated - and there was nothing in the constitution to prevent them from doing so<sup>77</sup>.

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74. Notulen, 1889 Congress, Bylage A.

75. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. A.B. Vanes to J.E. McCusker, editor of the Graaff-Reinetter, 30 Nov. 1888 (A graphic description).

76. Te Water Papers, vol. 56, passim. There is much correspondence on the Graaff-Reinet election in this volume.

77. Notulen, 1889 Congress, Bylage E. Report of the Congress constitutional committee.

The Middelburg Congress appointed a committee to examine the more important electoral disputes and devise constitutional changes which would obviate any recurrence in the future<sup>78</sup>. It conducted a systematic investigation of the detailed complaints and proposed a new clause in the constitution to cover them, which Congress accepted<sup>79</sup>. More important still, it recommended the establishment of a Commissie van Toezicht op Elekties of three Bondsmen, whose purpose should be that of securing the return to Parliament of properly nominated Bond candidates. It was to see that nomination meetings were properly called, to call them itself if the local chairman failed to do his duty, and to take the initiative in the summoning of Circle meetings to nominate candidates for the Upper House. In two further respects it was to be endowed with important discretionary powers: first, all disputes concerning elections could be referred to it by either party, and if they were so referred its judgment was to be final; and secondly, if there was no chance of returning a Bondsman to Parliament in any single constituency, and there was no lawfully chosen Bond candidate in the field, the Commissie was to be given authority, on request by any branch, to direct members to cast their votes for candidates who were not Bondsmen. The former power would give the Commissie complete control over the settlement of nomination disputes, especially when, as often happened in later years, it demanded a written declaration of submission to its authority by both parties before it agreed to arbitrate in any dispute. The second of these powers would give the Commissie a reasonably free hand in the choice of outside candidates for marginal constituencies, of which Hofmeyr was to make good use in the elections of 1894 and 1898. There was no opposition to these

78. Its members were: P.J. du Toit (Hope Town), N.F. de Waal (Middelburg), A. Innes (Murraysburg), A.S. du Plessis (Steynburg), W.D. Snyman (Queenstown), A.L. Aucamp (Kimberley) and J.H. Smith (Aberdeen).

79. See Appendix E below, Article (XII) (in part).

proposals, and the first three members of the Commissie van Toezicht, nominated by the chairman with the assent of the congress, were J. H. Hofmeyr, R. P. Botha, and N. F. de Waal.<sup>80</sup>

The Middelburg Congress also reached a decision on another subject which had troubled the minds of Bondsmen since 1882, by formally adopting a Programme of Principles (Program van Beginnselen). In order to appreciate the size of this achievement, it is necessary to relate it to a long history of disagreement within the party, ever since S. J. du Toit's original Program had been referred by the Graaff-Reinet Congress to the branches, and by the Cradock Congress to a party constitutional commission<sup>81</sup>. The failure of the Richmond, second Graaff-Reinet and Beaufort West Congresses to reach agreement over du Toit's document had then led to the appointment of a commission of three with instructions to produce a new draft for consideration in 1886<sup>82</sup>. The members of this commission were Hofmeyr, D. F. du Toit, and J. M. Hoffman. But du Toit had not seen eye to eye with the other two members of the commission, and according to the majority report tabled at the 1886 Congress over the signatures of Hofmeyr and Hoffman, he had been unable to consult with them<sup>83</sup>. Instead, he had produced a draft of his own which retained the form and most of the contents of S. J. du Toit's Program, but omitted some of its more contentious phrases<sup>84</sup>. Hofmeyr and Hoffman had worked out a new draft, which differed from du Toit's in important details, yet contained a good deal

80. Notulen, 1889 Congress, p.19. On the powers of the Commissie van Toezicht, see below, Appendix F, and for its performance in subsequent elections, pp.292, 314-25, 368-70, 385-93.

81. See above, pp.118, 126-7.

82. Notulen, 1885 Congress, p.8.

83. Rapport der Commissie over het Program van Beginnselen (in Hofmeyr Collection).

84. D.F. du Toit's draft, entitled, like his brother's, a Program van Beginnselen van de Nationale Partij, left out most of the politically explosive phrases which offered oblique insults to English-speaking colonials, such as their virtual exclusion from the biological definition of the volk in the first, and the references to "wederrechtelijke vreemde overheersing" and to "vreemde fortuinzoekers" in the second and tenth articles respectively, the word "vreemde" being omitted in each case. His omissions also included the phrase "onder eigen vlag" in the sixth article, presumably

which conformed with the ideas of the brothers du Toit<sup>85</sup>. The highest common factor of the two documents may be set out as follows: the Bond was declared in both to be an independent political party, prepared to co-operate with outsiders in so far as this could be done without compromising its principles. These principles included the assumption that South African nationality was Christian and European. They proclaimed the obligation of governments not to impede the spread of the Gospel, and in more detail to permit freedom of worship, to compel Sunday observance, to control public morals and public health without trespassing on legitimate privacy, to administer impartial justice, levy impartial taxes, and protect the economic and cultural interests of the people. Over and above these general principles there was much similarity regarding the Bond's particular aims, which in both documents were said to include the achievement of a united South Africa, the reform of the electoral system in the Colony, the reform of the masters and servants law, and the achievement of complete local South African control over native policy. Both went some way towards meeting the new conciliatory spirit which prevailed between the two white language groups, but their difference in temper may be seen, as well as anywhere, in a comparison of the manner in which each sought to develop a sense of nationality:

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84.(cont.) because the Central Bestuur had decided not to include it in the general constitution. See Appendix G below, where S. J. du Toit's original Program is set out with D. F. du Toit's amendments.

85. Entitled a Program van Beginnselen van de Afrikaander Nationale Partij, based on an earlier draft, the authorship of which is not apparent.

D.F. du Toit's concept, Art. XV. (identical to Art. XVI of S.J. du Toit's Program)

Kracht tot handhaving onzer nationale zelfstandigheid zoekt zij in de erkenning, handhaving en beoefening onzer landstaal; in het onderwijzen onzer verachterde boerenbevolking; in de bevordering van kennis onzer historie; in de opkweeking van vrijheidsgezin en patriotisme bij onze bevolking, vooral bij de jeugd; en voorts in eene doeltreffende Burgerwet, die in de burgerij de eigenlijke strijdkracht des lands erkent en ontwikkelt.

The Hofmeyr-Hoffman concept, Art. 4.

Zij meent dat de AANEENSLUITING bedoeld onder Artikel 3(a) behoort te rusten op een helder en duidelijk besef van malkanders gezamenlijke belang in staatkunde, landbouw, vee-teelt, handel en nijverheid en op de erkenning van ieders bijzondere rechten, betreffende godsdienst, onderwijs en taal, zoodat alle nationale naijver tusschen de differente bestanddeelen van ons volk worde weggeruimd en plaats make voor een onmiskenbaar ZUID AFRIKAANSCH nationaliteitsgevoel.

Du Toit had not broken entirely free from the notion of an exclusive group patriotism, whereas the Hofmeyr-Hoffman concept had shed limitations of this kind. The only other major difference in emphasis was that while D. F. du Toit clung to his brother's Kuyperian ideas concerning the relationship between church and state, the Hofmeyr-Hoffman document, though by no means departing from the principles of a Calvinist polity, placed less emphasis on subjects of primary interest to the theologian. For the du Toits, "noch in de volkswil noch in de wet, maar alleen in God vindt [de Nationale Partij] de bron van het souvereine gezag". For Hofmeyr, "de Afrikaander Nationale Partij erkent de leiding der Voorzienigheid ook in de lotgevallen van landen en volkeren".

As might have been expected, the two draft Programmes became a source of contention, and the Grahamstown, Uitenhage and Paarl congresses found themselves unqualified to judge between them. But at Paarl in 1888 the Bondsmen were afflicted with a sense of urgency and decided to reappoint the original commission of three with instructions to bring the two drafts together ("dat een Program van Beginselen zoo eenvoudig en duidelijk mogelijk uit beide Programmen ... worde opgesteld"). If simplicity and clarity were to be the criteria, there could be no question that the Hofmeyr-Hoffman formulation was the better, and

it was this document that the 1889 congress eventually accepted with only insignificant amendments<sup>86</sup>. The Bond had had nearly a decade of growing pains, trying to decide what sort of nationality it was trying to create, and now the Cape Bondsmen, without the aid of their Transvaal and Free State brethren, had at last come down on the side of a moderate statement of principles. Hofmeyr had won through, with an appeal for a broadly tolerant white South African patriotism, which would serve the Bond well during the exhilarating period of its alliance with Cecil Rhodes.

The changes effected at Middelburg could not transform the Bond from a rather aimless and undisciplined association into a political party with a sense of purpose overnight; but they created a foundation on which Hofmeyr would in due course be able to build. Hofmeyr, as chairman of the Commissie van Toezicht, whose other members shared his views on most matters, had been given the sort of power which he wanted. He could begin to develop the Bond in the manner broadly enunciated in his own Programme of Principles, and he now had power to face the outside world, confident in the knowledge that the Bond had confidence in him. His market value, to put it crudely, went up. In particular, he would cease to address Rhodes with the air of one buffeted by uncontrollable circumstances, and begin to drive hard bargains with Bond votes for counters, while the other man drove clever ones on the basis of his Chartered shares. It would take a few months, however, before either would be able to profit from the respective positions of strength which each was in the process of gaining. Rhodes applied for his Charter in April 1889, but he did not get it until 29 October, the date on which he also reached an agreement with the Cape Government respecting the building of the Bechuanaland railway. Hofmeyr, meanwhile, had to shepherd a parliamentary

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86. Notulen, 1889 congress, Bijlage D.

flock no stronger than that of the previous year, if the observation of a Bondsman new to the Council is to be trusted, and divisions among its members continued to prevent it from taking a strong line in either house:

Unless our party act a little more liberal[ly] we will be out of it. We are not so strong here as some people imagine and we are getting more divided daily. Everybody wants his own way and his own railway and what will be the end of it remains to be seen. Hofmeyr does not seem so very delighted with some of the Bond members. He says they are too ignorant and however good a man might be if he lacks education he cannot be a success in parliament. Believe me we have too many of that class here, and if we do not send better men the Afrikaner party will never be able to take the lead and I am sure of it that the first opportunity Sprigg sees to do without us he will show us his back. This of course is strictly 'enternous' [sic]<sup>87</sup>.

Dolf Botha endorsed Herholdt's judgment, regretting the lack of unity among the Bond parliamentarians. They were not really behind Sprigg's railway plans, he told te Water,

maar Hofmeyer ziet het nootzaklyke er van in, dat het Afrikaner party zyn zedelyk verpligt na al het gebeurde, het gouvernement door te helpen, al zyn hun verrigtingen vouttief, anders verloren wy ons invloed als een party, en ik hoop gy zal/my instem, dat wy dat niet toelaten kan<sup>88</sup>. met

The Government and the Bondsmen were both marking time, each in their own way dissatisfied with the other; and there was no apparent prospect of an early change.

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87. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. A.J. Herholdt to T. te Water, 8 July 1889.

88. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. R.P. Botha to T. te Water, 18 July, 1889.

## THE HOFMEYR-RHODES ALLIANCE

## I

The continuance of the Sprigg Government in office during 1889 and the early part of 1890 must be ascribed, in a negative sense, to the fact that the political alliance between Rhodes and Hofmeyr had not yet fully matured. This alliance was rooted, as Hofmeyr's biographer has shown, in a personal friendship struck up during the middle 'eighties. There had, of course, been misunderstandings. Rhodes had thought in 1883 that Hofmeyr was a republican: Hofmeyr had thought that Rhodes was a "regular beefsteak John Bull Englishman" with whom it would be impossible to find common ground; but in the course of time both had come to see that the other had a respect for the traditions and interests of his own people which went beyond mere lip-service. For the rest, the alliance was formed by "force of circumstances", by "links ... forgett imperceptibly" which bound man to man. In so far as this naturally ripening friendship was hastened to maturity by calculated actions, these usually came, as Hofmeyr's biographer has said, from the side of Rhodes<sup>1</sup>.

The two men drew together by gradual stages, but in the closing months of Sprigg's second ministry they were not united on many aspects of public policy. On the matter of imperial relations and native affairs Rhodes and Hofmeyr had come to see eye to eye; but they were not yet at one with each other over railway and tariff matters and the increasingly important question of 'the North'. Native policy

1. The account in J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, c.XXII, is silent on important aspects of the alliance, but does not stray far from the truth. There is an attempt to explain the alliance, mainly from Hofmeyr's side, in A.H. de Swardt, Rhodes en die Afrikaner Bond. See also B. Williams, Rhodes, c. XIII. Felix Gross, Rhodes of Africa, pp.195-8, is unjust to Rhodes. Scoble and Abercrombie, The Rise and Fall of Krugerism, pp.178-9, allowed their imaginations to run riot, and were unfair to the Bond.

would go into the melting pot during Rhodes's premiership, and will be considered in due course. The continuity of our narrative requires an investigation, at this stage, of the developing attitudes of these two men to the tariff, railway and northern problems, and of the so-called "imperceptible links".

We have already seen that at the time of the general election of 1888 Hofmeyr had reservations about the immediate expansion of Colonial influence into Bechuanaland and Zambia. His biographer has stressed this point convincingly<sup>2</sup>. As during the Bechuanaland crisis of 1884, Hofmeyr jibbed at the thought of Colonial expansion at the expense of the Transvaal, in an area where he considered the Transvaal had at least as good a prescriptive right to expand as the Colony. If expansion in that direction was desirable - and he did not say that it was not - then the Cape and the Transvaal should co-operate in bringing these new regions under their control: neither should act alone. A failure to reach agreement on northern policy would have destroyed all prospects of a fruitful alliance between Rhodes and Hofmeyr, for the raison d'être would not have existed from Rhodes's point of view. But agreement was in fact reached because Hofmeyr altered course. His conversion had several facets, and the point to which he gave most publicity himself was that the Transvaal Government had let him down:

Had Kruger fulfilled my expectations, and fallen in with my advice, then Rhodes and I might have agreed to differ.

These remarks referred to the failure of his efforts, after the customs convention with the Free State had been agreed upon in March 1889, to persuade the President of the South African Republic to allow free trade between the Transvaal and the Cape. Between April and July Hofmeyr put steady pressure on Kruger, both directly and through the medium of

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2. Hofmeyr, pp.354-7, 382-9. The two passages should be read together. They are based mainly on documents in the Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 13 (Railway and Customs sub-file).

President Reitz, to induce him to bring the Transvaal into the customs union. He tried to impress on Kruger that, while continuing to build the Delagoa Bay line "with the greatest energy", he ought to look after his own interests by encouraging the Free State to build a line as rapidly as possible to the Vaal River, where it should divide into two arms, one to Johannesburg and Pretoria, the other through Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp to the western Transvaal. The Johannesburg line, he suggested, might subsequently be extended northwards to the Limpopo:

If Your Honour should make public anything of this nature as your railway programme, you would reap the support of every true Africander. You would completely take the wind out of the sails of the Bechuanaland Syndicate, by depriving it of the prospect, not only of the trade of the West of the Transvaal, but also that from the regions North of the Protectorate and between the Limpopo and the Zambesi; you would strengthen our Colonial Government against the men of the Opposition in their striving to co-operate with the Transvaal; you would satisfy the population of every part of the Republic; you would give an enormous push to the development of Republican industries and agriculture; you would lead the whole traffic with Central Africa through your State; you would lay a strong bond between your burghers and their kinsfolk in the Free State and the Cape Colony, and you would bring Natal to a conception of its duty<sup>3</sup>.

These were persuasive words. The Transvaal Government pondered them and replied cryptically but not unfavourably<sup>4</sup>. But ten days later, on 29 July, the Volksraad turned down by twenty-six votes to six a motion put forward by the Executive Council in favour of a limited customs agreement with the Cape. In spite of Kruger's eloquent defence of such an agreement, the Raad decided to postpone a decision until the following session<sup>5</sup>. Rebuffed by the Transvaal, Hofmeyr walked into the arms of Rhodes, just at the moment when the latter was most anxious to receive him.

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3. Quoted in Hofmeyr, p.356. My italics.

4. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 13 (Railway and Customs sub-file). Telegrams, Hofmeyr to Kruger, 27 June; Kruger to Hofmeyr, 2 July; State Secretary, Pretoria to Hofmeyr, 19 July 1889.

5. Notulen, Transvaal Volksraad, 27,29 July 1889. The debates were published in the Staatscourant.

"This decision of the Transvaal Volksraad is one of considerable importance in South African history", wrote Hofmeyr's biographer, "for it practically determined what was to be the position of the Republic in the development of the North" (p.357). These words deserve emphasis.

Rhodes left England in August, confident that he would get his charter, and determined that the extension of the railway from Kimberley into Bechuanaland should proceed. He went almost immediately to Kimberley, where Hofmeyr paid him a visit, and the nature of their discussions may be deduced, with reasonable certainty, from a letter which Hofmeyr received from Rhodes after returning to Cape Town. The Company, in anticipation of its charter, had secured an option on the land through which the northern railway would have to pass; but it would still have been possible to prevent the building of the railway by a special act of Parliament, and Rhodes needed Hofmeyr's support to make sure that this would not happen. Rhodes therefore brought up the subject of the charter and of the proposed rail extension northwards. Hofmeyr objected that the rail extension would call forth a great deal of opposition. Rhodes attempted to allay his fears by disclosing his intention of placing the affairs of the Company under the control of a local South African Board, and the two men agreed - on whose suggestion it is not clear - to consult James Sivewright, himself a Bondsman and an expert on communications, over the desirability of proceeding with the railway plan. After Hofmeyr's return, Rhodes wrote to him, intimating that he had discussed the northern extension with Sivewright, and found him "heart and soul" behind the idea and "enthusiastic" about the plan for a local Board for the Company; but he proposed to "do nothing until the atmosphere clears as to railway, and I know Reitz' views". Hofmeyr replied, advising him "in his own interest, to suspend Kimberley extension" until the arrival of Sir Francis de Winton, who had been commissioned by the Imperial Government to negotiate with the Transvaal over Swaziland, and who would be able to sound Reitz, and in the meantime to take no steps without consulting Sprigg<sup>6</sup>. Hofmeyr did not want to commit the Cape

6. Hofmeyr Papers, vol.13 (Railway and Customs sub-file). Rhodes to Hofmeyr, 20 Sept. 1889; quoted also by Hofmeyr, p.384. Hofmeyr noted the gist of his reply on Rhodes's letter.

to a railway policy which would thoroughly estrange the Transvaal, even though the Free State soon accepted Rhodes's policy. On 29 October, an agreement between the Cape Government and the Chartered Company was signed at Sivewright's home in Somerset West, under which the Cape undertook to raise enough money to take the railway to Vryburg without extra cost to the Company, and the Company agreed to complete the next section as far as Mafeking if the Colonial Government had purchased the first section by August 1891<sup>7</sup>. These terms were not to Hofmeyr's satisfaction; but by January 1890, when a further agreement was concluded under which the Imperial Government made over a strip of land in Bechuanaland to the Company for railway purposes, Hofmeyr had come round in full support of the northern extension. The Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance had borne its first fruit<sup>8</sup>.

Meanwhile the net was closing round Sprigg. Tudhope, his Colonial Secretary, resigned in September 1889, having decided to migrate to the Rand. Sprigg offered the vacant post to Hofmeyr, and then to Sivewright, before it was eventually accepted by H. W. Pearson, a member for Port Elizabeth. This was not a strong appointment, and Sprigg, who realized that the support of the Bond for his Ministry was dwindling in proportion as Hofmeyr was successful in making common cause with Rhodes, tried to buy it back during the session of 1890 with proposals for a lavish distribution of new railway branch lines<sup>9</sup>. Strenuous agitation for a local line had come to be regarded almost as the acid test of a member's competence during the sessions of 1888 and 1889, but try though these

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7. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, pp.51-2, quoting G.49 of 1890; Hofmeyr, pp.384-5.

8. Hofmeyr, pp.384-5; I.D. Colvin, Life of L.S. Jameson, vol.I p.137.

9. Sprigg proposed to build lines as follows: Warrenton to Vryburg; Paarl to Worcester via du Toit's Kloof; Indwe to Molteno; Mossel Bay to Ashton; Mossel Bay-George-Oudtshoorn-Klipplaat-Somerset East-Cookhouse-Kingwilliamstown; Graaff-Reinet to Richmond Road; a line joining the eastern and midland systems; and to purchase the line to Kowie, at a total cost of at least £7.5 millions.

representatives of regional interests did, they were seldom able to secure more than one third of the votes of the House for their pet schemes. In 1890, the year in which the gold-mining industry began to run into difficulties, the demand for local railways in the Cape abated, but it was still there. The Bond congress at Somerset East rejected a proposal to build a line from Klipplaats to Beaufort West, but it approved of the construction of lines from Middelburg Road (now Rosmead) to Molteno, and from Graaff-Reinet to Middelburg Road, by small majorities. When Sprigg announced his proposals, several of Thomas te Water's Bond correspondents expressed their qualified approval, one even averring that "had Sir Gordon been able to do without the Klipplaats-King Williams-town line, he would I think have had the unanimous support of the Midlands and West"<sup>10</sup>. But it was a desperate gamble, an attempt to saddle the Colony with a construction programme which exceeded its resources, especially as Sprigg proposed to start all the lines simultaneously<sup>11</sup>. Its effect was to bring Rhodes back to Cape Town in unpremeditated haste, to take part in the winding up of a Government which was losing both its hold on the House and its sense of responsibility<sup>12</sup>.

The railway bill defeated, Sprigg resigned on 10 July. The Governor sent for Sauer, on whose shoulders the leadership of the Opposition had now fallen; but Sauer thought that the premiership should be entrusted to one "who might be able to combine in his government a wider representation of the several parties in the country", and recommended Rhodes<sup>13</sup>.

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10. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. A. Innes to T. te Water, 10 June 1890. The Sprigg Papers contain many memorials in support of the proposals, including some from Bondsmen.
  11. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. A.J. Herholdt to T. te Water, 2 June 1890: Sprigg "gave me the assurance that the G[raaff] R[eine]t extension will be commenced simultaneously with all the rest so that whoever gets into office will be bound to finish the line".
  12. B. Williams, Rhodes, p.183.
  13. S.J. Jenkins, The Administration of C.J. Rhodes, p.13, quoting Cape Times, 16 July 1890.

Rhodes's first reaction was to offer to serve under Hofmeyr, who was at that moment in Pretoria conducting negotiations over Swaziland, and if Hofmeyr was not prepared to form a Government, he invited him to take a portfolio in a Ministry of his own. Hofmeyr, acting his usual part as a "sort of Colonial Warwick"<sup>14</sup>, declined both offers, but undertook to support Rhodes; and the latter, reassured that the Bond leader would at least not try to drag him down, felt free to assemble a team<sup>15</sup>.

Rhodes's choice of ministerial colleagues revealed his concern to obliterate partisan groupings inside the House<sup>16</sup>. He found room in his Cabinet for both liberals and Bondsmen, and took pains to ensure that both groups were satisfied before taking the oath of office.

After the composition of the Cabinet had been settled [recorded Innes], Rhodes asked me whether I objected to his meeting the Bond members and asking them to 'give us fair play'. 'Certainly not, that is all we want', I replied,

though Innes wished afterwards that he had stipulated more precise conditions<sup>17</sup>. Rhodes then persuaded Theron to promise his support for the charter, and on 16 July met the Bond parliamentary caucus to receive the assurances for which he had asked<sup>18</sup>. Dolf Botha justified the Bondsmen's decision a

14. R.W. Murray, article in South Africa, 5 Sept. 1891, pp.431-2.

15. The text of Rhodes's cable and Hofmeyr's reply are given in Hofmeyr, pp.388-9. The explanation of Hofmeyr's refusal to take office on this occasion should be compared with that given in Innes, Autobiography, pp.59-60. His refusal caused a resurgence of the criticism which had accompanied his reluctance to take on responsibility at the time of the 1888 general election (see above, pp.251-2; Innes, loc.cit.; and Michell, Rhodes, vol. I p.287, quoting Robinson to Michell, 24 July 1890: "I fear the new Government, with Hofmeyr outside acting the part of a candid friend, will not be strong or lasting. He has the power and he ought to take the responsibility, and it should be forced on him....I wonder Rhodes did not refuse to take office without him").

16. Prime Minister and Commissioner: C.J. Rhodes; Treasurer: J.X. Merriman; Secretary for Native Affairs: P.H. Faure; Attorney-General: J. Rose Innes; Colonial Secretary: J.W. Sauer; Minister without Portfolio: J. Sivewright. Rhodes took on the Commissionership only because he was led to believe that it was necessary for the Premier to hold a portfolio, but handed it over to Sivewright in September. Other Bondsmen considered for Cabinet posts were J.S. Marais and R.P. Botha (See Te Water Papers, vol. 56. R.P. Botha to T. te Water, 14 July 1890).

17. Innes, p.80.

18. Minutes of the caucus meeting are printed in Hofmeyr, p.388. An eyewitness account of Rhodes's meeting with the Bond caucus (cont.)

week later:

... Om van het tegenwoordige Kabinet een goed denkbeeld te geven, Rhodes, nog voor ingesworen vroeg my, als voorzitter, de Bondsleden by elkaar te roepen. Hy ontmoet ons, en leg zyn program bloot. Wil de Bond hem een kans geven dan ga hy in met toestemming van den Bond anders niet. Zyn regering zal Afrikaans zyn, de Naturelle pollitiek zal zyn eigen zyn; en de Minister [sic] die niet met hem mee gaan moet uit. Hy erken dat geen gouvernement is mogelyk zonder de Bond. Hofmeyr is met hem<sup>19</sup>.

Finally, Rhodes felt called upon to justify his actions to his business associates when he met them at a banquet in Kimberley on 6 September. He hoped that they would not be alarmed when he told them that he had asked the Bondsmen to meet him, and explained that in his view it was necessary to take the Bondsmen into fuller confidence for the sake of creating greater harmony in the Colony<sup>20</sup>. His plans required the elimination of internal tensions in Colonial politics, as a stepping-stone to the pursuit of what he regarded as the Colony's real interests beyond its borders.

Rhodes had tried, and not yet failed, to set up his local board of directors for the Chartered Company. The Chief Justice, it seems, had already been approached and turned the offer down; but the approach to Hofmeyr was not made until after the meeting of the Bond caucus, at which its desirability was discussed<sup>21</sup>. Hofmeyr later refused, and the project lapsed, according to Michell, because "men of sufficient breadth of view to act as Directors were not to be found", the control of the Company remaining nominally in the hands of the London directors, but in reality in those of Rhodes.

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18. (cont.) was given in the Patriot of 24 July 1890, presumably by D.F. du Toit, who, though not a member of Parliament, witnessed the proceedings.
19. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. R.P. Botha to T. te Water, 23 July 1890. For another favourable Bond view, see J.H.H. de Waal, Die Lewe van D.C. de Waal, pp.136-7.
20. Michell, Rhodes, vol. I, pp.279-83.
21. On the offer to de Villiers, see Michell, Rhodes, vol. I, pp.276-7; Walker, De Villiers, p.208; Williams, Rhodes, pp.140-2. On the offer to Hofmeyr, see the Patriot, 24 July 1890; Hofmeyr, p.388.

There were other means, however, of building up a vested interest in the Charter, and of these Rhodes made good use: to turn the men whose support he coveted into shareholders, and to give them or their friends a farming interest in the North. That Rhodes distributed a large number of Charter shares in the Colony is well known, though there have been discrepancies in the published statements concerning the number of shares sold and the timing of the sales, and general silence concerning the names of the recipients. Michell, who was Rhodes's banker, though evidently not completely in his confidence, stated that 25,000 shares were "reserved for Colonial Applicants . . ., especially the Colonials of Dutch extraction", and added that "it was reported at the time, and probably with truth, that he had shrewdly allocated the bulk of these shares to members or friends of the Afrikander Bond"<sup>22</sup>. Williams raised the number of shares thus distributed to 125,000, and added that Rhodes "found no difficulty in placing even more than these among the Dutch as well as the English colonists"<sup>23</sup>. Innes, writing long after the event, thought that Rhodes was offering these shares as early as 1889, while Michell, with some corroboration from a letter in the Merriman Papers, implied that important transactions took place in the early part of 1890<sup>24</sup>. The direct contemporary evidence, which may not tell the whole story, gives no clear indication that Rhodes interested the Bondsmen in Charter shares on favourable terms before November 1890 - that is, after he had already formed his Cabinet on the basis of Bond support. In that month, Tielman Hofmeyr, brother of Onze Jan, paid £1300 to Dr Rutherford Harris for one thousand fully paid and two thousand 3s. paid pound shares in Chartered stock at a time when these shares were not being offered on

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22. Michell, Rhodes, vol. I, pp.276-7.

23. Williams, pp.140-2; J.G. McDonald, Rhodes: A Life, pp. 116-7, raises the figure to 150,000.

24. Innes, p.87. Merriman Papers: Merriman to his mother, 24 Apr. 1890, quoting information that "shares are being plentifully distributed to members of Parlt, even very obscure one coming in for a share". The letter refers to correspondence in the Pall Mall Gazette, taken over in the Cape Times of

the London market<sup>25</sup>. The transaction was certainly known to Onze Jan, for the copies of the relevant correspondence in the Hofmeyr Papers, including the signature in his brother's name, are in his handwriting<sup>26</sup>. A month later, David de Waal received ten provisional share certificates from Dr Rutherford Harris totalling one thousand shares. There is no record of what he paid for them, but it is safe to infer that the shares were split to facilitate distribution<sup>27</sup>.

There has been much confused argument on the subject of these and other deals, which were turned into political ammunition against the Bond on two subsequent occasions: in 1896, when Rhodes used them to blackmail Hofmeyr into silence during the Colonial inquiry into the Jameson Raid; and during the 1898 general election, when Dr T. W. Smartt, an ex-Bondsman who stood as the Progressive candidate for Wodehouse, tried to discredit Hofmeyr by asserting that he had cleared £30,000 profit from Charters, an insinuation which Hofmeyr was almost certainly right in denying<sup>28</sup>. The only big

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24. (cont.) the 24th, and implicates "the Compy" in these transactions. The Gazette article, however, does not mention the distribution of Charter shares, though it deals with the prospects of the B.S.A. Company.
25. The Times stock exchange reports at that time did not record any deals in Charters, which is not altogether surprising in the light of the following question asked of the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies by H. Labouchere, in the House of Commons on 18 March 1890: "Whether he was aware that the one million sterling, which by the terms of the Royal Charter had to be subscribed within one year of its being granted, had already been syndicated, and that the right to apply for the £1 shares of the contemplated issue had been sold for £4 per share ... and whether he would in future put up to public competition all Royal Charters which it is intended to grant" (quoted in South Africa, 22 Mar. 1890).
26. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 21, T.J. Hofmeyr to Harris, 5 Nov. 1890; ibid. vol. 24, T.J. Hofmeyr to Manager, Standard Bank, Cape Town, 5 Nov. 1890. These shares were, of course, purchased at par.
27. Rhodes Papers, vol. 3a. Harris to Currey, 6 Dec. 1890. See also ibid., vol. 29, a provisional share certificate counterfoil book bearing the printed date 1890, in which De Waal's purchase is recorded.
28. See the references given in J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, p.4, and contrast Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Miscellaneous election matters sub-file): Hofmeyr to Attorney Smit (draft telegram), 4 Aug. 1898: "... Have never had more than 1000 [Charters] with rights profit on which was under £2500..." Also, Ons Land, 4 Aug. 1898. Letter from Hofmeyr, enclosing a certificate from Bolus Brothers to the effect that his total profits from Charters to date amounted to £2465. 4s.

transaction in which Hofmeyr seems to have participated, and which was the real foundation for both attempts at blackmail, concerned a large deal in De Beers shares which he made in August 1895, of which Rhodes kept the necessary evidence. Rhodes never carried out his threat to publicize it, however, and contemporaries were left to suppose that it was a deal in Charters<sup>29</sup>.

In his early attempts to win over the support of the Bond, Rhodes concentrated mainly on its leaders, whom he sought to influence not only by the distribution of shares at par, but also by holding out farming prospects for Colonial Boers in Charterland. Therefore, when he visited Mashonaland with the High Commissioner in October 1890, he took D. C. de Waal and another Bondsman, M. M. Venter of Philipstown, with him<sup>30</sup>. Dolf Botha, who was chairman of the Provincial Bestuur, went on an expedition to the north in December, and wrote to te Water from Vryburg:

Ik denk veel van ons jonge Afrikaner boeren die geen grond heef zou wel doen dadelyk op te pakken en hier heen te trekken. Dan zyn zy ook hier bekend wanneer de grond nou onder inspectie hier verkocht worden...<sup>31</sup>

The road to the North was strewn with hazards, and Rhodes needed the solid support of the Colony if he was to overcome them. The courting of the Bondsmen took many months and it was very hard work, but before 1890 was out Rhodes had received clear indications of their willingness to assist him.

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29. Rhodes Papers, vol. 27. Hofmeyr to Rhodes, 26 Aug. 1895: "My dear Rhodes. Yrs. of this date received (with Wernher, Beit & Co's invoice) informing me that they had bought one thousand de Beers for me. I enclose my cheque for £23,218. 16. to be paid against scrip. With many thanks. Yrs. truly [signed] J.H. Hofmeyr. P.S. I observe that de Beers are now at £27.10. in London. If Wernher, Beit & Co. can get anything like that price they may sell my thousand."

Hofmeyr bought just before Kruger closed the Vaal drifts, at a time when De Beers and Charters were soaring. See Walker, Schreiner, p.65, and the Times stock exchange reports for Aug. 1895.

30. De Waal commemorated this trip, and another made a year later, with a series of articles in the Z.A. Tijdschrift, published in English in 1896 under the title With Rhodes in Mashonaland.

31. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. R.P. Botha to T. te Water, 10 Dec. 1890.

Hofmeyr made a substantial contribution by the part he played in the negotiations between the Transvaal Government and the Imperial High Commissioner over the question of Swaziland. This was not a subject of particular concern for the Cape Bondsmen, who never discussed it formally at their congresses; but it had a direct bearing on Rhodes's northern policy and assisted the development of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance both positively by depriving Transvalers of the right to cross the Limpopo, and negatively by undermining Hofmeyr's reputation with the Government of the South African Republic.<sup>32</sup>

The Pretoria and London Conventions had sealed the Transvaal within defined boundaries on the east and west.<sup>2</sup> Although the Republic's attempts to break out westwards had failed, a similar temptation arose in the east, where, after seasonal trekkers and concession-hunters arriving in large numbers had begun to undermine the Swazi tribal authority, the Transvaal Government found it desirable to intervene for the dual purpose of restoring law and order and establishing access to the sea in the as yet unappropriated region of Kosi Bay.

The Imperial Government was at first not unwilling to allow the Republican Government a free hand; but the pressure of British public opinion induced the Imperial authorities to appoint a Special Commissioner, Sir Francis de Winton, to examine the Transvaal claims on the spot at the end of 1889. De Winton's report recommended that these claims should be accepted on the condition that the Transvaal should abandon all claims to territory north of the Limpopo, grant free trade in Colonial products, and admit railways from the coastal Colonies into the Republic. Pending acceptance of these conditions by the Transvaal, a joint pro-

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32. On the Swaziland negotiations, see N. Garson, The Swaziland Question and a Road to the Sea, 1887-1895; W.J. Leyds, The Transvaal Surrounded, pp. 235-380; Hofmeyr, c.XXIII; Walker, De Villiers, c.XI; van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, pp.48-51; J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, c.III.

visional Government was set up over the white people in the territory in question. Kruger had misgivings about the terms proposed, and at his request the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Loch, met him at Blignaut's Pont on 12 March 1890, to discuss not only this matter, but also the problems arising from a proposed trek into Mashonaland by a group of Transvaalers<sup>33</sup>. As an interested party in the Mashonaland question, Rhodes was also present. At Blignaut's Pont, Loch presented Kruger with a draft convention for the settlement of Swaziland: the South African Republic could have Kosi Bay and a strip of territory connecting it with the Transvaal, provided Kruger undertook to join the customs union within six months of the Imperial Government's assent to the convention; but the joint administration of Swaziland by the Transvaal and the Imperial Government was to continue. Kruger was given until 18 July to add his signature, under the threat of the replacement of the joint provisional administration, which was in any case due to expire, by the authority of a British Commissioner.

Kruger had gone to Blignaut's Pont with the object of negotiating the transfer of Swaziland and Kosi Bay to his own Government, in return for an undertaking not to extend his authority northwards. He nevertheless undertook to place Loch's proposals before his own advisers, but claimed against Loch after the conference was over that he had committed himself to nothing at Blignaut's Pont. Fearful of Loch's threat to use troops, he made an urgent request for delay, in the knowledge that he would not be able to persuade his Executive Council and Volksraad to accept Loch's terms. Loch, who did not want to force on a crisis at this stage, asked Hofmeyr at the end of June to go to Pretoria and negotiate on his behalf, since there was no British Resident in the Transvaal capital at that moment.

Hofmeyr arrived in Pretoria on 5 July, with instructions not to give way on the main points of the "agreement entered

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33. This was the abortive Bowler Trek.

into ... at Blignaut's Pont"<sup>34</sup>, and by 2 August he had obtained Kruger's signature to a convention which contained the substance of Loch's earlier proposals. The success of Hofmeyr's mission was attributed by his biographer to his serpentine wisdom, but later commentators have probably been right to lay more emphasis on the threat of armed intervention which Loch held out in the event of Kruger's rejection of his terms<sup>35</sup>. Kruger agreed to sign at a moment when the provisional government in Swaziland had only sixteen days to run, and although he had been prepared to accept Hofmeyr's counsels on railway matters a year earlier with good grace, he was unable to restrain his anger at Onze Jan's new role. Dormer, who now edited the Johannesburg Star, told Rhodes:

Hofmeyr ... so far as I can learn ... is not ingratiating himself with the Boers, although he is posing as an anti-railway man! Paul's greeting - seriously meant - was significant. 'You are a traitor! And you have come up here as a traitor!' This in presence of a dozen people! It completely flabbergasted the blind man<sup>36</sup>.

Why had Hofmeyr accepted this assignment from the Imperial High Commissioner, which placed him in such an embarrassing position? It is known that he was no longer so staunch a defender of the Transvaal's interests as he had once been; but it is perhaps possible to go further than that, and suggest that one reason for his Pretoria mission in July 1890 was to help Rhodes's cause forward by using pressure to keep Transvaal influence out of the North. The evidence for this is not clear-cut, but it is strongly suggestive.

Before Hofmeyr left for the Transvaal - indeed, before

34. See Hofmeyr, pp.395-6 for the text of his instructions.
35. Hofmeyr, p.403; Leyds, pp.296-301; Garson, p.321; J.E.S. Green, Rhodes Goes North, p.209.
36. Rhodes Papers, vol. 27. Dormer to Rhodes, 23 July 1890. Cf. the usual version of the President's outburst, as given in Hofmeyr, p.406 and Michell, vol.I p.127. Michell clearly erred in saying that Kruger's explosion took place at the actual signing of the Convention.

the Transvaal Government knew that Loch had decided to send him - General Piet Joubert arrived in Cape Town on his way to Europe. He had been sent primarily to implement a secret resolution of the Volksraad, taken in June, for the establishment of an independent steamship service between Europe and Delagoa Bay. But the published reason for his mission was the conduct of informal negotiations with the Imperial Government on outstanding points at issue respecting Swaziland and related questions, on the basis of Kruger's undertaking of May 1889 not to extend his rule across the Limpopo if the Transvaal's other demands were met. Joubert had not been given plenipotentiary powers to reach a settlement with the Imperial Government, and it was not Kruger's intention to use Joubert's mission as a means of undermining Hofmeyr's position in Pretoria. But Joubert was known to disagree with Kruger's policy of abandoning the North for the sake of obtaining access to the sea, partly because he did not regard the construction of a harbour at Kosi Bay as a feasible venture, and partly because he still looked upon the regions north of the Limpopo as territory falling within the Transvaal's legitimate sphere of influence. He did not in fact abandon the idea of taking over the North until the following year<sup>37</sup>.

Hofmeyr therefore had good grounds for fearing that, whatever Joubert's instructions were, he might use his influence to endanger his own negotiations. He took the trouble to obtain an assurance from Loch before leaving for Pretoria that the Imperial Government would not negotiate with

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37. On the Joubert mission, see J.A. Mouton, Generaal Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis, pp.181-3; Garson, pp.320-1; Leyds, p.256; P.J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, vol. II, pp.102-5. On Joubert's change of attitude regarding the North, see Mouton, pp.183-4, and his speech quoted by "Vindex", pp.256ff. While he was in London, Joubert did in fact speak against the Swaziland Convention, but only it seems after it had been signed: in an interview with the Times on 15 August, and at a dinner in London on 9 December. He told Sir Charles Mills of his dislike of it on 7 August (Merriman Papers, 1890/106).

Joubert, and when Loch intimated while Hofmeyr was in Pretoria that Joubert might, after all, obtain a hearing, he replied with what his biographer has termed "some asperity"<sup>38</sup>. Was the success of his mission, considered as a virtuoso performance in diplomacy, Hofmeyr's only concern? It is necessary to recall that the situation in the North was extremely delicate. Nine months earlier, when the Bowler trek was being organized, Rhodes had displayed great anxiety in his letter to the Imperial Secretary, urging him to use force to expel any Boers who crossed the Limpopo -

If not the game is up. You cannot allow a single Boer to settle across the Limpopo until our position in the north is secure<sup>39</sup>.

By the time Hofmeyr had reached Pretoria in July 1890, Rhodes's pioneer column had already set out, without a presentable title to the lands on which it proposed to settle. Kruger had renounced all claim to these lands; but did Kruger really speak for the Transvaal? Joubert's presence in London was a reminder that this was only partly true. Hofmeyr, while he was in Pretoria, seems to have felt himself under an obligation to look after Rhodes's northern interests. While there, he was approached by the most able of Rhodes's opponents, E. A. Lippert, who, with his partner Renny-Tailyour, was angling for a concession from Lobengula covering land rights not yet secured by Rhodes's Company<sup>40</sup>. Lippert seems to have presumed on Hofmeyr's neutrality by asking him to help two of Lobengula's indunas to secure an interview with Sir Henry Loch, with a view to having the claims of his own syndicate "impartially and calmly examined into", and the dispute "fairly adjusted". Hofmeyr forwarded the letter, as requested, to the Imperial Secretary in Cape Town, but with the further request that it be shown to Rhodes, who kept it<sup>41</sup>. In further corroboration of the suggestion that Hofmeyr had gone to Pretoria to safeguard Rhodes's interests in the North, it is

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38. Hofmeyr, p.399.

39. Williams, pp.146-7.

40. Lippert did not obtain his concession from Lobengula until April 1891. See Michell, vol. I, p.322; Green, p.311.

41. Rhodes Papers, vol. 3a. E. Lippert to Hofmeyr, 11 July 1890.

noteworthy that the terms of the bargain with Kruger which he had been sent up, in Williams's words, to clinch, included the provision that the articles of the Convention relating to Swaziland could come up for review and possible amendment after three years; but the Transvaal's undertaking to keep out of the North was excluded from this provision. Hofmeyr himself had persuaded Loch to give ground on certain other aspects of the Swaziland negotiations for the sake of making the Republican Government's promise with respect to the northern territories permanent and irrevocable<sup>42</sup>.

Hofmeyr had therefore gone over fully to Rhodes's northern policy by the middle of 1890. The conversion of S. J. du Toit, who returned to Paarl at the end of the year, belongs to the early months of 1891. We possess a letter which he wrote to Hofmeyr while he was still going through the process of making up his mind:

Edele Heer en Vriend,

Zoo garne had ik den Heer Rhodes met u zamen gezien vóór ik naar het Bondscongres ging, ten einde de hoofdpunten die aldaar zullen behandeld worden eerst vooraf te bespreken, ten einde te weten hoever de Regeering bereid is met ons mee te gaan. Mijns inziens verliest de Bond aan prestige door een gansche boel besluiten te nemen, welke wij toch niet kunnen uitvoeren. Terwijl wij eene Regeering hebben die met ons zoover zamenwerken wil, zou het dus beter zijn vooraf tot een verstandhouding te komen, althans omtrent de gewichtigste punten.

Nu zal echter de heer Rhodes te laat arriveeren om hem eerst te zien; maar dan wou ik om per telegraaf zijn beschouwingen te weten te komen. Zoudt gij nu niet op u willen nemen, hem zoo spoedig mogelijk na zijne aankomst te zien en ons kortelijks (desnoods per codex) te zeinen omtrent eenige punten, als 1. Annexatie Bechuanaland (en verhouding tot Zambesia). 2. Stemrecht, hoe te wijzigen. 3. Herstel van Bamberger. 4. Nationale Bank. 5. Spoorweg politiek enz. enz.

Vindt gij het noodig dat wij eerst elkaar zien, dan zal ik trachten even over te komen volgende week. Doch mogelijk kunt gij mij wel schriftelijk uwe opinie op hoofdpunten meedeelen, of door de Kaapsche afgevaardigden<sup>43</sup>.

Thus even du Toit was inclined to co-operate, and would soon do so without reservation.

42. Hofmeyr, pp.400-1; Garson, p.326.

43. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 14 Mar. 1891. The reference to Bamberger, a magistrate who had been demoted for brutal conduct, is explained below, p.303

The ground was therefore well prepared for Rhodes's appearance at the Bond Congress in March 1891. This Congress, by a happy decision taken a full year earlier, was due to meet in Kimberley. Rhodes was not present at the start, but Dolf Botha in his presidential address referred to the "great personal sacrifice" which he had made in accepting the premiership, and said he expected him to follow a "true national policy". Rhodes had been invited to attend not only the Congress, which he did on the last day, after travelling up by train with Hofmeyr, but also a love-feast (vriendschaps maaltijd) that evening, when he took the opportunity of explaining his policy towards the Bond in words which have often been quoted<sup>44</sup>. He sought to enlist the support of the Colony in the development of the North, and assured his audience that his aim was to work for the unification of Southern Africa on terms most favourable to the Cape, without trespassing on the independence of the Republics or destroying the link with Great Britain. He urged the Colony not to throw away any of the cards in its hand, and appealed to the Bond for co-operation, in conformity with its own professed intention to work for South African union. The speech was received with the bonhomie usually accorded to after-dinner orations, and Rhodes was no doubt satisfied that a good proportion of the Bondsmen present were already converts to his expansionist policy. But he still needed to make sure of the rank and file, some of whom had tried to drag the name of De Beers through the dirt only that morning<sup>45</sup>, while other Bondsmen would soon show that they were very determined opponents of his northern schemes, not least among them Oom Lokomotief du Toit.

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44. "Vindex", pp.264-77.

45. See below, pp.287-8

## II

The real trial of strength between the Rhodes and the anti-Rhodes parties within the Bond centred upon the very inflammable issue of the Adendorff Trek, the last full-scale attempt by white men to contest the Chartered Company's title to the North. Kruger, by signing the Swaziland Convention of August 1890, had forsworn all interest in expansion across the Limpopo on behalf of his State; but the connection of Transvalers with Mashonaland and Matabeleland already existed, and there were those whose determination to occupy land in those parts grew in proportion as Rhodes and his Company succeeded in establishing themselves there. An ill-fated emissary from the Republican President, named Grobler, had extracted a concession from Lobengula in July 1887, but this had been undermined by the diplomacy of the missionary, J. S. Moffat, acting on behalf of the High Commissioner, in February 1888. Rhodes's agents, C. D. Rudd, Rochfort Maguire and F. R. (Matabele') Thompson, had then concluded their own deal with the Matabele King, securing the important concession covering mineral rights on which the charter of the British South Africa Company was later based. In 1889 Rhodes obtained his charter, and the Bowler trek was organized in the Transvaal in an attempt to invalidate it; but it failed largely because of Kruger's act of renunciation in the early part of 1890. The German speculator, E. A. Lippert, then attempted to embarrass Rhodes by securing a concession which included the right to dispose of the land on Lobengula's behalf, a right which Rhodes had not obtained under the Rudd concession, and Rhodes, after first arresting Lippert's agent, Renny-Tailour, decided to play safe and buy Lippert out.

But he only succeeded in December 1891. Long before this and long before Lippert had obtained his concession, a move was set on foot by two Transvaal burghers, L. D. Adendorff and Barend Vorster, to organize a trek into the south-eastern part of Lobengula's territory, known as Banyailand, which the Company claimed lay within its own sphere. On his return from

the north at the end of 1890, Rhodes broke his journey at Pietersburg to interview Adendorff and Vorster. Their conduct, even allowing for David de Waal's partisanship, was not impressive, for they seem to have been more interested in selling their concession to Rhodes than in using it as a title for occupation<sup>46</sup>. Rhodes repudiated their claim, and proceeded to Pretoria, where he appears to have received an assurance from the President that the trekkers could not count on his support<sup>47</sup>. Early in 1891, however, Adendorff threw caution to the winds. On 24 March, a few days before Rhodes won his diplomatic triumph at the Bond's Kimberley Congress, he addressed a letter to the press inviting others to join his trek which was about to get under way<sup>48</sup>. His letter included a direct challenge to the Chartered Company, and announced that further information could be obtained from three men: D. J. Malan, Lokomotief du Toit, and J. P. Toerien (also of Paarl), who had set themselves up as a corresponding committee in Pretoria.

Kruger frowned on the trek in public, and the Transvaal Volksraad decided in April to apply penal sanctions against any who took part in it. But in spite of the official opposition of the Republican Government and the essential weakness of Adendorff's title,<sup>49</sup> Colonial Bond opinion swayed for some months in the balance. From the Free State, Carl Borchenhagen wrote to Hofmeyr, expressing grave misgivings over the Bondsmen's decision at Kimberley to trail along behind Rhodes, and pouring out his soul "on the matter of Rhodes's

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46. D.C. de Waal, With Rhodes in Mashonaland, pp.92-102.

47. De Waal, p.109; Michell, vol. I, p.313; Williams, p.155. Contrast M. Nathan, Paul Kruger, p.291.

48. Published in the Patriot, 2 Apr. 1891. Among the provisional leaders, Adendorff unwisely named A.S. du Plessis of Steynsburg, who indignantly dissociated himself from the trek in the Patriot of 9 April.

49. It rested on the assumption that the chief from whom the concession had been obtained was not a vassal of Lobengula. It subsequently transpired that he was. See below, p.284

speech". "I do not grudge the ground of your indignation", Hofmeyr replied by wire. "Write to the man direct and you will find you are wrong. Du Toit delighted with the speech!"<sup>50</sup> But Borckenhagen's feelings were widely shared, and the trek provided the main focus for the opposition.

S. J. du Toit, in whose delight Hofmeyr rejoiced, was now bending his efforts wholeheartedly in support of Rhodes. Not only had he resumed the editorship of the Patriot and brought its policy round full circle in support of the Government, effecting a nimble editorial manoeuvre in the months of March and April<sup>51</sup>, but he was in communication with Rhodes on a number of subjects, among them the best means of counteracting the influence of the trekkers. It was his idea that a deputation of Colonial farmers should be sent into Charterland to inspect and report on the country<sup>52</sup>. He canvassed the idea at the Kimberley Congress, Rhodes accepted it, and du Toit pursued the plan with vigour. By the middle of April, a committee had been set up which included himself, Hofmeyr, David de Waal, and representatives from Stellenbosch, Malmesbury and Wellington, all of whom had attended the Kimberley Congress, to organize a deputation from the Western Province, and plans were also afoot to hold meetings at Victoria West and Philipstown<sup>53</sup>. On the 22nd, the Cape Town Bondsmen prepared a printed circular under the title De Afrikaander Bond en de Dreigende Botsing in Het Noorden for distribution among Bond branches<sup>54</sup>, while on the 30th S. J. du Toit was ready with an Open Brief aan mijne Trans-

50. This correspondence is in vol. 1 of the Hofmeyr Papers. By September Borckenhagen had so far overcome his suspicion of Rhodes that he sent him a private request for financial assistance for the O.F.S. National Bank, of which Borckenhagen was a director (see Rhodes Papers, vol. 27. Borckenhagen to Rhodes, 10 Sept. 1891).

51. See editorial opinion on the Adendorff trek, 2, 9, 16 Apr. 1891.

52. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 3 Apr. 1891. Compare Rhodes's letter to the Secretary of the Cape Town Bond of 17 April, quoted in Michell, vol. II, pp. 20-3.

53. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 14 Apr. 1891.

54. Text given in the Patriot, 30 Apr. 1891.

vaalsche Vrienden, welke den Trek naar Banyailand voorstaan, which appeared in a supplement to the Patriot on 7 May.

Rhodes made a major speech at Paarl on the 23rd, addressing himself to the farming interest in general. He dealt with nearly every subject of interest to farmers in the Colony before working his audience up to a peak of indignation with an attack on the Banyailand trekkers<sup>55</sup>. It was obviously intended as a tour de force, in which he brought out every shot in his locker to win over the farmers and discredit the trek, and it is quite plain that he was very worried indeed. He was worried because, weak though Adendorff's claim might be, his own title to dispose of the land north of the Limpopo was no better. Innes has made this clear in his account of a visit paid by Rhodes and Hofmeyr, accompanied by himself, Merriman and Sauer, to the educational establishments of Stellenbosch in May<sup>56</sup>.

The British Government has granted you a charter to occupy Matabeleland and Mashonaland [asked one of the students], but what right has the British Government to dispose of those countries?

There was no answer, so "by way of reply Rhodes made another speech".

I am continually receiving applications for farms in Mashonaland under the Chartered Co. from different parts of the Colony [S.J. du Toit told Rhodes in August] ... Many of them ask, whether your Concession gives you the right to issue land grants, or whether your company only holds mineral rights. Of course, I put the reply to this question off at present<sup>57</sup>.

At first, the campaign waged by Rhodes and the Bond leaders to defeat the aims of the trekkers went entirely according to plan. The deputation of Colonial farmers set out. The Transvaal Government condemned the trek, even Piet Joubert coming round to the view that it was injudicious and should be discouraged<sup>58</sup>. Adendorff lost a great deal of support, and when a few of the more determined spirits arrived at the Limpopo on 24 June with the

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55. "Vindex", pp.277-91; Michell, vol. II, pp.24-8.

56. Innes, pp.89-90.

57. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 8 Aug.1891. The weakness of Rhodes's legal position in Charterland is well stressed in H.M. Hole, The Making of Rhodesia, pp. 186-7, and in J.E.S. Green, Rhodes Goes North, c.XIII.

58. Mouton, pp. 183-4.

object of crossing, they were turned back by the tact of Dr Jameson and the appearance of a force of Bechuanaland Police.

So far from giving up, however, the trekkers pursued their political campaign with redoubled vigour. They put their case in the hands of a committee of three Free Staters, headed by Johannes van Soelen of Ladybrand, and this committee worked in association with D. J. Malan and J. S. Joubert, into whose hands the concession had now passed. D. F. du Toit continued to associate himself with their cause, and his influence among the Colonial Bondsmen caused the loyalists much concern<sup>59</sup>. The Graaff-Reinetter, the most influential Bond paper in the Cape Midlands, went over to the trekkers' side, adding the weight of its propaganda to that of Borckenhagen's Express. As an illustration of the doubt which settled on the minds of many Bondsmen in the Colony, the words of Ds. W. P. de Villiers may be quoted:

Ik kan my nog niet vereenigen met het gedrag van den Bond en 'Onzen Jan' (dien ik nog niet heb kunnen spreken). Onze leuze moet toch zyn: 'geen onregt', en zie nog meer dan ik vermoedde, komt het nu aan den dag door een brief van Ds. Helm<sup>60</sup> en andere private informatie my gegeven, dat de concessie in Banjaijland echt en wettig is. Zou het niet goed zijn om weer vergadering te houden en te eischen dat aan onze landgenooten regt gedaan worde? Waarom al die hinderpalen voor het Afrikanerdom? ... Ik denk wij kunnen binnen kort 'Ichabod' schrijven over nationaliteit, taal en welligt kerk ook!<sup>61</sup>

This was written before the rebuff of 24 June; but support for the trekkers continued to grow in spite of that rebuff.

In den Vrijstaat winnen de Trekkers veld [S.J. du Toit told Hofmeyr in October]. Te Aberdeen zijn onze beste mannen voor hen. Te Pearston ... heeft de Bond een resolutie tegen ons ... gepasseerd<sup>62</sup>.

In August S. J. du Toit went to the Transvaal in an attempt to find out what the trekkers' plans were. They naturally

59. See, for example, Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. D.F. ("Doctor") du Toit to Hofmeyr, 5 Aug. 1891. This D.F. du Toit was a cousin of his namesake, like him a foundation member of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners, and on the staff of the Patriot.

60. A missionary at Lobengula's kraal.

61. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. W.P. de Villiers to T. te Water, 30 May 1891.

62. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 19 Oct. 1891.

did not take him into their confidence, but du Toit had his ear to the ground and was able to give Rhodes a detailed account of their objectives, which were said to include an intensification of propaganda with a view to a renewed attempt at a trek in 1892<sup>63</sup>. After his return, the Bond leaders in the western Cape were able to arrange an interview between Rhodes and one of the concession-holders, D. J. Malan. Du Toit worked hard on Malan, confiding the details of his discussions to Hofmeyr<sup>64</sup>, and Rhodes was able to persuade Malan to accept a proposal for the arbitration of the Chief Justices of the Cape and Free State over the trekkers' claims. No sooner had Malan departed, however, than a telegram arrived from a fellow-concessionaire in Pretoria, which du Toit said he had received authority to open, ordering Malan to stop all dealings with Rhodes forthwith:

... Zijn voorstel compromittiert ons. Wees voorzichtig. Hij is listig;

and another from the trekkers' committee in Bloemfontein, declaring that Malan had negotiated without authority.

The way of compromise thus appeared to have failed; but in fact the trekkers had shot their bolt. In October the Colonial farmers' deputation returned from Charterland, suitably impressed with the prospects. They held a successful meeting at Hope Town on their way home, and an even more successful one at Paarl on 13 October, in the course of which Hofmeyr made an earnest appeal for Colonial unity behind Rhodes's Mashonaland policy<sup>65</sup>. "Wij moeten ons ... gereed houden voor een minor bataille", S.J. du Toit told Hofmeyr on the 19th; but he was beginning to see light on the horizon. Rhodes had set off for his second trip through Charterland, and it occurred to du Toit that it would now be possible for him to investigate the Adendorff concession at its source.

Brushing away the cobwebs from his memory, and recalling his

63. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 8 Aug. 1891

64. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 19 Sept. 1891, in which the following telegrams to D.J. Malan are quoted. See also Patriot editorial, 17 Sept. 1891.

65. The Zuid Afrikaan, 10 Oct. 1891, published the text of the farmers' report. For Onze Jan's speech at the Paarl meeting see Hofmeyr, pp. 418-9.

conversation with Malan, he had reached the conclusion that the Banyai chiefs were probably under the impression when they negotiated with Adendorff that they were dealing with the Transvaal Government and not with private speculators. If so, the trekkers' bluff could be called<sup>66</sup>. Whether Rhodes received a message on the lines of that which du Toit suggested is not clear, but within a few days he was at the kraal of the Banyai chief, cross-examining him over the concession which Adendorff claimed to have extracted from his grandson. The questions he asked were not those suggested by du Toit; but this was hardly to be expected, since Chibe denied either that he had made any concession, or that he or his grandson had any power to grant one: both were subjects of Lobengula, whose tax-gatherers were at that very moment in his village appropriating their annual tribute<sup>67</sup>.

This information, however, was obtained too late to be of use, for the trekkers' committee had already begun to see the virtue of compromise. They had agreed to meet in conference with Rhodes's supporters at Burghersdorp on 4 November, and their decision was approved by Borckenhagen, who wired to Hofmeyr on the 3rd:

If you will trustfully meet van Soelen you are sure to come to basis of some kind of arrangement which will end this sorry business to mutual advantage. I hope you will not miss this favourable opportunity<sup>68</sup>.

The Burghersdorp conference was a meeting of Bondsmen, though others were able to attend without voting rights<sup>69</sup>. Its discussions were not limited to the trek question, but the trek was the central issue. Hofmeyr and S. J. du Toit arrived to put the case for the Rhodes party, Lokomotief and van Soelen to put that of the trekkers, and the rivals agreed on a formula:

Naardien zekere partijen aanspraak maken op zekere rechten in Banyailand, verkregen door sekere concessies, en de Trekkers als een der partijen gaarne verlangen dat er een

66. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 27 Oct. 1891.

67. D.C. de Waal, Part II, c. XXVI. De Waal did not keep a regular record of dates, but his narrative makes it clear that the interview with (the) Chibe must have taken place between 5 and 20 November.

68. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1.

69. Patriot, 12 Nov.; Zuid Afrikaan, 14 Nov. 1891.

rechterlijk onderzoek ingesteld worde naar de wettige rechten der aanspraak makende partijen, zoo besluit deze vergadering bij den Hoogen Commissaris aan te dringen om volgens Akte 2 en 9 van het Charter<sup>70</sup>, door de Imperiale Regeering of den Staatssecretaris zulk een onderzoek te laten instellen, opdat deze kwestie voor goed gesetteld worde<sup>71</sup>.

Hofmeyr, van Soelen and the du Toit brothers were chosen by the conference as a commission to see to the implementation of these proposals, and on 10 November Hofmeyr passed them on to the High Commissioner, who agreed on the 13th that

certain concessions in the Banyai country alleged to be at variance with the concession claimed by the Br. S.A. Chartered Company should be made the subject of a judicial enquiry under articles 2 and 9 of the Charter granted by H.M. to the Co.<sup>72</sup>.

This, however, was not what D. F. du Toit wanted. Hofmeyr had to inform Loch again on the 26th that the trekkers' committee stood out for an enquiry which would also bring the legal basis of the Company's land claims in Charterland under judicial review. When therefore the Imperial Secretary informed Hofmeyr that the High Commissioner would recommend to the Secretary of State that such an inquiry should be held, on the understanding that Banyailand was British territory subject to British law, the trekkers' committee were unable to agree<sup>73</sup>.

They were, however, cornered. Rhodes bought the Lip-pert concession in December, and thus covered the gap in his defences. The trekkers' committee then fell back on the weak argument that the Burghersdorp conference had been rigged, and that the voting on the resolution had been out of order:

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70. Art. 2 of the Charter declared concessions invalid if they infringed earlier concessions granted by the chiefs concerned; Art. 9 empowered the Secretary of State to prevent the Company from exercising authority in any part of its territories "on the ground of there being an adverse claim to or in respect of that part" (See Michell, vol. I, pp. 331-42).

71. Text as in Zuid Afrikaan, 5 Nov. 1891.

72. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. Quoted in Hofmeyr to Loch, 26 Nov. 1891. (copy in Hofmeyr's hand).

73. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. I. Graham Bower to Hofmeyr, 30 Nov. 1891.

Toen de vergadering 's middags verdaagde kwamen verscheidene personen ons hun ongenoegen met den afloop betuigen. Sommigen hadden het tegen de regelen van den voorzitter<sup>74</sup>; anderen vonden fout met ons omdat wy in zulk een voorstel genoegen genomen en er in toegeestemd hadden ... Verscheidene beweerden en hielden staande dat de resolutie niet door de meerderheid van de vergadering was aangenomen<sup>75</sup>.

It was not the first time that D. F. du Toit had fought this sort of rearguard action<sup>76</sup>. Whatever justice there was in his case - and it was presented too late to look really convincing - there is no doubt that the Rhodes party had gone to some trouble to arrange the Burghersdorp meeting under conditions favourable to themselves. A large number of applications for farms in Charterland had already come from that district<sup>77</sup>; the leaders of the Bond in Albert were known to be supporters of the Chartered Company<sup>78</sup>; and meetings had been arranged in other parts of the Colony (De Aar, Kimberley, and Rietfontein, near Hanover) to endorse the Burghersdorp decisions as soon as these were known to be favourable to Rhodes's policy. Eventually, on 28 April, the Imperial Secretary informed Hofmeyr that the Imperial Government had agreed to the holding of a judicial inquiry, but only on the assumption that Banyailand was British territory. The resistance of the trekkers wilted, however, and no inquiry was held. Rhodes, meanwhile, <sup>was</sup> overwhelmed with applications for farms in Charterland, coming from large numbers of Bondsmen and others who were not prepared

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74. This was Jotham Joubert.

75. D.F. du Toit and J. van Soelen to the editor of the Graaff-Reinetter, 5 Feb. 1892.

76. But it was the last. He went to live with van Soelen at Ladybrand, pulling up his roots from the Colony. In 1894 he moved to Bloemfontein and joined the staff of the Express. See P.J. Nienaber, Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek, p.246.

77. E.g. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 8 Aug. 1891: "... I am continually receiving applications for farms in Mashonaland under the Chartered Co. from different parts of the Colony, e.g. 22 in one letter from Burghersdorp ...".

78. See, for example, Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 15 Oct. 1891, and J. Joubert to S.J. du Toit, 19 Oct. 1891, which explain the attitudes of D.P. van den Heever and Jotham Joubert.

to look such a gift horse in the mouth<sup>79</sup>.

The Rhodes-Bond alliance weathered the storm of the Adendorff trek, and by the time of the Stellenbosch Congress in April 1892 the Bond may be said to have identified itself with Rhodes's policy in Charterland. But opposition to the Rhodes alliance had also been manifested in another direction, when members of the Kimberley branch brought complaints against De Beers to the Congress of 1891. Prompt action, for which S. J. du Toit assumed the credit, prevented a vote being taken on these complaints on the very day that Rhodes arrived in Kimberley as the guest of the congress.

To prevent a premature resolution being taken at the Bond Congress [he told Rhodes] I proposed and unanimously carried an amendment to appoint a committee consisting of Messrs. D.C. de Waal M.L.A., P.J. Marais and myself, so that I have the two extremes, reserving to myself the controlling position in the Committee<sup>80</sup>.

He was ready to receive Rhodes's instructions.

P. J. Marais, a Kimberley Bondsman who described himself as a speculator and owner of farm property, took charge of the inquiry after the Congress was over, and an outspoken report was submitted to the Stellenbosch Congress over his signature and that of H. D. Stiglingh, the other Kimberley

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79. The evidence is in the Rhodes Papers. For reasons of space, only two examples are quoted. Thus, vol. 3a. J.J. Vosloo (of Klipfontein, Bedford) to Rhodes, 4 May 1891: "De trek geest onder de Boeren hier in het Oostelyke Provincie zyn groot allen naar het noorden van Africa. Op den 29ste April laatz was er een Bond's vergadering te Grootfontein waar de Trek besproken werd, ook een vergadering op den 1ste Dezer te Klip Plaatz Bedford, den 2de te Somerset, den 4de te Klipfontein Dist. Somerset Oost, alle deze vergaderings waren ten gunste ver de Trek naar Mashonaland onder de Gecharterde Maatschappy ...". Vol. 26. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 16 Jan. 1892: "I have got fully 150 applications for farms, of which 30 are from Burghersdorp, 47 from Somerset East, 41 from Griqualand East and several other districts including a few from Free State and Transvaal...".

On the subject of settlers from the Republics, D.C. de Waal's account of his trips into Mashonaland contains several references to Transvaal burghers who expressed a desire to settle there under the Company. C.f. "Vindex", p.256ff., quoting a speech by Piet Joubert warning would-be settlers that trekking away from the territory of the S.A. Republic was an unpatriotic act.

80. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 3 Apr. 1891.

delegate. Du Toit told the congress he had been unable to convene his committee owing to the absence abroad of de Waal, and he dissociated himself from the severe strictures on De Beers contained in the Marais report<sup>81</sup>. The Griqualand West mines, this report declared, were capable of supporting four times the population of the Colony, "indien zij niet door eene Europeesche Maatschappij ontnomen zijn". By closing down Du Toits Pan and Bultfontein, both well-paying mines, De Beers had dispensed with the services of thousands, and cut down the local demand for Colonial produce. Local commerce had been severely compromised by the introduction of the compound system and truck payments. The value of fixed property had fallen by over seventy-five per cent. The report attacked the De Beers monopoly in several other ways, and concluded with a recommendation for the alteration of the law so as to make the amalgamation of alluvial claims very much more difficult.

Many people on the diamond fields were undoubtedly experiencing hardships as a result of the extension of De Beers' control. This is apparent from the report of a parliamentary select committee appointed during the session of 1891, which drew attention to the fact that between 1888 and 1891 the population of Kimberley had halved, the total valuation of fixed property in Beaconsfield had fallen by approximately one-third, and the market dues paid to the Kimberley council had fallen from over £4000 in 1886 to under £1600 in 1890<sup>82</sup>. The judgment of this select committee, however, seems to have been affected by political considerations. Upington and Sprigg, in their minority report, considered that the distress

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81. Notulen, 1892 Congress, Bijlage H. Marais had introduced the original motion at Kimberley. It seems probable that in drawing up his report, Marais secured the help of D.F. du Toit. See Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 27 Oct. 1891: "Loko is gister avond naar Kimberley: ik denk dat hij met Stiglingh en P. Marais zal probeeren onder dat anti-Rhodes Wesselton gespuis eene resolutie gepasseerd te krijgen."

82. A.7 of 1891. Report of the Select Committee on Trade and Business in Griqualand West, Appendix K.

was widespread, that the closing of certain mines had caused real harm to local business interests, and that intervention by the Government was called for<sup>83</sup>. The majority rejected these arguments, attributing the fall off in trade and employment in Kimberley to the "feverish state of prosperity consequent on the amalgamation of the local companies in 1887-8", and declaring that "the entire weight of evidence is in favour of the [compound] system", even if it had not been "of equal advantage to the small retailers". They recognized that the closing down of Du Toits Pan had been "detrimental to Beaconsfield", but doubted whether the total number of people engaged in the production of diamonds had grown less, and considered it

a very open question whether the opening of new diamond mines would permanently promote the trade and prosperity of Griqualand West and the Colony; but whatever might be the result, your Committee are strongly of opinion that it would be very unwise for Government to embark on any financial responsibility for the promotion of a hazardous and speculative enterprise<sup>84</sup>.

It is not necessary in the present context to assess the relative merits of these two reports. The Bond Congress at Stellenbosch considered both of them, as well as Marais's document, and refused to commit itself, accepting a motion by Frederic de Waal and Dolf Botha "dat ter eerst-komende Parlements-sessie zoodanige maatregelen zullen worden genomen als vereischt door de algemeene belangen der Kolonie"<sup>85</sup>.

The attempt by some of the Kimberley Bondsmen to drive a wedge between Rhodes and their organization thus failed, and although the Kimberley representatives succeeded in securing the passage of two motions at the 1893 Congress, dealing with the De Beers compound system and the payment of convict labour on the diamond mines, in each case on lines suggested in the Marais report, the matter was allowed to drop in 1894 when the chairman explained that there was no prospect of legislation

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83. *Ibid.*, pp. xiii-xviii.

84. *Ibid.*, pp. v-xii. The signatories to the majority report were T.P. Theron, the Treasurer-General (J.X. Merriman), the Colonial Secretary (J.W. Sauer), T.E. Fuller, B.I. Barnato, J.T. Molteno and L. Wiener.

85. Notulen, 1892 Congress, p.23.

on these matters<sup>86</sup>. There was no talk during the Rhodes period, as there had been in 1887 and 1888, of clamping a tax on exported diamonds; but the anti-Rhodes element in the Kimberley Bond survived to give the alliance considerable trouble during the general election of 1894.

### III

The failure of the Adendorff trek and of the attack on De Beers illustrate how opinion within the Bond had tipped decisively in favour of Rhodes, who himself profited immensely from the support which the Bondsmen gave him. By the middle of 1892 he was secure in Charterland, his railway had reached Vryburg, and the strong political majority which he commanded in the Colony was united by a common vested interest in the North. But it would be misleading to suggest that the Bond, in electing to follow his lead, had made a simple sacrifice of its political principles before the lure of material gain<sup>87</sup>. The history of the partnership over its five and a half year course refutes this over-simple judgment, which takes no account of the fact that the early years of Rhodes's premiership witnessed a recovery by the Bondsmen of much of the political initiative which they had lost under the distracting influences of the late 'eighties. A new spirit overtook Bond thinking, a spirit which echoed the enthusiasm of the early 'eighties, less intense, decidedly more tolerant in outlook, and guided by a real sense of purpose.

Its manifestations were varied. On his return from the Transvaal, S. J. du Toit busied himself once again with a campaign to establish a national bank. Arndt's comment, that du Toit had little understanding of banking, but had in

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86. Notulen, 1893 Congress, p.34; 1894 Congress, p.12.

87. As is suggested, for example, by J.A. Coetzee.

mind the formation of a truly national institution, makes the essential point<sup>88</sup>. In October 1890, the Taalbond was inaugurated, in order to propagate the Dutch language and culture in the schools. The devotees of Afrikaans had so far made little progress against the advocates of Dutch; but the latter were a power in the land, and Rhodes, like his predecessors, found it desirable to yield to their pressure, by appointing an educational commission in 1891 to look into the teaching of Dutch in schools, and by tacitly abandoning his plan for a teaching university in the English-dominated Cape Peninsula<sup>89</sup>. The removal of legal disabilities in the way of Dutch-speakers was so much a part of accepted public policy by this time that the campaign began to move out of the parliamentary arena. The legal battle was largely over: only the harvest of victory remained to be gathered in.

The Bond itself profited from this rejuvenation, for the early Rhodes period was marked by a more rapid growth in its membership than at any other time in its history. This doubled itself in the three years between the Somerset East congress of 1890 and the Queenstown congress of 1893, during which period the average annual increase in membership rose to 1600, as against 800 in the preceding three years<sup>90</sup>. This

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88. E.H.D. Arndt, Banking and Currency Development in South Africa, pp.414-7. The project came to nothing. It grew out of the reluctance of existing banks to grant extensive credit facilities in a period of depression. Hofmeyr himself was lukewarm over the proposals. See Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 20. Letters from D.F. ("Doctor") du Toit to Hofmeyr, 11 Nov. - 12 Dec. 1890.

89. On the Taalbond, see L. van Niekerk, Die Eerste Afrikaanse Taalbeweging; the contemporary issues of the Z.A. Tijdschrift, which became the organ of the Taalbond; and a host of other printed works.

90. See table in Appendix H.

may have been due in part to an influx of English-speaking members; but Englishmen had begun to trickle into the Bond before 1890, and the increase was too well spread geographically for it to be explained simply in these terms<sup>91</sup>.

The growth in membership was accompanied by real success in the Council elections of 1891, which was the first occasion on which the Commissie van Toezicht was given a chance to prove itself. The Bondsmen and their allies won sixteen of the twenty-two seats. Disappointments in the Eastern and North-Eastern circles, where the Bondsmen hoped to do better than they did, were matched by triumphs in the Midlands, where the Commissie worked hard to secure the return of all three Bond candidates against stiff opposition, and in the South-Eastern circle, largely Settler country, where the Bondsmen concentrated their efforts on one candidate and secured his return at the head of the poll<sup>92</sup>.

But the most outstanding achievement of the Bond in the early Rhodes period concerned the press. Not without reason, S. J. du Toit denounced his brother, Borckenhagen and J. E. McCusker as the three leading trouble-makers in the Adendorff affair. The first had indeed been edged out of the Patriot's editorial office, but Borckenhagen through the Express, and McCusker through the Graaff-Reinetter, had given a powerful lift to the trekkers' cause. Even before McCusker fell foul of the Bond leadership, the need had been felt for a Bond paper in the Dutch language which would circulate widely in the Eastern Province, while in the early part of 1891 a demand grew for another to feed the region of Victoria West and Carnarvon. In parts, Bondsmen complained of literary undernourishment; in others, if McCusker's critics are to be believed

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91. Thus, to take one example, the Calvinia District Bestuur had 148 members on its establishment as a separate Bestuur in 1891. Its membership rose to 274 (1892), 288 (1893), 375 (1894). (Total Bond membership decreased in the years 1895-7, probably on account of the Scab agitation and the Raid, but reached unprecedented heights in 1898-9).
92. The Commissie van Toezicht files for these elections are in the Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 3. See also scattered correspondence, relating mainly to the Midland Circle election, in the Te Water Papers, vols. 56, 59 and 60.

they were suffering under a diet of editorial champagne. The Bond could still count on a bevy of local newspapers which served a useful if limited function. Thus N. F. de Waal, who had been obliged to return the Middelburg Getuige to its owner on the expiry of his three-year contract, had succeeded in driving Heathcote out of business when he started the Nieuwe Middelburger in 1885<sup>93</sup>. This paper, with a limited circulation, followed Hofmeyr's line, as did others like the Oudtshoornsche Courant in the south-west. But local papers could not atone for deficiencies in the larger journals which circulated through the Colony, and in the early 'nineties it was these journals which caused the Bond leadership the greatest concern. De Tolk, that stodgy concentrate of branch news, lightened by a very thin layer of editorial butter, had ceased in 1885, without loss to the cause; but the defection of the Graaff-Reinetter was a serious blow, for it was read widely in the Midlands. The Patriot, which had been tardy to approve of the Rhodes-Hofmeyr alliance, was brought back into line with the orthodoxy of the moment when S. J. du Toit resumed control in the early part of 1891; but it immediately ran into severe financial difficulties<sup>94</sup>. In the course of the same year the Zuid Afrikaan, still under the editorship of Dr J. W. G. van Oordt, incurred the opprobrium of the Bond leadership because it had not adjusted itself sufficiently to the requirements of the new official policy. Its short-comings are not easy to discern, for in 1891 it gave strong support to the alliance with Rhodes on most contentious matters; but van Oordt stood out against any

93. De Nieuwe Middelburger, 1 May 1885; Middelburg Getuige, 4 July 1885. See above, pp. 65

94. Little evidence has come to light regarding the plight of the Patriot; but see Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 20. C.P. Hoogenhout to Hofmeyr, 4 Aug. 1891. Hoogenhout described the firm as "op zyn laatste beenen", and suggested a few ways in which the du Toit brothers might be rescued. Hofmeyr noted on the letter: "R[eplied] 7.8.91. Friends ready to help if confidentially consulted."

watering down of the Afrikaner cause, and probably resisted pressure to translate his editorials into English<sup>95</sup>.

By April 1892, however, the position had entirely changed. The Stellenbosch congress recorded its gratitude

over de pogingen om ook door middel van de Drukkers de Bondsbeginnelsen te verbreiden en verdedigen, zooals in het laatste jaar door de oprichting van bladen als Ons Land, De Paarl, Onze Courant, Het Philipstownsche Weekblad, Het Oosten, welke alleen openlijk hebben verklaard zich te gronden op ons Program van Beginnelsen<sup>96</sup>.

Both in the capital and in the provinces, the Bond's journalistic deficiencies had been set right. Ons Land had appeared in Cape Town, under the editorship of Ds. J. H. Hofmeyr, a cousin of Onze Jan, with the avowed object of driving the Zuid Afrikaan out of business - an object which was achieved in exactly two years<sup>97</sup>. Not only was the Patriot still going, but the Paarl Drukkerij was also turning out a new Dutch paper, De Paarl, for the benefit of Boland readers. Further afield, new Bond papers had been established in Philipstown and Somerset East, while Onze Courant, founded to offset the influence of the Graaff-Reinetter, was a first-rate production in both the technical and the editorial sense<sup>98</sup>.

Hofmeyr was aware of the importance to the Bond of an efficient news press. "It is a matter of dire necessity", he wrote to te Water, with his mind on impending political struggles, "for our party to be possessed of trustworthy and resolute organs"<sup>99</sup>. For S. J. du Toit,

De pers is de grootste macht en sterkste factor in de politiek. En wij hebben kans de pers van de Kolonie

95. Editorials on 2,30 April, 5 May, 18 July, 27 August 1891, give a good indication how far van Oordt was prepared to back the Rhodes-Bond alliance. His defence of his editorial policy in the issue of 14 Jan. 1892 gives the best illustration of his rift with Hofmeyr.
96. Notulen, 1892 Congress, p.25.
97. Ons Land first appeared on 14 Jan. 1892. The Zuid Afrikaan amalgamated with it on 13 Jan. 1894. For published comments on the controversy leading to the foundation of Ons Land, see Sir J.T. Molteno, The Dominion of Afrikanderdom, p.38; Hofmeyr, p.441; and especially J.H.H. de Waal, Het Leven van D.C. de Waal, pp.192-3. Ons Land carried editorials in English as well as Dutch, by contrast with the Zuid Afrikaan.
98. On the negotiations leading to the establishment of Onze Courant, see correspondence in the Te Water Papers, vol.59.
99. Te Water Papers, vol. 59. Hofmeyr to T. te Water, 27 Aug. 1891.

tot zulk eene uitgestrektheid in handen te krijgen, dat wij de publieke opinie kunnen beheerschen<sup>100</sup>.

His imagination, assisted no doubt by the straitness of his financial circumstances, took in the concept of a vast press union, the purpose of which was to provide some form of centralized direction for a chain of newspapers feeding all the important districts of the Colony, and he communicated this idea to Rhodes, on the suggestion of David de Waal, as early as April 1891, with the caution that "having lost everything in the late crisis I am not in a position to provide the funds"<sup>101</sup>. It was clearly to the advantage of Rhodes that the Bond press should be a force in Colonial politics, and to the advantage of both parties that any financial assistance provided by Rhodes should be given sub rosa. Consequently, though the sudden appearance of five new Bond newspapers in the course of a year is difficult to explain without allowing for the accretion of new funds from some external source, it is difficult if not impossible to link Rhodes positively with these developments. Both the Zuid Afrikaan and the Patriot denied having received aid from Rhodes shortly after du Toit had drawn Rhodes's attention to his shortage of funds<sup>102</sup>. When Onze Courant first appeared, the Graaff-Reinetter alleged that it was backed by Rhodes's money, and te Water asked Hofmeyr's advice as to whether this gave sufficient ground for a libel action. Hofmeyr thought not. He had advised the foundation of Onze Courant as a private company, with a high proportion of the shares held in Cape Town in order to provide a ballast against the ups and downs of local politics. "Please ask Botha not to talk of loans from Rhodes or any other Cape T[ow]n man", he wrote. "Cape Town men will take shares to the tune of five hundred pounds, if necessary"<sup>103</sup>. But the identity of the "Cape Town friends"

100. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 19 Sept. 1891.

101. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. S.J. du Toit to Rhodes, 3 Apr. 1891. C.f. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 1. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 19 Sept. 1891 for a much fuller exposition of the same theme.

102. A.H. de Swardt, p.61, quoting the Patriot of 30 Apr. 1891.

103. Te Water Papers, vol. 59. See especially Hofmeyr to T. te Water, 27 Aug., 11 Sept., 1 Oct. 1891.

who undertook to rescue the Patriot and set Onze Courant on its feet has not been revealed<sup>104</sup>.

The economic policy of Rhodes's first Ministry was geared to suit the interests of the Bond, with its emphasis on the need for developing the natural resources of the Colony above and below the ground. For the farmers, this involved special emphasis on four points: the encouragement of potentially valuable export products by a tariff policy adapted to their interests; the development of the internal and external railway system so as to increase the flow of goods at the smallest possible capital cost; the application of scientific knowledge to specialized branches of farming, especially those which were handicapped by disease; and the solution of the labour problem.

The tariff and railway policies are best considered together, since both have a direct bearing on the developing relationship between the Cape and the Transvaal. Kruger's Government had resisted pressure from the Cape to enter the customs union at the time of the Swaziland negotiations, while the construction of the Bechuanaland railway encouraged it to retire still further into isolation; but circumstances soon forced it to behave in a more conciliatory manner. The Netherlands Railway Company was able to proceed with the Transvaal section of the Delagoa Bay railway under a new concession in the middle of 1890; but in spite of generous terms allowed it by the Republican Government, its work was delayed by insufficiency of funds during the severe gold crisis of 1890-1<sup>105</sup>. The Government, as a leading shareholder, could not afford to allow the pace of construction to slacken, and was

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104. The term could have stood for Rhodes, or for the Cape Town Bondsmen, or even for Hofmeyr himself. R.P. Botha knew that Hofmeyr was in the habit of contributing substantial out of his own pocket to Bond election expenses. (See *Te Water Papers*, vol. 56. R.P. Botha to T. te Water, 21 Feb. 1891.)

105. J. van der Poel, pp.54-9; P.J. van Winter, vol. II, c.XX.

driven in its need to accept whatever loans it could get. Thus it happened that Rhodes, who had been "watching the growing financial embarrassment of Kruger's railway very closely"<sup>106</sup>, with the keen support of Merriman, his Treasurer, and Sivewright, his Commissioner, was able to negotiate a loan from the Cape Government to the Transvaal, in terms of which Kruger also undertook to construct a railway from Johannesburg to the Vaal which would link up with the Cape-Free State line. The South African Republic thus allowed the Cape to win the railway race, but without abandoning its declared policy of giving preference to the Delagoa line, which was due for completion in 1894. For a short spell, therefore, from the opening of its own line to Johannesburg in September 1892, the Colony enjoyed almost a monopoly of the Rand traffic, and with over three-quarters of the Transvaal's external trade in its hands, it began to enjoy an unprecedented prosperity. The Cape knew well that this prosperity could not last, especially as Colonial money had revitalized the Netherlands Company, and Kruger was also beginning to turn a more sympathetic ear to the interests of Natal; but it did not expect a sudden increase in Transvaal customs duties to mar the bliss of its economic honeymoon. In response to agitation from the Rand in 1891, the Kruger Government had reduced the general ad valorem duty on imports to 5 per cent, though without alleviating the burden on the Cape exporter, whose liquor, for example, still paid an extra 6s. per gallon<sup>107</sup>. In 1892, however, the ad valorem duty soared to 7½ per cent, the Transvaal Government having not unnaturally decided to make what it could out of the sudden increase in the Cape trade<sup>108</sup>. Whatever the real reasons for its action, the Transvaal Government was moving further away from a policy of South African free trade, in a direction which would lead within three years to the drifts crisis, and it

106. J. van der Poel, p.59; van Winter, vol. II, pp.120-1; J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, c.II.

107. J. van der Poel, p.55, quoting Transvaal Volksraad Notulen, 1890, pp. 3, 33.

108. J. van der Poel, p.63; Garson, p.402.

was destroying much of the good will which it might otherwise have had within the Cape Colony.

The new Transvaal tariffs aroused the opposition of the Bond in the Colony. The issue came up in the Cape Parliament on 24 August<sup>109</sup>. This was the occasion when Rhodes turned to his Bond supporters and urged them to moderate their language for the sake of restoring good relations with the northern Republic. But in spite of the friendly representations which Rhodes immediately made, he received no satisfaction, and the Bondsmen expressed their extreme annoyance and disappointment in the following March:

Dat ... m.b.t. het tarief nu van kracht tusschen de Kolonie en de Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek, onze boerenbevolking zeer benadeeld wordt door de prohibitive invoerrechten der Republiek waardoor de handel in boerenprodukten uit de Kolonie geheel en al gestremd wordt, en denkt dat ons Parlement plannen behoort te beramen om de Transvaalsche Regeering te bewegen dit tarief te wijzigen en ons vrijen handel met onze landgenooten en mede-Afrikaners over de Vaal te schenken<sup>110</sup>.

They were particularly galled by the fact that Free State produce could enter the Transvaal duty free. But their representations came to nothing, and the chairman's report to Congress the following year indicated that the situation had gone from bad to worse<sup>111</sup>. Rhodes had lost the customs battle with the Transvaal; but he had lost it in the Bondsmen's cause, and his failure was offset to a considerable extent, not only by the opening of the railway to the Rand, but also by the sensible construction of new lines within the territories under his own jurisdiction. The Bechuana-land railway reached Mafeking in 1893, and with the construction of branch lines between Stormberg and Middelburg Road, and between Burghersdorp and Springfontein via the Bethulie Bridge, Rhodes brought the three main Colonial ports into rail communication with each other and with the Rand, in a manner calculated also to facilitate the transport of Colonial

109. Michell, vol. II, p.57; Williams, pp.196-7.

110. Notulen, 1893 Congress, p.23.

111. Notulen, 1894 Congress, pp.9-13.

produce to the centres of population at the coast, all at a tenth of the cost envisaged for Sprigg's expensive proposals in 1890<sup>112</sup>.

Rhodes looked upon agriculture as an industry of enormous potential profit to the Colony, and sought to develop it primarily from that point of view. Though unable to help the wine export trade by obtaining a more favourable tariff on the British market, he took the trouble to have the problem of phylloxera investigated by setting up a commission under the chairmanship of Hofmeyr, and by acting on the advice of this commission to import American root stocks<sup>113</sup>. His motive was not entirely disinterested, for he appreciated the value of placating the liquor lobby, to which several of his more intimate political friends, like David de Waal and S. J. du Toit, were closely bound. But he also helped to save the citrus and practically created the deciduous fruit industries. He took pains to improve the breed of all manner of livestock, and his interest in this field was well illustrated by a decision of the Bond congress in 1895 to refer a resolution in favour of improving the "donkeys ras" to the Minister of Agriculture. This official was himself a product of Rhodes's effort to cultivate the support of the farmers, after the Bondsmen had prodded him for three years to make the portfolio change involved<sup>114</sup>. During his first Ministry, the farmers were given many reasons for supporting Rhodes and few for going against him, and if the harmony failed to survive through his second Ministry, the blame could hardly be laid at his door<sup>115</sup>.

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112. Williams, pp.193-4.

113. Hofmeyr, pp.369-70; Williams, p.194.

114. On the developments leading to the establishment of a Ministry of Agriculture, see Jenkins, pp. 54-8 and the Hansard references which he quotes; Notulen, 1891 Congress p.34. The portfolio was created by Act 14 of 1893.

115. For the Scab Act controversy, see below pp. 332-41.

If the legislation of the Rhodes period reveals anything, it is that there was no clear boundary between certain aspects of agricultural policy and the big issues connected with native affairs. These latter issues pressed, perhaps, no harder on the farmer's mind at this time than they had done during the 'eighties; but the strength of the Rhodes-Bond alliance now encouraged the Bondsmen to develop their arguments for legislative changes with increased vigour. Their traditional hardships, they said, still prevailed. Labour was short, disobedient and criminous; land was scarce, with a consequent impoverishment of white men, and stock was still disappearing. Much of their attention was focussed on the rural location system and on the related problem of African squatting.

It was not difficult, in terms of the Native Locations Act of 1884<sup>116</sup>, for the individual who wished to set up a location on his property to do so, provided he could obtain the concurrence of the Divisional Council for such a step. Farmers who set aside land for such a purpose were aware that they exposed their stock to certain risks, and that they were liable to incur the disapproval of their neighbours for the same reason; but the location, whose inhabitants were by definition people/<sup>not</sup>in the continuous employment of the land-owner, provided a convenient pool of seasonal labourers, especially valuable in areas where labour was short, and therefore fulfilled a useful function. But locations were usually to be found in areas where labour was plentiful. Most of them were in the eastern Cape, bordering on the tribal areas, and in proportion as the pressure on the land in these tribal areas increased, as it was steadily doing in the 'eighties and 'nineties, so squatters tended to crowd into the existing locations, to the growing consternation of the farmers.

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At the 1891 congress, the Bondsmen pressed for radical  
116. Act 37 of 1884.

changes in the Locations Act, urging the imposition of heavy penalties on individuals who maintained squatters on their land. They wanted legislation to prevent Africans who could not prove that they had a bona fide means of livelihood from settling in locations, and to place all locations under the supervision of the Colonial police<sup>117</sup>. These and other suggestions were confirmed at the following congress, and the hope expressed that Parliament would take steps to end the abuses complained of during the forthcoming session<sup>118</sup>. Parliament went a long way towards meeting the Bondsmen's wishes, by passing a law which required the Governor, when approached by a Divisional Council with the backing of two-thirds of the registered voters in the district, to revoke or suspend licences issued for the establishment of locations. The same law made licences more difficult to obtain and their renewal more expensive, limited the number of adult males resident in any private location to forty, and compelled the owners of such locations to keep readily available for inspection an up-to-date register of the huts, their occupants, and their stock<sup>119</sup>. Thus encouraged, the Bondsmen became more forthright in their demands, and at the next congress accepted a motion by delegates from Albany and Albert which urged the Government not simply to prevent the establishment of more locations, but so far as possible to abolish those which already existed<sup>120</sup>. The Government did as much as any responsible administration could be expected to do, and referred the question to a select committee of the Assembly, which reported unfavourably<sup>121</sup>. In seeking to remove this sort of 'nuisance' by legislative action, the Bondsmen exhibited a naïve misapprehension of the real nature of the problem, as was well demonstrated in the evidence led before the select

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117. Notulen, 1891 Congress, p.39.

118. Notulen, 1892 Congress, p.19.

119. Act 33 of 1892.

120. Notulen, 1893 Congress, p.26.

121. A.10 of 1893. Report of the Select Committee on the Native Location Act, August 1893.

committee by P. J. du Toit of Hope Town, when he was examined on the subject of the congress debate:

Was any suggestion made as to what is to be done with natives turned off farms? - No. That did not come before the Congress.

Does it not occur to you that there would be some difficulty in providing for such a large number of natives as would be likely to be turned off? - No. There was nothing brought forward with reference to that<sup>122</sup>.

He pleaded ignorance of the problem on the ground that there were no locations in his part of the world. A good many Bondsmen undoubtedly hoped that the abolition of the locations would force more Africans on to the labour market by making them dependent on the mercy of some farmer for a place of abode; but this was no way to approach the problem of the farm labour shortage, as a select committee appointed in 1892 firmly emphasized<sup>123</sup>.

Questions of this type imposed severe strains on the unity of Rhodes's Cabinet, and called for the utmost tact on the part of Ministers on both wings. When P. J. du Toit introduced his notorious 'Strop Bill' in 1890, Merriman, Innes and Sauer voted against it, and it was defeated even though Rhodes gave it his support. No Cabinet crisis ensued, because the Government had decided to leave the matter to a free vote; and when the Bill was introduced again in 1891, the mover was persuaded to withdraw it before the second reading<sup>124</sup>. But the differences of opinion in the Cabinet were plain for all to see.

Owing to the opposition of the Cabinet's liberal wing, the Bondsmen got no significant master and servant legislation out of Rhodes, and failed also to get satisfaction in a related matter which touched them to the raw. This was the celebrated

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122. A.10 of 1893, Minutes of Evidence, QQ.311-2.

123. C.2 and 2A of 1892. Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question, August 1892.

124. The second reading of the 'Strop Bill' was thrown out by 35-23 votes on 30 July 1890. All the 'Ayes' were Bondsmen except the two Barkly West members, Rhodes and Paton, and Hofmeyr's name was not among them.

affair of A. N. Bamberger, a Resident Magistrate who had been removed from his post by Upington on account of what Innes later described as his "extreme harshness and severity towards Native offenders, and refractory Native servants"<sup>125</sup>. The transfer of this officer to another branch of the public service caused a storm of protest at the Bond congresses of 1889, 1890 and 1892, and they did not cease to protest until 1895. Innes, as Rhodes's Attorney-General, regarded Upington's action as correct, and stated in his memoirs that he was "not prepared to make judicial appointments under political pressure". He therefore resisted the agitation; but while he was in England in 1891, the Cabinet decided to reinstate Bamberger, and this Cabinet decision was communicated to the Zuid Afrikaan, as Innes supposed, by Sivewright. Pressed by Sprigg to make a statement, Rhodes confirmed the truth of the report, but explained that the decision had been taken when not all Ministers were present, and had subsequently been reversed in full Cabinet. Thus, in his "artless fashion", Rhodes papered over the cracks; but the cracks were there, and this skirmish between Innes and Sivewright would have its sequel. It is noteworthy, however, that in spite of the differences in the Cabinet on matters of principle, the problems in the field of native affairs were not amenable to any simple doctrinaire solution, and one of the most striking features of the two main legislative achievements of the Rhodes Ministries in this field - the Franchise and Ballot Act of 1892 and the Glen Grey Act of 1894 - was the extent to which they secured the support of men whose political principles were radically diverse<sup>126</sup>.

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125. Innes, p.94.

126. For the Glen Grey Act, see below, pp. 325-32.

Sprigg's Parliamentary Registration Act of 1887<sup>127</sup> had not altered the franchise provisions of the Constitution Ordinance, but re-defined them in such a way as to remove the obvious political dangers to white electoral supremacy which would have followed from the passage of the Transkeian Representation Bill. After 1887, however, the argument gained ground that the African vote, as distinct from that of the Coloured, was strong enough in the eastern constituencies to swing a general election<sup>128</sup>. The Bondsmen, who had wanted a discriminatory franchise in 1887, and had seen their desires only partly realized in the Transkeian Act, therefore began to press for higher electoral qualifications, and were prepared at least for tactical reasons to admit that these qualifications should not be racial ones. Thus they accepted S. J. du Toit's proposal at the Kimberley congress:

Die de tegenwoordige kwalificatie bezit, heeft zooals ééne stem (rechten van het getal); maar een tweede stem heeft hij die óf minstens £200 waard is (rechten van het eigendom), óf matriculatie, óf hooger examen gedaan heeft (rechten van verstandsontwikkeling)<sup>129</sup>.

Hofmeyr discussed this proposal with the Bond caucus and took the matter up with the Cabinet. Rhodes, anxious above all at this early stage in their alliance to reach a working agreement with the Bond, piloted a formula through the Cabinet which represented Hofmeyr's essential case on 22 July, and left it to Hofmeyr to move it in the Assembly on 4 August:

That the attention of the Government be directed to the question of the amendment of the Parliamentary Franchise in order to secure due weight in the future for the material and educational interests of the country, with a view to legislation during the next session of Parliament<sup>130</sup>.

Thus worded, the motion was rather too strong for the liberals, for it seemed to compromise their position in the eyes of the public by presuming an affirmative answer to the question

127. For Sprigg's legislation of 1887, see above, pp. 249-50

128. Jenkins, p.20, quoting Imvo Zabantsundu, 6 Aug. 1891.

129. Notulen, 1891 Congress, p.38. The following year, again on a motion by S.J. du Toit, this resolution was endorsed "met bijvoeging van het beginsel van beschaving" - however that was to be interpreted. See Notulen, 1892 Congress, p.11.

130. Hofmeyr, p.431.

whether or not reform was really necessary. But from their point of view it was a question of tactics, not of principle, as Innes assured Hofmeyr, and on this understanding Hofmeyr persuaded Sauer to move an amendment which had the effect of leaving the question more open<sup>131</sup>. Sauer's amendment was carried by forty-five votes to twenty-two, and the way was opened for the canvassing of positive proposals.

Much discussion took place during the recess. Hofmeyr stumped the country, making speeches at Burghersdorp, Stellenbosch and Malmesbury in defence of his suggestions. The liberals gave the subject serious attention, with Innes hovering at times on the brink of resignation; but Sauer came out in favour of a qualified non-racial franchise in a speech at Aliwal North on 12 March 1892<sup>132</sup>. Most of the opposition to Hofmeyr's proposals came from those who looked upon them as a trick by the Bondsmen to reduce the voting strength of their opponents in the marginal constituencies. To deny that this was part of the Bond's object would be unrealistic; but it is not at all certain that Hofmeyr's suggestion of a loaded franchise would have produced the right results for them, while Hofmeyr paraded the argument that his proposals would increase the voting strength of town against country<sup>133</sup>. No known test, other than a racial one, would have excluded the Africans without also excluding poor and illiterate white men, to whose votes the Bond attached more importance than its opponents did. Furthermore, when the Bondsmen really applied their minds to the problem of increasing their parliamentary strength, they usually focussed

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131. Jenkins, p.23. Sauer's amendment asked the Government to consider "whether any legislation is required". On the background to the amendment, see Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 19. Hofmeyr to Canon A.T. Wirgman, 12 Aug. 1891: "I consider the debate on my franchise motion highly satisfactory. The Sauer amendment I arranged myself to prevent complications as regards the position of Innes - who, however, would have voted for the motion (this is confidential)."

132. Hofmeyr, p.436; Jenkins, pp.24-5.

133. Hofmeyr, p.435.

their attention on the registration of voters and preferred to talk about redistribution rather than franchise reform, though they never succeeded in working out a convincing argument why the rural areas should receive better parliamentary representation than they already had<sup>134</sup>.

When Parliament met in 1892, Hofmeyr dropped his idea of a plural vote after discussions with the Government, and gave his agreement to the proposals which soon became law<sup>135</sup>. These included the raising of the occupational franchise from £25 to £75, the retention of the income qualification at £50, and a provision that all who qualified under either of these heads should be able to write their own name, address and occupation. Nobody already on the common roll was to be removed from it if he remained in the same electoral division, and the secret ballot was to come into force from 1 July 1894 - that is, after the next general election. This last provision was not a concession to the liberals, for as Innes noted, the division of opinion in the Cabinet did not follow the usual lines: Rhodes, Merriman and Faure - and, outside the Cabinet, Hofmeyr - disliked the ballot; but Sauer, backed by Innes and Sivewright, favoured it. The Franchise and Ballot Act enjoyed the support of liberals as well as Bondsmen, and Innes was still satisfied with it in his old age<sup>136</sup>. Both wings of the Cabinet had agreed to conserve the non-racial principle, and both appreciated the dangers of low franchise qualifications in the Colonial society of the day, even if they argued from opposite premises.

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134. The Congresses of 1889, 1890, 1891, 1893, 1894, 1897 and 1898 all considered the question of redistribution, which became a major issue in 1898 (see below, pp.383-4).

135. As Act 9 of 1892.

136. Innes, p.95. See also, Jenkins, pp. 29-30.

## THE END OF THE ALLIANCE

## I

The relationship between Rhodes and the Bond down to the middle of 1892 had its moments of stress, but to that point the alliance had shown little prospect of foundering. If Rhodes could succeed in retaining the support of all the other talents which he had drawn into his Government, he stood to gain nothing by driving the liberal members of the Cabinet across the floor, provided they remained broadly sympathetic towards his plans for the development of the Colony and the North. But the Bondsmen and the liberals were unhappy bed-fellows, and there is evidence, not only that both sides were looking for an opportunity to dissolve their partnership from the middle of 1892 onwards, but also that Rhodes himself was in favour of a Cabinet reshuffle.

I don't think the ministry as safe as some people fancy [Herholdt wrote on 21 June], in fact I am quite convinced that before many days a change must come, for there is such internal decension [sic] with them that it is simply impossible for them to live together. If it were not for the franchise question which we must get through this session Merriman Innes and Sauer would have had to clear out already but Hofmeyr seems to be very anxious to avoid a split before that important measure is settled. Don't be at all surprised if you hear of a burst up. The Bamberger case is another point and I am quite convinced that this is the rock on which the Ministry will be landed<sup>1</sup>.

There were forces in the Cape Parliament which had exerted themselves from the early days of Rhodes's premiership to prevent him from falling into too great a dependence on the Bond, among them a Progressive Committee of which T. E. Fuller claimed to be the leader<sup>2</sup>. It was to Fuller, as chairman of this Committee, that Hofmeyr turned during the franchise debates of 1892, and by persuading its members to accept higher voting qualifications in return for the Bond's acceptance of the ballot, ensured that at the division on

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1. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. A.J. Herholdt to T. te Water, 21 June 1892. For the Bamberger case, see above, p.303
  2. Y.P. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, 1884-1898, quoting Sir T.E. Fuller, The Right Honourable Cecil John Rhodes, pp. 164-5.

the third reading the Opposition could muster only thirteen votes. The effect of Hofmeyr's approach was to undermine the hitherto rigidly anti-Bond attitude of the Progressive Committee, and to transfer their mantle to this more resolute baker's dozen, whom Fuller described as "members who represented constituencies where the native vote was large", and who saw in its reduction a threat to their own parliamentary security<sup>3</sup>, while Innes looked upon them as being motivated primarily by "hostility to the Bond"<sup>4</sup>. Whichever interpretation is the more correct, it seems reasonable to regard these thirteen as pre-eminently critics of the Progressive Committee's failure to do what it had set out to do, namely to arrest the Bondward tendencies in Cecil Rhodes<sup>5</sup>. A Farmers' Congress at Cradock earlier in the year had voted decisively, by twenty-six votes to six, against the alteration of the franchise, and although they were not all farmers, the thirteen certainly took this expression of opinion into account. Furthermore, nine of them had decided by September, after the end of the parliamentary session, to throw in their lot with a new Progressive Party which seems to have been formed without reference to the existing Committee, and to some extent in spite of it<sup>6</sup>.

This new Progressive Party had a very heterogeneous membership. Its leader, E. Y. Brabant of East London, was an ex-soldier, British to the core, and anti-Bond. It included a group of English-speaking farmers, headed by Arthur Douglass, some of whom had been prepared to compromise over the franchise issue, whereas others had not. There was even a Bondsman among them, J. S. Marais of Paarl, who probably lost the Bond nomination for that constituency in the 1894 general election as the price of his truancy. The Party included Innes, the

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3. Fuller, pp. 180-1.

4. Sir J. Rose Innes, Autobiography, p.95.

5. The interpretation given in Sank, pp.49-51.

6. Sank, p.49, where the original membership is given as follows: Robertson (George), Pearson and Jones (Port Elizabeth), Douglass and Wood (Grahamstown), Innes (Cape Division), Hockly and Palmer (Somerset East), Norton (Albany), de Smidt (Oudtshoorn), Tamplin (Victoria East), Brabant (East London), Marais (Paarl), Frost (Queenstown), Mackay (Uitenhage), Warren (Kingwilliamstown) and Griffiths (Tembuland).

only representative of Rhodes's Cabinet, and J. Frost, who would soon accept the portfolio of Native Affairs in Rhodes's second Ministry, after the liberals had left the Cabinet following the Logan crisis. To look for any co-ordinating principle within this alliance would be an interesting exercise likely to yield no result. The Progressives could not even be labelled an Opposition Party, and represented an alliance as illogical as the blend of Bondsmen and liberals which constituted the Ministry of the day.

It is more than likely that this regrouping of parliamentary forces was hastened by Rhodes's decision to cast around for a firmer basis of political support. To this end, on 27 September and again on 4 October, he invited Sir Gordon Sprigg to take part in private consultations<sup>7</sup>. Sprigg left the following record of what transpired:

During the session of 1892 Mr Rhodes informed me that so soon as the session had closed he wished to have a long talk with me upon public affairs. Soon after the session closed Mr Rhodes had to go through the South Western Districts, so that my interview with him did not come off till the end of September, when he wrote & asked me to take breakfast with him at his residence - the Grange.

During breakfast & afterwards the conversation took place. Mr Rhodes said that in view of the many important questions to be discussed and settled in South Africa in the near future he thought the time had arrived when an endeavour should be made to form an administration consisting of the ablest men engaged in public affairs, and with that object in view he proposed that Mr Merriman, the Treasurer, should vacate his office, and go to London in the place of Sir C. Mills, to be retired, and that I should take the Treasury. Mr Rhodes thought that as he & I agreed upon so many great questions there would be no difficulty in our working together, especially as he was prepared to give me an assurance that the railway extension to Mafeking would be at once proceeded with. I referred to the unconstitutional position occupied by him as Prime Minister without a portfolio - but said that that difficulty might be overcome by his taking the office of Secretary for Native Affairs, where there was very little work. He said he was willing to take it. I then referred to the entire distrust I had of Mr Sauer, and said that I knew that distrust to be general. It therefore appeared necessary if my junction was to be secured that Mr Sauer should go out. Mr Rhodes asked what was to be done with him? [sic]. I suggested a berth in the Chartered Company, to which Mr Rhodes replied that he wanted men in Mashonaland upon whom he could thoroughly rely. After

7. Sprigg Papers. Rhodes to Sprigg, 27 Sept., 4 Oct. 1892. The following memorandum by Sprigg was entitled a "Short record of negotiations concerning proposal by of Mr Rhodes that I should join his Ministry", and dated 1893.

much further conversation we parted without arriving at any definite conclusion. Another interview occurred a few days subsequently; and afterwards I saw the Governor upon the same subject, who pressed upon me the advisability in the public interest of joining the Ministry. The Governor & Mr Rhodes then left for England. By the following mail I wrote Mr Rhodes [see letter]<sup>8</sup> informing him that upon full consideration I was not prepared to join him unless further changes in the Ministry were made, the presence of Mr Sauer being an insuperable obstacle. Subsequently the incident of the cancellation of the Logan Contract occurred, and I then wrote to Mr Rhodes & informed him that if I was otherwise disposed to join the Ministry (which was not the case) I could not possibly think of doing such a thing after the recent disclosures of Ministerial dissensions: that to join now would be an indication of approval of the act of cancellation, which upon the contrary I entirely condemned, & that without expressing any opinion upon the merits of the contract itself. I therefore wished Mr Rhodes to consider the negotiations at an end: and I informed him that I should address my constituents upon the basis that it was not in the interests of the country that the present administration should continue.

This memorandum gives the first positive indication which has come to light that Rhodes seriously contemplated changing his Ministry before the Logan crisis forced him to do so. It also suggests, however, that Rhodes did not want to sweep the entire liberal element away, but aimed rather to strengthen the Government and weaken its opponents by drawing in no less a person than the official leader of the Opposition.

There is no reason to suppose that the Logan affair of September 1892 was a calculated attempt by anybody to precipitate a political crisis. James D. Logan, who described himself on his letterheads as an importer and general merchant, was well placed to carry out the railway catering assignment which Sivewright entrusted to him. Living at Matjesfontein, between Worcester and Laingsburg, he owned a chain of stores at key points on the western and Free State railways, served from a main depot in Cape Town. He was given the contract, in Sivewright's words, with the "unanimous recommendation of all Railway heads, including [the] Midland Accountant"<sup>9</sup>. But Logan was a personal friend of Sivewright's, and the latter had neither advertised the contract for public tender, nor taken

8. Square brackets in original. I have not found the letter referred to.

9. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 20. Sivewright to Ross (copy of telegram, 22 Nov. 1892). For a full account of the crisis, see S. J. Jenkins, The Administration of C. J. Rhodes, c. III.

the Cabinet into his confidence, nor apparently even seen the document personally.

When they heard about the transaction in November, Merriman and Innes were furious. The former found it "quite impossible ... to sit in the same Cabinet with a man who could do such a thing as well as others which have come to my notice"<sup>10</sup>. Innes, mindful of Sivewright's connection with a recent scandal involving the Johannesburg Waterworks Company<sup>11</sup> and of his indiscretion over the Bamberger Affair<sup>12</sup>, rightly considered that the Law Department should have been shown a copy of the contract in the first instance<sup>13</sup>. Like Merriman, he felt that the limit of endurance had been reached, and as both of them were unhappy about their position in the Cabinet they decided to make an issue of it.

Rhodes and Sivewright were in the United Kingdom "doing important work for Cape Colony", when Innes sent off his telegraphic protest on 8 November. Hofmeyr, embarrassed by the indiscretion of the Bond Commissioner, did his best to smooth matters over:

New Logan Contract causes great dissatisfaction, weakens Ministry, places friends in false position [he cabled]. Retreat in time. Show Rhodes<sup>14</sup>.

Rhodes and Sivewright immediately cancelled the contract in response to these urgent appeals from the Cape, at an eventual cost to the Colony of £5000 damages in favour of Logan, who had claimed ten times this figure. Had they returned immediately they might, perhaps, have averted a Cabinet split; but they were still overseas in March when Hofmeyr cabled again:

... Allegiance of many of even your best friends severely strained by continued absence<sup>15</sup>.

By this time, as the new session approached, the "Musketeers" had decided to force Rhodes to choose between Sivewright and

10. Quoted in Sir P. Laurence, Life of J.X. Merriman, pp.143-

11. Sir L. Michell, Life of C.J. Rhodes, vol. II, p.72; J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, c.II.

12. See above, p. 303

13. Innes, p.96; J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, p.443.

14. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 9. Hofmeyr and (D.P.) Graaff to Sivewright, 19 Nov. 1892.

15. Hofmeyr Papers, vol.20. From Hofmeyr "for Rhodes pro Sivewright", 14 Mar. 1893.

themselves, taking their stand on the need to maintain honesty in the public service, in the supposition that if Rhodes repudiated Sivewright he stood in danger of losing the Bond alliance. Rhodes, from oversight or genuine perplexity, did not call the Cabinet together when he and Sivewright returned to the Cape in April, while Sivewright annoyed the Cabinet rebels still further by continuing to insist that the contract had been in the public interest<sup>16</sup>. The choice before Rhodes was not easy. He could not afford to lose the support of the Bond at a time when affairs in Charterland were financially precarious, especially since he must have known that his relationship with it was likely to be strained when the report of his Scab Commission, which was then collecting evidence, came before Parliament. He therefore followed Hofmeyr's advice and submitted the resignation of his Cabinet, thereby, as Innes later observed, avoiding a decision on the merits of the controversy.

Rhodes would have preferred to hand over the premiership to either Hofmeyr or the Chief Justice, J. H. de Villiers, if the former had been prepared to take it on, or if the latter had consented to let Rhodes name his Cabinet for him. Neither, however, was accommodating. Hofmeyr, in addition to his habitual reluctance, probably foresaw the dangers of political office with the Scab controversy looming on the horizon; but he agreed that de Villiers should be invited to form a Government<sup>17</sup>. De Villiers, who expressed his readiness to assume the burden, was not prepared to submit to dictation<sup>18</sup>. Rhodes therefore neglected to complete his negotiations with him, after a satisfactory meeting

16. Innes, p.97; Laurence, pp.142-6; Michell, vol.II, pp.72-5.

17. Hofmeyr's biographer offers no reason for Onze Jan's refusal; but Walker, presumably relying on correspondence in the Schreiner Papers, has stated (Schreiner, pp.49-50) that he declined "partly because he knew that, if he did take office, half his present followers would be trying to pull him down within a twelvemonth". See also Hofmeyr, pp.441-5.

18. For de Villiers's part in the negotiations, see Walker, De Villiers, pp.222-38, and Williams, Rhodes (2nd edn.), pp. 187, 215-8.

with Sprigg on 1 May had given him a chance to solve his problem on different lines. With the help of the Leader of the Opposition, who was now prepared to bury his former antagonism, he would form another Ministry himself, leaving out both Sivewright and the "Musketeers". The advantage of this course lay chiefly in the fact that Hofmeyr approved of it. The Ministry which he eventually formed bore a striking resemblance to the list of names scribbled by Hofmeyr on a scrap of paper, and kept by him presumably as a record of his discussions with Rhodes, when<sup>n</sup> they had originally met together to plan a Cabinet for the Chief Justice<sup>19</sup>. It was designed to facilitate an unbroken continuity in the alliance between Rhodes and the Bond. Sivewright was omitted but not alienated, and Pieter Faure was retained. The Government would be strong, enabling Rhodes to devote his energies to work elsewhere. Rhodes hoped that the Opposition would be correspondingly weak. He had already promoted Upington to the Bench, and was preparing a similar destiny for Innes. "With Innes on the bench and Sprigg in the Cabinet", he had told de Villiers, without in fact informing Innes of his intentions, "the Opposition will not have a possible Prime Minister"<sup>20</sup>. He made his peace with Sauer, who expressed a desire to remain outside the Cabinet for the time being, and disarmed the Progressives by finding a place for Frost. But Rhodes's attempt to emasculate the Opposition by depriving it of its intellectual and debating strength was only partly successful, for Merriman refused the offer of the Agent-Generalship in London, while Innes would almost certainly not have accepted judicial office had Rhodes actually tried to foist it upon him<sup>21</sup>.

19. Hofmeyr, p.445. Rhodes's Cabinet was as follows: Premier, C.J. Rhodes; Treasurer, J.G. Sprigg; Attorney-General, W.P. Schreiner; Commissioner, J. Laing; Colonial Secretary, P.H. Faure; Secretary for Agriculture, J. Frost.

20. Walker, De Villiers, p.227.

21. Innes, p.99.

"What great news this change of personnel of the Ministry is"; wrote Victor Sampson, an advocate from the Eastern Province who voiced the opinion of English-speaking white supremacists. "I fancy Merriman and Innes had no idea they were going to be dished like this."

It was very exasperating [he continued] to see the clay and the iron attempting to combine. No-one knew where they were. I could not tell whether I was a ministerialist or not. As long as Merriman Innes and Sauer had so much of the direction of affairs I was not.

He thought that in due course Sprigg would resume the premiership, and the "Musketeers"

come out in their true colours as strong anti-Bond. They will infallibly become the nucleus around which Brabant and his lot will form into rather a strong opposition. The Progressive Party will now become a reality I fancy?<sup>22</sup>

Sampson, who could not have foreseen the circumstances under which Sprigg would eventually resume the premiership, overrated the unity and potential strength of the Progressives. The liberal wing of the new Party had already begun to find difficulty in making common cause with Brabant and his eastern followers. They had in fact begun to fall apart even before the Logan crisis blew up, and were unable to build up an effective unity during the parliamentary session of 1893<sup>23</sup>.

## II

A Cabinet crisis on the eve of a parliamentary session may be expected to interfere with the smooth running of legislative business. This was especially true of the session of 1893, for it was also the last of the eighth Parliament, and the various parties and groups were fully occupied manoeuvring into position for the general election which was due to

22. Te Water Papers, vol. 60. V. Sampson to T. te Water, 9 May 1893.

23. Sank, pp.51-63, who draws fully on correspondence in the Innes Papers, especially between Innes and Brabant.

take place early in the new year. The Progressives of various hues worked hard behind the scenes, searching for a leader and an agreed platform, but gave little evidence of unity in the divisions. Not even the notorious Constitution Ordinance Amendment Bill, designed to prevent plumping in the Cape Town constituency with the (unstated) object of preventing the leader of the Cape Malay community, Ahmed Effendi, from obtaining a seat in the House, could unite the votes of the Opposition against a measure which had the full backing of the Bond<sup>24</sup>. But the Bondsmen found their own position hardly more satisfactory. Much time was spent during the session in raking over the coals of the Logan dispute, and Hofmeyr had the unpleasant task of presiding over the select committee which reported adversely on Sivewright's conduct<sup>25</sup>. The Bondsmen were not handicapped, as the Progressives were, through a failure to agree on what they wanted; but they had to resign themselves to seeing several of the resolutions carried by their congress earlier in the year set aside on the ground that these were not fitting matters to be decided upon during the final session of a Parliament<sup>26</sup>.

The sooner the general election took place, therefore, the better it would be for the Bond. But the Progressives were not ready for it. There were renewed attempts during the recess to formulate an agreed programme; but in the end the various Opposition groups acted independently of each other. Brabant issued a statement at Bedford in September, containing in nine points the "programme adopted by the Progressive Party as their platform at the ensuing General Election"<sup>27</sup>. Innes enunciated a different programme at Woodstock in October<sup>28</sup>.

24. Assembly Debates, 1893, p.282; Sank, p.62. The account of Onze Jan's part in the Ahmed Effendi affair in Hofmeyr, pp. 451-2, is absurdly favourable to Onze Jan. Innes, p.100, has redressed the balance. The disunity among the Opposition may be seen in the fact that the 'Noes' at the third reading, who numbered fifteen, included only eight of the Progressive Party.

25. A.4 of 1893.

26. Notulen, 1894 Congress, chairman's report, pp.9-13.

27. Sank, p.65, quoting E.P. Herald, 18 Sept. 1893.

28. Sank, p.67, quoting Cape Times, 17 Oct. 1893.

X A Queenstown Political Association, founded in November, came out with another which approximated closely with that of Innes and differed in emphasis from Brabant's. Hofmeyr, who kept a small black note-book for press cuttings and diligently compared the Progressive and Queenstown programmes, found that they agreed on a few points - on the reimposition of an excise on spirits in some form, on the encouragement of individual freehold tenure by Africans, and on the need for the introduction of a general compulsory Scab Act; but the differences, he noted, were at least as striking as the similarities<sup>29</sup>.

The detailed contents of these various programmes seem to have been determined mainly by tactical considerations, in particular the attitude which their authors had decided to adopt towards Rhodes and the Bond. In this respect the Progressives were more cautious than Innes and the Queenstown Association. Brabant, it seems, had no intention of dislodging Rhodes, but wished to drive a wedge between him and the Bond. In December he wrote to Sivewright, who was contesting the Griqualand East seat with the support of the Commissie van Toezicht, declaring his intention of supporting Zietsman, "the nominee of the Progressives" - and, incidentally, of the local Bond branches as well - against himself. He assured Sivewright that he did not oppose him on personal grounds, but

with regard to your position as a member of the Bond, that is another matter. I hold, as I dare say you know, strong opinions as to Englishmen or Britishers who join that organization and I never hesitate to express my opinions publicly or privately in plain terms<sup>30</sup>.

The Progressives, who were trying to make capital out of a growing dissatisfaction within the Farmers' Associations over

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29. Sank, pp.68-9. Hofmeyr's annotated cuttings are in vol. I of the Hofmeyr Papers.

30. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 5 (Griqualand East election folder), Brabant to Sivewright, 24 Dec. 1893 (copy).

their past policy of political neutrality<sup>31</sup>, appear to have been trying to provide Rhodes with a point d'appui alternative to the Bond. Their September programme, considered in this light, makes reasonably good sense. By showing an interest in the rehabilitation of poor whites, by insisting that if the excise were reintroduced it should fall on the consumer, by not pressing for a redistribution of seats, and by standing for a native policy of "firmness coupled with justice", they bade fair to attract the votes of potential Bond supporters. At the same time, they supported Rhodes's plans to allow individual title to Africans, to introduce a general Scab Act, and to work for the unification of South Africa. The weakness of the Progressives lay chiefly in the fact that they could not make up their minds as to the tactical wisdom of declaring their opposition to the Bond in public. They were not all as clear on this point as Brabant. Arthur Douglass talked of giving "independent support" to the Government<sup>32</sup>, while Hockly, ex-member for Somerset East, was reported in a Dutch paper as having referred to "een der Bondskandidaten van de Progressieve Partij", and as having stated approvingly that there was room for both progressives and anti-progressives within the Bond<sup>33</sup>.

Such attempts to make the best of both worlds would not do for Innes, who had broken with Rhodes on a matter of principle and reached the firm conclusion that both Rhodes and the Bond should be dislodged. He accused the Bond of political irresponsibility in refusing to form its own government, and longed for the establishment of a clear-cut party system of the type which the tactics of the Progressives were more likely to retard than to promote. The Innes and Queenstown

31. Sank, p.56, quoting E.P. Herald, 12 May 1893. The Graaff Reinet Farmers' Association had just decided to include the word 'Political' in its title. Contrast also the attitude of the Cradock Farmers' Congress to the franchise in 1892, with that of the Port Elizabeth Farmers' Congress in 1886 (above, pp. 247, 308)

32. Sank, p.65, quoting E.P. Herald, 22 Sept. 1893.

33. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. I (black note-book). Paper not indicated, but the Cape Times carried a similar report on 12 Dec. 1893.

programmes attacked the social policy of the Bond on the ground of inhumanity, the latter demanding "an uncompromising rejection of Strop Bills, Compulsory Labour Bills, and all such kindred attempts at obnoxious class legislation, as being ineffectual in their application and brutalising in their tendency". The two programmes also contained a demand for redistribution, with a view to increasing the representation of the urban constituencies - an argument not calculated to please the eastern Farmers' Associations, and indicative of the rift within the Opposition between urban and rural interests. Had Innes, with his strong views on the desirability of party government, been prepared to suppress his scruples and assume the leadership of a united Opposition party, it is conceivable that the opponents of the Bond might have gone into the general election with an agreed programme; but it is doubtful whether such a party could have maintained a united front for long against the Bondsmen, who steadily refused to play at party politics within the House.

The Bond's problem was of a different order. It already had leadership and a policy. But Hofmeyr, who knew that however hard his Party worked during the election, it stood a very slender chance of increasing its representation by very much, was concerned above all about the quality of its candidates. Ons Land posed the problem on 1 February 1894, when it urged that what the Bond needed was greater debating strength ("mannen van groote zeggingskracht") in Parliament:

Vooral wat rechtsgeleerde kennis betreft is onze Afrikaner-Nationale partij altoos zwak geweest in het Parlement. Met uitzondering van de weinige maanden gedurende welke de heer Ewald Esselen lid der Wetgevende Vergadering was, heeft zij nooit een advokaat in hare gelederen gehad, die haar kon bijstaan met rechtsgeleerde advies ... De partij maakte dientengevolge doorgaans een armoedige vertoonning in het Huis in alle zuivere rechtsgeleerde discussies<sup>34</sup>.

34. C.f. Te Water Papers, vol. 59. Hofmeyr to T. te Water, 19 Dec. 1892, discussing the parliamentary candidature of Victor Sampson: "...We do require a barrister in Parliament, who is 1stly heart and soul with us. 2ndly of such standing as to be fit for the Attorney-Generalship. 3rd, not so selfish, as to turn against us should he not get that office through our influence."

How to make up this deficiency in professional men, above all of lawyers, was a major difficulty. The constitution of the Bond, which left the choice of parliamentary candidates to the branch representatives meeting at a central benoemings-vergadering in each constituency, and prevented the Commissie van Toezicht from intervening except in the case of disputed elections, and even then from taking the initiative in selecting a suitable candidate, contained no remedy<sup>35</sup>. The Bond, in short, was paying the penalty for the extreme decentralization given to it in its early days by the ideologists from Paarl, for if it could not secure a clear parliamentary majority and win its way by force of numbers rather than by force of intellect, there was little to be gained from S. J. du Toit's earlier addiction to "manne wat mar reg stem".

S. J. du Toit, who had now replaced Dolf Botha on the Commissie van Toezicht, would have been the first to admit this. His lively intellect, however, combined with the legal mind of Frederic de Waal and the shrewd judgment of Jan Hofmeyr, enabled the Commissie to rise to the occasion. They proceeded, after a careful selection of constituencies and by a calculated violation of the Bond constitution, to secure the nomination of several candidates of their choice, and once the shouting was over they had good reason to congratulate themselves on their achievement<sup>36</sup>.

Places were found for three medical men of some calibre: Thomas te Water and Arthur Vanes, who were returned as members for their home constituencies, Graaff Reinet and Uitenhage respectively; and Thomas Smartt, who came from Britstown, but for whom the Commissie secured the Wodehouse nomination after

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35. See Appendix F.

36. Hofmeyr, pp.452-7, gives some account of the activities of the Commissie van Toezicht during this election. The description of the Griqualand East election will be seen to be incomplete. That of the Barkly West election is an even greater simplification of a very involved story than that offered in the present work, and fails both to capture the spirit of the opposition and to do justice to their case.

a great deal of angry correspondence<sup>37</sup>. Something also had to be done for poor Sivewright, the sitting member for Griqualand East, whose reputation within the Bond was clouded on account of the Logan affair. The Bondsmen in his constituency had decided to throw him over in favour of L. S. Zietsman, a non-Bondsman of somewhat heterodox views, though not unfavourably disposed towards the Bond. Bondsmen were not limited in their choice of candidates to members of the Bond, and the Griqualand East benoemingsvergadering was entitled to choose Zietsman in preference to Sivewright; but the Commissie van Toezicht, after failing to persuade the local Bondsmen to change their minds, declared Zietsman's nomination invalid and ordered a new benoemingsvergadering, which declared as firmly in favour of Zietsman as the first. Thereupon the Commissie van Toezicht broke the rules and absolved the Griqualand East Bondsmen from their constitutional obligation to vote for the properly nominated candidate or abstain. It later rejoiced to see Sivewright win the election.<sup>38</sup>

Then there was W. P. Schreiner, himself not a Bondsman, but a desirable Bond candidate from Hofmeyr's point of view because he was a lawyer and had for a short while been Attorney-General in Rhodes's Cabinet<sup>39</sup>. The Commissie decided to put

37. This involved the unseating of the sitting member, W.H. Jans van Rensburg, who was very angry. Not long afterwards he was writing to Rhodes with a view to migrating to Charterland.

The Wodehouse election is of particular interest in that it illustrates the working of the Bond Commissie van Organisatie, a new body, the function of which is described in Appendix F. On this occasion, however, it functioned badly. Trouble arose from the fact that one member of the Commissie, W.D. Snyman, was election agent for Dr Smartt, whose candidature was contested on an issue not covered by the Bond constitution, namely who should decide how many candidates should be put forward in any constituency. Snyman's *secundus* then made matters worse by intervening without authority from Snyman himself. The original establishment of the Commissie van Organisatie had met with opposition in Congress, as a result of which it was laid down that it could only intervene in local disputes on the invitation of the District Bestuur concerned. But this did not help in the case of Wodehouse, where the two District Besturen in the division, Barkly East and Dordrecht, sponsored rival candidates.

38. For the Griqualand East election, see Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 5.

39. On Schreiner's brief tenure of the Attorney-Generalship under Rhodes, which he had resigned before the general election, and his resumption of that office in September 1894, see Walker, Schreiner, pp. 55-8. His resignation had been occasioned by pressure of work, not by political (cont.)

him up to run beside Rhodes in Barkly West, but did not make up their minds to do so until after the local Bond branches had chosen their own candidate. This man, P. J. Marais, already encountered as the author of a critical report on De Beers<sup>40</sup>, announced that he was willing to stand down in favour of Schreiner; but his secundus, H. D. Stiglingh, who had also been connected with that report, was not. It was hard on the Barkly West Bondsmen to be asked to give their support to two candidates, neither of whom was a member of the Bond, both of whom were connected with De Beers, when the local branches had been built up largely on a basis of opposition to that Company. The Commissie therefore decided to take them by stealth rather than by storm. S. J. du Toit, who was already in the running for the Bond candidature in both Victoria West and Paarl, agreed to add Barkly West to his list of potential constituencies, and secured the nomination at a second benoemingsvergadering called by the Commissie. Stiglingh still stood up for his rights as the original secundus; but du Toit called a special meeting in the constituency, at Campbell, explained that it was desirable that the delegates should elect another secundus, and made a strong appeal that they should choose Schreiner. This they did after deliberations behind closed doors, "met het vol vertrouwen dat de Primarius zal optreden als kandidaat", and du Toit closed the meeting with a prayer. The exact date of du Toit's decision to withdraw his candidature and thus leave the field open for Schreiner does not emerge from the documents; but he had done so before the end of January 1894, having made up his mind to stand for Paarl. By this time the Stiglingh faction had already begun to sense a ruse and to bombard Hofmeyr with furious and dis-

39 (cont.) differences with his chief. On his original appointment to Cabinet office, when he was not yet a member of Parliament, Rhodes had found him a Kimberley seat (June 1893 with the backing of a Bond majority. It seems to have been the opposition of a section of the Bond, combined with his desire not to appear subservient to Rhodes, that led him to decline to stand for Kimberley again in 1894. As it was, he held the De Beers retainer.

40. See above, p. 287.

respectful letters, insisting that Stiglingh was the only properly elected secundus in the field, and therefore entitled to become the official candidate if du Toit withdrew. Hofmeyr, who was much put out by the fact that his original private letter recommending Schreiner had been read to a meeting of Bondsmen without his authority<sup>41</sup>, threw his influence behind Schreiner's candidature and parried the blows of the opposition with technical arguments about party discipline. Shortly before the election, at Schreiner's request, he sent an urgent telegraphic message to the Bondsmen in Barkly West:

... Valt Schr[einer] uit dan heeft de Afrikaner party geen enkele advokaat in het Parlement en zonder een advokaat is onze party hulpeloos ...

The election fight was a close one, but by a narrow margin both Rhodes and Schreiner scraped home<sup>42</sup>.

Though the Commissie van Toezicht stretched their influence in the election beyond strict constitutional limits, they acted according to what they conceived to be the true interest of the Bond and its alliance with Rhodes. The campaign was particularly exhausting for Hofmeyr, especially as tiresome litigation continued to tax his energies when it was over. He persuaded du Toit not to take his opponent, J. S. Marais, to court after the latter had beaten him by a narrow majority in Paarl<sup>43</sup>. He persuaded the Bondsmen in Barkly West not to expel Stiglingh from the Party, with the result that Stiglingh did not take his case to the Provincial Bestuur, as he had threatened. But a sordid dispute arose and dragged on in Hofmeyr's own constituency of Stellenbosch, where Pieter de Waal, brother of David, had narrowly defeated the

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41. "Onder deze omstandigheden", Hofmeyr had written, "moet ik meer dan ooit neutraal zijn, hoewel ik nu nog blyde zou zijn kreeg Schreiner een plek buiten Kimberley" (his underlining on the copy of the letter which he kept).
42. Rhodes 927, Schreiner 885, Stiglingh 781. For the Commissie van Toezicht's correspondence files on the Barkly West election, see Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 4.
43. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 5 (Paarl election folder). Marais, whose brief experience as a Progressive had cost him the Bond nomination but not his Bond membership, was only temporarily estranged from Onze Jan. See Hofmeyr, pp.517-8.

other sitting member, W. A. Krige, by six votes. Hofmeyr had easily headed the poll, and preferred de Waal as his fellow member; but Krige decided to lay a charge against certain of de Waal's supporters, alleging bribery, and de Waal brought a counter charge against Krige personally on the same ground. These cases were still pending when, towards the end of May, Hofmeyr left for Canada to attend the Colonial Conference in Ottawa. He had already expressed his weariness of political wrangles to a friend in February:

Ik is dood moeg van die hele speel, en ik zou den Heer danken indien ik met goed fatsoen uit Bond en Parlement kon komen. Ik bemin den vrede, en toch ben gedurig in den stryd ...<sup>44</sup>

Now, in what seems to have been a state of physical and mental exhaustion, he addressed two letters, one to the Speaker, Sir David Tennant, resigning his seat in the House of Assembly, and the other to his Stellenbosch constituents on the same day, informing them that if the election petitions went against de Waal he would have to consider his next step<sup>45</sup>. Both plaintiffs succeeded. De Waal therefore lost his seat and Krige his civil rights for five years. Hofmeyr's resignation was accordingly withheld, even though Gideon Krige, stepping into his brother's shoes, defeated de Waal at a bye-election later in the year. The development of a family vendetta within his own constituency, and involving his own relations, was a heavy burden to bear on top of his work on the Commissie, and Hofmeyr would give up the unequal task before another year had passed.

For the Bond as a whole, however, the election was a matter neither for exhilaration nor for undue regret. Its alliance with Rhodes had held fast, and the ministerialists were returned with a comfortable majority over the Progressives and associated groups. "Tamelijk bevredigend" was the way the Commissie described the election to the Cape Town

44. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 5. Hofmeyr to an unknown addressee, 16 Feb. 1894.

45. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 20. Both letters were dated 22 May 1894. This explanation of Hofmeyr's threat of resignation is drawn mainly from Hofmeyr, pp.473-4, and J.H.H. de Waal. Die Lewe van D.C. de Waal, pp. 201-3.

congress<sup>46</sup>. Of thirty-eight candidates who had stood with the blessing of the Commissie, twenty-seven had been returned, and these, added to a further twenty who supported Rhodes, gave the alliance not far short of two-thirds of the seats in the Assembly.

Appearances, however, were to some extent illusory. So long as Rhodes and the Bond were agreed on policy, they would have no difficulty in beating the parliamentary Opposition by an impressive weight of numbers. On the other hand, Rhodes and his personal followers who were not Bondsmen could command sufficient support to outvote the Bondsmen if they chose to make common cause with the Opposition - a contingency which was not impossible, if it is borne in mind that the Progressives had fought the election with the object of giving independent support to the Government. This gave Rhodes a great deal of room in which to move, and placed the Bond in a position of some delicacy if it was to keep its alliance with the Premier intact, whereas only a major indiscretion on Rhodes's part would bring about the improbable contingency of an alliance between the Bondsmen and the Opposition against himself. Neither the re-formation of the Ministry after the Logan crisis, nor the general election of 1894, had really disturbed the subtle balance of forces in the House.

An appreciation of this fact is necessary if we are to understand the legislative activity of the second Rhodes Ministry, more especially the measures dealing with native affairs and farming matters. Innes was not far from the truth when he asserted, in relation to the Glen Grey Act of 1894, that "Rhodes wheeled his whole Cabinet into line in support of a Bill drafted by himself and his Secretary which was in substantial agreement with the Opposition policy"<sup>47</sup>, while it would soon become patently obvious that Rhodes would have to

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46. Notulen, 1894 Congress, pp.15-17. The estimate of the Government's success in the elections given in the Commissie van Toezicht's report agrees with that given in Sank, p.71, which is dependent on Opposition sources, the Cape Times and the E.P. Herald, in February 1894.

47. Innes, p.104.

lean on the votes of the Progressive Opposition if he wished to deal adequately with the problem of Scab.

### III

Glen Grey lies to the west of the district of Emigrant Tembuland, the northern part of which had been occupied by white settlers following the frontier war of the late 'seventies. Attempts had been made periodically from 1864 to persuade the Tambookies, who had been given the right to settle in Glen Grey by Sir George Cathcart in 1852, to remove themselves to alternative lands across the Indwe River; but although small-scale emigration took place from time to time - in 1865, for example, and again in 1885 - the Tambookies and Tembus never elected to migrate en masse, and the Government never descended to compulsory eviction<sup>48</sup>. During the Basuto war of 1880, a number of Tambookies from Glen Grey went into rebellion and left their lands. They could have been prevented from returning, but when the war was over they were permitted to resume occupation of their lands by the Resident Magistrate and without opposition from the Government of the day. By the early 'nineties, by which time Glen Grey had attracted a large number of squatters from other tribes as well, and over-population had become a serious problem, it was no longer an easy task either to identify the ex-rebels, or to find an equitable basis for evicting either them or the more recent immigrants to the district. Glen Grey comprised 250,000 morgen of high mountains and fertile valleys, supporting a population of 40,000 and an excess of stock, and providing a piéd à terre for an indeterminable number of migrant labourers who found short

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48. The information in this paragraph is derived mainly from A.3 of 1892, the Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the Tenure of Land, &c., in the Glen Grey District, June 1892.

term employment elsewhere. It was an area in urgent need of legislative attention.

A motion to appoint a commission to investigate the land situation in Glen Grey was defeated in the parliamentary session of 1889, but in 1892, partly in response to Bond pressure<sup>49</sup>, Rhodes took the necessary steps. His commission sought a solution to the problem in the grant of land titles to individual Africans. The amount of land available, they argued, would allow something less than fifty-five morgen per family, which was barely adequate because so much of the land was unproductive; but there was no vacant land which could be used to increase the size of the holdings. Individual title, they urged, would discourage the immigration of further squatters, and help to solve the Colonial labour problem by forcing those who did not possess small-holdings on to the labour market. Individual tenure was favoured by two-thirds of the tribesmen examined, in the realization that they would have to pay the costs of the survey, and on the assurance that they would not lose their commonage rights or pay more in quitrent than they already paid in hut tax. The commission considered that ideally title should be granted "without any restrictions whatever", but thought that out of deference to the Africans, who did not want their lands to be executable for debt, restrictions should be placed on the sale of their lands without Government/<sup>consent</sup> for a period of three or four years. Finally, after drawing attention to the prevalence of burr-weed and the neglected state of the roads, they suggested that Glen Grey should be constituted as a fiscal division of the Colony<sup>50</sup>.

The Glen Grey Act of 1894 was the product of much discussion, most of which focussed on the recommendations of this report, and represented a compromise between two diametrically opposed schools of thought. The liberals in

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49. See Notulen, 1890 Congress, p.28.

50. A.3 of 1892, pp.1-6.

Parliament recognized the value of individual title as a civilizing agency, and were prepared to see it granted without requiring its beneficiaries to surrender any privileges, in particular their voting privileges, in return. Their chief anxiety was to prevent the grant of title in such a way that Glen Grey lands could be bought by white men, and the Africans legally dispossessed. It was mainly for this reason that in 1893 Innes, "after consultation with Sauer, Merriman, Solomon and others", moved this amendment to Frost's motion for the adoption of the report:

That ... legislation should be introduced with regard to Glen Grey, and other Crown lands, to secure to individual Natives the right of separate occupation of defined portions of land thereon, to regulate the disposal during life, and the devolution after death, of such defined portions, to prevent over-crowding by squatters, to define commonage rights, and to provide for the regulation and good government of the locations<sup>51</sup>.

No decision was taken, however, in the disturbed session of that year.

The approach of the Bondsmen was very different. Ever since their failure to obtain as much of Emigrant Tembuland as they had coveted for white settlement during their dispute with the Scanlen Government in 1883-4<sup>52</sup>, they had shown a disposition to favour the claims of frontier farmers to lands in tribal occupation. In 1886 they congratulated the Government for the steps it had taken "in zake de verplaatsing van de Glen Grey naturellen"<sup>53</sup>, and expressed the hope that it would either remove more Africans from the region, or oblige those who remained to pay taxes on the same basis as the white settlers<sup>54</sup>. The commission report exploded the argument that there was any vacant land in the Glen Grey district which could be made available for white settlement without injuring the interests of the tribesmen, and went out of its way to quote the evidence of Bondsmen to that effect<sup>55</sup>; but the

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51. Innes, p.104; Sank, pp.62-3.

52. See above, pp. 172-4.

53. This refers to the settlement of certain Glen Grey Tembus in the Qumbu district in 1885. See A3. of 1892, p.2.

54. Notulen, 1886 Congress, p.12.

55. A.3 of 1892, p.3.

view that white men ought to be enabled to settle in the Glen Grey area continued to prevail in Bond circles, and was undoubtedly strengthened by the fact that the area in question was a tongue of tribal land protruding into a region of white settlement, with - indeed - a compact area of white settlement lying to the east of it. Thus the 1893 congress supported a motion by S. J. du Toit, that

indien persoonlijk grondbezit door de Regeering wordt toegestaan aan naturellen, in reserves, locaties of elders, zulks behoort te geschieden zonder het recht van verkoop te beperken<sup>56</sup>.

The Bondsmen were in favour of creating the sort of situation which the liberals were anxious to prevent, by granting individual title without any restrictions on re-sale.

The Bond's approach to the Glen Grey problem was influenced to a considerable extent by a man who was not himself a Bondsman, but who stood as the Bond-sponsored candidate for Tembuland in the 1894 election, maintained a full correspondence with Hofmeyr and te Water, and claimed to have had some influence on the subsequent legislation. This was Victor Sampson<sup>57</sup>. Sampson was thinking in terms of individual title for Africans at least as early as June 1891, but he feared that such a step would create too many African voters, for it would circumvent "Sprigg's famous 17th clause" in the Registration Act of 1887<sup>58</sup>. He sought a solution to this difficulty, however, by "still further doctoring the franchise", and urged

that large circles, say like those in the Transkei, be formed for native elections, and that each circle of such native constituents be allowed to send one or more member (European) to the House ... I cannot see how individual title is ever to be granted to the Natives on a large scale without some limitation to their right to vote<sup>59</sup>.

By 1893, he was strongly advocating the settlement of white men in Glen Grey, disapproving of the "silly notions" held by Merriman and Innes of "making the Transkei a native preserve"

56. Notulen, 1893 Congress, p.32.

57. V. Sampson, My Reminiscences, p.84.

58. See above, p. 249.

59. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 20. Sampson to Hofmeyr, 15 June 1891.

and giving "title to Locations as well as to individuals".

It is only by at once cutting up the Locations & at once putting in Europeans on the vacant parts that we can stop the process [of over-population]<sup>60</sup>.

He told Hofmeyr that he thought it would be possible to secure the support of the headmen for a limited form of individual tenure:

If we give them to understand that title will be given to the land actually occupied by their buildings and their gardens, and that not another inch is to be given out to any new men setting up house, but that the land now un-occupied by buildings, and not forming part of their gar-dens, will be strictly treated as commonage on which all title-holders would have the right of grazing so many head of cattle, we should give them all an interest in keeping the now unoccupied land unbuilt upon & untilled ...

Having got them to accept this principle I should proceed to form villages ... as we in the Colony do townships...

I think I should be inclined to help the poor whites to some of the land so saved. At any rate, considering how we ... have given land to other natives, at Matatiele, at Qumbu & at Tsomo, I do not think we should be blamed for giving our own kith & kin & colour a few of the crumbs that fall from the natives' table! Do you? <sup>61</sup>

A further letter to Hofmeyr objected to the Glen Grey Commission's proposal of giving fifty-five morgen to each family, on the ground that this would not stop squatting, and on this occasion he also put forward the suggestion of primogeniture, coupled with a prohibition on the sub-division of properties, so that younger sons would "have to go to the Colony in search of labour"<sup>62</sup>. Early in November, he told Hofmeyr of the pleasure it gave him "to know that any ideas of mine had a share in determining you to oppose Frost's motion"<sup>63</sup>.

The Glen Grey Bill was drafted by Rhodes, though most of the ideas in it were supplied by others<sup>64</sup>. The first part,

60. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. Sampson to T. te Water, 6 Mar., 1893.

61. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 20. Sampson to Hofmeyr, 22 May 1893.

62. *ibid.* Sampson to Hofmeyr, 18 July 1893.

63. *ibid.* Sampson to Hofmeyr, 3 Nov. 1893. How far it is sound to say, as Hofmeyr's biographer does, that Onze Jan really did "recognize the necessity of keeping the native reserves free from European intruders" (p. 471), may be doubted in the light of Innes's remarks (pp. 104-5) and Hofmeyr's earlier attitude to Emigrant Tembuland (see above, p. 172). The present writer has not seen the memorandum submitted by Hofmeyr to Rhodes to which Innes refers. Sampson's *Reminiscences*, p. 84, record Hofmeyr's misgivings as to whether the Government would accept Sampson's proposals, but throw no light on Hofmeyr's own attitude towards them.

64. Enacted, without significant changes, as Act 25 of 1894. See Innes, pp. 105-7.

dealing with the survey and distribution of allotments under individual tenure, in effect rejected the views of the 1892 Commission and endorsed Sampson's argument for "hut and garden" allotments, for as against the Commission's fifty-five morgen, an area of four morgen was agreed upon - hardly sufficient for an economic peasant small-holding, but small enough to impose severe restrictions on squatting. Individual tenure was not held in question, for all parties were prepared to accept it. Part II dealt with exceptional circumstances under which alienation might take place, but made it clear that in the ordinary course the permission of the Governor would be necessary. It also laid down very precise rules of hereditary succession on the basis of primogeniture. This section conceded most of the Opposition case. The clauses dealing with alienation, which cut right across the aims of the Bond, were largely the work of Rhodes and incorporated the views of the Opposition regarding "the desirability of retaining the reserves for Native occupation"<sup>65</sup>. The liberals, however, had to pay their price in connection with Part III, containing what Innes described as a "purge of the voters' roll". Land allotted in individual tenure under the provisions of the Act was to be deemed, for the purpose of parliamentary registration, to be held under communal tenure, and its owners thus disqualified from being able to fulfil the proprietary conditions for the franchise. The labour tax imposed in Part IV, of ten shillings a year on all landless, able-bodied males who failed to perform three months' labour "beyond the borders of the district" until such time as they had completed three years' total service, was regarded by Innes as a "blot upon the measure". His judgment may be modified by the observation that this part of the "Bill for Africa" has since had rather stiffer parallels in other parts of Africa, and the comment that in

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65. Innes, p.105, who notes that the lands remained executable for debt.

any case the labour tax was never collected<sup>66</sup>; but there can be no doubt as to which party it was intended to please. With the establishment in Part V, however, of a "District Council for the administration of local affairs within the district of Glen Grey", the Opposition were given greater satisfaction. Sampson stated that the idea behind this came originally from Robert Stanford, later Chief Magistrate of Tembuland, and it formed part of the recommendations of the 1892 Commission. It offered the Africans of Glen Grey the chance to operate local self-government at the divisional council level without taking away their influence, such as it was, in the central legislature. This was some compensation for the limitations on their franchise rights imposed in Part III, and it offered something very different both from the notion of a separate roll for Africans suggested by Sampson, and the idea of a completely separate naturellenraad for the Transkei and the Colony, with only very wealthy Africans remaining on the common roll, which had received the approval of the Bond congress in 1886<sup>67</sup>.

The Glen Grey Act has the appearance of a truce between two groups of contenders for control over the native policy of the Rhodes Government. That policy had its seamy side, as was shown by the Matabele War of 1893, and by the series of developments in Pondoland which began with a machine-gun demonstration as a prelude to annexation, and finished with the Sigcau affair of 1895<sup>68</sup>. When Innes described the Glen Grey Act as Rhodes's greatest legislative achievement, he implied that it differed in quality and intention from these other actions, which contained no suggestion that Rhodes's patriarchal views on native policy were informed by a conscious desire to civilize his wards. On the other hand, the Rhodes-Bond alliance was not endangered by the Act, for if the Bondsmen had failed to gain their point over the alienability of

66. Lord Hailey, An African Survey (1956 edn.), index under 'Labour, forced'. E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa p.432.

67. Notulen, 1886 Congress, p. 11.

68. Innes, pp.100ff.; Walker, Schreiner, pp.62-5; Walker, De Villiers, pp.258-60; Sampson, pp.93-4.

the lands, they had at least obtained a full assurance over the limitation of the freehold African vote.

## IV

In the case of the Scab Act, however, the alliance with Rhodes proved harder to maintain, and came within an ace of foundering. The ravages of the scab insect caused losses to the Colonial sheep farmers of perhaps £500,000 a year, by reducing the quantity and quality of the wool and mohair clip, and by causing the death of thousands of sheep in times of drought<sup>69</sup>. The disease had been endemic in the Colony at least since the seventeenth century, and attempts to control it by legislation dated back as far as 1693<sup>70</sup>. Only towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, did reliable experiments reveal that the disease could be controlled by simultaneous dipping of all sheep in a given area at regulated intervals, together with the isolation of infected flocks. Legislation on these lines accordingly followed. An Act of 1886 applied compulsory dipping and isolation to twenty districts in the Eastern Cape. Permissive Acts in 1889 and 1891 empowered field cornetries adjoining the protected areas, and divisional councils anywhere in the Colony, to place themselves under the control regulations. The control of pounds, the specification of dips, and the removal of sheep from one district to another, were made the subjects of further legislation. Inspectors were appointed, with power to prosecute for infringements, and the growing zeal with which they performed their task may be gleaned from the fact that the number of prosecutions rose from forty-seven in 1887 to 1,568 in 1893,

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69. The information in this paragraph is based mainly on G.1 of 1894, the Report of the Scab Disease Commission, 1892-4. See also Jenkins, pp.58-74, for a detailed account of the Rhodes legislation.

70. G.1 of 1894, p.7, mentions V.O.C. placaaten of 1693 and 1740.

including 377 white men<sup>71</sup>.

The Scab Disease Commission appointed by Rhodes in 1892 had no doubt that where the regulations were effectively enforced the results were beneficial; but it also noted a

great diversity of opinion often expressed by farmers, residing in the same locality, and under absolutely similar conditions, as to the prevalence of scab among the flocks in their neighbourhood; the suitability or otherwise of scab legislation...; the circumstances which caused or favoured the disease, and the losses caused thereby; the efficacy or non-efficacy of different modes of treatment - some stating that two dippings in a recognized solution, properly applied at stated intervals, would cure any case of the disease under any conditions, and others even going so far as to maintain that treatment of any sort was not only non-efficient but absolutely injurious; .... the contagiousness or non-contagiousness of the disease, and the possibility or otherwise of eradicating the disease from the flocks of the Colony by legislation<sup>72</sup>.

The commissioners also noted among some of the farmers "a sentimental feeling that legislation referring to their flocks interfered with what they considered their sacred liberty", a notion which was sometimes accompanied by an astonishing degree of ignorance<sup>73</sup>. The Act of 1886 had worked well in the south-eastern Cape, and enjoyed the general support of the English-speaking Farmers' Associations and a good many Bond branches in these parts; but in the north-west, where the incidence of drought was most severe and the ignorance most profound, there was strong resistance to scab legislation even though the toll taken by the disease was severe in those parts<sup>74</sup>. The Commissioners decided, nevertheless, to recommend

71. Figures from the C.G.H. Statistical Registers. They reached a peak in 1893 and declined sharply in 1894-5.

72. G.l of 1894, p.3.

73. G.l of 1894, p.28. For the type of ignorance with which the Commission had to deal, see ibid, p.583, QQ.13,373-81; evidence of J.B. Nigrini, a Bondsman from Fraserburg.

74. Farmers in the north-west frequently had to move their sheep long distances on account of drought. For scab-weakened sheep this often meant high fatalities. But they often attributed the deaths to the journey rather than the disease, and objected to the Scab Act on account of the necessity of extra trekking to the dipping tanks. Furthermore, if a farmer wished to move infected sheep in a protected area, he had to visit the inspector (who might be away on a tour of inspection) and obtain a permit, which would only be granted if the farmer had notified "such sheep owners in the neighbourhood of the route taken by such infected sheep as to the said inspector shall seem proper" - often an arduous performance.

S.Grové of Prieska complained to Hofmeyr on 29 Aug. 1894 (Hofmeyr Papers, vol.1) that he had been expelled from the local Bond committee for drawing up a notice "verbiedende alle personen om met Brandziekte over mijn grond te trekken".

the enactment of a general compulsory Scab Law, containing provisions for its suspension in specified areas under strict conditions, but only at times when the need for this was clearly proven. Their Report was considered by Parliament in 1894.

The Bondsmen, aware of division among their own ranks on this controversial issue, usually trod cautiously. They accepted the Act of 1886, which incorporated certain recommendations made by their Grahamstown Congress for the improvement of an earlier Act of 1874, though it did not embody their proposal that the inspectors should be appointed by the Divisional Councils on the recommendation of a meeting of farmers. As the Act did not come into force until July 1887, the Congress of that year suspended judgment upon it; but the Paarl Congress in 1888, which set the tone for Bond policy in subsequent years, declared itself in favour of a less rigid law, tempered to meet the difficulties of farmers who came under its provisions, and allowing farmers in infected districts to decide at the divisional council level whether their district should be proclaimed under the Act or not. They were averse to a compulsory general Act<sup>75</sup>.

When the Government introduced a general compulsory Scab Bill to implement the recommendations of the Commission during the session of 1894, the Bond parliamentary caucus met to consider it. They appointed their own committee, consisting of both supporters and opponents of the Bill, with instructions to suggest amendments which would bring the Bill into line with the opinion of Congress, which had declared the existing law unsatisfactory and expressed special concern for the difficulties of the dry north-west<sup>76</sup>. Rhodes agreed to defer the second reading in order to give the Bond committee a

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75. Notulen, 1886 Congress, p.15; 1887 Congress, p.8; 1888 Congress, p.13; 1889 Congress, p.12; 1890 Congress, p.22; 1891 Congress, p.34; 1892 Congress, p.16.
76. Notulen, 1894 Congress, p.26; 1895 Congress, pp.7-10, from which the account of the negotiations in Parliament is drawn.

chance to work out their amendments, which they then proceeded to do, deleting eighteen clauses of the Bill and proposing a large number of minor changes as well. Sprigg contended that these changes amounted to an alteration in the principle of the Bill; but Rhodes was prepared to accept them if the Bondsmen would guarantee in return that a sufficient number of their representatives would support the measure thus amended. The Bondsmen gave him this assurance, and in return for Rhodes's undertaking that their amendments would be incorporated in Committee, they agreed to the second reading. The changes made in the original Bill were considerable, but were chiefly concerned with administrative details. The new Act was not to come into force until March 1895 in districts where the local farmers were in favour of it, and only in November in districts where they were opposed to it, and provision was made for its suspension by the Government in times of drought. But it remained in substance general and compulsory, and the Bond M.P.'s soon became aware that they had signed away more than their supporters would agree to.

Towards the end of the year opposition began to get under way. The Brandvlei Bondsmen, from the Calvinia district, began to call for petitions in September, while in December close on a hundred representatives from thirty-two farming centres met in Victoria West to organize a campaign for a permissive Act. The malcontents found a leader and spokesman in the fluent Oom Daantje van den Heever, and bade fair to challenge the parliamentary leadership of the Party at the forthcoming congress, perhaps even to split the Bond in twain?<sup>77</sup>

S. J. du Toit, ever one to declare his thoughts on paper, wrote to Hofmeyr in February:

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77. Jenkins, p.70, quoting Cape Times, 27 Dec. 1894. A committee under the chairmanship of D.P. van den Heever was established to organize opposition to the Scab Act at a meeting held in De Aar, in November 1894. The conference called by this committee met at Victoria West on 19 December, and its proceedings were fully described in the Victoria West Messenger (Nieuwsbode) of 21 and 28 December. "De beweging was niet op touw gezet om een breuk in de Bond te veroorzaken", van den Heever said, and supporters of the Act were given a fair hearing, but the majority were determined that the Act should be made permissive.

Amice,

Ik ben bezig de pols van den Bond te voelen voor 't aanstaande Congres, ten einde te zien of wij eene dubbele resolutie kunnen doorkrijgen 1) de agitatie van Oom Daantje veroordeelende, en 2) aanhoudende de Brandziewet een proef van 2 of 3 jaren te geven, onder belofte dat de Bond zal samenwerken tot herroeping of wijziging bijaldien de Wet onwerkbaar blijkt of op punten wijziging vereischt....

He enclosed letters from Theron, (P. J.?) du Toit and A. du Plessis, with whom he had been in communication, and a carefully worked out estimate of voting strength at the forthcoming Congress, which gave the opponents of the Scab Act a probable majority over those who were likely to follow a moderate line.

Ik zie slechts één weg [he continued]: een onderhoud met den heer Rhodes zoo spoedig mogelijk na zijne aankomst, en onze taktiek dan inrichten volgens zijne inzichten. Wilt ge mij er bij, roep me dan maar. Wilt ge 't liever met hem alleen bespreken, laat mij dan slechts de resultaten weten ...<sup>78</sup>

Shortly after the dispatch of this letter, du Toit conferred with Hofmeyr and Rhodes, and then wrote to te Water in still greater agitation:

Waarde Vriend,

De agitatie van Oom D. bedreigt ons met óf eene neerlaag óf eene scheuring in den Bond ... Ik heb eerst gemeend dat wij een voorstel moeten dien door te krijgen om de Wet te beperken voor zegge 3 jaren. Maar bij nauwkeurig nagaan onzer stemkracht op 't Congres ... hebben wij hoegenaamd geen kans zulk een voorstel door te krijgen.

He now estimated the strength of the anti-Scabs to be even greater than he had calculated in his letter to Hofmeyr, and continued:

Ik heb verschillende vrienden geraadpleegd, en vooral onze Kaapsche vrienden (H en R), en wij meenen, dat onze eenige kans om Oom D's party de winning op 't Congres te ontrukken, is zijne gelederen te dunnen met een voor de 'antiscabs' zoo gunstig mogelijk voorstel...

He then suggested, as the basis of such a proposal, a line drawn across the Colony from north to south approximately between Warrenton and Mossel Bay, to the east of which the Scab Act should be compulsory, to the west permissive, and the appointment of a committee under the magistrate of each district to mediate in disputes between farmers and inspectors. Te Water was asked to treat these proposals as confidential,

in order to keep van den Heever's followers in tactical darkness<sup>79</sup>.

The possibility of a dividing line had been envisaged in the Commission Report<sup>80</sup>, and the Bondsmen were certain to welcome any proposal which really placed the relationship between the farmer and the inspector on a more equal basis;<sup>81</sup> but the anti-scabs were firm in their resolve to obtain a permissive Act and conscious of their superior strength. They therefore pressed home their advantage at the Port Elizabeth Congress by forcing through a motion demanding a permissive Act in unambiguous terms, against which thirty-eight delegates recorded their names in the minority:

Aangezien de thans bestaande Brandziekte Wet van 1894, voor onze veeboeren onbestaanbaar en zeer drukkend op het land zal zijn, en vooral voor de drooge Noordwestelijke districten, zoo verzoekt deze vergadering, eerbiediglijk het Gouvernement goenoemde Wet permissief te maken, dat is toegevend waar twee derden (2/3) ook schaaapboeren zijn, en stemgerechtigden onder de nieuwe Brandziekte Wet en voor Districts Raad doeleinden in een Wijk, er om verzoeken de Wet toegepast kan worden. Ook besluit deze vergadering om memories te zenden, naar het Hooger en Lager Huis, van het Parlement, en indien noodig aan Zijne Excellentie den Gouverneur met een Deputatie<sup>82</sup>.

But having delivered this severe reproof to the parliamentary leadership, Congress then proceeded to close its ranks by expressing its "volkomen afkeuring ... over de volksagitatie op touw gezet door den edelen heer D. P. van den Heever". This was moved by Frederic de Waal, who was able to secure the assent of Congress to the proposition that

de Bond volgens zijn program van beginselen zijn doel zoekt te bereiken langs constitutioneelen weg en als politieke partij zelfstandig optreedt door middel van zijn provinciaal bestuur en Bondsparlementsleden, zoo wordt het van zijn leden verwacht dat zij den Bond zullen erkennen als het eenige middel waardoor hun

79. Te Water Papers, vol. 57. S.J. du Toit to T. te Water, 28 Feb. 1895.

80. G.l of 1894, p.31.

81. For evidence of friction between farmers and inspectors, which abounds, see Notulen, 1895 Congress, p.17; Te Water Papers, vol. 59; C.A. du Toit to T. te Water, 11,18 July; J. du Toit to T. te Water, 8 June 1894, and other documents in an agricultural sub-file.

82. Notulen, 1895 Congress, p.17. This was, in substance, the same as the resolution adopted by majority vote at van den Heever's Volksvergadering at Victoria West.

politieke grieven worden bekend gemaakt en verholpen... A split was thus avoided in the Provincial Bestuur, but not always in the branches<sup>83</sup>.

Stimulated by the stand taken by Congress, opposition to the Act spread through the platteland during 1895. A large deputation of farmers went in accordance with the Congress resolution to interview the Government, and Hofmeyr acted as go-between - "not however, without having first pointed out to them, that he was not altogether in agreement with their opposition to the Act", as his biographer adds with careful under-statement<sup>84</sup>. At the beginning of the parliamentary session the Government was inclined to brave the opposition of the Bondsmen, and Sprigg, with a bravado he subsequently regretted, referred to the agitators as victims of the "Demon of ignorance and prejudice". A Bondsman, D. J. A. van Zyl, introduced a Bill to make the Act permissive. Frost, now Secretary for Agriculture, moved its rejection. The Government caucus reconsidered the matter and accepted a motion

that no further steps should be taken this session in regard to the Scab Amendment Bill, but ... that a searching inquiry be made by the Government during the recess into the working of the Scab Act of 1894 with a view to (1) a judicious application of the second section ... in districts where such application may be calculated to meet reasonable objections to the Act; and if found necessary<sup>85</sup> such fresh legislation next year as experience may prove expedient<sup>86</sup>.

Innes, who was in a minority of twelve in the division, has

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83. Notulen, 1895 Congress, p.20. The following entry appears in the Notule Boek of Tak No. 3, Hopetown, under the date 26 Apr. 1895: N. Badenhorst challenged the chairman, B.J. Badenhorst: "Hij ziet dat de Heer v.d. Heever nog voort ga, de Volksvergaderingsmannen op te roepen, terwijl het Provinciaal Bestuur zich uitgesproken heeft, tegen het Volkskomité en Volksvergadering en daar het Provinciaal Bestuur reeds het besluit aangenomen heeft wat gij wilde. Hij gevoelde bezwaar er tegen om reden wij kunnen niet in twee lichamen werken. De Voorzitter zei dat hij nog lid is van het Volkskomité en zal het blijven. Na een hevige discussie bedankte de heer N. Badenhorst en Ph. Badenhorst als leden om reden zij kunnen niet op die wijze zamen werken."
84. Hofmeyr, pp.472-3; Jenkins, p.71.
85. The words "if <sup>found</sup> necessary" were inserted at Rhodes's request.
86. Assembly Debates, 1895, p.471.

observed that Rhodes did not carry out his undertaking then made to visit the disaffected districts at the end of the year, when the time came being "less lawfully engaged"; but his memory played him false when he asserted that Rhodes had changed his front<sup>87</sup>. The Act remained general and compulsory, and if its administration was softened, as seems to be a legitimate inference from the greatly reduced activity of the courts, it continued to bring forth protests from the hard hit country areas. A severe drought afflicted the north midlands in 1895, and Ds. W. P. de Villiers approached Rhodes direct, writing from Carnarvon in September:

... If it does not rain, I am sure you will have reason enough to suspend the Act. The drought is getting worse every day, and to crown all the misery, myriads (literally not figuratively) of springboks are coming in from all quarters of the compass ...

and again in December:

... Some people have had to trek for want of water. And yet the act is not suspended<sup>88</sup>.

The opposition did not "die away", as Hofmeyr's biographer supposed, without causing the Bond and the following Government a great deal more trouble; but its later developments belong to the period after the Jameson Raid, when the forces of unity within the Bond were stronger than those of division. In 1896, moreover, though a further attempt was made to make the Act permissive, the policy of systematic dipping and quarantine began to justify itself in a reduction in the number of infected sheep and an increase in the value of wool exports.

"It must be remembered", wrote Victor Sampson, "that the scab law was one of the burning questions of the day, and that Hofmeyr, as I happen to know, retired from Parliament because he feared to weaken his prestige with, at any rate, one section of his followers, by his attitude in the House on any question

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87. Innes, p.114.

88. Rhodes Papers, vol. 2a. W.P. de Villiers to Rhodes, 30 Sept., 2 Dec. 1895.

connected with this subject"<sup>89</sup>. The Port Elizabeth Congress carried its motion in favour of a permissive Scab Act on 18 March 1895, and Onze Jan submitted his resignation as member for Stellenbosch on the 30th. The two events are certainly connected, but it is reasonably certain that Hofmeyr's resignation also stemmed from other causes. J. T. Molteno, with excessive imagination, traced it back to his "false step" in supporting Sivewright in the Logan affair, which was to "bring him a cup overflowing with bitterness and repentance"<sup>90</sup>. His illness in Canada in 1894 was doubtless an important consideration, and featured prominently in the telegrams of commiseration which he received after his resignation had been made public<sup>91</sup>. It may well have been this which led him to turn down several offers of alternative seats in place of his own Stellenbosch, or the vacant Agent-Generalship in London which Rhodes, Sprigg and Upington all tried to induce him to accept. But Stellenbosch itself was among the causes. "Hy is bitter, bitter ziek van Stellenbosch", wrote David de Waal to a Bond M.P. on 1 November 1894<sup>92</sup>. Not only did the family feud continue between Hofmeyr's parliamentary colleague and the de Waals; but Stellenbosch was a particularly unsatisfactory constituency from a loyal Bondsman's point of view. Its Bond branch, for reasons which have not been explained, ceased to exist in 1892 and was not revived until after the South African War.

Although the timing of Hofmeyr's resignation was apparently connected with the Port Elizabeth resolution on Scab, the reasons behind it were probably more general. If he interpreted the Congress resolution as a vote of no confidence in himself, his logical action would have been to resign from his position as chairman of the Commissie van Toezicht, and this he did not do. If he remained in Parliament, his inability to hold the caucus together would be bound to reflect adversely on his authority in the Commissie, and perhaps weaken his leadership

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89. Sampson, p.87. My italics.

90. J. T. Molteno, The Dominion of Afrikanderdom, p.39.

91. These are in vol. 20 of the Hofmeyr Papers.

92. Quoted in J.H.H. de Waal, pp.201-3. Hofmeyr, p.474 (note) quotes evidence that Onze Jan was contemplating (cont.)

still further. His work for the Bond and his work as leader of the Bond parliamentary group seem to have been separate matters in his mind, and he abandoned the latter so as to be able more effectively to carry out the former.

Surprise in some quarters, regret in all, followed Hofmeyr's action. There is no proof that Rhodes in any way 'willed' him out of Parliament, despite Innes's observation that Rhodes's speech in the House when he heard of the Bond leader's decision was not tinged by any expression of personal loss<sup>93</sup>. The personal relationship between Rhodes and Hofmeyr did not apparently suffer from the latter's resignation. Hofmeyr's fiftieth birthday celebration, at which both men made ostentatious display of their friendship, was held on 4 July, while his big share transaction with De Beers<sup>94</sup> took place in August. If Hofmeyr's absence from the House facilitated the development of Rhodes's secret plans for the North at the end of the year, the argument that Rhodes in any way contrived to bring it about must therefore rest on pure conjecture.

The reaction within the Bond was chiefly one of dismay. Hasty consultations took place among leading Afrikaners to decide what sort of approach should be made to Onze Jan.

Mijn voorstel [wrote S. J. du Toit on the copy of a circular he sent to te Water on the subject] zou zijn, den heer Hofmeyr per algemeen geteekende Adressen van sympathie, tevens onzen leider te blijven, cok buiten 't Parlement zijnde<sup>95</sup>.

He at least knew that Hofmeyr would not be persuaded to enter the House again.

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92.(cont.) resigning in Dec. 1894.

93. Innes, p.113.

94. See above, p.270.

95. Te Water Papers, vol. 59. The circular was dated 6 Apr. 1895.

## V

Hofmeyr's resignation from Parliament coincided almost exactly with the return of Sir Hercules Robinson for a second period of office as Governor and High Commissioner at the Cape. Robinson's departure in 1889 had been greeted with regret by the Bondsmen, who had come to look upon him as a renegade imperialist and convert to the Colonial point of view. His successor, Sir Henry Loch, had done much, however, to alleviate their disappointment, for he had successfully hidden most of his militant imperialism from their gaze and struck up a friendly relationship with Hofmeyr, with whom he had worked in close collaboration over the difficult Swaziland negotiations in 1890. Loch had also been able to work with Rhodes, up to a point. In 1890 he had been persuaded, somewhat reluctantly, to accompany him part of the way on an expedition to the North. In 1891 they had worked together to discredit the Adendorff agitation. Both were at one in their growing desire to end the non-co-operative behaviour of the South African Republic in its attitude to the railway, customs and - a new development - the Uitlander problems. But whereas Rhodes was primarily interested in developing the power and influence of his Company, Loch sought similar ends in the name of the Imperial Government, and distrusted companies. When Loch decided to resign while he was on leave in 1894, Rhodes was therefore pleased to be rid of a High Commissioner who had been of use to him in the past but was likely to be an obstacle in the future. Loch, in fact, by investigating the possibility of a revolt in Johannesburg and by placing Bechuana-land Police on the Transvaal's western border, had done great service to Rhodes by providing him with the rudiments of the plan he and Jameson were to develop later; but its proper execution required a High Commissioner "relegated to an assistant role"<sup>96</sup>.

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96. J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, p.20; J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic, c.III.

That was why the reappointment of Sir Hercules proved to hold such great importance. An old man now, a shareholder in the Chartered Company, an ex-director of De Beers and the Standard Bank, Robinson was not likely to stand in Rhodes's way, and he had the right interests. Some people realized this at the time<sup>97</sup>. Robinson's reappointment occasioned a public meeting of protest in Cape Town, the initiative behind which came from the parliamentary Opposition, Sauer, Innes and Merriman all having a hand in it. Another meeting, however, called by the Cape Town Bondsmen the same evening (28 march), was intended as a deliberate counterblast<sup>98</sup>. The Port Elizabeth Congress had carried unopposed motions a few days earlier, appreciating Loch's services to the Colony, "inzonderheid in de Zwasieland kwestie", and welcoming Robinson's impending return<sup>99</sup>. Now, on Hofmeyr's initiative, the Cape Town Bondsmen expressed ardent support for Loch and Robinson, and Loch was quick to return the compliment. They took both High Commissioners too much on trust; but lack of judgment was the full extent of their sin, committed at a time when the tension between the Cape and the Transvaal showed no signs of easing, and when the dramatic consequences of their blindness would have been impossible to foretell.

The Sivewright Agreement with the South African Republic lapsed by effluxion of time at the end of 1894, and it was known in the Colony that the soaring profits enjoyed by the Cape railways were destined for a substantial reduction when the lines from Natal and Delagoa Bay reached the Rand. Kruger had reached an agreement with Natal in February 1894 for the construction of a direct line from Charlestown on the border to Johannesburg, avoiding the Free State, while the Delagoa

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97. Innes, pp.110-11; Laurence, pp.150-1; Michell, Rhodes, vol. II, p.131, who states that Robinson returned "against his better judgment".

98. Innes, p.111; Hofmeyr, pp.479-80.

99. Notulen, 1895 Congress, pp.14-15.

Bay railway was completed and came into use in January 1895, though it was not formally opened until June<sup>100</sup>. Not only did these two railways enjoy the advantage of shorter routes to the Rand than any of the Cape lines, but Kruger was now free to grant preferential rates to the Netherlands Company, and, if he so desired, to manipulate the tariffs on the line between Johannesburg and the Vaal. In an effort to forestall such discrimination, Rhodes's Commissioner, Laing, met Middelberg, the head of the Netherlands Company, in Pretoria in August 1894, and took a stronger line than was warranted by his weak tactical position<sup>101</sup>. Though Sivewright warned him against "declaring ... war to the knife", he demanded half the Transvaal's heavy traffic and threatened to undercut the other lines when Middelberg replied by offering him one-third. Middelberg retaliated by persuading Kruger to impose extra rates on the railway from the Vaal to Johannesburg, and the General Manager of the Cape railways was unable, when he visited Pretoria in November, to prevent these coming into operation in December. The Cape merchants therefore organized the conveyance of their goods from the Vaal to the Rand by ox-waggon, an expedient which was not likely to be effective against the competition of the other railways for long, but which had the merit of keeping the controversy open. The Port Elizabeth Bond Congress, meanwhile, expressed its perennial indignation at the high Transvaal import duties on Colonial produce, and the Colonial Government, no doubt strengthened by this resolution, called a conference to meet in Cape Town in April<sup>102</sup>. It was prepared by this time to reduce its demand to two-fifths of the Rand traffic; but the Natal delegation refused to accept less than one-third, which Kruger had already offered them, while the Transvaal, whose representatives attended the conference, was now reluctant to

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100. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, pp.76,81-2  
On the Sivewright Agreement, see above, p.297.

101. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, pp.80-1;  
P.J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, vol.II, p.210.

102. Notulen, 1895 Congress, p.18; J. van der Poel, p.83; van Winter, vol. II, p.213.

be bound to a rigid allocation. The conference therefore achieved nothing.

No course remained open to the Cape Government except to encourage the defiant by-passing of the Vaal-Rand line by its enterprising merchant community. What was worse, the deadlock in the railway war occurred at a time when it was quite clear that the efforts of Rhodes and the Imperial Government to reduce the Transvaal to terms by political and economic encirclement had irremediably failed. If Kruger had been unable to secure control of Delagoa Bay, so had Rhodes, and the Imperial Government had resigned itself to this fact by June 1894<sup>103</sup>. From Rhodes's point of view it was also of considerable importance that the successful conclusion of the Matabele war of 1893, which had given the Chartered Company undisputed control over the lands of Lobengula, had failed to give it those prospects of early profits to which its directors and shareholders had so patiently looked forward. On the strength of the survey made by John Hays Hammond in September 1894, Rhodes was "careful not to promise dividends" when he addressed the shareholders in London in January 1895<sup>104</sup>.

The railway deadlock, coming on top of the disappointing revelations about Charterland, drove Rhodes to consider more seriously the idea of a violent overthrow of the Transvaal State, in the interest of "federation within the year". Loch's plan had depended on the presence of an armed force in Bechuanaland which could strike out for the Rand on the first signs of revolution there. Rhodes's plan required a force in the same place for the same purpose; but as a preliminary step he decided to secure the transfer of British Bechuanaland to the Colony, without which the Bechuanaland Border Police could not be released for Company service<sup>105</sup>, and the transfer of the Protectorate to the Company, to pro-

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103. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, p.74; Michell, Rhodes, vol. II, pp. 93-6.

104. Michell, vol. II, pp.118-26.

105. J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, p. 58.

vide a base from which the invasion itself could start. He therefore introduced a motion with this double purpose, naturally without disclosing his object, in the House of Assembly at the beginning of June, 1895. It was carried by forty-five votes to twenty-three. In the same month, however, Lord Rosebery's Government fell in England. Joseph Chamberlain took over the Colonial Office from Lord Ripon; but it was not until after the drifts crisis had ended in November that he gave his partial consent to the double request, allowing the Cape to take over the Crown Colony and granting to the Company a strip of territory along the Protectorate-Transvaal border.

Evidence is entirely lacking to show that the Bondsmen were accessories to Rhodes's plan before the fact; but Rhodes must have known that the Bondsmen desired the incorporation of British Bechuanaland. There were, as we have seen, Bond branches in the territory. Though technically outside the Colony, they had sent representatives to the Cape Congresses since 1891, and the strength of their desire to be included in the Colony may be seen in the spectacular increase in the membership of these branches immediately before the incorporation was brought about. The Vryburg District Bestuur grew from eighty-four members in March 1895 to 453 at the time of the 1896 Congress. Indeed, without waiting for the Imperial Government's consent to the annexation, the Bond began to prepare for an election contest in the territory, S. J. du Toit, who remembered the local support which he had received during his unfortunate escapade in 1884, taking what seems to have been an unusually keen interest in securing the nomination, which, however, he failed to get<sup>106</sup>.

The development of the drifts crisis fitted in with Rhodes's plans. Had Kruger ignored the Cape's boycott of the Vaal-Rand line and relied on the other lines to drive the

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106. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 6 (Vryburg election folder). The earliest correspondence in this file is dated 13 June, only 3 days after the debate on Rhodes's motion in the House. The benoemingsvergadering took place on 13 November. The annexation was proclaimed on the 16th.

drifts traffic out of business, time might well have been on his side. But on 20 August he tried to force the issue to a speedy conclusion by proclaiming the closure of the drifts from the beginning of October<sup>107</sup>. The closure was enforced, despite the Cape's protest that it was a violation of the London Convention and the Transvaal customs law; but it soon became apparent that Kruger was more anxious to secure a peaceful solution of the crisis than Rhodes. Frightened perhaps by the hostile reception given to his action by the Cape and Free State Dutch press, he allowed Middelberg to offer the Cape one-third of the Rand traffic, as he had done a year earlier, provided the Cape did not insist on the reopening of the drifts. Rhodes, who was advised by Michell and the railway manager to accept these terms, on the ground that to refuse them would probably result in greater revenue losses than would be incurred by their acceptance, evaded a direct answer, explaining to the former that he "must consult Hofmeyr"<sup>108</sup>. He was really waiting for London's reaction to the opinion of his Attorney-General, Schreiner, that the Transvaal's closure of the drifts was a breach of the London Convention<sup>109</sup>. Chamberlain indicated that the Imperial Government supported Schreiner's view, and was prepared if necessary to support an ultimatum with a British expeditionary force, provided the Cape was willing to contribute substantially with manpower and material aid should it become necessary to use violence<sup>110</sup>. With the assent of Schreiner and Laing, who were on their way to Pretoria, on the Transvaal Government's invitation, to discuss the railway deadlock, Rhodes advised Chamberlain to send his threat. It arrived in Pretoria on 4 November, the day before the railway conference was due to begin. The conference itself broke down on the 7th, but the same day Kruger reopened

107. Transvaal Staatscourant, 20 Aug. 1895. J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, p.85; van Winter, vol. II, p.214; Hofmeyr, p.485.

108. Michell, vol.II, p.136; Hofmeyr, p.485; J. van der Poel, Railway and Customs Policies, p.86.

109. Schreiner's opinion is given in C.8474 (of 1897), p.3.

110. Van Winter, vol.II, p.218; J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, pp.39-41; Walker, Schreiner, pp.65-7.

the drifts, bowing to the threat of superior force, and the crisis was over. It had contributed nothing to the solution of the tariff war between the Cape and the Transvaal; but it established accord between Rhodes and Chamberlain, it kept alive the unrest in Johannesburg so essential to Rhodes's plans for a rising there, and it helped Rhodes to retain the support of the Cape Bondsmen, who, without being apprised of his real intentions, shared in the general indignation against the Transvaal<sup>111</sup>. Kruger's reopening of the drifts neither took Rhodes by surprise nor interfered with his plans for a Raid and a Rising, which were already well under way.

The fact that the Bond was represented in the Ministry whose leader bore the chief responsibility for the Raid placed its members in a most unenviable position, the more especially since Republican leaders had from time to time expressed their strong disapproval of the Bond's alliance with Rhodes. In fact, when Jameson crossed the Transvaal border on 29 December 1895, he did so without the prior knowledge of any member of the Cape Ministry except Rhodes. When Schreiner saw Pieter Faure on the 30th, the latter expressed astonishment that Rhodes had allowed such a thing to happen without consulting his Cabinet<sup>112</sup>. Schreiner saw Rhodes the same evening and made his own position plain, after obtaining confirmation of the essential accuracy of the telegraphic reports: he was in no doubt that Rhodes ought to resign, and would in any case do so himself as soon as blood was known to have been shed.

Hofmeyr, who learned the news for the first time on the following day, experienced a bouleversement more shattering than Schreiner's. The Raid epitomized - or so it must appear to the mass of his supporters - a gigantic error of

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111. "It is not unlikely that at that time a majority of the Bond would have confirmed the action of the Cabinet, at any rate in so far as threats were concerned" (Hofmeyr, p.485).

112. Walker, Schreiner, pp.70-4.

judgment on his part. Not only were his dreams of co-operation destroyed, but his authority would be undermined among his own people unless he took prompt and unequivocal action to dissociate himself from the events which were taking place and if possible unearth the guilty party. He wasted no time, therefore, before sending a message to President Kruger:

Ik hoop uwe burgers zullen zich kwyten als helden  
tegen Jamesons filibusters<sup>113</sup>.

He then called on the High Commissioner, whose private knowledge of the invasion plans he did not suspect, and persuaded him to issue a proclamation, as Robinson put it in an apologetic message to Chamberlain, "publicly repudiating Jameson's action on behalf of Her Majesty's Government and calling on all British subjects to refrain from aiding or abetting him in armed violation of territory of friendly State"<sup>114</sup>. Hofmeyr was permitted to draft this proclamation in collaboration with the Imperial Secretary, Sir Graham Bower, and informed Kruger that Robinson

gaat Proclamatie publiceeren Jameson veroordeelende  
en hier en elders alle Britsche onderdanen verzoe-  
kende hem te opponeeren<sup>115</sup>;

but in fact the instruction to oppose Jameson was toned down at Bower's suggestion, and filleted still further by Edmund Garrett, editor of the Cape Times, who was allowed by Robinson to inspect the draft proclamation after Hofmeyr's departure. This necessitated delay in its despatch while Hofmeyr was sought to approve the alteration, and Hofmeyr, in consequence, began to suspect a move in the High Commissioner's office to make the proclamation nugatory, wrongly attributing the evil genius to Bower.

Having obtained an official British repudiation of the Raid, Hofmeyr met Rhodes the same afternoon in Bower's office, and emerged from the interview convinced that Rhodes himself

113. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Kruger, 31 Dec. 1895 (telegram).

114. Robinson to Chamberlain, 31 Dec. 1895, quoted in Sir J.G. Kotze, Memoirs and Reminiscences, vol. II, p. 250.

115. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Kruger, 31 Dec. 1895 (telegram).

was implicated in the events:

... Rhodes professes to [have] received Jameson's telegram at 4 p.m. on Sunday (29th Dec.). Schreiner visited him later on, he said nothing - he sent no warning to Transvaal - he informed Bower at 11 p.m. - he kept at home all Monday keeping his colleagues ignorant<sup>116</sup>.

All this pointed to the Premier's complicity, Hofmeyr thought, and when Rhodes refused the challenge of publicly repudiating Jameson and instituting criminal proceedings against him, he considered his guilt to be beyond doubt.

Without knowing whether the High Commissioner's proclamation would be published in time to prevent a rising on the Rand, but with his confidence in Robinson still unshaken - "ik denk hy is te vertrouwen" - he impressed upon the Transvaal Government the desirability of inviting him to Pretoria "om in handhaving van vrede en orde u by te staan"<sup>117</sup>. The Republican Government, understandably keen to show that the invasion had been put down by their unaided resources, at first demurred<sup>118</sup>; but on Hofmeyr's insistence they agreed to welcome the High Commissioner in a further telegram dated 1 January. Hofmeyr declined Robinson's invitation to accompany him, pleading ill health as his reason, and explaining that he wished to withhold his diplomatic services until the moment of "supreme necessity ... which is not yet"<sup>119</sup>. It is equally probable that he desired to remain in Cape Town in order to probe the conspiracy still further, and to discuss with his fellow Bondsmen the situation in which they found themselves. He was in communication with S. J. du Toit at the time. The latter was already trying to arrange a meeting between Rhodes and the Afrikaner leaders, so that he could explain his actions to them; but Hofmeyr was opposed to this idea<sup>120</sup>.

116. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. The memorandum is printed in part in Hofmeyr, p.499.

117. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Kruger, 31 Dec. 1895 (telegram).

118. Kotze, vol. II, p.254. Contrast Hofmeyr, p.492. See also J. van der Poel, Jameson Raid, p.119.

119. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Robinson (undated telegram).

120. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 1,6 Jan 1896.

The news of Jameson's defeat reached the Cape on 2 January, and Hofmeyr sent off a congratulatory telegram to Kruger the same day, urging him at the same time to be conciliatory:

... Bied alle gevangenen aan Robinson om naar wet te worden behandeld. Geef zooveel concessien mogelyk. Overwinnaars kunnen grootmoedig zyn<sup>121</sup>.

On the 4th, he entered into correspondence with Chamberlain, on the latter's invitation, which apparently stemmed from Robinson's report of their interview of 31 December. Hofmeyr was apparently pressing his investigations too hard for the Colonial Secretary's liking, and Chamberlain sought to reassure him of the Imperial Government's bona fides:

Inform Hofmeyr [he told Robinson] that Her Majesty's Government repudiates Jameson's action, and are doing all in their power to counteract the mischief he has done. I have no doubt that the influence of Hofmeyr will be used in the same direction.

Onze Jan's reply contained a pointed reference to "men of high reputation in British financial and military circles, as well as in Her Majesty's Service" who had taken an active part in the events leading to the Raid, and he asked for a radical change in the government of the Company's territories and a "searching inquiry ... through impartial and energetic men" into the origins of the Raid. "There shall be full inquiry", Chamberlain replied on the 7th, and he asked Hofmeyr to "telegraph this to High Commissioner to save time and publish"<sup>122</sup>.

The following day, on the intercession of Adriaan Hofmeyr, he met Rhodes again at Groote Schuur. Rhodes was apparently indifferent about the interview - "A chat will do the country no harm, but I leave it to you", he replied to Hofmeyr's message of acceptance. However the chat apparently did some good, for they met again next day at the home of Thomas Louw. Hofmeyr left a record of this interview, and of his subsequent negotiations with Rhodes, written apparently in February:

121. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Kruger, 2 Jan. 1896 (telegram).

122. The correspondence is quoted in Hofmeyr, pp.494-5.

When I saw Rhodes at Tom Louw's ... I advised him either to resign his seat or to absent himself from P[arliament]t next session - advised him to issue manifesto in interest of reconciliation & peace, sketched how it should read & offered to write it. He said he would consider my advice. He said he was leaving for Kimberley on day after, but proved very nervous about his charter. I told him I had done my duty in my letter to Chamberlain - it was for Ch. to carry out his promise. If I could give any information to promote thoroughness of enquiry I would do so; but for the present my chief object was not anti-Charter agitation but to throw light on Bower's doings.

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Next day de Waal called on me at City Club and [he]<sup>123</sup> said Rhodes was going to Bulawayo where he intended staying long time; but if I was going to immediately attack his charter he could not go, etc. I replied there was a wire & he would be able to come down in a few days time when required, so that need not stand in his way. Ultimately I gave him the following to wire Rhodes:-

'Hofmeyr says he adhered to what he told you yesterday. The chief man he has his eye on now is not yourself. He will not gratuitously agitate against you'.

Rhodes never gave me any further information re manifesto or seat in Pt. - he left for Kimberley within a few hrs. instead of next day - instead of promoting peace & reconciliation he made bluffing speech at Kimberley - sent irritating wire to America, sneaked off to England, allowed Times to be filled with invidious fictions.

On 8 Feb. de Waal brought me following:-

'Communicate the following to Mr D.C. de Waal. Tell Hon. Hofmeyr I hear he continues to attack my Charter. He informed me he would leave it alone'.

I handed de Waal on - Feb. the following:

'Hofmeyr surprised know your message especially after your Kimberley speech, American cable, sudden trip to England, ignoring his advice and telegraphic fictions in Times, He reserves perfect liberty of action but has hitherto not made further attacks Charter, though freely giving legitimate information directly or indirectly bearing on Jameson Raid when asked. Hofmeyr has some intention if Johannesburg fictions in Times continue to cable exposure signed by himself and other prominent men'<sup>124</sup>.

The two men parted in anger, and they parted absolutely.

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123. The original has "I", which would not make sense.

124. For Adriaan Hofmeyr's letter, of which the Dutch original is in the Hofmeyr Papers, see Hofmeyr, p.499. For the meetings at Groote Schuur and Louw's house, see Hofmeyr, p.500; J.H.H. de Waal, pp.225-6; J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, pp.155-6. The memorandum is in vol. 11 of the Hofmeyr Papers.

It is impossible to page through the sheaf of letters, memoranda and telegrams in the Hofmeyr Papers which deal with the Jameson Raid, without gaining an impression of the sincerity, moderation and integrity of Onze Jan as he set about the unravelling of the mystery, counselling the victors to clemency, the Imperial authorities to honesty, and the rumour-mongers to hold their peace. By the time of his final communication with Rhodes, he had contributed a great deal towards the solution of the crisis. He had succeeded to some extent in softening the indignation of the Government and people of the Transvaal; he had tested Rhodes's sincerity and found it lacking; and he had forced the Imperial Government and its local representative into the position of having to declare, not only their opposition to the Raid but also their intention of holding a public investigation into the causes of it. Here, at least, was some achievement to offset his bitter personal disappointment.

## I

The military defeat of Jameson was taken by a reluctant Rhodes as the signal for the Government to resign, but the impending departure of the Governor for Pretoria delayed the formal resignation of the Ministry until 7 January, for a Cabinet crisis would have prevented Robinson's early departure. An adequate successor was difficult to find. Friends approached the Chief Justice, urging him to form a Government; but de Villiers explained through the Cape Times that he would not consider doing so until Hofmeyr and Sprigg (in that order) had tried and failed, adding that he had not been approached by the Governor, and that he was precluded by his position as Chief Justice from entering into negotiations with politicians<sup>1</sup>. Hofmeyr's reasons for not wanting to form a Government on this occasion may only be inferred from his refusals on previous occasions. But Sprigg was prepared to accept the very difficult task, and Onze Jan would not stand in his way, improbable though it must have seemed that a man who had insisted so strongly on a compulsory Scab Act would succeed in securing adequate Bond support. He informed Hofmeyr on the 8th that, with one exception, his Cabinet was ready. The exception concerned the portfolio of Agriculture, which tact decreed should be given to a Bondsman, and Sprigg's choice fell on either Pieter Faure or Thomas te Water:

I have told Te Water that probably Faure will be Secy. for Agriculture and in that case Te Water would be Colonial Secretary, who has now a light Department. Te Water seems well inclined, but it was a great surprise to him - I have given him until noon tomorrow for his decision. He asked for your opinion, and I told him you were favourable to his acceptance. It is very kind of you to take so much trouble in the matter<sup>2</sup>.

Te Water's anxieties were reflected in a telegraphic conversation which he must have had with Hofmeyr shortly after the

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1. E.A. Walker, Lord de Villiers and his Times, pp.267-8; Sir J. Rose Innes, Autobiography, p.127.
  2. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Sprigg to Hofmeyr, 8 Jan. 1896.

despatch of Sprigg's note. He had deferred his final answer to Sprigg in order to seek Hofmeyr's advice, not wishing to take "any step which our party might not cordially approve"<sup>3</sup>. Onze Jan refused to make up his mind for him, but put on that air of injured indifference which came to him easily in times of great personal disappointment, replying that, though Sprigg was probably not acceptable to the Republics, his proposed Ministry was "almost as good as any other which could be formed under existing circumstances". Personally, he continued, if he were forming a Ministry during the current crisis, he would not bother about the views of his team mates on peripheral matters, but leave them "perfect individual liberty of action":

It is all bosh to stand out for a complete programme of Principles. What the country grievously requires now is an administrative ministry that will see us through far greater questions than the details of Scab and the weight of the penny loaf. Decide for yourself.

"I see you are pretty well determined not to give me the advice I require", te Water complained. Had Schreiner been prepared to follow Sprigg, te Water would have found the decision easier; but Schreiner did not think that a Ministry under Sprigg could win the confidence of the Republics<sup>4</sup>. Further pressure from Sprigg, however, soon led te Water to accept Cabinet office, and the debate shifted to the question of which portfolio he was to hold. On the 10th, Sprigg told him that for health reasons Faure was disinclined to accept Agriculture, which would necessitate a good deal of travelling. Te Water felt that his own lack of farming qualifications "would challenge very strong opposition probably from both sides", and begged Sprigg to adhere to his original proposal.

In my proposal I am consulting both the public interest and your own [Sprigg replied]. You will really be placed in a superior position. At the present time the Agricultural Dept. is more important than that of the Colonial Secretary and requires at its head a man possessing exactly your qualifications. It will give you

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3. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. A document in Hofmeyr's hand which must belong to 8 or 9 January. It is quoted in part in J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, pp.508-9.
  4. E.A. Walker, W.P. Schreiner. A South African, p.75. Hofmeyr told te Water that he thought Schreiner had not accepted office because he "refuses to eat his last year's words on the grain duty, and wants a ministry acceptable to the Republics, so as not to wreck the Railway Convention and the Customs Union".

a great opportunity of making a successful start in ministerial life. So far from your holding that office being objected to it will be hailed with acclamation especially by those whom we desire to conciliate in regard to the Scab Act. My general difficulties are enormous. I must ask you to assist me in this matter . . . Please at this juncture trust yourself in my hands<sup>5</sup>.

So te Water, in response to Sprigg's urgent invitation, made the long cross-country journey from Graaff-Reinet to Cape Town. But by 13 January, when the Cabinet was formed, he had the Colonial Secretaryship, and Faure had been induced to accept Agriculture.

Te Water's acceptance of office committed the Bond to public support of the new Ministry, whose path had been made much straighter as a result of Hofmeyr's dedicated and fearless statesmanship in connection with the Raid. The congratulatory messages which Hofmeyr received from Republican as well as Colonial quarters were a good indication that the Cape and the Colonial Bondsmen had a mediatory role to fulfil<sup>6</sup>; but so great were the external and internal pressures to which the Bond was now subjected that its continued unity was placed in real jeopardy. On the one hand, it was committed to Sprigg. On the other, it had to face stiff demands from Pretoria for the effective punishment of Rhodes and the Chartered Company<sup>7</sup>, acceptance of which would have endangered its relationship with Sprigg. Meanwhile some of its members interpreted the Raid as a sign that Afrikaners should turn their backs on the strangers in their midst, placing the need for group security above the need for conciliation, whereas others were still prepared to give Rhodes a chance to explain himself, or to go along with him even if he failed to do so.

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5. Te Water Papers, vol. 56. Sprigg to te Water, te Water to Sprigg, 10 Jan.; Sprigg to te Water, 11 Jan. 1896 (telegrams)
  6. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Among the more interesting messages of congratulation were those of Borckenhagen, 1 Jan. 1896: "Lead friend and we shall follow"; C. van Boeschoten, Acting State Secretary of the South African Republic, 30 Jan. 1896, expressing Kruger's appreciation of Hofmeyr's services; and S.C. Cronwright-Schreiner, 20 Mar. 1896, from Kimberley (a most appreciative letter from a political opponent, quoted in Hofmeyr, p.510).
  7. The Transvaal Government sent two lawyers to Cape Town to collect evidence concerning the Raid and the Rand plot. Chie

## II

The Raid gave birth to a new form of self-conscious Afrikaner nationalism, at once self-critical and self-congratulatory, which tended to lay stress on the exclusiveness of the wronged group and its need to close its ranks. Some, like F. S. Malan, the new editor of Ons Land, saw the best hope for the future of Afrikanerdom in something like a spiritual rebirth.

Zullen de Afrikaanders blijven genden voor wat zij waard zijn [Malan wrot], zullen zij hun invloed op de toekomstige lotgevallen van dit land behouden, dan moet nadruk gelegd worden op het onderwijs en het nationaliteitsgevoel. Het hoofd en het hart moeten verzorgd worden, stappen moeten worden genomen om hoofd en hart zuiver te houden, en te bewaren van verduisterd te worden door den geest van materialisme die ons komt toevloeien van uit Europa<sup>8</sup>.

The same ideas were reflected in a series of articles contributed to Ons Land by Ds. P. J. G. de Vos of Stellenbosch, published under the title Nationale Vraagstukken during the course of this troubled year. According to de Vos, the Raid was an outcome of the Englishman's fundamental lack of respect for the Afrikaner. Afrikaners who had been anglicized therefore came in for his special reprobation, above all those who still looked upon Rhodes as a benefactor, whom he compared with small birds which had been lucky enough to escape from a trap, and remembered the gift of grain offered as bait, but not the intention to kill. So he told the Afrikaner to recover his self-respect, prize his language as never before, and return to his Bible.

In a negative sense, these feelings found expression in a renewed suspicion of the alien, of whatever origin. Even S. J. du Toit, who was not otherwise overwhelmed by a sense of insecurity, urged in his first note to Hofmeyr after the

7. (cont.) Justice Kotze insisted that the Colonial Bond should come out openly in favour of maximum penalties for the miscreants, in letters to Hofmeyr on 27 and 29 Jan. 1896 (Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11).

8. Quoted by B. Cloete, Die Lewe van Senator F.S. Malan, pp.126-7.

Raid "dat onze partij nou een ferme houding moeten innemen anders geven wij de Hollanderpartij oorzaak tegen ons"<sup>9</sup>.

His own long-standing resentment against the Hollander element in the South African Republic was widely shared by Afrikaners in the Cape, more especially by those who had tried and failed to obtain employment in Mansveldt's Education Department, or who held the high Transvaal tariff policy against the Netherlands Railway Company. The Dutch firms in the Transvaal had begun to sense even before the Raid that their presence was not entirely popular among the burghers, and had gone out of their way at the time of Jameson's expedition to demonstrate their solidarity with the Republic of their adoption<sup>10</sup>; but they soon had to face the fact that the new Afrikaner patriotism was something largely external to themselves. Even the correspondence of the moderate Chief Justice Kotzé was strongly tinged with the desire to build up Afrikaner volkseenheid and remove the alien influence from the counsels of his Government:

Zeer terecht zegt gy [he told Hofmeyr] dat wy niet een politiek van isolatie & van wantrouwen in de Kapenaars moeten volgen ... Daar zit het groot gevaar, en dit is een der hoofd oorzaken die geleid hebben tot de jongste onlusten, en zal nog veel onheil in den toekomst bewerken. De oogen van sommigen worden hier voor dat gevaar geopend & pogingen zullen & worden aangewend om den invloed van de 'Mijnbeestjes van het vasteland' voor goed te breken. Paul Kruger is voor ons & het land onmisbaar en ik ben bereid voor goed onder & met hem zamen te werken, maar hy moet ander raadsmanen hebben dan hy tot nu toe heeft gehad - raadsmanen van Afrikaander hart en bloed, die hem getrouwd zullen bystaan. Zie daar een eenvoudige & tevens moeilyke oplossing van alles! Zoodra genoemd invloed der buitenlandsche heertjes is gebroken, zal alles langzamerhand rechtekomen ... Kunt gy niet door middel der pers & de Afrikaner Bond stadig maar beslist het Afrikaansch volk ten uwent opwekken en door middel van dit alles ons krachtig bystaan om de Republiek te zuiveren van wat een molensteen om haar nek blykt te zyn? ... Een zuiver Afrikaansche Regeering in de Republiek is eene sine qua non & dan komen alle de andere dingen als van zelf<sup>11</sup>.

The indications are that Hofmeyr took these remarks seriously - as did Kruger in due course, when he came to see the practical wisdom of replacing Hollanders by Afrikaners in his leading offices of state.

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9. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 1 Jan. 1896.  
 10. P.J. van Winter, Onder Krugers Hollanders, vol. II, pp. 253-4, 264-72; Sir J.G. Kotzé, Biographical Memoirs and Reminiscences vol. II, pp. 235-7; J.S. Marais, The Fall of Kruger's Republic c. I.  
 11. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Kotzé to Hofmeyr, 14 Feb. 1896.

There was, however, a small but influential group among the Cape Afrikaners who were not only unwilling to lend their support to a narrow nationalist revival, but reluctant even to sever their ties with Rhodes. David de Waal, Hofmeyr's brother-in-law, was among these<sup>12</sup>. So was Tom Louw, in whose house Rhodes and Hofmeyr had held their final meeting<sup>13</sup>. Such men formed the nucleus of Rhodes's "My Dutch" group, who would soon find it impossible to remain within the Bond, but who were initially hard to distinguish from a much larger fellowship, held together by a sense of obligation to Rhodes, by disapproval of precipitate action, or by the feeling that the South African Republic was not, after all, completely free from blame. Hofmeyr himself was alive to the weaknesses in Kruger's State, and although he turned down Chamberlain's unwise and untimely proposals for the establishment of local autonomy on the Rand, which Sir Hercules Robinson submitted to him for comment in February, he agreed in May, on Robinson's instance, to submit a private memorandum containing far-reaching ideas for reform in the Transvaal<sup>14</sup>.

The most sensational case was that of S. J. du Toit, whose deviation and ultimate defection could not fail to have deep repercussions on the Bond on account of his peculiar standing in it. Shortly after the Raid, du Toit wrote to Hofmeyr:

Ik nam en neem noch een middenweg intusschen de 2 uitersten. Het spijt mij zeer, maar ik kan nog niet met u zeggen: 'Hij moet niet, hij kan niet aanblijven', enz. mogelijk omdat ik niet zooveel van de zaken weet. Mijn standpunt is nog: eerst explicatie van Rhodes krijgen. Weigert hij zulks te geven, dan natuurlijk moeten wij stappen nemen. Maar hij heeft te veel voor

12. J.H.H. de Waal, Die Lewe van D.C. de Waal, pp.221-33.

13. Rhodes Papers, vol. 27. T. Louw to Rhodes, 15 Jan. 1896.

14. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Robinson to Hofmeyr, 8, 11 Feb. 1896, and the "Memorandum on proposed Local Autonomy for Rand District" in Hofmeyr's hand, dated 11 Feb. Also, Robinson to Hofmeyr, 11 May 1896, and Hofmeyr's memorandum of 18 May, entitled "Suggestions in connection with proposed Transvaal reforms". Hofmeyr's suggestions included the grant of municipal government to Johannesburg; the reform of the Transvaal constitution to prevent the introduction of important changes in the law by mere besluit; considerable relaxation of the franchise law in favour of uitlanders; the abolition of the Second Volksraad and the enlargement of the First.

ons gedaan om hem zoos naar overhoord te werpen zonder hem allen redelijken kans tot verantwoording te geven. En als hij dan gaan moet, dan nog wil ik liever dat we als vrienden uiteengaan en zooveel mogelijk zamen werken in de toekomst. Tegen agitatie in den zin van opzegging van Charter heb ik gewichtige bezwaar, evenzeer als tegen eene direkte belasting op diamanten<sup>15</sup>.

Rhodes's sudden departure for the north removed all possibility of an interview of the sort which du Toit desired, and he wrote again to Hofmeyr on 13 January:

Jammer van Rhodes! Zoo begint elkeen te zeggen nu hij gevallen is. Hadden wij onze zamenkomst als vroeger aangekondigd, dan was mijn plan een deputatie naar hem te zenden als partij om hem te hooren en te rapporteeren, waarop wij dan een of ander stap konden nemen. Ik ben met u overtuigd dat hij schuldig is, maar wilde hem gaarne uit eigen mond geoordeeld zijn. Nu zullen wij het onderzoek moeten afwachten<sup>16</sup>.

These letters reveal a slight difference of view between du Toit and Onze Jan immediately after the Raid, but as yet no real rift.

It has sometimes been suggested that du Toit's breach with the Bond majority took place at the Burghersdorp Congress in March 1896; but this is improbable. An interesting debate was promised on this occasion by the fact that F. S. Malan (who thought as Hofmeyr did) and S. J. du Toit gave notice of contradictory motions, the former blaming Rhodes for the Raid, the latter placing the onus on Jameson. The suggestion of Malan's biographer that a clash between these two men took place at Congress is not unreasonable, more especially because a tradition grew up in Bond circles that it was Malan's contribution to the Raid debate that brought him into sudden prominence in the Party; but the details given by this writer are in some respects difficult to square with the documentary

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15. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 6 Jan. 1896.

16. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. S.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 13 Jan. 1896. See N.J. Hofmeyr, De Afrikaner-Boer en de Jameson-Inval, p.393, for the text of a motion moved by du Toit at a meeting at Paarl early in January, which condemned the Raid but also alluded to "redelijke grieven der Uitlanders".

evidence<sup>17</sup>. Malan's motion congratulated the Transvaal on its defeat of the Raiders, thanked Hofmeyr for his stand and assured him of the Bond's support, held the Imperial Government to its promise of a full inquiry, urged Sprigg to call an early meeting of Parliament with a view to instituting an investigation of the plot by the Colonial representatives, and censured Rhodes for his actions both before and after the Raid, with the clear implication that unless he gave a satisfactory explanation of them it would be impossible for the Bond to cooperate with him in the future. Malan proposed this motion with a long and effective speech, which was warmly applauded. Du Toit rose immediately to second it, explaining his decision not to move the alternative motion which he had drawn up. He mentioned the name of Rhodes with greater apparent reverence than Malan thought the occasion warranted; but he praised Hofmeyr's stand, and described Rhodes's South African policy in not very flattering terms as "de amalgamatie van de slang die het muisje inslikt". When he sat down, unanimity reigned.

17. Cloete, p.128. She states that du Toit actually moved an amendment to Malan's motion in order to place the blame upon Jameson, whereupon Malan refused to alter his own proposal, and the Congress adjourned to enable the two men to hold a private discussion, each accompanied by two supporters. This discussion, she continues, proved fruitless. Du Toit then lost his temper and stood on his dignity, a gesture which failed to move the young Malan. But then, in the "evening", when Congress resumed, "toe die voorstel weer tot bespreking kom, tot Frans se verbasing, het ds. Du Toit opgestaan en gesê: 'Ek trek my voorstel terug, en sekondeer die van die afgevaardigde van Kaapstad!'"

The 'David and Goliath' quality of this version of the events, as given by Malan's daughter, may perhaps reflect the tone of the debate. But the minutes do not support the statement that an open clash took place on the floor of Congress, followed by an adjournment for purpose of lobbying, followed by an unexpected decision on du Toit's part to second Malan's motion. They indicate, rather, that the whole question was disposed of, from beginning to end, on the morning of Saturday 14 March. It is possible that, for the sake of presenting a united front, Congress decided to expunge evidence of an open clash between Malan and du Toit from the record; but there is no reference to such a clash either in Malan's account (Ons Land, 17, 21 Mar. 1896), or in du Toit's (Patriot, 19 Mar. 1896, and the unofficial minutes reprinted from De Paarl), or in the account taken over from the Express in N.J. Hofmeyr, pp.398-416. See also Notulen, 1896 Congress, pp.9-10.

Whether the undivided support which Malan's motion received represented the surrender of du Toit, or whether the motion carried was not rather a compromise between the antagonists<sup>18</sup>, must go unanswered, for, if there was any rift to hide, Congress was careful to paper over the cracks.

Parliament was opened at the beginning of May, and Merriman, furious at the recent evil manifestations of the capitalism which he loathed, moved for the revocation or alteration of the B.S.A.C. Charter on the 12th. His motion went further than the Bond's Burghersdorp resolution, and the Bond parliamentarians voted against it and in favour of an amendment moved by Schreiner, which called for a select committee of inquiry and asked the Imperial Government to take steps to alter the governance of Rhodesia in such a way as to make a recurrence of the Raid impossible. Walker supposes that Schreiner dissuaded Hofmeyr and his colleagues from supporting Merriman's proposal; but it appears rather that Schreiner chose a form of words to fit in with the Burghersdorp resolution.<sup>19</sup> The Bond in Parliament maintained a front as unbroken as that of the Burghersdorp Congress. Schreiner's select committee was appointed. All its members save Upington attributed responsibility for the Raid to Rhodes, and its report was carried by the Assembly without opposition on 24 July<sup>20</sup>.

Nine days earlier, there had appeared in Paarl a new Dutch-language daily newspaper named Het Dagblad, of which S. J. du Toit was the editor. He announced that this paper would take the place of De Paarl, while the Patriot would

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18. It is noteworthy that Malan's motion included provision for consultation with Rhodes, which was the essence of du Toit's case.

19. See Walker, Schreiner, pp.79-80. The Burghersdorp resolution had not asked for the revocation of the Charter, but merely expressed the wish "dat ingrijpende veranderingen in de administratie van Rhodesia zullen gebracht worden om aanvallen als die van Dr Jameson in 't vervolg te voorkomen" - a form of words reflected in Schreiner's amendment. See also Michell, Rhodes, vol. II, pp.185-92; Hofmeyr, pp.510-1; J. van der Poel, The Jameson Raid, pp. 176-8.

20. Upington, a member of the Cabinet, was its chairman. The other members were Innes, Merriman, Schreiner, Jones of Port Elizabeth, T.E.Fuller, and P.J.du Toit(the only Bondsman).

continue to appear as its week-end supplement. Het Dagblad would adhere to Bond principles, actually claiming to be a Bond organ, and it would aim at the reconciliation of the Dutch and English sections of the population. There is good authority for the statement that the paper was at some stage financed by Rhodes, and though the evidence for this assertion has never been published, the fact does not seem to have been denied either by du Toit or his biographer<sup>21</sup>. The appearance of the paper gave the first clear sign of a rift within the Bond; but it was a rift which developed slowly and was helped by other factors, not least among them the public acts of Rhodes himself.

After concluding the Matabele war at some personal risk in October 1896, Rhodes made a triumphant progress through Natal and the Cape Colony in December and January, on his way to give evidence before the committee of inquiry in London. He was given a rousing welcome in Port Elizabeth on 23 December, presided over the annual meeting of De Beers at Kimberley on the 28th, and was honoured with a banquet in the Cape Town drill hall on 5 January, before sailing for England the following day. The enthusiasm of his reception on these occasions was matched only by that which greeted his return in April.

The columns of Het Dagblad before Rhodes's departure for England contained little to which the faithful Bondsman could legitimately take exception. It argued on 25 September against the confiscation of the Charter, using the argument, hoary in Bond circles, that the alternative of crown colony rule for Rhodesia was not a satisfactory solution. It

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21. See J.D. du Toit, S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, pp.335-6, where the lie direct is not given; Hofmeyr, p.514 (but I have not seen the correspondence referred to in the Hofmeyr Papers); Walker, Schreiner, p.84; Sir J.T. Molteno, The Dominion of Afrikanderdom, p.132; and more especially J.H.H. de Waal, p.231, who adds the information that financial help was given by Dr Rutherford Harris, with the suggestion that this was in connection with the purchase of premises in Cape Town. (Het Dagblad was published in Cape Town only from May 1897.)

devoted considerable editorial space to Rhodes's impending visit to Cape Town in January, deprecating the suggestion that he should be given a public reception, and still placing the onus on him to prove his innocence in respect of the Raid<sup>22</sup>. In January 1897, in fact, S. J. du Toit's position was not appreciably different from that which he had taken up in January 1896. But he was still arguing that Rhodes should be given an opportunity to clear himself even after the Cape parliamentary inquiry had placed responsibility for the Raid on his shoulders, and it was primarily this fact that lost him the confidence of the Afrikaner Bond, to whose principles he still professed an undeviating loyalty.

The Malmesbury congress was the turning point. By March 1897 the bulk of the Bondsmen were no longer in any doubt that necessity demanded the condemnation of Rhodes and all his works. A delegate from Colesberg therefore proposed a motion to repudiate the editorial policy of Het Dagblad and deny it the right to call itself a Bond organ. The fact that the paper had not yet committed a major indiscretion was borne out by the lack of unanimity in congress<sup>23</sup>. S. J. du Toit put up a spirited defence; but the meeting carried by thirty-five votes to twenty-five an amendment by J. M. Hoffman to the effect that recognition should be withheld on the ground that it had never been granted. The Congress then made its position clear beyond dispute on other related issues. It took the findings of the Cape select committee as a sufficient justification for a final breach with Rhodes, though the London inquiry was still in progress, and roundly declared that

alle overwegingen van nationaal zelf-respect, politieke eerlijkheid en goede trouw de Nationale Afrikaner Partij gebieden den heer Rhodes verder geen de minste politieke ondersteuning te verleenen hetzij op publieke vergaderingen, in de drukpers, bij de stembus, in het parlement of waar ook<sup>24</sup>.

22. Het Dagblad, 9 Dec. 1896, 7 Jan. 1897.

23. Notulen, 1897 Congress, p.14; Het Dagblad, 13 Mar. 1897.

24. Notulen, 1897 Congress, pp.23-4.

It disowned two Rhodes men, Thomas Louw and M. M. Venter, who had been summoned to the London inquiry to present "the Dutch point of view", by declaring that they represented neither the Bond nor any other significant body of Colonial opinion, and spent ten pounds on a cable to London conveying this information<sup>25</sup>. It also decided to send to all branches a warning against the danger of weakening the "goede zaak van het Afrikanerisme" by compromising with other parties whose principles were repugnant to those of the Bond. With Congress in this mood, du Toit must have realized that the parting of the ways had come; but he still chose to remain in the Bond in the vain hope that he might be able to change its policies from within.

Du Toit's hope was vain because it proved to be impossible in the hardening political climate of 1897 and 1898 to build up a moderate centre party capable of holding its own against the twin pressures of the Afrikaner Bond and its emergent rival, the South African League. This difficulty was perhaps less easy to see in the second half of 1897 than at any other time between the Raid and the outbreak of the South African war, for it was a period of unusual fluidity in Colonial politics. Sir Alfred Milner, the new High Commissioner, was still taking stock of the position, and apparently in conciliatory mood. Rhodes was away in Rhodesia, and had not yet announced his intention of resuming a leading role in Colonial politics. The Ministry, for all its inner tensions, showed no signs of breaking up. Indeed, Thomas te Water steadfastly refused to surrender his portfolio despite constant pressure from his constituents and Bond parliamentary colleagues to leave the Government before he became indelibly labelled as a Rhodes man<sup>26</sup>. To resign prematurely, as he must have realized, would have been to precipitate the rift between the races and thrust Sprigg into the arms of the League.

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25. Notulen, 1897 Congress, pp.27, 34.

26. Te Water Papers, vol. 57. Letters received by te Water between May and September 1897 from C.H.O. Marais (editor of Onze Courant), G. van Heerden, Ds. W.P. de Villiers, J.F. Joubert and D.P. van den Heever.

Under these circumstances, it was still reasonable to believe that a moderate party, if quickly brought into being, might succeed in stemming the racial tide. Much depended on James Rose Innes, the leader of the moderate South African Political Association which had been formed in May 1895. But Innes was temperamentally unsuited to lead a political party, and in the last resort aware that even his personal reputation would not have been sufficient to bring an effective opposition party into being. He later slightly referred to his "bare half-dozen" followers in the 1897 House as an "Opposition rump"<sup>27</sup>. The suggestion that Innes might lead a centre party was raised and rejected by du Toit in Het Dagblad on 28 October, and again on 5 March 1898. Du Toit in fact wanted the Bond to fill this mediatory role. On 7 September he concluded a series of extremely long-winded articles under the title Onze Politieke Aardbewing, in which he had reviewed the history of the Rhodes problem from the time of the Raid to the publication of the London committee's report on it. "We are agreed", he wrote in the English translation of this final article, "that we as an Africander party can no longer follow Mr Rhodes after what has happened". But although he accepted the view that Rhodes was the most guilty party in the affair, he considered that he had already received as much punishment as it would be wise to mete out to him. What then should be done? The principles of the Bond, du Toit declared, contained a sufficient answer to the difficulty:

We have been advocating for more than a year ... that a strong moderate party should be formed in Parliament, by which means the progressive Africanders and the moderate Englishmen can join each other and can co-operate in a broad, healthy South African policy ... The reason why the Bond on the one hand and the League on the other so often go over to extremes cannot be ascribed to their principles as laid down in their programmes, but to the sentiments of their individual members.

But "the door of the Bond is open still", and he exhorted the progressive Afrikaners and moderate Englishmen to join it and turn it from its mistaken ways<sup>28</sup>.

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27. Innes, p.144.

28. Het Dagblad, 29 Oct. 1897.

This was a move in the right direction, however unrealistic; but S. J. du Toit was the wrong person to make it. It was the weakness of all the Bond renegades, the "Nicodemuses who visited me by night", as Innes remembered Rhodes describing them, that they were unable to convince the public mind of the disinterestedness of their motives. They were thought to be loyal, in Molteno's phrase, only to "the sovereign in Rhodes's pocket", S. J. du Toit no less than the others. The Malmesbury Congress had demolished his effective influence over the Bond. This had happened at a time when, as at the start of his political career, he found himself isolated in ecclesiastical circles too, for the schismatic Kruiskerk movement which he had launched at meetings of the faithful in Paarl in January 1896 and January 1897 had failed to make much impression on the mass of N.G. churchmen<sup>29</sup>. He was therefore deprived of the support of his fellow clergy when such might have been useful in the political context. At Malmesbury, the Bond had shown that it was not interested in conciliation, because to conciliate was to appear weak. The same was seen to be true of Rhodes when, after announcing his intention of resuming an active political career in January 1898, he set out to destroy the power of the mugwumps with all the craft and influence at his command. His interest was not in moderates, whether English- or Dutch-speaking, but in men who, when it came to the point, could be relied on to throw in their lot with him<sup>30</sup>.

Thus the influence of the Innes and du Toit groups was crushed, by the former's analogy<sup>31</sup>, between the League hammer and the Bond anvil. There is no better illustration of how this was done than the story of the Western Province Council election of 1898.

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29. J.A.S. Oberholster, Die Gereformeerde Kerke onder die Kruis in Suid-Afrika, pp.225-46; J.D. du Toit, pp.369-73.
30. Michell II pp.235-40. Speaking at Port Elizabeth on 17 September, Rhodes held forth on the subject of independents: "I can respect your Bondsmen, and I can fight your Bondsmen. But these Independents! I cannot stand them..."
31. Cape Hansard (Assembly), 1898, p.162, quoted by Sank, p.198.

At the end of August 1897, a deputation of Bondsmen in the Western Circle interviewed two potential Bond candidates, M. L. Neethling, who had represented the Circle since 1869, and a Paarl wine farmer named J. A. Faure, and on the strength of their advice the Paarl District Bestuur decided on 31 August to back Faure, as there was little chance of the Bond being able to secure the return of more than one candidate in this Circle<sup>32</sup>. Innes had also been interested in Faure's candidature since January 1897<sup>33</sup>. Towards the end of the year, however, Faure came under the influence of a newly formed Rhodes-ite electoral committee, as may be seen from the markedly pro-Rhodian manifesto which he issued in January<sup>34</sup>. The S.A.P.A. and the Cape Town Bondsmen therefore decided that he was no longer a suitable candidate to put forward, and Hofmeyr's Bond supporters at Paarl, led by Dr J. M. Hoffman, accordingly set out to secure the cancellation of Faure's nomination. They were supported by the Commissie van Toezicht, which declared that in the event of official nomination day occurring after the term of office of existing Bond besturen expired in December (which it did), all Bond nominations for Council seats were to be regarded as invalid, and fresh ones made by the new besturen<sup>35</sup>. On account of the Paarl situation, David de Waal informed Rhodes, Hofmeyr "upset the whole election in the Colony"<sup>36</sup>. The Paarl District Bestuur, in which the influence of S. J. du Toit was still dominant, represented three-quarters of the total Bond membership in the Circle<sup>37</sup>. They resented the Commissie's interference, and when Hoffman attempted to obtain the establishment of a new branch named Zuider Paarl

32. Hofmeyr Papers, vol.3. Paarl District Bestuur to Commissie van Toezicht, 17 Jan. 1898, which recapitulates the early part of the story.

33. Sank, pp.169-84, where Faure's candidature is considered from the League and S.A.P.A. points of view. On these bodies, see below p. 374.

34. Published in Cape Times, 22 Jan. 1898.

35. Het Dagblad, 6, 17 Nov. 1897, gives du Toit's strong opposition to this decision, which was taken after much correspondence between the members of the Commissie van Toezicht.

36. Rhodes Papers, vol. 27. D.C. de Waal to Rhodes, 30 Dec. 1897.

37. The published membership at the time was: Paarl (including Wellington) 159, Cape Town 53. The Stellenbosch branch had ceased to exist.

which would have supported the candidature of Neethling, they rejected the application on a technicality and retaliated by founding a branch of Noorder Paarl which was loyal to Faure<sup>38</sup>. The Cape Town Bondsmen meanwhile nominated Neethling, and invited the delegates from the Paarl District Bestuur to attend a cirkel-vergadering in Cape Town on 29 December to elect the Bond candidate. Du Toit and van Eyk duly arrived on the appointed day to find that Tielman Hofmeyr, the Cape Town delegate, was not present - deliberately, as it subsequently turned out, in order to prevent a quorum at a meeting which would certainly have chosen the Paarl candidate<sup>39</sup>. The Paarl District Bestuur, meeting on 12 January, therefore decided to ask the Commissie van Toezicht to declare Faure the lawful candidate. Hofmeyr found an excuse for not doing so; he had only received the request on 24 January, which did not give him time to investigate the question before official nomination day on 5 February; he was therefore unable to do more than judge according to the bare facts of the case, which were that a quorum had not been present at the cirkelvergadering; but he would willingly refer the case to his secundus (J. P. du Plessis, M.L.A. for Cradock, who was on his deathbed and clearly not in a position to be consulted!). N. F. de Waal concurred. Du Toit, the third member of the Commissie, quite correctly referred the matter to his secundus, T. P. Theron; but Theron endorsed Hofmeyr's view, probably on Hofmeyr's advice<sup>40</sup>. Thus had the Commissie van Toezicht, acting against the spirit if not the letter of the constitution, but in a manner which accorded with the known attitude of the Bondsmen as expressed in Congress, rejected a parliamentary candidate who enjoyed the support of well over half of the Bondsmen in

38. Hofmeyr Papers, vol.3. Hoffman to Hofmeyr, 3 Nov. 1897. Het Dagblad, 22 Dec. 1897.

39. Ons Land, 25 Dec. 1897; Cape Town Bond Notulen, 23 Dec. 1897; 11 Jan. 1898; De Kolonist (supplement to Het Dagblad), 15 Jan. 1898 (a report by S.J. du Toit). Had there been a quorum present, Faure would have received the nomination by two votes to one.

40. Hofmeyr Papers, vol.3. Paarl District Bestuur to Commissie van Toezicht, 17 Jan. 1898, and remarks thereon by Hofmeyr (24 Jan.), N.F. de Waal (28 Jan.), and S.J. du Toit (1 Feb.) See also report by Theron dated 4 Feb. 1898.

the Circle. They took care at the next Congress to provide the Commissie with the discretionary powers which they had used without authority, and in doing so widened the rift with S. J. du Toit still further, to the point of forcing him out of the party.

The editorials in Het Dagblad during the first quarter of 1898 contained frequent allusions to the "Bond dictatorship [which] has definitely been established at the Ons Land office", and at the Worcester Congress in February the issue was brought to a climax. For the first time, the Commissie van Toezicht election was contested, seventeen candidates being proposed to fill the three positions<sup>41</sup>. After three ballots, only Hofmeyr was left of the original Commissie, S. J. du Toit being rejected in favour of his Paarl opponent, J. M. Hoffman, and N. F. de Waal losing by a narrow margin to Thomas Theron. Du Toit's influence was thereby excluded, and the majority proceeded to strengthen their position still further by adopting two changes in the constitution as proposed in the outgoing Commissie's majority report<sup>42</sup>, one empowering the Provincial Bestuur to dissolve and reconstitute any Ward or District Besturen in the event of their coming under any influence "die nadelig is voor of vijandig tegen de organisatie", the other giving the Commissie van Toezicht the sort of discretion it had already used in the case of the Western Circle election, namely the right to refuse recognition as a Bond candidate to any person so chosen, should it consider that the interests of the Bond would be furthered by such refusal<sup>43</sup>. Du Toit was furious, and moved off in high dudgeon to consider his next step.

A revealing letter from Theron to Frederic de Waal, his

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41. Notulen, 1898 Congress, p.12. The voting on the first ballot, which gives a direct indication of the amount of support S.J. du Toit enjoyed in Congress, was as follows (in relation to the first five places): J.H. Hofmeyr 76, Dr J.M. Hoffman 49, N.F. de Waal 29, T.P. Theron 22, S.J. du Toit 18.
42. S.J. du Toit's minority report is discussed in J.D. du Toit pp.182-4. Both it and the majority report were published in the Notulen, 1898 Congress, pp.34,39.
43. Notulen, 1898 Congress, pp.33-4. See below, Appendix F.

predecessor on the Commissie van Toezicht, throws some light on the malaise which afflicted the Bond leadership following the defeat of du Toit.

Laat my uw maar hierby zeggen [he wrote], dat de Brandstof voor de vlammetje daar ontstoken, grooter en verder verspreid is dan men denkt en in die zaak meer volgelingen hebben zal dan wy verwachten. Zelf hier by ons en op meer plaatsen door my onlangs bezocht, was hetzelfde gevoelen op te merken en hoorde men over dezelfde zaak spreken en plannen maken om alle verbintenis met de organi[s]atie op te zeggen. Ik betreur die dingen en voel er zwaar onder, en had men in Congres naar myn onwaardige raad geluisterd in die gevolg dingen en zaken waren misschien anders geloopt, maar nu wordt het een visschen in troebele wateren, en wy gaan tot onze schande er onder lyden<sup>44</sup>.

He went on to propose that an open letter to all Bondsmen should be published in the press, requesting them through their District Besturen to urge delay in the reprinting of the constitution (that is, incorporating the Worcester Congress amendments), until Congress had had another opportunity to consider the position. De Waal, however, passed the letter on to Hofmeyr with adverse comments, which Onze Jan endorsed:

Het volgen van Toms raad [Hofmeyr wrote] zou kunnen uitgelegd worden als ophitsen van takken tot verzet tegen Provinciaal Bestuur te verzetten [sic]. Ik heb geen vryheid iets anders te raden dan houden aan uwe instructies.

The amended constitution was therefore published, and the seal set upon the schism.

While the Bond was thus divided within itself, the Progressives, as the party under Rhodes's leadership had come to be called, succeeded in winning the Council elections with slight gains in the Western, North-Western and Midland Circles which were just sufficient to tip the scales in their favour. S. J. du Toit considered this Progressive victory to be a vindication of his views, and told his readers:

One thing is perfectly clear: the future belongs to the Progressives. There is only one remedy for the Bond party; namely, to pursue a moderately progressive policy, to leave the retrogressive course they have lately been following, and not to run candidates with

44. Hofmeyr Papers, vol.7 (Paarl election folder). Theron to de Waal, 11 Apr. 1898. According to the report in Ons Land, 24 Feb. 1898, Theron did not speak during the debate at congress; but a proposal similar to that made by him in this letter was made by H.J.H. Claassens of Victoria West.

such extreme views. If this is declined, the result of the Legislative Assembly election will be a more crushing defeat to them than was the case at the Council election<sup>45</sup>.

These remarks, a curious compound of moderation and defeatism, illustrate his frame of mind when, on 23 April, he and his Paarl supporters established a new political party, the Koloniale Unie (Colonial Union) to witness to the errors into which the Afrikaner Bond had fallen.

The nucleus round which du Toit constructed his new party were those members of the Paarl District Bestuur who had backed the candidature of J. A. Faure. There were two main planks to their programme: the removal of racial hatred between the two "Europeesche nationaliteiten", and the strict operation of the majority principle at all levels of the party machine<sup>46</sup>. Was it permissible to join the new party without giving up one's membership of the Bond? Du Toit turned this awkward question at the inaugural meeting, perhaps because it exposed the pathos of his own position, his severance in practice, though not by any formal act of resignation or expulsion, from the party which he himself had created twenty years earlier:

Hy is bereid [runs the report], wat zij ook al mogen besluiten, aan te toonen dat wij eerlijk gehandeld hebben, en dat, indien wij mogen besluiten den Bond te bedanken dat wij zulks deden niet om de Paarlse Bondskwestie, maar omdat de fondamente van den Bond omver geworpen zijn door de invoegingen in de Constitutie bij 't jongste Congres<sup>47</sup>.

It seemed evident, however, that the Union men would have to oppose the Bond in the forthcoming Assembly elections, and the only question was whether they would fight as an independent middle party or join forces with Rhodes and his Progressives. In fact, they did the latter, and in doing so destroyed what slender chance they had of drawing moderate men away from the

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45. Het Dagblad, 2 Apr. 1898.

46. For the constitution of the Colonial Union, as adopted at its inaugural meeting, see Appendix K.

47. Het Dagblad, 26 Apr. 1898. At the 1899 Bond Congress (Notulen, p.29) Colonial Union members were declared ineligible for the Bond.

Bond<sup>48</sup>. They held their first congress early in 1899, at which branches in Paarl, Barkly West, Prieska, Britstown and Cape Town were represented<sup>49</sup>. But by this time their movement was already declining. At the end of September 1898, du Toit also had to admit that the publication of a Dutch-language daily "does not serve the purpose we had expected to attain". Het Dagblad ceased to appear forthwith, and its editor turned his waning energies to the publication of De Kolonist on alternate days<sup>50</sup>.

S. J. du Toit's departure into the wilderness marked the end of a political career which was full of enormous contradictions, in which only two constant features stand out: a devotion to Neo-Calvinist doctrine and a desire to secure the acceptance of the Afrikaans language in public life and public worship. Beside these aims, both of which preceded and outlasted his venture into politics, all else was fickle. A prolific writer, with a firm grasp of academic principles within a narrow field, he seems to have lacked the originality of the real scholar. Impetuous to a fault, given in some degree to casuistry, he was the sort of person who probably did not know when he was bluffing himself. To one writer he has appeared as a "lonely Ishmael"<sup>51</sup>, to another as the victim of a disappointed idealism<sup>52</sup>. He possessed a rare gift for getting out of step with his closest political allies, and was a bad politician largely because he had the courage of his own unstable convictions. A suggestion of classic tragedy overshadows a career which began with the brash uncouthness of a political revivalism largely of his own making (though it grew out of a real need), and ended in tempestuous days with a mellow but sadly ineffectual plea for political peace.

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48. See below, pp. 391-2

49. J.A. Coetzee, Politieke Groepering in die wording van die Afrikanernasie, p.188.

50. Het Dagblad, 30 Sept. 1898. His last political act was to fight a Richmond seat in the Assembly elections in August.

51. P.J. Nienaber, in a book thus entitled.

52. J.A. Coetzee, pp.189-91.

## III

The formation of a moderate centre party in the Cape Colony was thwarted by the decision of the Bond to close its ranks, which was in turn due to the appearance in 1895 and 1896 of two new political organizations hostile to the Bond, which directed their appeal mainly to the English-speaking voter. The first of these, the South African Political Association (S.A.P.A.), was small and politically weak. It was led by Innes and the Cape Town merchant, J. W. Jagger, and it preached cheap bread, dear brandy, and a humane native policy<sup>53</sup>. The South African League, however, which had emerged since the Jameson Raid, was gaining in strength at a rapid rate, and had held a very successful congress at Queenstown in May 1896<sup>54</sup>. This body differed from the S.A.P.A. in its more outspoken advocacy of British supremacy in South Africa, which led its members to deplore the Raid as a failure rather than to denounce it as a crime. It paid no more than lip-service to liberal ideas in the field of race relations. On tariff matters, it was at one with Jagger and his free traders, in so far as its rural supporters allowed it to be. With brazen indifference to moles and beams, it waged war on the Bond on the ground of its alleged racialism. It also favoured a compulsory Scab Act. It thus attacked on a broad front, appealing to English ultra-loyalists, urban free traders and progressive sheep-farmers alike, and presented the novel spectacle of a political party which seriously set itself the task of forcing the Bondsmen on to the Opposition benches. Its organization was federal, with associated branches in the Transvaal and Natal, while its Cape membership had reached 4,500 by July 1896<sup>55</sup>, distributed

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53. Y.P. Sank, The Origin and Development of the Cape Progressive Party, c.IV, dates the birth of the S.A.P.A. on 28 May 1895, a week after 26 members of Parliament had voted against a motion by D.C. de Waal in favour of a higher tariff on imported wheat and flour.

54. For descriptions of the S.A. League, see Sank, cc. V, VI, and M.F. Bitensky, The South African League: British Imperialist Organization in South Africa, 1896-1899, especially cc. III, VII.

55. The official Bond membership in March 1896 was 8,511.

through branches which rose in number from 24 at the time of the 1896 Queenstown Congress to 74 by October 1900. Its main tactical objective in 1897 was to break the Sprigg-Bond marriage of convenience and win the premier over to its side.

Sprigg was ever on the look-out for parliamentary allies who might take the place of the Bondsmen on the Government benches. He had additional cause to do so in 1897, when, to the perennial strain between the Bondsmen and himself over the issue of scab legislation, was now added further friction over the handling of a serious rinderpest epidemic<sup>56</sup>. So slender, indeed, was his hold on his Bond followers, that in April 1897 the Government was nearly defeated in a 'no confidence' division in which the bulk of the Bondsmen voted with the Opposition - an occasion on which the Government may truthfully be said to have owed its survival to the official Opposition, the Speaker's casting vote, and the timely return of Rhodes from his ordeal in London<sup>57</sup>.

It was not in Sprigg's nature, however, to forsake one group of political supporters without making sure that their opponents would serve him better, and his actions during the 1897 session show that he was still calculating on Bond support and working to retain it. He therefore supported du Toit's 'preservation of peace' motion of 15 April, which received point chiefly from the fact that it was carried by the House against an amendment by Innes demanding the redress of "legitimate uitlander grievances"<sup>58</sup>. His native policy

56. Owing to the indignation of the 1897 Bond Congress (Notulen, pp.17,33), a proclamation ordering the slaughter of healthy beasts in infected herds had to be withdrawn.

57. Innes, pp.142-6; Walker, Schreiner, pp.95-9; Hofmeyr, pp. 515-7; J.H.H. de Waal, pp.241-2; Marais, c.VI.

58. Du Toit's motion read: "That this House, being of opinion that the occurrence of hostilities between the European communities of South Africa would for many years to come prove disastrous to the best interests of the country, and earnestly desiring to secure peace and establish mutual confidence in and between the various South African States and Colonies, wishes to express the conviction that these objects can best be obtained by the faithful and reciprocal observance of all obligations under treaties, conventions, or agreements, and whilst averse to the interference of any foreign power in any dispute with Her Majesty's Government, means could be devised to obtain an amicable settlement of any differences which may arise in the interpretation of such obligations, and that by the adoption of a policy of moderation, mutual conciliation and fairness in  
(cont.)

during this year suited his Bond allies equally well. It included the settlement of the Langeberg rebellion in Bechuanaland with the confiscation of a large tract of land for white occupation<sup>59</sup>, and the passage of a Transkeian Territories Bill which armed the Governor with extensive powers of arbitrary arrest and detention in the tribal areas<sup>60</sup>. Furthermore, Sprigg went out of his way to resist the growing agitation in the towns for the removal of agricultural protection, and the Bondsmen appreciated his efforts<sup>61</sup>. Despite this show of cooperation, however, the partnership wore thinner by the day, Sprigg left Cape Town in the middle of June to attend Queen Victoria's diamond jubilee celebrations and the Colonial Conference in London. He responded to the spirit of the occasion, but took liberties with the benevolence of the Cape Parliament, by offering a warship to the Imperial navy in place of the modest financial contribution which he had been authorized to make. "That Battleship" became a live political issue at the Cape from the moment Sprigg laid her imaginary keel until the Schreiner Government settled the question with an annual grant of £30,000 to the Imperial Navy and the handing over of the Simonstown dockyard. The Bondsmen, who opposed Sprigg's action, charged him with irresponsibility, while at the same time offering to support the laying of a deep sea west coast cable at the Colony's expense<sup>62</sup>. The League, with some assistance from Milner<sup>63</sup>, retaliated with the allegation of Bond

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58. (cont.) the discussion of and dealing with all differences, the tranquillity of South Africa would be further assured."

59. A revolt by Chief Galishiwe, shortly after the Cape had taken over British Bechuanaland, had been suppressed by a Cape force under Colonel Dalgety. Sprigg sought and obtained Imperial permission to confiscate 483,000 acres of tribal land. See C. Headlam, *The Milner Papers*, vol. I pp.65-7 for correspondence between Sprigg and Milner; and, for official Bond approval of Sprigg's policy before and after its execution, Notulen, 1897 Congress, p.20; 1898 Congress, p.28.

60. Walker, *Schreiner*, pp.98-9. But fears were expressed by Congress lest these powers might be used against white men.

61. Notulen, 1897 Congress, p. 30. It was used against white men.

62. Notulen, 1898 Congress, pp.27,40. It cannot be seriously maintained that the Bond's opposition to Sprigg's authorized offer was inspired by a deliberate attempt to loosen the Imperial connection. The necessity of "Britische Kustbescherming", for which they were prepared to pay, had never been questioned in Bond circles.

63. Headlam, vol. I, pp.249-51.

disloyalty - a ranging shot in the early stages of the electioneering battle, the effect of which was almost to dissolve the partnership in power.

As the Council elections of 1898 drew near, the charge of Bond disloyalty which had originally focussed on the topic of "H.M.S. Africander" was extended by League spokesmen in South Africa and their supporters in Britain to cover the whole relationship between the Bond and the British Crown. It was sometimes suggested that the Bondsmen stood four-square behind the Government of the South African Republic in its opposition to the claims of the Imperial power, though such a charge would have been difficult to substantiate in a court of law. The Bondsmen became progressively more incensed at these repeated charges of disloyalty, and when Congress met at Worcester in February 1898 it decided to protest formally against remarks of this kind recently made by a visiting member of the British Parliament. The resolution continued:

Met het oog op het feit dat een deel van de Engelsche pers in Zuid-Afrika, ongelukkig gesteund en aangemoedigd door zekere leden van de Zuid-Afrikaansch League, bij meer dan een gelegenheid twijfel heeft geuit aan de loyaliteit van den kolonialen Bondsmen aan de Britsche Kroon, en als redenen van dien twijfel heeft aangegeven:-

- (a) de rassenhaat die er ongelukkig nog bestaat tussen de twee groote blanke rassen in de Kolonie;
- (b) de houding die de Bond heeft aangenomen tegen de Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek; en
- (c) de houding van den Bond tegenover den persoon van den heer Rhodes, -

zoo verklaart dit Congres dat het de beschuldiging van disloyaliteit met verachting van zich afwerpt - zoowel voor zichzelf als voor de quizzenden Bondsmannen door het Congres vertegenwoordigd<sup>64</sup>.

They decided to transmit the resolution to Hofmeyr for presentation to the Governor, but it is not known whether he was able to present it before Milner set out for Graaff-Reinet at the end of the month to open the new railway line from Middelburg Road<sup>65</sup>.

The Graaff-Reinettters had decided to treat the visit of the Governor as a gala occasion, and a reception committee from the town and district had been set up to look after arrangements. But the local Bondsmen decided that they wanted

64. Notulen, 1898 Congress, p.31.

65. Now Rosmead.

to approach Milner directly, in order to rebut the charges of disloyalty to which their party had been subjected.

C. H. O. Marais, the editor of Onze Courant, therefore wrote to te Water on 13 February, seeking his advice on matters of procedure, and help in drafting the address:

Ik ben al voor de laatste 14 dagen bezig om een adres op te krygen voor de Gouverneur [he wrote] maar ons kan de regte bewoording niet krygen.

After drawing attention to an enclosed draft in English by another Bondsman, with which he was not satisfied, he continued in the same language:

Is it not possible for you to draft me a copy in pencil so that we can have the right thing - of course everything will be kept private. Please try to assist me in this matter and please let me know if the address must be in Dutch or English. - I prefer Dutch if the Gov. can understand it... My intention is not to give the address to the Governor on his arrival but we want you so to arrange it that a deputation of the Africander party meet him at his house to give him an address as the address which is drawn up by the comite [sic] is for the whole town and district - please let me know also what you think of it and also let me know by whom the address is to [be] signed ...<sup>66</sup>

How or if te Water replied is not known; but it is at least likely that this Minister, who accompanied Milner on his visit, had something to do with the address which Marais read to Milner in Dutch on his arrival at the station. It ran as follows:

Hoog Edele Heer,

Terwyl ten volle overeenstemmende met de gedachten uitgedrukt in de adressen reeds aan Uwe Excellentie aangeboden, gevoelen wy ons gedrongen uit naam meer bepaald van het Afrikaner deel van de bevolking van een der oudste en belangrykste der Middellandsche distrikten om aan Uwe Excellentie als vertegenwoordigende Hare Majesteit de Koningin, een allerhartelykste welkom in ons midden te geven, en onze dankbaarheid en waardeering te betuigen voor de opofferings door Uwe Excellentie gemaakt ten einde deze strekken te bezoeken en persoonlyk kennis met derzelve inwoners te maken.

Wy koesteren de hoop dat UEds. verblyf onder ons niet alleen aangenaam zal zyn, maar dat het strekken moge om een verdere toename te verhoeden van de betreuenswaardige verwydering tusschen zekere sectien der Maatschappy, onlangs ongelukkigerwyze door voorvallen in Zuid Afrika in het leven geroepen, en om de goede verstandhouding tusschen hen te herstellen.

Omstandigheden tot onze diepste smart maken het verplichtend om ons van deze gelegenheid te bedienen aan Uwe Excellentie de verzekering te geven van onze trouw en gehechtheid aan het Groot Britsche Ryk, waarvan wy dat deel uitmaken waarover Uwe Excellentie gesteld is. Het was met innig leedwezen dat wy vernomen hebben dat herhaalde malen gedurende de laatste tyden door zekere partyen onze loyaliteit aan Hare Majesteit de Koningin openlyk in twyfel werd getrokken, en dat wy aan onze mede onderdanen als trouweloos werden voorgesteld. Wy durven dus hiet het zwygen bewaren. Van wege de Afrikaander bevolking in dit land wenschen wy de beledigende en leugenachtige beschuldigingen door kwaad stokers tegen ons gebracht met de grootste verontwaardiging en verachting van ons te werpen. Wy willen Uwe Excellentie tevens eerbiedig, doch zeer dringend verzoeken om ons van den ongegronden laster waarmede wy beklad werden by Hare Majesteit te zuiveren. Het heeft geene rechtvaardiging en is geheel op onkunde en misverstand gegrond. Het grootsch doel dat wy beoogen is, om dat deel van de burgers der Kolonie waartoe wy behooren op maatschapelyk, politiek, en zedelyk gebied op te heffen en betere en waardiger onderdanen van Hare Majesteit te maken en om aan onze bloedverwanten in Zuid Afrika die regten te verzekeren die door Hare Majesteit onze Geëerbiedigde Koningin hun goedgunstelyk werden toegezegd in het verledere.

In de hoop dat Uwe Excellenties Regeering over ons gekenmerkt mogt worden door grooten vooruitgang van deze Kolonie en Zuid Afrika,

Hebben wy de eer te zyn  
Uwe Excellenties onderdanige dienaren<sup>67</sup>.

The Governor reserved his reply, which he composed during brief interludes in a crowded day, until the formal banquet due to be held the same evening. He was not the first statesman to be placed in an embarrassing situation by the formal and possibly unexpected attentions of Bondsmen. The address, as we have seen, had been long premeditated. It contained, not only allusions to the loyalty of the Bond which in the circumstances were amply justified, but a well sugared criticism of Imperial policy towards the Transvaal. It was presented just at a time when Milner was beginning to feel that the screw on the Transvaal Government should be tightened, and it came from an organization whose Congress at Worcester a fortnight earlier had warmly congratulated Paul Kruger on his success in the recent presidential election<sup>68</sup>. Furthermore, the Colonial Council elections were in full swing, and there was some reason for construing the address as an attempt by the Midland Bondsmen to obtain a certificate of political decency

67. Seven signatures followed. The text is that given in Onze Courant, 7 Mar. 1898.

68. Notulen, 1898 Congress, pp. 23, 29.

for electoral purposes. When all this is said, however, the reply delivered by Milner was not in the best of taste. He was glad to be assured of their loyalty, he said, but would have been happier to be able to take it for granted. Then, after extolling the advantages of life in the Colony under British rule, he declared that, before he could put the topic aside with a good conscience, it would be necessary for him to mention certain "unpleasant facts". What he went on to say included the assertion that when disputes arose between the Imperial Government and that of the South African Republic, "a number of people in the Colony at once vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality, espouse the side of the Republic"<sup>69</sup>. It would have been in place for Milner to reassure the Bondsmen that he, at least, did not subscribe to some of the more extravagant allegations that had been made against them. As it was, however, though Milner declared it to be "improper for a Governor, especially at a time of electioneering, to concern himself with rebutting charges brought by one party against another", the effect of his speech was to underline these charges.

The local Advertiser interpreted Milner's address as a major rebuff for the Bond, as no doubt Milner intended it to be. But Marais, answering back through the editorial columns of Onze Courant, rode the blow with complete composure. If the Bond had not decided to present that type of address, he wrote, the Governor would surely not have spoken as he did.

De 'Advertiser' schynt de Bondsmannen als kinderen op politiek gebied te beschouwen, anders zou hy toch kunnen verstaan dat de Bond door zyn direkt verzoek ook een direkt antwoord wilde uitlokken ... Wy hebben kritiek in ons adres uitgelokt, en dus kritiek verwacht, en, God zy gedankt, Bondsmannen kunnen kritiek staan<sup>70</sup>.

If Milner sought to damage the Bond by his outspoken words, we have at least the affirmation of one of those responsible for drawing up the address that the object of presenting it was to lure him into the open. Damnation could be as good an

69. Headlam, vol. I, pp.242-7, where much of Milner's speech is quoted.

70. Onze Courant, 10 Mar. 1898.

electioneering asset as high praise, provided it came from the right quarter.

Barely had Milner uttered, when Rhodes took up the refrain in an interview with the Cape Times on 8 March, making his first open attack on the "little gang in Camp Street" and the Party over which they presided, on the ground of their alleged reactionary outlook<sup>71</sup>. Rhodes was rapidly replacing Sprigg as the Progressive leader, and making the position of Bondsmen on the Government benches increasingly intolerable. No wonder that, at about this time, a prominent Bondsman wished him on the moon, or better still the sun, since "onze aarde is 'n klein bietje te erg voor zulke omvattende individuële"<sup>72</sup>.

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71. Michell, vol. II, p.221; Walker, Schreiner, p. 105.

72. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 2. J. M. Hoffman to Hofmeyr, 28 Apr. 1898.

## IV

The alliance between Sprigg and the Bondsmen finally snapped during the first parliamentary session of 1898. The Progressive victory in the Council elections gave Sprigg the confidence which he needed in the organized Opposition, without which he would have been reluctant to change horses, while the Bondsmen for their part found new allies without whom it would have been difficult to dispense with Sprigg. Among the more important converts was Merriman, who moved across, not out of support for Afrikaner nationalism, with which he had little real sympathy, but out of a growing dislike for Rhodes and the Chartered Company, and a growing conviction that the imperial factor should be eliminated<sup>73</sup>. With Merriman, as a matter of course, went Sauer. But the conversion which had the most immediate significance was that of W. P. Schreiner. The gradual approach of Schreiner towards the Bond had begun, as we have seen, when Hofmeyr first sought to obtain his services at the time of the 1894 general election. He was still in the pre-liberal phase of his development, having given his backing to the Langeberg confiscations and fathered the Transkeian Bill<sup>74</sup>. Strong family pressure, notably that exerted by his sister Olive, at first kept him at a distance from the Bondsmen, as did his friendship with Rhodes, which was shaken but not broken by the Raid. His breach with Rhodes occurred, indeed, only when he went to give evidence before the London inquiry in the early part of 1897. Even then he would not become a Bondsman, but he began to see the Bond in the light of a sober counterpoise to the dangers of Rhodes's unprincipled bid for power, with the backing of the S. A. League. Though he continued to regard the Bond as antiquarian in its outlook, he came to the conclusion that if Merriman and Sauer, its hardest critics of earlier days, could ally themselves with it, there could

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73. Sir P. Laurence, Life of J.X. Merriman, pp.161-6.

74. Walker, Schreiner, p.139.

be no objection on principle to his doing the same thing<sup>75</sup>. He had as good as accepted the de facto parliamentary leadership of the Bond, in Hofmeyr's absence from the House, before the session began on 20 May, and it was he who moved the 'no confidence' motion on the 31st.

The most controversial issue of the session was parliamentary redistribution, a subject in need of legislative attention on account of the fact that the unequal ratio of voters in the Lower House constituencies had steadily increased since their establishment under the Constitution Ordinance. Innes later noted that in his own constituency, the Cape Division, the number of voters had increased fivefold in that time<sup>76</sup>. The extreme examples of Port Elizabeth and Victoria East, the former with 3280 voters per member, the latter with 391, illustrate this disparity<sup>77</sup>. The Progressives, in their efforts to destroy the power of the Bond, campaigned hard for a delimitation which would be less disadvantageous to the larger urban constituencies. From the side of the Bond there was less dissatisfaction with existing arrangements, chiefly because any new division made on the normal democratic basis, that of voting population, would have been to its disadvantage. But the Cape Town Congress in 1894 had declared in favour of reform on the rather specious ground that certain rural fiscal divisions had inadequate representation because they were cut up for electoral purposes. The Rhodes Government would not accept this plea; but with the renewed talk of redistribution after the Raid, the Malmesbury Congress reaffirmed the 1894 resolution, as did the Worcester Congress in 1898<sup>78</sup>. The situation was awkward because, while equity required a

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75. Walker, Schreiner, cc. V, VI, passim.

76. Innes, p.167.

77. See Appendix J, Table I, col.6, for the disparity between the constituencies. The following figures give the greatest discrepancies as a percentage variation from the norm: Port Elizabeth 236, Uitsnhage 192, Cape Division 191, Cape Town 140, Worcester 134, George 127; Victoria East 28, Mafeking 44, Fort Beaufort 51, Albany 52, Piquetberg 53, Namaqualand 53, Stellenbosch 59, Grahamstown 61, Aliwal North 63.

78. Notulen, 1894 Congress, p.14; 1895 Congress, p.7; 1897 Congress, p.38; 1898 Congress, p.41.

relative increase in the urban representation, the political effects of any significant increase would have been to destroy the subtle balance of forces between the Bond and its opponents. at a time when each group feared that the other, if presented with a clear parliamentary majority, might have been tempted to throw caution to the winds and entrench itself in power. A commission appointed in 1897 failed to agree over the number of new seats to be created, though even the Bondsmen on that commission admitted that an increase in the representation of certain urban and rural constituencies was desirable<sup>79</sup>. On the strength of its report, legislation was bound to follow.

When he knew that the Government proposed to go ahead with redistribution, te Water resigned from the Cabinet, to the relief of his Bond supporters. "Het was vir my die beste tyding, die ik lange jaren vernomen heb, dat u het Rhodes ministerie verlaten heeft", wrote Ds. W.P. de Villiers<sup>80</sup>. Upington resigned for health reasons at about the same time (he died on 10 December); but Milner had no doubt about the relative significance of these two Cabinet changes, and informed Chamberlain with regard to te Water:

His presence in the Ministry was a link between that body and the leaders of the Afrikander Bond ... The personal relations between Dr Te Water and Mr Hofmeyr were very intimate, and, as long as the latter remained in the Ministry, its original character of a Compromise Ministry, steering a middle course between parties of divided views and avoiding a clear-cut policy, was bound to be more or less maintained ... But, though collectively neutral, the members of the Cabinet, with the exception of Dr Te Water, were known to be individually more or less friendly to Mr Rhodes, and the extreme Dutch party are increasingly inclined to take up the attitude that every man, who is not on their side in the Rhodes controversy, is to be treated as an enemy. Nevertheless an open rupture might have been avoided

79. G.8 of 1898. Report of the Redistribution of Seats Commission. Its members were: Sprigg (chairman), Innes, Fuller, Douglass, T.P. Theron, I.J. van der Walt and A.S. du Plessis, the last three being Bondsmen. The minority (consisting of the first three) favoured the creation of 18 new seats; the entire commission agreed to the creation of 15, in such a way as to give a slight increase in weight to urban constituencies.

80. Te Water Papers, vol. 58. W.P. de Villiers to T. te Water, 6 June 1898. See also Cape Town Bond Notulen, 20 May 1898. Pieter Faure, recently knighted, stayed on in the Cabinet, and would fight successfully against the Bond in Namaqualand during the Assembly elections.

had it not been for the publication of the Redistribution Bill...<sup>81</sup>

Sprigg based his Bill in 1898 on the more extreme minority report, and with the help of the Opposition and most of the Innes group, he carried the second reading by forty-two votes to thirty-five. "Now or never", counselled Hofmeyr, when Schreiner faltered before introducing his 'no confidence' motion. Schreiner longed for Hofmeyr to return to Parliament and lead the opposition to the Government; but Olive assured him that Onze Jan did right to stay in the background. "The more the Dutch party make Englishmen their spokesmen and official leaders", she wrote, "the stronger their party becomes. You and Merriman could say things which if said by any Dutchman would fill the country with howls of 'treason'..."<sup>82</sup>. So Schreiner moved, and with the help of some of the moderates, who wanted redistribution without Rhodes, he achieved the defeat of Sprigg.

Milner dissolved the Assembly, at Sprigg's request, at the end of June, and the parties began to prepare for the fiercest general election in the Colony's history. The moment was propitious from the Government's point of view, for Milner had shown by his address to Bondsmen at Graaff-Reinet in March that he intended to stiffen the backs of loyalists in the Colony, while the Government had achieved notable successes with its tariff policy in May, renewing the convention with the Free State, which Natal now joined<sup>83</sup>.

The election was a straight and not very clean fight between the Bond and the Progressives, in which the Innes and du Toit splinter groups were barely distinguishable from the latter, though Innes himself stood as an independent and was returned<sup>84</sup>. The 'brains' of both parties were in Cape Town. The Central Progressive Committee under the chairmanship of T. E. Fuller had its office in Church Square, while

81. Headlam, vol. I, pp.253-4. Milner to Chamberlain, 18 May 1898.

82. Walker, Schreiner, pp.109-12; Hofmeyr, pp.525-6; Innes, pp.166-8.

83. C.H.B.E. Vol. VIII, p.542; G.66 of 1898.

84. Sank, p.201: The S.A.P.A. split on the eve of the (cont.)

the Bond organized its campaign from the Ons Land office, Hofmeyr maintaining close postal contact with his fellow members of the Commissie van Toezicht. With the sole important exception of Het Dagblad, the leading Dutch and English newspapers supported the party of their respective language groups, and in general helped to feed the fires of hatred and suspicion which divided them. It was a renegade Bond parliamentarian, Dr T. W. Smartt, who in August alleged that Hofmeyr had made £30,000 out of Charters, which drew from Onze Jan a direct denial in the Colonial press<sup>85</sup>. More insidious and damaging to the Bond cause were the rumours that the Bond fought the elections with the aid of Transvaal secret service funds, or alternatively with the aid of political agents from the Transvaal. These were the sort of charges which, in the nature of the case, would have been very difficult to disprove, but the onus still lies on the prosecution to prove that the Bond was helped in these ways<sup>86</sup>. The venom which underlay the charge must itself be counted a factor in the Bondsmen's favour, coupled with the fact that the Progressives were openly dependent on large gifts of money from Rhodes, which Rhodes "frankly admitted and defended when charged with it"<sup>87</sup>.

The Coloured and African vote probably counted for less in the 1898 elections than it had done in 1894, pace Dormer, who not only thought it was decisive, but deplored "the spectacle of Mr Rhodes on the one hand, and Mr Hofmeyr on the other, kow-towing to our coloured brethren for their suffrages, and appealing to them to save either British supremacy or Afrikaner freedom" in a manner which would "make even Mr Saul Solomon turn in his grave"<sup>88</sup>. Hitherto, as indicated earlier<sup>89</sup>, the opponents of the Bond had normally been able to count on

84.(cont.) election and Innes failed to give them a lead.

85. See above, pp. 269-70

86. See below, Appendix L, for a summary of the evidence.

87. Williams, p.294; "Vindex", p.573; Walker, Schreiner, p.114.

88. Dormer, pp.142-3.

89. See above, pp. 243-6

the mass of the African voters, while the Coloured votes had probably been more evenly divided. But in 1898 the Bond received a considerable accretion of African support. The explanation of this fact may be found, first, in the willingness of Merriman and Sauer to stand as Bond candidates in eastern constituencies; and secondly, in Hofmeyr's novel decision to canvass seriously for African votes. On 28 March, he spoke at a meeting in Cape Town, pointing out that he had not voted for the strop bill, had "never tried to deprive a single Native of the vote which he had already acquired", and "never joined in the insensate cry of 'Equal rights for all white men south of the Zambesi'"<sup>90</sup>. The arguments were shallow, but their effect on at least one leader of African opinion was remarkable. Tengo Jabavu, whose editorials in Imvo had always been antagonistic to the Bond until as late as 10 March 1898, when he had instructed his readers to vote for anti-Bond candidates in the Council elections, turned right about:

We shall be much surprised [he wrote] if Mr Hofmeyr's great speech on Monday last, does not prove an epoch-making address in the politics of this country. The great Bond leader may be physically short-sighted. Mentally, and as a political tactician, there is no more far-seeing statesman in the whole of South Africa. He has discerned the Progressive wave, evidenced by the Legislative Council elections, which has deprived him of an absolute Bond majority in the Upper House; and, like a wise man, he counts the cost of entering into a fight with those commanding larger forces than himself, and makes terms of peace ... The decadence of the Bond offers him a surcease from his labours, and he reverts to type, unfurling as liberal and progressive a programme on the Native Question that [sic] any political leader could lay before the country ... It would not be right not to give Mr Sauer credit for this magnanimous utterance of Mr Hofmeyr's ... So that when it was said that Mr Sauer had gone over to Mr Hofmeyr, we clung to the belief that it was Mr Hofmeyr who had returned to Mr Sauer, by whom he fought side by side in 1879-81 in the great Disarmament struggle...<sup>91</sup>

Jabavu still had his difficulties. He would have preferred Innes for premier, and did not find it easy to adjust himself to the prospect of Schreiner as an alternative<sup>92</sup>; but this

90. Report in Imvo Neliso Lomzi, 31 Mar. 1898. There is a full report in Ons Land, 7 Apr. 1898. It is perhaps significant that neither this paper nor Onze Courant chose to lay any emphasis on the 'negrophilist' aspect of the address.

91. Imvo Neliso Lomzi, 31 Mar. 1898.

92. Imvo Neliso Lomzi, 29 June, 3 Aug. 1898.

did not stop him from offering Hofmeyr an electoral alliance in the constituencies fought by his liberal friends who had gone over to the Bond, and he wrote to him during the early stages of the campaign:

Dear Mr Hofmeyr,

It is now some years since I wrote to you, but I make no apology for addressing you at the present time.

The crisis is an important one. You may have noticed that I have been roundly abused in Jingo-Quarters for supporting Mr Sauer, Mr Merriman, Mr Solomon, Mr Hay & others, who are said to have contaminated themselves by voting with the Bond on the no confidence question. I don't mind this as these gentlemen are old friends of mine & of our people; and I know they have sided with your people because they feel they have been wronged. Now I would strongly impress on you & your people not to see them penalised for their stand; & you could do so much for the cause by cooperating with our people in constituencies where there are Dutch, English and Native voters, neither of which sections can command a majority by itself. [An analysis of these constituencies follows.]

Ever Yours,

Tengo Jabavu<sup>93</sup>.

Jabavu wrote from Indwe, where Merriman, "feeling like Ovid in Tomi", had asked for his support in his electoral campaign, and Hofmeyr noted having sent an appreciative reply.

The Bond therefore entered the lists with the prospect of considerable African support, but its hopes of securing a landslide in its favour were largely belied in the event. Merriman and P. J. de Wet secured Wodehouse; but according to one writer (who may have been wrong) this was largely in spite of the African vote<sup>94</sup>. The partnership of Sauer and J. N. P. Botha, with African support, was likewise successful in Aliwal North<sup>95</sup>. But the Progressives, aided by Rhodes's new African paper, Izwi Labantu<sup>96</sup>, were able to counter the Bond influence in the other key constituencies. At Queenstown Hofmeyr's ingenuity failed:

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93. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Miscellaneous folder). Jabavu to Hofmeyr, 2 July 1898.

94. Sir P. Laurence, Life of J.X. Merriman, p.165.

95. Walker, De Villiers, pp.325-6. Botha polled two votes more than the Progressive, Crewe.

96. Edited by A. K. Soga.

Fearing Bond vote is not strong enough to return a Queens Town member single handed [he wrote] I have been trying to get native[s] to put up one man with one of ours against the two sitting members. I found however that natives are already pledged to Berry who is bound to Frost. Our only chance would therefore perhaps be to adopt as our Bond member a man like Advocate Molteno who stands well with natives and agrees with us on great questions of day as he proved in Parliament<sup>97</sup>.

A short while later a deputation from the Queenstown District Bestuur called on Jabavu at the latter's request, and the secretary reported to Hofmeyr:

Hoewel ons geen medewerking beloofd werd, beloofde de Heer Jabavu ons niet tegen te werken en dat hij zaken aan de 'natives' zoude duidelijk maken, dat zij van de Bond niets te vrezen hebben ... De onderhandeling met den Heer Jabavu was van zeer geheimen aard omdat ons tegen partij hem in den oog houden<sup>98</sup>.

He was reasonably optimistic about the chances of M. J. du Plessis winning a seat; but the branch chairman, who proved right in the long run, saw the Queenstown problem as insoluble:

Hier is niet kans om Dr Berry uit te hou. In gaat de Bond met Molteno direk, dan is ik bang dat ons de onafhankelyke stem verloor voor den heer du Plessis. Gaat ons niet met de heer Molteno dan verloor ons de kaffer stem<sup>99</sup>.

- Molteno eventually chose to fight a Somerset East seat, which he won with ten votes to spare<sup>100</sup>, and the Queenstownners returned Berry and Frost. In Jabavu's own constituency of Kingwilliamstown, the Bondsmen were again unable to obtain the nomination of the candidate of their choice, for Richard Solomon declined to stand<sup>101</sup>. They failed to win a seat either there or in Fort Beaufort<sup>102</sup>. To look after the Coloured and African vote in the key constituency of Barkly West,
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97. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Queenstown folder). Hofmeyr to M.J. du Plessis, M.L.A., 4 July 1898.
98. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Queenstown folder). A.J. Botha to Hofmeyr, 16 July 1898.
99. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Queenstown folder). J.H. de Lange to Hofmeyr, 19 July 1898.
100. See the bombastic account in his Dominion of Afrikanderdom, pp.132-8.
101. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Kingwilliamstown folder). D. Janse van Rensburg to Hofmeyr, 30 June; Jabavu to Hofmeyr (telegram), 13 July 1898.
102. Te Water Papers, vol. 60. W. Rogers to J.W. Sauer, 26 June; Sauer to te Water, 1 July 1898.

Hofmeyr could count on Cronwright Schreiner and his still abler wife, Olive, who at least set about exploding Rhodes's "negrophilism" with imagination. They accepted Hofmeyr's suggestion that an article should be written on "Mr Rhodes's Oppressive Native Policy", accompanied by a photograph of Peter Halket<sup>103</sup> - provided Olive was spared the publicity. "Say simply", Cronwright suggested, "that this is a photograph taken at Bulawayo, showing how natives are treated in Rhodesia. And don't mention the Transvaal"<sup>104</sup>. But Rhodes, in the course of an election campaign which his biographers usually choose to dwell on, was more than a match even for opposition of this kind<sup>105</sup>. With the help of Colonial Union supporters who split the local Bond branches, he secured not only his own return but that of a little known colleague as well. Hofmeyr made good tactical use of Englishmen whose disgust at the methods of chartered capitalism exceeded their antipathy towards Bond racial policy, and these included a few first rate liberals; but the Bond programme contained no new deal for the African or the Coloured man, nor could its agents compete with the lucrative attractions which Rhodes's men had to offer, with the result that they failed, by and large, to attract them. There is some evidence from the Bond's side that Coloured voters in the Western Cape also supported the Progressives or were susceptible to their bribery<sup>106</sup>.

The influence of Hofmeyr's "Negrophilists" was largely offset by that of Rhodes's "My Dutch". One of these, Gert Olivier, secured an Oudtshoorn seat after the Speaker, Sir

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103. The subject of a work by Olive Schreiner. See also Walker, Schreiner, p.86.

104. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 6 (Barkly West folder). S.C. Cronwright Schreiner to Hofmeyr, 14 July 1898.

105. See, for example, P.J. Jourdan, Cecil Rhodes: his Private Life, pp.57-61; Michell, vol.11, pp.228-34; Williams, pp.294-5.

106. E.g. in the Stellenbosch constituency. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7. E. Marshall to Hofmeyr, 17 Aug. 1898: "Our party kept together but the whole coloured vote turned against us at the last minute, in fact some promised at the door to vote for our candidate and went in and voted solid for S[ivewright]. They had their instructions from Faure..." C.f. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Namaqualand folder). A.F. Weich to Hofmeyr, 12 Sept. 1898: "I'm distressed that our coloured people have been bought by Rhodes' money (cont.)"

Henry Juta, whom the Bondsmen would have been prepared to support as an independent, went over to the Progressives and ruined his own prospects by doing so<sup>107</sup>. Danie Haarhoff, another of Rhodes's Dutchmen, secured a Vryburg seat. This was a constituency which the Bondsmen ought to have carried; but one of their candidates was killed in a railway accident after nomination day, while the League had taken the precaution in the previous year of placing large numbers of volunteers from other parts of the Colony, who had taken part in the suppression of Galishiwe's rising, on the local roll, and made arrangements for them to return to Bechuanaland to record their votes<sup>108</sup>. It was Piketberg, however, that presented Hofmeyr with his biggest poser. His brother-in-law, David de Waal, was too strong locally to be dislodged, chiefly on account of his past stewardship on behalf of the grain farmers and his fight to secure a local railway. His affinity with Rhodes was also of long duration, though he had maintained an independence of action in Parliament to the embarrassment of both Rhodes and Hofmeyr, especially the latter. After demurring, the Commissie van Toezicht decided to follow Hofmeyr's advice and support him.<sup>109</sup> In the next Parliament de Waal would find himself on the point of balance between the parties, able to throw his weight whichever way he chose.

The contribution of the Colonial Union men to the Progressive electoral successes was slight but not entirely negligible. The Basson who called himself a Progressive and opposed the Bond candidates at Malmesbury without success may have belonged to du Toit's party<sup>110</sup>. The Richmond Bond

106.(cont.) against Afrikaner Party." (This was in a subsequent by-election.) Also Ons Land, 5 Jan. 1899: "De overgrootte meerderheid onzer kleurling-kiezers bij de jongste electie 'progressief' bleek."

107. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Oudtshoorn folder); Molteno, p.160 Correspondence in the te Water Papers indicates that Olivier had come under Rhodes's spell at least as early as 1894.

108. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Vryburg folder); Headlam, vol. I pp.275-7; Milner to Chamberlain, 20 Sept. 1898.

109. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Piketberg folder); J.H.H. de Waal, pp. 240-51.

110. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Malmesbury folder).

candidates complained to Hofmeyr of the activities of Union men in that constituency, where it seems that the members of the Union and S. J. du Toit's Kruiskerkers were usually the same people, and where du Toit offered himself unsuccessfully as a candidate, polling 646 votes against the 1046 of his nearest successful rival. Strydenburg, near Hope Town, where the first Kruiskerk had been founded in 1897, was reported to be full of Union supporters, while there were allusions in the Bond correspondence to political opposition from "Kruiskerkers in de spoorweg"<sup>111</sup>. A. S. le Roex, that old stalwart from Fraserburg, who had a long-standing affinity with S. J. du Toit, stood against the official Bond candidates in the Victoria West constituency. He had the support of one branch in Victoria West, two in Fraserburg and one in Williston, and only just failed to get the nomination at the Beroemingsvergadering with fifteen years' parliamentary service to the constituency behind him. He stood as a Progressive but failed to win a seat<sup>112</sup>. The most stubborn loyalty to du Toit still seems to have come from those regions where the Bond had most easily taken root in the early 'eighties, a fact which would emerge even more clearly during the by-elections which followed redistribution in 1899. In the 1898 general election, however, the clearest evidence of their activities comes from the Commissie van Toezicht's files relating to Barkly West. These show how the local Bond branches were riven with discord on the vital question of the attitude to be adopted towards Rhodes, and suggest that the divisions were chiefly due to the activities of Union men<sup>113</sup>.

111. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 6 (Colesberg folder). T.P. Theron to Hofmeyr, 28 July 1898; vol. 7 (Richmond folder), P.J. du Toit to Hofmeyr, 6 Aug. 1898.

112. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Victoria West folder); Molteno, pp. 50-4; P.N. Nienaber, Afrikaanse Biografiese Woordeboek, p.219. Le Roex's 474 votes compared badly with the 1566 and 1424 polled by the Bond candidates.

113. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 6 (Barkly West folder). See especially J.A. van Niekerk to Hofmeyr, 17 June; C.J. Kieser to Hofmeyr, 27 June, 1 July (with enclosures), 4 July 1898.

When all is said, however, the Bondsmen had good reason to be satisfied with the election results, which the Commissie van Toezicht would later describe as "niet alleen bemoedigend, maar uiterst verrassend"<sup>114</sup>. The Council elections had indicated a swing towards the Progressives, but this had been checked. Despite the poor response of African and Coloured voters to the new Bond propaganda, and despite the influence of Rhodes's Dutchmen and the Colonial Union in some constituencies, together with the far greater financial resources which the Progressives had been able to deploy, the Bond succeeded in gaining control of the new Assembly by the narrowest of possible majorities. Milner, who made a careful analysis of the election, showed how easily it could have gone the other way:

The result may be said to be due entirely to luck, as one of the doubtful seats fell to the Bond by a majority of 2, another by a majority of 10 and a third by a majority of 20 ... On the other hand, no seat won by a Ministerialist has been won by less than 135.

He calculated, on what he claimed to be an estimate favourable to the Bond, that the Progressives had polled some 6,500 more votes than the Bondsmen. This is an intelligible margin in view of the weighting of the rural constituencies, and Milner's comments may be taken at more or less their face value<sup>115</sup>.

When the results were known, both Sprigg and Rhodes hoped that the Government would be able to remain in office, its position strengthened in due course by favourable judgments on certain electoral petitions which they planned to bring forward. Milner, partly to his credit, for he was personally in strong sympathy with the Government party,

114. Notulen, 1899 Congress, p.20.

115. Headlam, vol. I pp.275-7. The majority of 2 was at Aliwal North, the majority of 10 at Somerset East. Milner apparently took Gert Olivier's defeat of Sir Henry Juta at Oudtshoorn by 20 votes as a Bond victory; but Olivier was certainly in Rhodes's camp. For the weighting of constituencies, see Appendix J, Table I.

deprecated such a course of action on constitutional and tactical grounds, and refused to listen to Sprigg's plea that the opening of the new Parliament should be deferred until such time as the Progressives were able to consolidate their position in the manner they proposed<sup>116</sup>. The new Parliament therefore opened on 7 October, and on the 10th Schreiner proposed his second motion of 'no confidence'.

The fate of Sprigg's Government was sealed by Milner's refusal to allow the premier to take liberties with the conventions of the constitution, by the refusal of Innes to give his support to a party led by Rhodes, and by the steadfastness of the Bond waverers, including David de Waal, whom the Progressives could not win over during the 'no confidence' debate<sup>117</sup>. The election of Dr Berry to the Speakership reduced the Government's strength still further, and Schreiner's motion was carried by thirty-nine votes to thirty-seven. Sprigg resigned on the 12th, and Schreiner immediately agreed to form an administration.

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116. Headlam, vol. I pp.264-77; Marais, c.VIII.

117. J.H.H. de Waal, p.253.

## RELAPSE INTO WAR, 1898-9

## I

Schreiner's Cabinet was complete by 14 October 1898. He took the Colonial Secretaryship himself, chose Richard Solomon as his Attorney-General, brought in Merriman and Sauer as Treasurer and Commissioner respectively, and found room for two Bondsmen: A. J. Herholdt as Minister of Agriculture, and Thomas te Water, who wished to avoid the stigma of being labelled a career politician, as unsalaried minister without portfolio<sup>1</sup>. Though he was dependent on Bond support, Schreiner's Ministry had a non-Bond majority, an indication that the new premier intended to be more than a mere nominal leader and to base his power on the support of as many moderates as he could. He chose to refer to his followers as the South African Party, and his team could be labelled neither anti-British nor Imperialist, neither protectionist nor free trade, neither negrophilist nor negrophobe. There is no indication that he had any difficulty in forming his Cabinet, though a certain amount of doubt still exists as to how far he seriously considered the inclusion of David de Waal. According to de Waal's biographer, David was earmarked for Agriculture, but Hofmeyr advised Schreiner against the idea<sup>2</sup>. According to Schreiner's, Hofmeyr pressed for de Waal's inclusion, with the omission, not of Herholdt, but of Richard Solomon, for whom a seat would in any case have to be found in the House. Merriman was unhappy, not for the last time in his life, serving under a much younger man; but the main troubles for Schreiner would come, not from discord within his ministerial team, but from the fact that he had no majority in the Upper House and an extremely slender one in the Lower. The loyal support given by the Bond press<sup>3</sup> to "het eerste Ministerie dat men eigenlyk

1. Ons Land, 15 Oct. 1898. For useful comments on the composition of Schreiner's Ministry, see C. Headlam, The Milner Papers, vol. I, pp.280-4; E.A. Walker, W.P. Schreiner, pp. 117-20; J.H.H. de Waal, Die Lewe van D.C. de Waal, pp.253-5; Sir P. Laurence, Life of J.X. Merriman, p.166.

2. "Maar Onse Jan het dit afgeraai, omdat David niet hooggejoeg geleerd was vir die verhewe pos van kabinetminister nie".

3. Onze Courant, 20 Oct. 1898. The only member over whom this and Ons Land had any difficulty was Richard Solomon.

een Bondsministerie kan noemen" was incomplete compensation for this lack of real parliamentary strength.

The extent to which Schreiner was not his own master can be seen most clearly in his inability to resist Opposition pressure over the introduction of a Redistribution Bill during his first month of office. To placate his opponents, who were in any case hardly satisfied, he introduced a measure based on the more conservative majority report of the 1897 Commission; but even after this gesture, his plan was waylaid by David de Waal's motion of 4 November, calling for an inter-party conference with a view to working out an agreed measure, which was seconded by Rhodes and carried by the Speaker's vote. Schreiner, conscious of the fact that the Speaker had already come to the rescue of his Government two days earlier, and afraid for the Supply Bill in the event of his refusal to call such a conference, had no choice but to succumb<sup>4</sup>. There does not seem to have been any intention to stab the Bond in the back on de Waal's part, and it is doubtful if he expected quite such high praise as he received from Rhodes, or quite such sharp hostility as the Bondsmen, his kinsmen among them, meted out to him. When Hofmeyr broke with him, and the Bond leaders brought pressure to bear on the Picketberg electors to urge him to resign, he sold his shares in Ons Land out of protest<sup>5</sup>. Seen in perspective, however, de Waal's action did not damage the Ministry or the Bond in the way contemporaries feared - or hoped - but it might have done so had the South African Party fared less well over the large number of election petitions which were then sub judice, or failed to win as many of the new seats created under the Redistribution Act as it did.

The new redistribution favoured the Progressives by a small margin;<sup>6</sup> but, whereas no South African Party member lost his seat on petition, a sufficient number of the Progressives were unseated to tip the scale in the Government's favour.

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3. See p. viii.

4. Sir L. Michell, Life of C.J. Rhodes, vol. II, pp.242-3.

5. De Waal, pp.255-61.

6. Of the sixteen new seats created, the Progressives won nine: Cape Town, Cathcart, Griqualand East, Kimberley, Port Elizabeth (2), Simonstown, Woodstock and Wynberg. The South(cont

Gideon Krige, himself an old hand at electoral disputation, produced evidence of attempts to bribe him, which resulted in the unseating of Sir James Sivewright at Stellenbosch and the election of a Bondsman, J. H. Marais, to succeed him<sup>7</sup>. The two Progressives returned for the Vryburg constituency resigned their seats rather than face legal proceedings, and then stood again. Their supporters organized a mass immigration by train into the constituency on polling day, while the Cape Bondsmen arranged for the presence at Vryburg of two Stellenbosch students "who are thoroughly at home in the working of cameras", and warned their candidates to "have a good strong contingent of detectives at polling station"<sup>8</sup>. These precautions contributed to the victory of both Bond candidates, which gave Schreiner's Government a narrow mandate to remain in office.

## II

The critical relations between the South African Republic and the Imperial Government eclipsed all local political issues during 1899, and it was on its handling of this extremely delicate situation that the reputation of the new Ministry was bound to stand or fall. The Sprigg Government had tried to follow a middle course in Colonial politics, while making demonstrations of fervid loyalty to the Imperial cause, and failed to maintain itself in office. Schreiner intended to follow a real middle course, the only course logically possible for him between the rival pressures of a High Commissioner out to "convince the wobblers" in the Colony that they ought to

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6. (cont.) African Party gained seven: George, Humansdorp, Jan-senville, Middelburg, Prieska, Tembuland and Worcester.
7. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Stellenbosch by-election folder). Sir J.T. Molteno, The Dominion of Afrikanderdom, p.153.
8. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 7 (Vryburg by-election folder); Molteno, pp.139-40. See also E.A. Walker, Lord de Villiers and his Times, pp.325-6.

espouse the Imperial Government's Transvaal policy, and a Republican Government, whose members included his own brother-in-law, which refused under pressure to sacrifice a tittle of its independence.

The effectiveness of the Schreiner Ministry would depend in large measure on its ability to win the confidence of the High Commissioner, Sir Alfred Milner. It is therefore noteworthy that on its formation Milner should have been well impressed with Schreiner's choice of colleagues. "They were all absolutely unobjectionable", he informed Chamberlain in a confidential dispatch on 19 October, in which he went on to stress the weight of their collective experience, the "high average capacity" of the individual members, and the policy of "compromise and conciliation, or, perhaps it would be more correct to say, of comprehension", which the new Prime Minister was expected to follow<sup>9</sup>. He held Schreiner himself in high regard, but was worried lest he should be unable to keep his Bond followers under control. This placed him at a disadvantage in whatever desires he may have had of working with the Ministers whom he thus lauded, for he privately wished them out of office. He almost assumed the role, at times, of a Progressive Party manager. Thus, when Sprigg had urged delay in the summoning of Parliament after the Progressive defeat in the Assembly elections, Milner had refused the request, not simply out of concern for constitutional propriety and the shortage of supply, but because "though I, of course, want Sprigg to stay in, I disbelieve absolutely in the policy of such tactics"<sup>10</sup>. A week later he had told Chamberlain that

// In my opinion it would be wiser for the Ministry to resign, or to face immediate and honourable defeat by a majority of 1 or 2 than to try to escape an adverse vote by tactics which might end in discreditable defeat and a very much weakened position afterwards<sup>11</sup>.

9. Headlam, vol. I, pp.280-4.

10. Headlam, vol. I, pp.273-4, quoting Milner to Selborne, 14 Sept. 1898. My italics.

11. Headlam, vol. I, pp.275-7, quoting Milner to Chamberlain, 20 Sept. 1898. My italics.

A Bond victory in the elections, which Milner had anticipated without qualms, could itself do some good, he thought, because it would help to galvanize the Opposition and dispel some of the "flabbiness on questions of Imperial interest" which the Sprigg caretaker regime had brought in its train<sup>12</sup>. It was with evident relief that he told Chamberlain on 19 October:

We have got a Bond Ministry, but so far we have not got a Bond policy,

• which meant there might be time to nurse the Opposition, whose short-sightedness in waging a guerre à outrance over Redistribution at first distressed him. If Milner's experience in the months between October 1898 and October 1899 proved anything, it was the practical impossibility, under the conditions of the time, of combining properly the diplomatic post of Imperial High Commissioner and the non-political role of a Head of State.

Milner's attitude towards the Bond seems to have been determined less by an empirical effort to understand the views and ideals of Colonial Afrikaners, than by a notion, largely preconceived, that such views and ideals as they held, and which he claimed to understand, could not in the nature of the case be reconciled with the aims of Imperial policy as he thought these ought to be. This statement requires qualification. Milner taught himself Dutch, he claimed to keep abreast with comment in the Dutch-language newspapers, and he had taken the earliest opportunity after arrival to go on an extended tour of the country districts in order to meet the people. "We are getting on capitally with the Dutch", he had told Chamberlain in July 1897. "Feeling all round much better than when I came, but" - and this was the rub - "improvement began with and depends on [their] conviction [of the] determination[of] Great Britain not to be ousted"<sup>13</sup> Throughout his period as High Commissioner at the Cape, he adhered to the view that firmness, and firmness alone, would

12. Headlam, vol. I, pp.258-60, quoting Milner to Chamberlain, 29 June 1898.

13. Quoted in Headlam, vol. I, p.61.

bind the Colonial Afrikaner to the Imperial cause. A letter to Sir Clinton Dawkins in Egypt, which contained the question, "Would the French Canadians be loyal, if the United States were a French Republic?"<sup>14</sup>; another to Sir Edward Grey almost two years later, in which he described the Afrikaner party as consisting of an extremist element of republican rebels, and a less extreme section who would sing 'God save the Queen' if allowed to govern themselves, but would not support a wholesale clean-up of the Transvaal administration for fear that this would endanger Afrikaner ascendancy in the Republic<sup>15</sup> - these are indications of the depth of Milner's mistrust of the Afrikaners, and therefore of the Ministry which governed in their name. Even if Milner did understand the mainsprings of the Colonial Boer's ideas and actions, he neglected to relate these impartially to the provocative actions of the South African League, and to the unbending policy which he was himself pursuing. "It all depends how long the Bond can keep on flogging the dead horse of the Raid, the inquiry, the telegrams etc., with effect", he observed two months after the London inquiry had completed its work - as if these were dead issues at the time, or likely to become so while he and Chamberlain held the reins of policy<sup>16</sup>

Milner might have bridged the gap between the Colonial Afrikaners and himself, had he been able to reach an understanding with the moderate leaders of Cape Afrikaner opinion; but he never fully trusted either the Chief Justice, Sir Henry de Villiers, or Jan Hofmeyr. In the case of de Villiers, the fault may not have lain entirely on Milner's side<sup>17</sup>; but Milner could not entirely rid himself of the idea, fostered by plausible rumours, that de Villiers had political

14. Headlam, vol. I, p.87. The letter was dated 25 Aug. 1897.

15. Headlam, vol. I, pp.476-9. This letter was dated 7 Aug.1897

16. Headlam, vol. I, pp.88-90. Milner to Chamberlain, 29 Aug. 1897. Professor Marais has drawn attention to this illuminating sentence in his Fall of Kruger's Republic, c. VII.

17. Walker, De Villiers, p.307.

ambitions and was in league with Hofmeyr to sabotage Imperial policy, though these rumours have since been exposed as groundless<sup>18</sup>. Mutual respect existed between the two men, but not trust. De Villiers, wrote Milner,

is the ablest and most persuasive of the Dutch Party ... He will give you the Dutch Cape Colony view as well as it can be put by any man. He will assure you that the Dutch in the Colony are thoroughly loyal, and that they would fight for the Queen gladly against any foreign enemy and indeed against anyone but their relatives in the Transvaal, but that they cannot help feeling a great affection for those relatives ...<sup>19</sup>

This was soon after their first meeting. On the eve of war, Milner still looked upon Sir Henry as a man primarily "compelled by ties of race and tradition to sympathise with the Transvaal", which not only indicated a misunderstanding of the letter to which he was replying, but riled the erstwhile critic of the Dutch language movement who, thus provoked, paraded his French ancestry in his reply and explained icily that "unfortunately, perhaps, with my judicial training, I cannot help seeing both sides of every question"<sup>20</sup>. He believed that Onze Jan's political conduct was determined by devotion to "the great Afrikaner idea which [he] has been nursing so patiently and skilfully for many years"<sup>21</sup>. This, Milner supposed, led Hofmeyr to put peace above the realization of the aims of the Imperial Government, and had a good deal to do with the loyalty of the Colonial Afrikaners, or lack of it. On 6 July 1899, he passed on to Chamberlain the text of a telegram from the British Agent in Pretoria, asserting that Hofmeyr had told the Executive Council in secret session that in the matter of the franchise negotiations the Afrikaners could afford to play a waiting game until the hands of the paramount Power were full elsewhere<sup>22</sup>. Milner did work with Hofmeyr to some extent,

18. Headlam, vol. I, pp.79-80, quoting Milner to Chamberlain, 19 May 1897. See also Walker, *De Villiers*, pp. 299-300, and Marris, c.VI, where the origin of the rumours is indicated.

19. Headlam, vol. I, p.64, quoting Milner to Chamberlain, 25 May 1897.

20. Correspondence quoted in Walker, *De Villiers*, pp.358-62. Headlam, vol. I, p.556, quotes only Milner's letter.

21. Headlam, vol. I, p.531, quoting Milner to Chamberlain, 6 Sept. 1899.

22. Headlam, vol. I, p.453. See below, p.419.

consulting him privately on several occasions between May and July 1899, though not afterwards<sup>23</sup>; but effective co-operation between the two men was doomed in the last resort by Milner's refusal to allow the Bond to assume the credit for successful mediation between the Imperial and Republican authorities.

For a few brief weeks between November 1898 and February 1899, while Milner was on a visit to England, the Schreiner Ministry was able to use its influence with some effect to reduce tension over affairs in the Transvaal. General Sir William Butler, who acted as Governor and High Commissioner during this period, refused to be ruffled by unsubstantiated rumours from the Transvaal or to take up the cudgels with its Government over questions where the facts were in dispute, and he began his short term of civil office with the firm impression that the chief inflammatory agents in South Africa were Rhodes, the League and the jingo press. There was, he later recorded, "an acerbity in political and journalistic life, a seeking for causes of offence, a girding and goading at the Dutch in and beyond the Cape Colony" which needed to be checked<sup>24</sup>. Like Milner, Butler may have been too set in his opinions, and he admitted that his impression of Rhodes was not based on personal acquaintance<sup>25</sup>. He was a man of lesser intellect but greater South African experience than Milner - he had been a member of Wolseley's "Jamaica" team in Natal in the 'seventies - and he was prepared to take the Cape Ministry into his confidence in a way that Milner was not. When the Edgar incident<sup>26</sup> took place in Johannesburg in December 1898, and led after further friction to the despatch of a petition from the aggrieved Uitlanders to the Queen, Butler consulted the Cape Ministers, and partly on their advice refused to send it on. It might be objected that an incident occurring in the South African Republic was

23. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Herholdt to Steyn (telegram), 15 Sept. 1899.

24. Sir W. Butler, Autobiography, pp.392, 405.

25. Butler, p.396.

26. Marais, c. IX; Headlam, vol.I, c.11; J.H. Breytenbach,  
(cont.)

no concern of the Government of the Colony; but the grounds on which Butler based his decision, that, on the information of the Queen's Acting Agent in Pretoria, the Republican Government had taken steps to put the matter right in the knowledge of the petitioners, and that the latter had had the effrontery to publish the text of the petition in the press, were very reasonable.

The return of Milner in February coincided with a significant intensification of pressure on the Transvaal by the Colonial Office, for in that month Chamberlain invited the Chamber of Mines to reopen its case for the abrogation of the Government dynamite monopoly. This event had very important consequences, for it not only brought Chamberlain and the mining magnates together, but enabled Milner and Greene, the British Agent in Pretoria, to "reconstitute the reform movements of pre-raid days on the Rand"<sup>27</sup>. The abortive capitalist negotiations followed, on the Republican Government's initiative, after the offer of the mine leaders to buy out the dynamite monopoly had been turned down. The failure of these negotiations, for which Sir Percy Fitzpatrick later claimed chief responsibility<sup>28</sup>, led to the dispatch of a second Uitlander petition bearing 21,000 signatures, and of a counter-petition organized by the Republican Government bearing 23,000, which was soon followed by a request from the Colonial Office in April for Milner's comments on the Uitlander grievances in a form suitable for publication.

This was the background to Milner's notorious "helot" dispatch of 4 May, described by Chamberlain as a "tremendously stiff" document which, if published, would "make either an ultimatum or Sir A. Milner's recall necessary". The dispatch<sup>29</sup> was chiefly concerned with the situation in the Transvaal,

26. (cont.) Die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog, vol. I, pp.239-47; Butler, pp.399-403. Documentation in C.9345, especially pp. 126, 131-2.

27. Marais, c. IX.

28. Marais, c. IX, quoting Sir P. Fitzpatrick, South African Memories, pp.175-9.

29. Text in Headlam, vol. I, pp.349-53, and (with part omitted) in C.9345, pp.209-12.

but the section of it which created the greatest stir among Cape Bondsmen, after permission had been given to publish it on 10 June, was Milner's observation that

A certain section of the press, and not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a Republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, in alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which in case of war it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects. I regret to say that this doctrine, supported as it is by a ceaseless stream of malignant lies about the intentions of the British Government, is producing a great effect upon a large number of our Dutch fellow-colonists. Language is frequently used which seems to imply that the Dutch have some superior right even in this colony to their fellow-citizens of British birth. Thousands of men peaceably disposed, and, if left alone, perfectly satisfied with their position as British subjects, are being drawn into disaffection, and there is a corresponding exasperation on the side of the British.

These were exceptionally strong words, and it was to be expected that the Dutch press would react vigorously against them. When the cabled summary of Milner's dispatch reached South Africa, Ons Land refused to believe that the High Commissioner could have written such things in an official document, and withheld proper comment until the arrival of the blue book early in July<sup>30</sup>. The South African News, a journal recently started to put the Government view to English-speaking readers, considered that "Sir Alfred Milner's reference to alleged disaffection on the part of Dutch Colonists will create a profound and painful impression in this country"<sup>31</sup>. Onze Courant mockingly suggested that Milner's observation

heeft misschien betrekking op 'Di Patriot' ... want onze tydgenoot is het eenigste Koloniale blad dat ooit 'een Zuid Afrika onder eigen vlag' heeft voorgestaan... Wy herinneren ons niet ooit iets in een ander Koloniaal blad gelezen te hebben dat ook maar eenigzins in dien zin kan opgevat worden<sup>32</sup>.

But these denials in themselves contain no greater intrinsic

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30. Ons Land, 6 July 1899.

31. S.A. News, 5 July 1899.

32. Onze Courant, 10 July 1899.

reliability than Milner's original assertion. Only after the editorial policy of the Bond newspapers during the early part of 1899 has been considered can the degree of Milner's accuracy be assessed.

Let it be said at the outset that, though there are scraps of evidence which may be held to give some substance to Milner's words<sup>33</sup>, during the early months of 1899 prior to the cabling of the "helot" dispatch, the leading Bond papers paid next to no attention to Transvaal affairs in their editorial columns<sup>34</sup>. Neither Ons Land, nor Onze Courant, nor Het Oosten, the three most influential Bond papers in the Colony, either stimulated disaffection or indulged in republican propaganda of the kind suggested by Milner. There were frequent references to Afrikaner unity, but these were invariably in connection with the by-elections of the year. On the rare occasions when they handled the Transvaal crisis, the editors of these journals habitually expressed the hope that the dispute with the Imperial Government would be settled in a peaceful manner, they deplored the concern shown by the Colonial section of the S.A. League over Transvaal affairs on the ground that these were none of their business, and they expressed a good deal of scepticism about the validity of the Uitlander grievances. But they were in fact working under conditions of self-imposed restraint. Until the middle of July they took the line, which had apparently been agreed upon at the March Congress, that the handling of the crisis was a matter for their leaders, whose work was most likely to prosper with the minimum of publicity. So Bondsmen were counselled not to hold

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33. W.B. Worsfold, Lord Milner's Work in South Africa, 1897-1902, pp.119-21, quotes two not very significant examples. See also the reference to the Stellalander in Walker, Schreiner, p.164. The letter to which Schreiner referred is given (in the form in which the Cape Times reproduced it) in C.9345, p.182.

34. Of the thirty issues of Onze Courant between the beginning of 1899 and the penning of Milner's "helot" dispatch, only two discussed the Transvaal in editorials.

public meetings on the crisis, for fear of inciting League counter-demonstrations<sup>35</sup>. Only when their leaders had done their work and persuaded the Transvaal Government to offer terms something like those demanded by the High Commissioner, did the Bond editors and Bond committees begin to express themselves freely; and they took the cue to open their mouths from the prime minister himself, but this was not before the middle of July<sup>36</sup>. The "helot" dispatch therefore gave a very distorted picture of Bond press activity.

Bond committees responded to their leaders' request for restraint, and maintained their discipline well, with one important exception a month after the "helot" dispatch had been sent. The Albert Bondsmen lost patience and decided to hold a public meeting about the Transvaal to coincide with Milner's talks with Kruger at Bloemfontein. Hofmeyr tried to stop them in telegrams to Professor Cachet of the Burghersdorp seminary and "Oom Daantje" van den Heever<sup>37</sup>, but his advice was ignored. About 150 people attended the meeting, and heard Professor Cachet deplore the decision not to discuss the Transvaal at Congress or to hold public meetings. "Had de Bond toen rechtuit gesproken", he said, "dan was alles rechtgekomen" - a remark which was followed by applause for what the Ons Land reporter described as "een uitstekende patriotische toespraak die alle harten met sympathie voor Transvaal deed trillen"<sup>38</sup>. A local English trader and erstwhile opponent of the Albert Boeren Vereeniging rose to support Cachet; an old Boer with a wry sense of humour twitted Jotham Joubert, with feigned but effective naïveté, about the rights of the Transvaal; another dominie, who thought the Bloemfontein conference was a mistake, dismissed the idea

35. E.g. by Het Oosten, 29 June 1899.

36. S.A. News, Onze Courant, 13 July; Het Oosten, 20 July, 1899. See below, pp. 420-1.

37. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Notes by Hofmeyr on Edgar Walton to Hofmeyr, 19 May 1899.

38. Ons Land, 6 June 1899, had an inoffensive report of this concourse tucked away in an obscure column. The Patriot, 15 June 1899, gave a much fuller report based on that in the Burghersdorp Bondsman.

that Britain was a military danger to the Republics, basing his argument as to her troop requirements on the writings of General Butler; and a member of the Free State Volksraad added his contribution to what evidently became an extremely lively meeting. But as a meeting it was exceptional, and apparently the only occasion before the real crisis developed when Republican-minded Bondsmen met together in formal concourse to display their feelings 'with the lid off'. Milner may have deplored the sympathies of Bondsmen, but he had little ground for criticizing their conduct.

### III

In so far as the Bond sought to influence the relations between the Imperial Government and the Transvaal, its policy was to stand back and leave an unobstructed field for its leaders in the Ministry, who worked in close collaboration with Hofmeyr. These Ministers impressed F. J. Dormer, one of the least impassioned of witnesses, by the moderation with which they set about their task, defending neither Kruger's administration nor the policy of inducing him to improve it by coercion. "To call in question the loyalty of these men", he wrote in March 1899 after interviewing several of them, "in the sense of supposing them to be capable of contriving aught against the Queen's supremacy, would be cruel if it were not so palpably absurd". But he considered that in the prevailing atmosphere they stood in danger of being "thrust aside and spat upon" should they show a deficiency of zeal for the Imperial cause when the trial came. On the other hand, they would "probably take formal steps with a view to bringing [Kruger] to a better frame of mind, if any encouragement in that direction reached them from Government House"<sup>39</sup>.

39. F.J. Dormer, Vengeance as a Policy in Afrikanderland, p.124.

Ministers were not given much encouragement of the sort that Dormer had in mind, but they took such chances as came their way. Merriman, acting on his own initiative, made an indirect approach to Kruger at the end of 1898 with a view to obtaining concessions for Cape trade, holding out the bait that this might improve the chances of Bond candidates in the 1899 by-elections<sup>40</sup>. He drew the Free State into his orbit with a letter to Steyn on 1 January:

Is there no opportunity of bringing about a rapprochement between us, in which the Free State might play the part of honest broker?

He stressed the common railway interests of the Cape and the Free State, suggested that Kruger might like to see the establishment of a South African Appeal Court and perhaps - a long shot - listen to a "rediscussion of the Customs Union proposal"<sup>41</sup>. After receiving a favourable response, he set off for Pretoria in mid-January together with Abraham Fischer, Steyn's chief adviser, to lay the basis for a South African conference. "The more the different Governments in South Africa can be brought to take joint action upon matters on which they agree," Merriman recorded, "the better chance there will be for some mutual understanding on points where at present differences exist"<sup>42</sup>. After corresponding with Schreiner on the subject, Merriman then approached the High Commissioner in March with the suggestion of a conference of South African States and Colonies to discuss a customs union, a South African mint, university, appeal court, board of health, and perhaps other questions, as a precursor to a possible conference on more explosive topics. Milner replied that he would have no objection to such a conference, provided that it was purely deliberative, that it did not stray beyond the topics which Merriman had listed, that the German and

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40. Walker, Schreiner, pp.126-7.

41. Headlam, vol. I, pp.361-2.

42. Laurence, p.167.

Portuguese Colonies should be excluded, and that he himself should be represented as High Commissioner in virtue of the authority he had, if not in the native territories, than at least in Rhodesia<sup>43</sup>. But he told Hely Hutchinson, the Governor of Natal, that he hoped to "bosh the Conference", which in the event fell through because, though the Natal Ministry under Henry Binns accepted the invitation, neither the Free Staters nor the Transvalers were prepared to agree that the High Commissioner should be present<sup>44</sup>. Milner feared that in the conference atmosphere questions at issue between the Imperial and Republican Governments would be treated as purely South African questions in the handling of which the High Commissioner would lose the initiative. This was an understandable fear, as the Republican refusals to agree to his participation makes plain. The successful regulation of South African differences by means of a conference between States would have reduced the stature of the paramount Power, an eventuality which, in Milner's view, would have led to Boer domination of the whole of South Africa. This was something to be avoided, he thought, even at the price of continuing deadlock.

But if a general conference could not be arranged, there was still the possibility of a meeting between the heads of States. To this end, Schreiner persuaded the Chief Justice to visit Pretoria in April, and helped to pave the way by opening negotiations with J. C. Smuts, the State Attorney, tactfully suggesting the urgent need for reforms in the Transvaal. De Villiers, who reached Pretoria on the 26th, did not call on the President, for he doubted whether he would be made welcome, but he left other members of the Executive, notably Reitz, Smuts and Schalk Burger, under the impression that it would be discreet to offer some reforms at an early date. They agreed to work for franchise reform and an inquiry into the dynamite monopoly, provided the Imperial Government would make a complete and final presentation of its demands, and they admitted that

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43. Headlam, vol. I, pp.362-5.

44. Headlam, vol. I, pp.304-6; Walker, Schreiner, pp.134-5.

some hope might lie in a conference between the High Commissioner and the two Presidents<sup>45</sup>.

The precise connection between the discovery made by de Villiers that the Transvaal leaders were prepared to consider a 'summit' conference, and the interview between Chamberlain and Sivewright in London on 4 May, at which the latter persuaded the Colonial Secretary to agree that such a conference should be held, has never been drawn; but it is a reasonable inference that Sivewright had received his information from the Cape Government, to whom de Villiers had reported on the same day. Sivewright communicated with Hofmeyr on the 6th, strongly recommending that Kruger should invite Milner to Pretoria to discuss the dynamite question, and he indicated that the situation appeared to be serious<sup>46</sup>. Subsequent discussions between Hofmeyr, Schreiner and Sauer led these men to see the advantage of Bloemfontein over Pretoria as a venue for the proposed meeting, and they separated with two tasks to perform: to persuade Steyn to act as host and convener, and to impress upon the Transvaal Government the seriousness of the situation, with a view to securing a real offer of reform and the presence of Kruger at the conference table. Steyn proved very amenable, and anxious to fulfil the role assigned to him with the greatest possible tact. But there was a tendency on the part of some members of the Transvaal Executive to treat the crisis lightly. Reitz sent Milner a wire about the suzerainty in "irritating terms", affirming that the liberties of the Transvaal derived from no grant by the Imperial Government<sup>47</sup>. Smuts told both Schreiner and Hofmeyr that he thought war was unlikely to come, but that if it did there was little chance of the Republics losing it:

45. Walker, De Villiers, pp.332-4; Schreiner, pp.134,138,141.

46. J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, p.533. The documents on which Hofmeyr's biographer draws are in vol. 11 of the Papers.

47. On Steyn's attitude, see Headlam, vol. I, pp.373-6; N.J. van der Merwe, M.T. Steyn, vol. I, c.IX. On Reitz's wire, see Walker, Schreiner, pp.142-3; Hofmeyr, p.534.

... Als Engeland zich in het strijdperk met het Afrikanerdom zou wegen zonder een formeel goede excuus [he wrote to the latter] is haar zaak in Zuid Afrika gedaan. En dan hoe jammer hoe beter; daar wij van onzer kant heelmaal bereid zijn haar te ontmoeten. Ons volk over geheel Z.A. moet nog met een doop van bloed en vuur gedoopt worden alvorens het onder de groote volkeren der wereld zal kunnen worden opgenomen ...

In the event of war, he expected the Colonial Dutch to take an active part on the Republican side<sup>48</sup>. Hofmeyr cautioned both of them. "Als gy slaai maak wees zuinig met peper en azyn, liberaal met olie", he wired to Reitz. "Goed, maar pure olie walg", Reitz replied. On Smuts's letter, Hofmeyr noted: "Replied by wire 15.5.99 ... Threw cold water on idea that Cape Colonists would rise en masse & & ..." He and Schreiner then used their influence to overcome the difficulties which Reitz's telegram had raised in Milner's mind, with the result that by 17 May both Kruger and Milner, the latter with Chamberlain's approval, had agreed to accept Steyn's good offices and meet in Bloemfontein<sup>49</sup>.

Milner was reluctant for the conference to take place, and described the proposal to Greene as "a very clever move [which] has already produced one effect, viz. that of mollifying the British Press a bit and relaxing for the moment, unfortunately as I think, the screw upon the enemy"<sup>50</sup>. The conference proposal had in fact disturbed the timing of the Imperial strategy, for it involved a delay in the publication of the "helot" dispatch, which was intended to be the spearhead of a new diplomatic offensive against the Republican Government, supported by a blue book setting out the Uitlander grievances, aimed to compel reforms in the Transvaal, or to lead at once to stronger measures<sup>51</sup>.

But if Milner felt obliged to accept the conference proposal against his better inclinations, he was able to turn

48. For Smuts's communications, see Walker, Schreiner, pp. 143-4; Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Smuts to Hofmeyr, 10 May 1899.

49. Headlam, vol. I pp.374-5; C.9345, pp.239-43; A. Kieser, President Steyn in die Krisisjare, p.137.

50. Headlam, vol. I, p.378.

51. Marais, c. X.

the conference into something other than the Cape Ministers had hoped or intended. So far as the Ministers were concerned, the more the meeting could approximate to the sort of conference which Merriman had had in mind earlier in the year, the better it would have pleased them. The possibility of Steyn participating as a negotiator in the proceedings was not seriously canvassed, though Sauer and de Water apparently desired that he should do so<sup>52</sup>. But Schreiner was very anxious to take part himself, believing that he would be able to use his influence in the event of a threatened breakdown to keep the negotiations alive, and holding that the interest of the Colony in the success of the negotiations was itself a strong reason for his presence. Milner, however, thought otherwise, and decided to advise Schreiner not to attend - or "not to tell him to come", as he put it to Chamberlain - even though Chamberlain himself saw strong reasons for the Cape Premier being present<sup>53</sup>. In Headlam's words, Milner desired "the lists ... set for a duel", and he had his way. The other important respect in which Milner was able to turn the conference to his own ends concerned procedure. Hofmeyr had told Steyn and Sivewright that he wanted "an informal friendly talk ... free of formalities" between the President[s] and the High Commissioner, the results of which could be publicized in the form of a joint communiqué issued afterwards. Milner, on the other hand, insisted on a verbatim report of the discussions - a decision which was no doubt reassuring to the Uitlanders, whose petition still lay unanswered, but which had the inevitable effect of turning the Bloemfontein conference into a verbal fencing match and made its failure a virtual certainty even before the discussions began<sup>54</sup>.

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52. Headlam, vol. I, pp.375-6.

53. Headlam, vol. I, pp.391-2 (giving only Milner's side); Walker, Schreiner, pp.146-8; J.L. Garvin, Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. III, p.403; Marais, c.X, containing an important gloss on Walker's passage.

54. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Steyn, 8 or 9 May, 1899; Marais, c. X, quoting Hofmeyr to Sivewright, 8 May 1899 (in C.O. 417/282), and van der Merwe, vol. I, p.164.

The Bloemfontein conference, which opened on 30 May, failed because the maximum concessions which Kruger was prepared to make with regard to the Uitlander franchise - the point which Milner insisted on settling before discussing other controversial topics - amounted to less than the minimum demands on which Milner had decided to insist<sup>55</sup>. The Bond leaders and editors greeted the first news with regret, but soon came to the conclusion that whereas Kruger had approached the proceedings in a spirit of compromise, Milner had not<sup>56</sup>. The Ministers composed a minute of protest, but, unaware of the importance that Chamberlain attached at that moment to their point of view, decided not to present it formally, even though Schreiner came away from an interview with the High Commissioner extremely dissatisfied with the latter's unbending attitude<sup>57</sup>. Hofmeyr thought that Kruger "displayed an unexpectedly liberal spirit at Bl[loemfontein], & I am sure he w[ould] have done a great deal more if he had been encouraged by the other side"<sup>58</sup>. Like the members of the Government, he believed that the proposals made by Kruger, though inadequate as the basis of a settlement, might have been made so after fuller discussion. He proposed, therefore, to try to pull the fat out of the fire. The extent to which he had applied himself to the problem emerges from the following message sent by te Water to Steyn on the 9th:

Have had no information from you lately. How are things progressing Transvaal [?] Hofmeyr has called local Bond meeting for Tuesday at which he is -

1stly going to damn those who still talk of war as only solution of comparatively unimportant differences between his Honour and [his] Excellency.

2ndly thank you for convening and both for going to conference from which he expects good notwithstanding so-called failure.

3rdly express regret that President's proposals were not more fully discussed in detail as they contain germs of satisfactory settlement.

4thly hope Kruger will carry out 'dynamite' and promised franchise reforms and modify his proposals to

55. The minutes of the Bloemfontein conference were published in C.9404, pp.14-59.

56. S.A. News, 8,9 June; Het Oosten, 8 June; Onze Courant, 8,12 June; Ons Land, 8,10 June 1899.

57. Walker, Schreiner, pp.154-6.

58. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Notes on letter from Olive Schreiner, 3 June 1899.

such an extent that pending their application to whole country uitlanders now resident (for 7 years) on Rand can, say in a year's time, vote for the additional representation he is prepared to give them.

5thly give uitlanders who register in future the option of either taking the oath of allegiance immediately and thus becoming half-burghers, or otherwise at the end of seven years, then obtaining full rights but in the meantime retaining allegiance to their country.

6thly ten (10) years residence to vote for President. He and friends think it is highly desirable that you should impress these ideas on Transvaal, who can lose nothing thereby but succeed in maintaining friendly relations<sup>59</sup>.

But the Bond meeting was never called. Fischer, who had accused the Cape Bondsmen of indifference in a letter to Hofmeyr on the 8th, reacted unfavourably to Hofmeyr's amendments to Kruger's plan on the ground that they would create new divisions, while Smuts (who had not yet seen Hofmeyr's proposals) beat the drum with further exhortations to Afrikaner unity:

Wy nemen koers. Alle oogen zyn nu op Afrikaner Bond gevestigd. Zullen de broederbanden vaster of slapper worden? Afrikanerdom is nooit op kritieker punt geweest dan nu<sup>60</sup>.

The Transvalers were digging in their heels, refusing to go beyond the President's offer at Bloemfontein, and demanding the submission of outstanding disputes to arbitration as a quid pro quo for franchise concessions<sup>61</sup>. This made the Cape friends uneasy. On the 11th Milner told Schreiner that the Transvaal's proposed legislation was unacceptable<sup>62</sup>, while it was known that Chamberlain's reply to the Uitlander petition, which was due for publication in a few days' time, was likely to be a stiff document. Te Water explained Hofmeyr's predicament to Fischer:

Jan sounded men of authority and considered question from all aspects; thinks that if Bond should now adopt another course than more or less in direction indicated in my former telegram it would do harm rather than good here. He feels, now that nothing but President's proposals are insisted on, so very strongly on subject, sees so many difficulties, and is with all of us so

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59. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Te Water to Steyn (draft telegram), 9 June 1899. This document is not quoted in Hofmeyr's biography.
60. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr, 8 June; Fischer to Te Water (copy of telegram), 10 June; Smuts to Hofmeyr (telegram), 10 June 1899.
61. Headlam, vol. I, pp.432-7. The sort of bargain Kruger had proposed at Bloemfontein.
62. Headlam, vol. I, pp.438-9.

firmly convinced that there is no ground for the hope that the President's proposals as formulated will be accepted by the other party, that he has decided to hold no meeting tomorrow but to wait until he obtains more light from Sec. State for Colonies' despatch as well as from Pretoria and Bloemfontein ...

After stressing the need for keeping the franchise and arbitration questions separate, and Hofmeyr's readiness to speak in favour of the latter, the message ended with a request that Fischer should visit Cape Town for consultations<sup>63</sup>. Fischer agreed to make the journey, in a telegram full of regrets that Hofmeyr's meeting had not been held. "We feel disappointed", he wrote, "that whilst High Commissioner addresses political opponents and these speak out condemning Transvaal<sup>64</sup>, our friends keep silent & we have no words of support or sympathy<sup>65</sup>".

Telegraphic summaries of Chamberlain's reply to the Uitlander petition and of Milner's "helot" dispatch were published in the South African press in the middle of June<sup>66</sup>. These documents were even more outspoken than expected, and Schreiner tried unsuccessfully to persuade Milner to withhold publication for fear of upsetting the franchise negotiations<sup>67</sup>. It was a time for firmness, in the view of the High Commissioner and the Colonial Office, though public opinion in Britain was not yet ready for an ultimatum; but the Cape Bond leaders were more than ever aware that the time had come for the Transvaal to yield. A letter from Smuts at this juncture gave Hofmeyr some grounds for hope. The fire-breathing State Attorney now appreciated the difficulties of Cape Afrikaners, and realized that too robust support for Transvaal policy could destroy their influence in the Colony. He therefore urged them to support the Republic's franchise reform proposals in principle, yet suggest amendments in detail, to

63. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Te Water to Fischer (draft telegram), 13 June 1899.

64. A reference presumably to Milner's address to a Cape Town deputation on 12 June. See Headlam, vol. I, p.428.

65. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr (telegram), 13 June 1899.

66. Headlam, vol. I, p.441.

67. Headlam, vol. I, p.443; Walker, Schreiner, pp.156-7.

give discreet support to the idea of arbitration, and carry a motion in favour of peace, so that "van den anderen kan niet zou kunnen worden gezegd dat de Bond een vleugel der republikeinsche party is"<sup>68</sup>. A week later he told Hofmeyr:

"Sommige uwer punten zyn nog misschien uitvoerbaar"<sup>69</sup>. Here Smuts must have been referring to points agreed upon between the Ministers and Fischer, to which Milner had given his nihil obstat, during the Free Stater's visit to Cape Town, points which Hofmeyr had communicated to Smuts by letter on the 17th<sup>70</sup>.

Fischer's visit to the Cape caught Milner in a moment of doubt, when he was beginning to feel the need of the troops which the Imperial Government had so far refused to send, if he was to increase the pressure on the South African Republic. But it was politically impossible for the Colonial Office to send troops in advance of public opinion<sup>71</sup>, with the result that, for the second time in two months, Milner found it necessary to withdraw the mailed fist. The document which Fischer took home to Bloemfontein and eventually to Pretoria, embodying the hard thoughts of Hofmeyr and the Cape Ministers, contained a searching examination of the Transvaal proposals, which, if accepted by the Volksraad and applied, would certainly have rid Kruger's offer of ambiguity and gone far to remove the difficulties which had so far arisen in connection with the dispute over arbitration, the registration and enfranchisement of Uitlanders and the creation of better representation for the Witwatersrand<sup>72</sup>. Fischer, who was in Pretoria from 25 to 28 June, encountered some resistance in

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68. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Smuts to Hofmeyr, 13 June 1899.

69. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Smuts to Hofmeyr (telegram), 20 June 1899.

70. Walker, Schreiner, pp.157-8; Headlam, vol. I, pp.441-2; van der Merwe, vol. I, pp.208-9; Hofmeyr, pp.539-41; Marais, c. XI; C.9415, p.13.

71. See Headlam, vol. I, pp.443-6, especially Selborne to Milner, 25 June 1899; and Laurence p.172, quoting Bryce to Merriman, 2 July 1899, giving the Liberal Opposition view that war was improbable.

72. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Draft in Hofmeyr's hand, most of which is described in Hofmeyr, pp.539-40.

the Transvaal Executive Council to his proposals, but found Kruger prepared to go some distance to meet his arguments<sup>73</sup>. He obtained, as Marais has observed, "much more from Kruger and his government than he let on to Greene", but he was unable to persuade them to submit their new proposals to a responsible representative of the Imperial Government for scrutiny before laying them before the Volksraad, as Milner had hoped. This would have been a sensible concession to make, for nothing would have reduced the tension quite so much as an agreed measure; but the Republican leaders chose to regard it as an attempt to intervene in the Republic's internal affairs<sup>74</sup>. On balance, however, Fischer succeeded, and he succeeded against odds; for the concessions which he obtained from the President were gained in spite of an unauthorized and provocative movement of troops in the Cape Colony for which Schreiner was not wittingly responsible<sup>75</sup>, and in face of a singularly inopportune attempt by Chamberlain on the 26th to "give public opinion a lead" with a rousing anti-Transvaal speech at Birmingham<sup>76</sup>.

The Cape Ministers and Hofmeyr were aware, however, that Fischer had not wrung enough out of Kruger to satisfy the High Commissioner. They therefore decided that Hofmeyr himself, accompanied by Herholdt, the Minister of Agriculture, should go to Bloemfontein and, if invited, to Pretoria<sup>77</sup>. Smuts and Grobler, of the Transvaal Executive, met them at Bloemfontein by arrangement on 2 July. The Cape delegates presented them

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73. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Two telegrams, Steyn to te Water, 29 June 1899. Headlam, vol. I, p.447, gives a wrong impression of these negotiations, with incomplete quotation.
74. C.9415, p.13; Headlam, vol. I, pp.447-8. Milner to Chamberlain (telegram), 30 June 1899. I am not inclined to accept the view propounded by Breytenbach, vol. I, p.309, and Marais, c.XI, that Milner's request through Fischer has to be regarded as "a further step along the road of intervention". All Chamberlain asked for was an opportunity to give advice.
75. Walker, Schreiner, pp.159-60.
76. Headlam, vol. I, p.448.
77. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Fischer (draft telegram) 30 June 1899; Walker, Schreiner, pp.162-3; Hofmeyr, p.540-1.

with a memorandum indicating the points on which Kruger's offer to Fischer required to be supplemented, and the Transvaal emissaries gave them grounds for hoping that their objections might be overcome:

... In our conference Sunday night with Grobler [and] Smuts we drew attention to many shortcomings in concept and handed them written memo containing following recommendations. Firstly oath not to be obligatory without full franchise. Secondly Residential qualification for future arrivals not to be longer than seven years in any case. Thirdly more liberal provision for giving full franchise without delay on passing of proposed law to old residents who arrived after promulgation [of] law of 25 Aug. 90. Fourthly four additional Volksraad members to mining districts and these not to be neutralised by other new members. Fifthly Reforms Dynamite. Sixthly Reference to another and fuller memo in wh[ich] we enter more in detail on sliding scale, registration, and bribery laws, acting in understanding with other party etc.

They practically agreed that our suggestions would not endanger independence to greater extent than Concept Draft and promised to recommend same, but could not hold out hopes that all would be accepted. They were to wire today whether it was desirable that we should visit Pretoria. Telegrams received this evening show that while not decidedly objecting to visit from us they have misgivings as to its beneficial effect. Under these circumstances we have wired them that we intend returning Cape T[ow]n tomorrow Tuesday at one unless we get counter instructions from Pretoria<sup>78</sup>.

It has sometimes been suggested<sup>79</sup> that Kruger objected to Hofmeyr's mission on personal grounds, and that the opposition of the old President had to be overcome before he could set foot in the Transvaal. This may have been the case, but Kruger's only concern, according to the evidence of the telegrams, was lest Hofmeyr and Herholdt might fail in their mission, and in doing so compromise their own position in such a way that their usefulness to the Transvaal would diminish<sup>80</sup>. In fact, owing largely to the assistance of Fischer and Steyn, their mission to Pretoria was conspicuously successful. The chief obstacle they encountered was not Kruger

78. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr and Herholdt to Schreiner (telegram from Bloemfontein), 3 July 1899. A copy of the memorandum referred to, in Hofmeyr's hand, is in the Hofmeyr Papers.

79. E.g. in Hofmeyr, p.542; Headlam, vol. I, p.449; Kieser, p.162; van der Merwe, vol. I, p.224.

80. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Copies of telegrams, Fischer to Steyn (from Pretoria), 3 July 1899 and Kruger to Steyn (no date), given in van der Merwe, vol. I, pp.222-3.

but the Volksraad, which had shown a great want of political sense immediately before the Cape delegates' arrival by passing a redistribution Bill giving the Rand an extra four seats and the rural burgher constituencies an extra fifteen<sup>81</sup>. Undaunted by this apparent attempt to slam the door, however, Hofmeyr and Herholdt held consultations with the Executive Council and then met the two Volksraads in secret session. Using arguments on which the records throw no certain light, they succeeded in persuading the assembled legislators to accept the substance of the proposals they had brought up with them<sup>82</sup>.

It is important to note at this juncture that the concessions which Hofmeyr and Herholdt obtained from the representatives of the Transvaal fell some considerable way short of the demands which Milner had made at Bloemfontein. They did not include, for example, the five-year retrospective franchise, or even the seven-year maximum which Hofmeyr himself put forward, and therefore did not provide for the immediate enfranchisement of what Milner imagined would be a large number of Uitlanders, those who had entered the Transvaal in what he referred to as the "great immigration" between 1890 and 1895<sup>83</sup>. On the other hand - and this was the real measure of the Cape friends' achievement - the concessions did cover nearly all the major points on which Fischer had failed to achieve satisfaction, and Fischer had gone to Pretoria

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81. Hofmeyr, pp.542-3; Walker, Schreiner, p.164.

82. According to Greene (quoted in Headlam, vol. I, p.453), Onze Jan appealed to the serpentine wisdom of the members. According to Hofmeyr's biographer, he frightened them into agreement with a piece of spine-chilling oratory (pp.543-4). Neither quotes authorities and it seems unsafe to assume, in view of his introductory remarks on p. vi, that Hofmeyr's biographer depended on the memory of his collaborator, F. W. Reitz.

83. C.9415, p.44; Headlam, vol. I, pp.459-60. Milner to Chamberlain (telegram), 13 July 1899.

with at least the tacit agreement of Milner, if not with his whole-hearted approval as Walker and Kieser suggest<sup>84</sup>. It therefore seemed unarguable that the terms which the Volksraads had accepted were very nearly Milner's own.

That is why Schreiner, who, on the morning of 6 July, had been cabling sombre thoughts about the "darkest hour" and a possible severing of diplomatic relations between the Imperial Government and the Transvaal, was able to inform Herholdt in the afternoon that the Cabinet had considered his coded report of the Volksraad proceedings and regarded them as a substantial basis for peace<sup>85</sup>. They were "adequate, satisfactory and such as should secure a peaceful settlement", he informed the press, after badgering the emissaries for permission to break silence and send London "something simple and definite from Pretoria". Smuts also thanked Hofmeyr on the 9th

uit den grond myns harten ... voor de groote diensten die u in die dagen aan het Afrikanervolk en onze republiek in het byzonder verricht hebt. Dat de situatie gered is en de positie ... plotseling veranderd is, in de hereeniging van ons volk over geheel Zuid Afrika, is niet het minst aan u en Fischer te danken ... Myn wensch is dat het koloniale Afrikanerdom thans het werk moge voltoeien door u te Pretoria begonnen, en dat zy door hun stem en daden het Transvaalsche volk overtuigende van de zuiverheid hunner positie en sympathie<sup>86</sup>.

The reader is left to imagine precisely what Smuts was thanking him for, whether it was for taming the Volksraad or for taming the High Commissioner, but what clearly mattered to him most was that Afrikaner unity had been restored. In this he was right, for the end of the Hofmeyr mission marked the moment in time when the general body of Bond opinion ceased to believe that the Imperial Government any longer had a valid reason for applying pressure on the Government of the Transvaal.

A meeting of Bondsmen took place in Cape Town on the

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84. Milner had expressed himself non-committally to Chamberlain about Fischer's visit at the time (C.9415, p.13; Headlam, vol. I, pp.447-8). But see Walker, Schreiner, pp.157-8; Kieser, p.163, where Fischer is quoted as having stated that the Hofmeyr mission had achieved all "which Milner told me himself would satisfy him". Hofmeyr's copy of the memorandum given to Fischer on leaving for the north is marked: "Shown Governor".
85. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Schreiner to Herholdt (three telegrams), 6 July 1899. Walker, Schreiner, pp.165-7.
86. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Smuts to Hofmeyr, 9 July 1899.

evening of the 12th, the day after Hofmeyr returned from his mission. Onze Jan asked from the chair whether the time had not now come for Bondsmen to break silence.

It had been thought best [he reminded his audience] not to hold any big meetings, nor to get up an immense demonstration throughout the country, but to work in silence as they had done ... Before the Bloemfontein Conference they had been in uncertainty. Now, however, this period of doubt had passed away ...

Motions were then carried unanimously - in favour of peace and the settlement of the Transvaal franchise dispute, moved by F. S. Malan; in favour of the arbitration of disputes under the London Convention, in the light of the attitude taken by British delegates at the recent Hague Convention, moved by Hofmeyr; and of thanks to the Cabinet for their Transvaal policy. A fourth, condemning the reference to Colonial Boer disloyalty in the "helot" dispatch, was ruled out of order by the chairman<sup>87</sup>. The Bond press responded favourably.

Is er nog iemand die er aan twyfelt [asked Marais of Onze Courant] dat het thans ons heilige plicht is om met alle constitutioneele middelen ter onze beschikking onzen premier, ons ministerie, "Onze Jan" en de andere waardige Afrikaner staatsmannen, en daardoor de zaak van vrede en eendracht, te ondersteunen.

He urged Bondsmen to hold big meetings to show to the world their desire for peace, and other Bond papers carried the same message<sup>88</sup>. Such meetings, needless to say, were held all over the Colony<sup>89</sup>.

The occasion for most of the renewed public activity by the Bond was the failure of the Colonial Office and the High Commissioner to respond in the way the Cape Ministers expected to the success of Hofmeyr's mission. The objections raised on Milner's side fall essentially into two categories: first, he disagreed with the procedure followed by the Republic in embodying the concessions in new legislation without first permitting the Imperial authorities to examine them; and

87. Cape Town Bond Notulen, 12 July; S.A. News, 13 July 1899. Resolutions as transmitted to Colonial Office in C.9518, p.31.

88. Onze Courant, 13 July; Het Oosten, 20 July 1899.

89. For reports, see Onze Courant, 24 July, 5 Aug.; Ons Land, 25 July 1899. Most meetings carried resolutions identical to those carried at the Cape Town meeting.

second, when he was informed what the new law contained he decided that it would not meet with the Uitlander requirements. On the question of procedure the Transvaal Government was chiefly at fault. In the closing stages of the Bloemfontein conference, when Kruger had intimated that he might place his own franchise reform proposals before the Volksraad, Milner had replied: "I certainly do not wish in any way to discourage him, but he would do it of course on his own motion, and not as part of any understanding or arrangement with Her Majesty's Government"<sup>90</sup>. Kruger reminded the British Agent of this after Chamberlain had cabled a request on 11 July that the Transvaal Government should suspend legislation until the British Government, informed officially of the details, had been given a chance to communicate its views<sup>91</sup>. This was a reasonable request, especially as Chamberlain was disposed to treat the concessions as a possible basis for a settlement. The Colonial Bond leaders urged the Transvalers to accept it<sup>92</sup>. So did Steyn<sup>93</sup>. But Kruger replied both to the Free State President and to the British Agent, informing them that his Government was under no contractual obligation to defer legislation to satisfy the British Government, that the new draft law "indicated farthest limit at which people and Volksraad ... could arrive", and had in any case passed out of the hands of the Government into those of a commission<sup>94</sup>. It was a decision taken in error, a mistake to take a stand on the principle of the Republic's internal autonomy because the request did not in any case threaten it, and it was not as if the British request was unexpected for a similar request

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90. C.9404, p.43. Probably not a snub, but an attempt by Milner to cover himself against responsibility for what the Volksraad might do.
91. C.9415, p.43 (no.45), p.46 (no.50), and for another indication of Chamberlain's attitude, p.53 (no. 60).
92. E.g. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Te Water to Smuts, 11,13 July 1899.
93. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr, 13 July 1899.
94. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr, 13 July 1899 (no. 2); C.9415, pp.45-6 (no.50). The work of the commission could presumably have been held up.

had been made through Fischer and turned down.

When the objection as to content is considered, however, there can be little doubt that Milner was at fault, and the error which he made underlines the basic flaw in his diplomacy from the Bloemfontein conference onwards. The point may be illustrated with reference to one of the details at issue. The proposals which Fischer had submitted to the Executive Council in June, and which Milner almost certainly vetted, included a crisp demand for the creation of four new seats for the goldfields in the First Volksraad. Fischer failed to obtain concessions on this point; but Hofmeyr was able to secure a firm undertaking in this direction, as well as the effective invalidation of the redistribution law carried by the Volksraad on the eve of his visit. Yet the most substantial criticism which Milner had to make of the new concessions when they were first reported to him was that

As I understand the matter ... the largest representation Uitlanders can hope for from present scheme for some years to come ... is 4 [seats] out of 32 or out of 34<sup>95</sup>. Both as regards number of seats therefore and period qualifying franchise [i.e. the failure to concede five years' residence with retroactive effect] [the] proposal falls far short of what I suggested at Bloemfontein. And what I suggested then was always treated by me as a minimum<sup>96</sup>.

If the last sentence represented the true position, then Fischer and Hofmeyr had gone to Pretoria under false pretences. Alternatively, Milner had shifted his ground, not once but twice, by taking a strong line at Bloemfontein, yielding to the 'conference spirit' in late June and early July, and then reverting to a policy of firmness immediately after the Hofmeyr mission<sup>97</sup>. From Milner's own point of view, if it was his intention to compel the Transvaal Government to grant the Uitlanders real political power, he had had two courses open

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95. He should, of course, have said four extra seats.

96. C.9415, p.45 (no.49). Milner had insisted on one quarter of the seats for Uitlanders at Bloemfontein.

97. Kieser, pp.169-70, makes the same point concerning the attitude of Chamberlain; but Marais has shown, c. XI, that in July 1899 Chamberlain became very impatient with Milner's bellicosity. It was Milner rather than Chamberlain who took the lead over the rejection of the July franchise law.

to him at Bloemfontein. One was to confront Kruger with his minimum demands and back these with an ultimatum; but this was politically impossible in Britain. The other was to present demands which would have given him some room to bargain. But to refer to the Bloemfontein demands as the minimum he was prepared to accept, then to lend his backing to missions which set out to obtain something less, and then to revert to his earlier standpoint, was bound to turn moderate Afrikaner opinion against him.

The peace which Hofmeyr hoped he had achieved was therefore no peace, and the predicament in which Colonial Afrikanerdom and the Ministry found themselves became even more acute. Talk of Afrikaner volkseenheid, that dangerously imprecise expression which took no account of frontiers, began to grow more frequent in the correspondence of Boer leaders in the Colony and Republics, nurtured by the outpourings of devotion to Milner by Uitlander and Leaguesman, with the result that suspicions continued to deepen on both sides of the political fence. The refusal on the part of the Transvaal Government to admit any British influence in the drafting of their new Franchise Bill was rooted in the belief that, thanks to Hofmeyr, the formula for volkseenheid had been found. They could now count on the support, which they certainly had in a moral sense, of the Colonial Afrikaners. But Hofmeyr had left Pretoria with nothing more than a promise. The legislation to give effect to this promise had still to be drafted and enacted, and once enacted it had to prove acceptable to a very particular High Commissioner. Hofmeyr and the Ministers therefore bombarded the Transvaal Government, either directly through Smuts or indirectly through the Free State, with detailed suggestions for and criticisms of the proposed Bill. The Executive Council would accept from them ideas which it had become politically impossible to entertain if they came from the British, and on the whole they showed a disposition to listen to advice. "Er zal gehandeld worden volgens uw

en Hofmeyr's werk ... Wy doen ons best met de verbeteringen en ik zal best doen uitvoering te geven aan uwe suggesties van gisteren ... Heb in de laatste dagen met alle kracht gewerkt om art.4 op zeven jaar gesteld te krygen. Er is geen kans van slagen. Zend toch onmiddellyk een zeer sterk telegram om myne handen te sterken ..." These quotations from telegrams sent by Smuts to de Water and Hofmeyr in the first half of July<sup>98</sup> illustrate the concern on Smuts's part to work out an acceptable measure. Consequently the Cape friends were able to secure some improvements even on Hofmeyr's earlier terms, a notable example being the seven-year retrospective franchise, by the time the law had been gazetted on the 26th.

When Milner forwarded the text of the law and the explanatory memorandum to Chamberlain he observed that parts of these documents left him "in a state of complete bewilderment"<sup>99</sup>. His difficulties, as explained in earlier dispatches,<sup>100</sup> related both to the detailed interpretation of the law and to its practical effects in giving the Uitlanders real political power. On the latter question there was probably no means of obtaining assurance except by allowing the law to come into force and taking note of the results, for the state of knowledge about the number of Uitlanders who were likely to qualify under it was singularly meagre. On the question of interpretation, however, there was assuredly room for improvement even after the Transvaal legislators had done their best to be clear. The Volksraad had rushed the measure as part of a very understandable demonstration of its autonomy; but its action had not brought a restoration of the 'conference spirit' at a time when the differences to be settled were still wide.

At the end of July the Imperial Government proposed the holding of a Joint Inquiry, in order to bring the disputes back within the range of inter-governmental discussion; but in the light of the opposition which earlier, less formal

98. All are in the Hofmeyr Papers. C.f. Kieser, p.176, where the point is made that the Cape friends would not have succeeded in their efforts but for the influence of Steyn on Kruger.

99. C.9518, p.62.

100. C.9518, pp. 45, 51.

approaches of this kind had received this was a very stiff demand. The establishment of a joint Anglo-Boer commission to investigate a law on the Republican statute book savoured much more of intervention than the earlier requests, even though it was coupled with the offer to discuss "arbitration without introduction of foreign element" once the franchise question had been disposed of<sup>101</sup>. Nevertheless the Cape Ministers and Hofmeyr, together with the Bond parliamentary caucus, acting not so much out of sympathy with the Imperial Government as out of fear for the future of the Transvaal, put pressure on the Republic to accept the proposal:

We the undersigned Africander members of Parliament, thoroughly sympathising with our Transvaal relatives in their troubles and appreciating the concessions already made by them in the interest of peace, yet beg to urge the expediency of their still doing their very utmost short of sacrificing their independence, to avert the horrors of war. While agreeing that the Commission of Enquiry proposed by Mr Chamberlain can not be asked for as a matter of right, we believe that such a commission might provide a way out of existing difficulties, which are fast approaching a crisis, with results which might prove fatal to the best interests not only of our Transvaal and Free State brethren, but also of the Africander party in the Cape Colony. In the presence of an immediate danger and of the momentous issues awaiting the decision of your Honour's Executive and Volksraad, even the risk of being misunderstood or misrepresented is of minor importance. We beg that your Honour will lay these words which are only dictated by a keen sense of our common interests and risks privately before your Executive and Volksraad, and remain, your Honour's obedient servants. [Signed] P.G. Kuhn, C.W.H. Schröder, G.J. Krige, H.C. van Heerden, H.J. Raubenheimer, M.J. Pretorius, P.J. du Toit, M. Rademeyer, D. de Vos Rabie, Jos. M. Hoffman, O.A. Oosthuizen, D.H. Immelman, H. van Huyssteen, P.J. Weeber, H.P. Beyers, G.D. Wolmarans, D. Wessels, D.J. du Plessis, C.J. Lotter, D.J. van Wyk, J.V. Graaff, F.[F]. Wienand, A.S. du Plessis, M.J. du Plessis, C. Searle Jr., J.F. du Toit, J.H. Schoeman, J.N.P. Botha, N.J. de Wet, I.J. van der Walt, N.F. de Waal, C. Sonnenberg, J.C. Molteno, T.P. Theron, M.J. Dempers, Jos. W. Joubert, J.S. Marais, J.J. van der Merwe, J.A. Smuts, D.P. van den Heever, A.S. Bellingan, M.L. Neethling, J. Joubert, J.T. Molteno, J.S. Marais [bis]<sup>102</sup>, P.J. de Wet, I.W. van der Vyver, J.H. Smith, D.C. de Waal, D.J. Marais, D.J.A. van Zyl, J.A. Lochner<sup>103</sup>.

Fischer, to whom this message was sent for transmission to Kruger, protested that the acceptance of a joint commission "would be tantamount to surrender of independence". "Any other course", te Water replied on Hofmeyr's behalf, would be fatal

101. C.9518, p.29.

102. This should probably read J.H. Marais.

103. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Contained in te Water to Fischer (telegram), 11 Aug. 1899. See also the following (cont.)

to them, to you and to us"<sup>104</sup>. Fischer therefore addressed himself to Pretoria, if not to persuade the Transvaal to accept the joint commission, then at least to help it find a satisfactory alternative answer.

The Transvaal leaders saw the mirage of Afrikaner volks-  
eenheid dissolving before their eyes, and began to argue among themselves. "Had yesterday telegraphic communication with President and Smuts", Steyn cabled to Hofmeyr on the 14th. "President does not seem to agree with Smuts. Will speak [to] them again today." The same message contained the following communication from Smuts:

Have just had private conversation with Greene who informed me that object of joint commission was to bring Johannesburg into the matter and then to go further than at Bloemfontein. Uitlanders have gathered all facts which will then be brought before Commission to bring opinion of world over to their side. The only way open for this Government was to accept Bloemfontein proposals as alternative to prevent investigation and greater demands. The honour of High Commissioner and Ministry were bound to [? regard] Bloemfontein proposals as minimum. Kindly inform Hofmeyr of this. Perhaps he may persuade High Commissioner to bring his proposal to settlement basis. Can Fischer not go to Cape Town immediately?<sup>105</sup>

The interview between Smuts and Greene had taken place on Saturday, 11 August, and the above message suggests strongly that the Republican proposals which led to the Smuts-Greene negotiations were a concession offered by the Transvaal leaders in a moment of uncertainty for fear of meeting something worse.

The terms offered by Smuts to Greene conceded more than the points which Milner had insisted upon at Bloemfontein. He offered the five-year retrospective franchise with immediate effect; eight new seats for the Rand, bringing its representation up to one quarter of the First Volksraad, with

103. (cont.) telegrams: Te Water to Fischer, 31 July; Hofmeyr to Fischer, 3 Aug. 1899, for Hofmeyr's views on the joint commission; Walker, Schreiner, pp.171-2.

104. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Telegrams: Fischer to Hofmeyr, 11 Aug.; Te Water to Fischer, 12 Aug. 1899.

105. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Steyn to Hofmeyr, 14 Aug. 1899. For Greene's account, see C.9521, pp.44-5.

a guarantee that it would not fall below this ratio; no distinction in the election of the Commandant-General and the President; and the participation of the British Agent in discussions over the franchise law and any other points of dispute. In return, he asked that the British Government should not look upon this offer as a precedent for intervention, or in fact intervene, should also allow the dispute over suzerainty to drop, and, as soon as the new franchise scheme had become law, concede the principle of arbitration "from which the foreign element is excluded". These terms were to replace the British proposal of a joint inquiry. Two days later, on 21 August, Reitz made it known that Smuts's requests to the British Government had in fact to be treated as conditions, and this led to unfortunate confusion in British circles as to what the Transvaal really intended to offer; but there can be no doubt that the concessions offered by the Transvaal were substantial<sup>106</sup>.

Unfortunately, however, it was an offer made on the run, and created the impression among friends as well as opponents that the Transvaal Government considered that a joint inquiry would reveal the need for even greater concessions to the Uitlanders. Apparently not realizing this, the Transvalers considered that the initiative was now theirs, and that they had forced the British Government into a corner. Smuts told Hofmeyr on the 22nd that if Britain did not accept his offer she would put herself in the wrong in the eyes of the world, and he revealed a resurgence of his old spirit of defiance, considering that if a show-down came,

geloof ik dat de twee republieken zich zullen blyven handhaven. Wy hebben omtrent een 50,000 man, wier weerga als schutters en onverschrokken krygslieden de wereld kent niet, en volgens een berekening in Butler's Colley zal Engeland minstens 150,000 noodig hebben om zelfs gelyk te staan met deze republikeinsche legermacht ...

But he warned Hofmeyr not to run the Bond Ministry into too much danger, having taken to heart Hofmeyr's earlier warning

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106. C. 9521, pp.44-5, 58-9; Breytenbach, vol. I p.326; Kieser, pp.181, 185-6.

that indiscretion could lead to the dismissal of the Cape Government and its replacement by another under Sprigg or Rhodes<sup>107</sup>. Reitz told Hofmeyr:

Indien het Britsch ministerie nu beslist ons voorstel zou weigeren, dan zou de zaak maar slecht staan voor vrede - maar doen zy zulks dan is ons geweten vry ...<sup>108</sup>.

The Imperial Government could unquestionably have brought the immediate crisis to an end at this juncture, without dishonour, by accepting the Republic's terms, if concern for the reasonable demands of the Uitlander population had been its only objective. But it was evidently moved, by annoyance at the equivocation of the Transvaal Government, whose terms involved a rejection as well as an offer, by the constant importunities of the Uitlander Council, and by a sense of having forced Kruger to give ground, to stand by its demand for a joint inquiry, or alternatively a unilateral inquiry from the British side. In truth, Downing Street was less concerned with the Uitlander grievances at this stage than with the maintenance of British paramountcy in South Africa as a whole. Chamberlain's reply to Smuts's offer, cabled on 28 August, makes this abundantly clear, especially when taken in conjunction with his comments in the Times of the same date: the time had come "once for all" to "establish which is the Paramount Power in South Africa"<sup>109</sup>.

The Schreiner Government, which had found itself in trouble with the Opposition, with the Free State Government, and with Milner himself over the related questions of Imperial troop movements in the Colony and the passage of arms and ammunition to the Free State<sup>110</sup>, was not kept informed over the detailed plans of the Imperial Government,<sup>111</sup> and no advice

107. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Smuts to Hofmeyr, 22 Aug. 1899 (address and signature deleted).

108. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Reitz to Hofmeyr, 28 Aug. 1899.

109. C.9521, pp.49-56, 64. Chamberlain to Milner (telegrams), 28 Aug., 9 Sept. 1899; E.A. Walker in Cambridge History of the British Empire, vol. VIII, p.596. See also Headlam vol. I, p.525, for Milner's view, which was the same.

110. See, inter alia, Walker, Schreiner, c. IX.

111. Nor was Milner fully informed of their activities, according to the information he gave Chamberlain on 30 August (see Headlam, vol. I, pp.499-500).

which Schreiner and Hofmeyr were in a position to give to Kruger or his advisers was now likely to avert the coming clash. Hofmeyr, while appreciating the genuineness of the Smuts proposals, drew attention to their tactical weakness before he knew that the British Government intended to reject them<sup>112</sup>. He told Smuts: "... You gave too much, and at the same time asked too much, spoiling the first by the second, and thereby playing into the hand of the enemy." He considered that the Transvaal had offered too little at Bloemfontein and had failed to remove "the pitfalls out of the Act passed after our visit to Pretoria".

By refusing to restore the 'Conference spirit' [he continued], all your concessions have acquired the appearance of being forced. By giving them by fits and starts ['dribbling out reforms like a squeezed sponge' was Chamberlain's analogy], you have made no impression on the general public in foreign countries.

He thought there was still time for them to accept the joint inquiry, and pressed them to do so "although it is rather late, and the terms will become harder. Think of the Sibylline books"<sup>113</sup>.

On 2 September the Transvaal Government answered Chamberlain's objections to their offer of 19-21 August, but at the same time withdrew that offer, while remaining non-committal towards Chamberlain's further suggestion of another conference between the heads of States at Cape Town<sup>114</sup>. Hofmeyr protested that the Transvaal's reply was totally inadequate. "We consider a dilatory policy as most dangerous", he told Fischer, who was again in Pretoria<sup>115</sup>, and it was partly as a result of the pressure which he exerted through Fischer that on the 8th the South African Republic decided to accept Chamberlain's demand for a joint inquiry - only for its offer to be outdated

112. That the British Government did intend to reject them is cogently argued by Marais, c. XI. Contrast C.H.B.E., vol. VIII, pp.596-7 and Headlam, vol. I, pp.493-4.

113. English translation in Hofmeyr, p.550. The letter was dated 30 August.

114. C.9521, pp.52-4.

115. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Te Water to Fischer (draft telegram in Hofmeyr's hand), 6 Sept. 1899.

by Chamberlain's demand on the same day for the unconditional acceptance by the Transvaal of its own offer of 19 August, minus the conditions which had then been attached to it<sup>116</sup>. It was this offer, not the July franchise law, that Chamberlain now required his joint commission to examine.

The position of the Cape friends now became impossible. Hofmeyr tried once more to keep negotiations open by counselling the Transvaal, through Fischer, to return a conciliatory reply to Chamberlain's latest demand, to the effect that "they renew their offer in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 in note of 19th August and accept invitation to joint enquiry and conference, of course without detriment to their independence and existing rights"<sup>117</sup>. Fischer's reply indicated that at last the Free State and the Cape friends had parted company, for neither he nor Steyn felt that they could conscientiously advise the Transvaal to accept the latest demand<sup>118</sup>. Hofmeyr's rejoinder, that Brand had yielded over the Diamond Fields and saved his State, "and today there is none to censure Brand", had no effect<sup>119</sup>. Kruger's message of the 16th registered the parting of the ways:

Although we fully acknowledge and appreciate your good intentions, we however regret that it is no longer possible for us to further accede to extravagant and impudent demands of British Government. It was in cooperation with you and on your advice that we lowered the franchise and accepted joint Commission of Enquiry, acting under same conviction which you probably shared. All this was of no avail ... We are determined not to go any further than we have latterly done, and we are convinced that we cannot accept Secretary [of] State [for] Colonies' proposals regarding franchise after 5 years' residence, now that all assurance for our independence embodied in our proposals has been taken away... We are fully impressed with the very serious position in which we are placed, but with God before our eyes we cannot go further without endangering, if not totally destroying, our independence. This Government, Parliament and people are unanimous on this point<sup>120</sup>.

On the 18th, Hofmeyr abandoned his attempt to influence the

116. C.9521, pp.64-5. Chamberlain to Milner (telegram), 8 Sept. 1899.
117. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Herholdt to Fischer (telegram), 13 Sept. 1899. Quoted in Hofmeyr, p.551.
118. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr (telegram), 13 Sept. (quoted in Hofmeyr, p.552); Steyn to Hofmeyr (telegram), 14 Sept. 1899.
119. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Herholdt to Steyn (draft telegram in Hofmeyr's hand), 14 Sept. 1899. Quoted in Hofmeyr, p.552.
120. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr (telegram), 16 Sept. 1899.

Republics, wishing Kruger "wisdom to select the right way and strength to pursue it"<sup>121</sup>.

Two days later the Bond parliamentarians met and found nothing constructive to say. A meeting over which M. L. Neethling, Legislative Councillor for the Western Province, presided, noted with satisfaction that the Executive Council of the South African Republic had accepted the invitation of Her Majesty's Government to take part in a joint commission of inquiry, and trusted "dat die aanneming de uitbarsting van daadwerkelyke vyandelykheden onmogelyk zal maken". But they went on to observe that the recent British demands made the outbreak of hostilities a likely contingency, and raised the question of a subscription list for the Republican wounded, widows and orphans for discussion at a later date<sup>122</sup>. Next day the Cape Ministers petitioned the British Government to approach the South African Republic in a "spirit of magnanimous compromise", which elicited from Chamberlain a formal and unyielding reply<sup>123</sup>. A further attempt by them to frame a peace motion which might win the unanimous support of Parliament failed through ministerial disagreement over the contents of Schreiner's draft<sup>124</sup>. On the 28th, the Ministers and their parliamentary supporters petitioned the Queen, laying stress on their "ties of blood relationship, inter-marriage and friendship, with residents in the South African Republic", the preparedness of the Transvaal Government to institute adequate reforms, and the desirability of holding a joint inquiry. It received a somewhat chill response, and its effect was largely offset by a counter-petition signed by Sprigg and nearly as many members of Parliament, deprecating "the attempts which have been made to encourage the Government of South African Republic to continue their resistance to the just demands

121. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Hofmeyr to Fischer (telegram), 18 Sept. 1899.

122. Ons Land, 21 Sept. 1899.

123. C. 9530, pp.15, 18.

124. Walker, Schreiner, p.192.

of Her Majesty's Government", and underlining their support for Milner's policy<sup>125</sup>. Thus, to the sound of hollow formalities, South Africa drifted slowly towards war.

The threat of war presented a further problem for the Bond leaders, namely that of advising their followers what line of conduct they ought to pursue. Schreiner had discovered that it was constitutionally impossible for the Cape Colony to remain neutral without the consent of the Imperial Government. He might perhaps have pressed his case, had he not realized full well that if it came to an open rupture Milner would not have hesitated to dismiss the Ministry, as Frere had dismissed the Molteno Ministry in 1878, and seek to replace it by one of a stronger loyalist persuasion<sup>126</sup>. But he had done his best for the Colonial Afrikaners by obtaining the promise that Colonial troops would not be required to serve outside the borders of the Colony proper if this could possibly be avoided. This at least absolved the Boer from the most invidious of duties, and created conditions without which the Bond leaders would probably have been unable to control the rank and file.

No responsible Bond leader could have advised his fellow-Bondsmen to commit high treason by joining the enemies of the British Crown, or, worse still, implicate the Bond officially in such an act. So far were the executive members of the Provincial Bestuur from contemplating such action, that they threw their energies, together with Schreiner, into the task of preventing the possibility of a popular rising in the country districts. While Schreiner directed circulars to magistrates and Bond committees and approached the leaders of

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125. C.9530, pp.39-40, 45. For the background to the Bond petition, see Molteno, pp.169, 173-93.

126. Walker, Schreiner, pp.186-7; Headlam, vol. I, pp.503-5 (on the neutrality question); p.461 (on possibility of dismissal of Ministers); B. Cloete, Die Lewe van Senator F.S. Malan, p.149 (for S.A. Party caucus discussion).

the N.G. Kerk<sup>127</sup>, the Bond executive issued advice through the press as soon as it became apparent that war was bound to come:

Our advice is ... to keep quiet, and to hold no meetings with reference to the existing situation, neither of Ward nor of District [Besturen], nor any meetings of the public, in order that our voices may be heard at the highest meeting of our organization, where resolutions can be discussed and considered by our Delegates [wettige afgevaardigden].

To this end, they proposed to call a special congress sometime in November<sup>128</sup>. But after consultations between Hofmeyr, N. F. de Waal and Theron it was decided to postpone the congress indefinitely, in the words of a further press statement, because

We have again carefully reconsidered whether the meeting of the Congress under such circumstances is desirable before there are any signs that the opposing parties are willing to offer the olive-branch to each other. We have come to the conclusion that we must postpone the meeting of Congress for an indefinite period, till such time as there will be a possibility of our prayers being heard, and when the light will break through the dark clouds which are now darkening our South African skies<sup>129</sup>.

But a few scraps of correspondence in the Hofmeyr Papers suggest that the real reason for the decision to postpone was that the fear of a popular rising which had inspired the earlier announcement was now seen to be void of substance<sup>130</sup>. The final advice on how Bondsmen should act was given by Theron in a circular dated 17 November, when he was called upon to decide whether the election of new ward and district besturen should take place in December, as the Bond constitution required:

Myne antwoord aan onze geheele organisatie is: Broeders, houdt uwe vergaderingen, kiest uwe bestuursleden, betaalt uwe intekeningsgelden; in één worde, brengt uw huis in orde, doch handelt als mannen van verstaan in al uwe byeenkomsten, en toont aan de wereld, dat wat ons ook ten laste gelegd mag worden, wy in staat zyn om in onze vergaderingen alles in woord en daad te vermyden, dat in deze droevige tyden, al was het ook maar verkeerd, zou kunnen worden opgevat of uitgelegd. Vergeet uwe beschryvingspunten niet<sup>131</sup>.

127. Walker, Schreiner, pp.198-200.

128. De Afrikaander Bond en de Oorlog, pp.23-4. The instruction was dated 6 October, and signed by T.P. Theron as Chairman, D.J.A. van Zyl as Vice-chairman, and N.F. de Waal as secretary-treasurer of the Provincial Bestuur.

129. De Afrikaander Partij en de Oorlog, p.24. The statement was dated 30 October.

130. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 2. Theron to Hofmeyr (telegram), 25 Oct.; De Waal to Hofmeyr (telegram), 26 Oct. 1899.

131. Onze Courant, 27 Nov. 1899.

## IV

The part played by the Afrikaner Bond during the crisis which led up to the South African War has been the subject of considerable argument, most of it tendentious. Thus there is the view, originally expressed by Professor Cachet, at the Burghersdorp meeting in June<sup>132</sup> and repeated by a modern Afrikaner historian with a nationalist turn of mind<sup>133</sup>, that the Bond failed in its duty - its duty, that is, to the Afrikaner people - by not speaking out loudly and continuously in support of the Transvaal. It lapsed, this argument runs, into what Coetzee describes as 'diplomatic ineffectiveness' by allying with the Sprigg and Schreiner Ministries, and became - to use an analogy borrowed from the Bloemfontein Express - a tame elephant used by the hunter (the Imperial Government) to entrap its wild Republican blood-brother beyond the Colonial borders. At the other extreme, there is the view expressed in much of the hysterical wartime literature on the Imperial side, which has had considerable influence on later writings, that the Bond was "an unmixed curse to South Africa [which] has fostered race hatred and taught [the Dutch Boers] to identify themselves with the Republics rather than with their own country and Queen"<sup>134</sup>.

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132. See above, p.406.

133. J.A. Coetzee, Politieke Groepering in die wording van die Afrikanernasie, p.141.

134. From The Transvaal, Past and Present, and its Future, a pamphlet published by the S.A. Vigilance Committee in Cape Town, p.25. For other literature of this type, see Josiah Slater's The Birth of the Bond, published by the London Times, which used evidence from the early 'eighties as proof "beyond a doubt how deep-laid and well planned has been the plotting of the Africander Party to overthrow British Supremacy in South Africa". In 1901, the Imperial South African Association in London published a polemical pamphlet by T.L. Schreiner, brother of the Cape premier, entitled The Afrikaner Bond and Other Causes of the War, which paid more attention to fact, but pressed the charge of disloyalty. On a larger scale, see Scoble and Abercrombie's Rise and Fall of Krugerism, especially pp.237-45.

For more sympathetic interpretations of Bond conduct in contemporary English writings, see Sir J.T. Molteno's Dominion of Afrikanerdom, the work of a non-Afrikaner  
(cont.)

How little weight the latter argument carries has already been indicated in relation to the charges of disloyalty levelled against the Bond by Milner<sup>135</sup>, but the manner in which it has been perpetuated in later writings deserves some emphasis. There appeared, in about 1900, a book entitled The Origin of the Anglo-Boer War Revealed, by a certain C. H. Thomas, who described himself as "formerly an Orange Free State burgher". Thomas knew so little about the Bond that he asserted, as his main argument against it, that "the fell projects which developed into ... the Afrikaner Bond" were the work of a "well-informed, influential and unscrupulous coterie in Holland", out to wipe off ancient - really ancient - scores against Britain. He drew no distinction between the Afrikaner Bond and the Governments of the Republics, assumed that Kruger was a Bondsman, and hardly concerned himself with the Bond in the Colony at all. Yet Thomas's book has set the tone for much of what has been written about the Bond in English. He gives<sup>136</sup> what he calls "Memoranda of Bond Programme, Emanating from Holland (Translation from Gleanings)", an entirely unauthenticated statement of Bond aims and policy, which appears to include rough paraphrases of Patriot editorials dating from the Bond's early anti-British phase, together with some imaginative interpolations. Worsfold, in his work on Milner in 1906, took over this passage from Thomas in its entirety and gave it an authentic look<sup>137</sup>. In Newton's Unification of South Africa, the same extract from Thomas has become a "document", tentatively dated 1881, but one to be regarded as "not

134. (cont.) who went over to the Bond after the Raid and subsequently quarrelled with Milner; Sir Lewis Michell's Life of C.J. Rhodes, written by a man who was far from sharing the Bond outlook, but who regarded it as an organization which "being feared, ... is often maligned" (vol. II, pp. 231-3); and, above all, F.J. Dormer's Vengeance as a Policy in Afrikanerland, perhaps the most objective contemporary work on the origins of the S.A. War by a man who had seen South African life from many angles.

135. See above, pp. 404-7.

136. At pp. 64-9. On account of its ready accessibility, it is not quoted here.

137. Worsfold, pp. 48-57.

authoritative" and "reprinted ... as illustrating a particular point of view"<sup>138</sup>. Headlam, however, relying on one or other of these sources, used the same material without reservations of any kind<sup>139</sup>. From Headlam, the legend has passed into the latest biography of Milner<sup>140</sup>, while the "document" has the dignity of a footnote in the latest edition of Walker's History<sup>141</sup>. Thus has the story of Bond disloyalty in the period leading up to the war sprung and flourished from legendary roots. There can be no doubt that the story gained in strength from the fact that a number of individual Bondsmen, including at least one of their parliamentary representatives<sup>142</sup>, did go over to the Republican side after the war had started; but that is a separate issue which should not be allowed to form part of an indictment of Bond conduct before the war broke out. The most that can be said in favour of the Imperial propaganda is that there was a good deal of talk of Afrikaner unity in the negotiations between the Republican and Bond leaders throughout the crisis. Yet the negotiations reveal only too clearly how frail a plant this idea of volksseenheid was. The Transvalers, who banked on its reality, discovered at the time of the Smuts-Greene negotiations how grievously they had been mistaken. The concept of volksseenheid, which came to mean a great deal in Steyn's Free State, never meant more to Bondsmen in the Colony than a feeling of moral support for their relations in the Republics, as the Bond leaders repeatedly pointed out. It was qualified in their minds by a sense that the Transvaal leaders had played their cards with a singular lack of skill.

But the fact that the Colonial Bondsmen were not guilty of acts of disloyalty against the Imperial power should not be taken

138. A.P. Newton, Select Documents relating to the Unification of South Africa, vol. 1, p.86.

139. Headlam, vol. I, pp.44-7.

140. Sir Evelyn Wrench, Alfred, Lord Milner: the Man of no Illusions, p.175.

141. E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p.389.

142. This was Ds. C.W.H. Schröder, who won the Prieska by-election in 1899. Jotham Joubert of Albert and I.J. van der Walt of Colesberg were absent from the House of Assembly without leave in 1900.

to mean that they set out to undermine the resistance of the Transvaal, either positively, or negatively by default. There is no case at all for the view - if it has ever been seriously propounded - that the Bondsmen deliberately weakened the Republican resistance, as even a superficial study of Hofmeyr's activities must demonstrate. But the negative charge is less easy to disprove. It might be urged that Milner used the Fischer and Hofmeyr missions as a means of penetrating the Transvaal's moral defences; but the force of this argument must disappear once it is appreciated that Milner looked on these missions as interruptions of his own diplomatic offensive, and would have preferred them not to take place. On the other hand, the fact that the South African Republic withdrew by stages from the position which Kruger had taken up at Bloemfontein, and thereby exposed itself - rightly or wrongly - to the charge of equivocation, did follow as a result of pressure applied by Hofmeyr and the Cape Government. But a distinction must be made here between the steps which the Transvaal authorities took and those which Hofmeyr in particular advised them to take. Had Hofmeyr's advice been followed, and a generous and simple extension of the vote to the Uitlanders been given - with qualifications for the presidential vote, for which the Republicans put up no real defence, made subject to stiffer safeguards - the negotiations could hardly have been shipwrecked on the sharp rock of misunderstanding, the Imperial Government would probably have been forced to show its hand sooner, and the issue for the Colonial Afrikaner would have been clearer cut. Briefly, questions related to the Uitlander demands would have been separated from the more fundamental questions of paramountcy, with the connected issues of suzerainty and arbitration. Hofmeyr believed that the Uitlanders had something of a case - how much, it is difficult to say, but he at least saw that the Republic's refusal to extend political privileges to them damaged its own case in the eyes of the world. On the broader issues, however, he supported the Transvaal, indicating his

readiness to speak in favour of arbitration, and showing constant concern lest the Republic should abdicate its sovereignty unnecessarily. It was one of the essential weaknesses of the Transvaal Government's handling of the crisis, that by allowing negotiations to become bogged down on the question of Uitlander rights, over which the moral arguments were not more than half in their favour, they failed to give Colonial Afrikanerdom a satisfactory basis on which to pledge its support, and at the same time gave the Imperial Government excellent cover under which to develop its doctrine of paramountcy.

Some urged - as did Cachet at Burghersdorp - that if the Colonial Bondsmen had given open and vociferous support to the Transvaal from the beginning of the year, the Imperial Government would not have dared to press its case; but that argument presupposes a very questionable estimate of Milner. Alternatively, they might have sided strongly with the Transvaal after the latter had indicated its readiness to accept the joint inquiry in September. This was the moment at which the Government of the Free State clearly saw their path of duty, feeling, as Fischer did, that the latest British demand was "palpably dishonest and insulting and makes it only too clear that Transvaal was deliberately trapped"<sup>143</sup>. The Free Staters had made up their minds that the Colonial Office intended to take from the Transvaal all that was needed for the effective assertion of British paramountcy. The Kapenaars, on the other hand, continued to advise the Transvaal to give ground, until the latter would hear no more of it, on the assumption that Britain might still be persuaded to ask for something less. The evidence of the correspondence between Chamberlain and Milner indicates that the Free Staters were right<sup>144</sup>. But the position of Boers in the Free State and

143. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11. Fischer to Hofmeyr (telegram), 12 Sept. 1899.

144. This case is fully argued by Marais. As evidence of British intentions, it is perhaps sufficient in the present context to refer to Chamberlain's confidential letter to Milner of 2 September, his secret telegram of the same date, and Milner's telegraphic reply to the latter, quoted in Headlam, vol. I pp.524-8.

in the Colony was not the same. The Free State was master of its own destiny, seeking with troops at its disposal to honour a treaty with a threatened ally. The Cape friends, had they followed the Free State lead, would have run the risk of unleashing civil war, with all the additional hazards incumbent on those who commit high treason. They would have enlarged the area of racial conflict at a time when it was too late to divert the Imperial Government from its main purpose, or, indeed, to affect the end result.

University of Cape Town

PART THREE

THE BOND IN RETROSPECT

University of Cape Town

## P E R S P E C T I V E S

## I

When Sir Bartle Frere dismissed the first Cape prime minister from office in 1878, even though Sir John Molteno had commanded a safe majority in the Assembly during the previous session, the public outcry which followed was not sufficient to prevent the formation of a new government by J. G. Sprigg, who found he could count on the continued support of the House. Sir James Rose Innes rightly considered, the propriety of the Governor's action quite apart, that this change of ministry "could not have happened without a general election, had party lines been definite, and party discipline strict". But a change was at hand, he continued: when Hofmeyr entered the House in 1879, "the formation of, at any rate, one real parliamentary party began"<sup>1</sup>.

The fact that Milner refrained from doing to Schreiner in 1899 what Frere had done to Molteno in 1878 was due, on the Governor's own admission, to the existence of political forces which simply were not there twenty years earlier<sup>2</sup>. The formation of the Z.A. Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging had led to the appearance in Parliament of an organized pressure group with a watching brief over a particular set of interests - the nucleus, despite the interpretation which has sometimes been given to the twenty-third article of its constitution<sup>3</sup>, of the parliamentary party that Innes had in mind. But the expression 'parliamentary party' is misleading when applied to its heir and successor, the Afrikaner Bond, for it conjures up the idea of a political party the rudiments of whose cohesion were to be found within the walls of the House, and invites attention to the manoeuvres of politicians there, rather than to the connection between those politicians and the electorate. To grasp the meaning of the Afrikaner Bond as a political organization, it is necessary to conduct an investigation at both levels, taking account both of its activities on the parliamentary

1. Sir James Rose Innes, *Autobiography*, p.36.

2. See the reasons given by Milner for not dismissing Schreiner's Ministry, in Headlam, vol. I, pp.503-21 *passim*.

3. See above, p.50 note 40.

front and of the character of its articulation outside.

The Cape Parliament was modelled on the British at a time when the British party system was long established but still relatively immature. There was little demand in Great Britain for the elaboration of party machinery, involving the working out of party constitutions and the development of the party caucus, until the appearance in the second half of the nineteenth century of a mass electorate. The Whig or Tory of tradition had been prepared to accept discipline at a price, but preferred to stand before his electors as a man of independent judgment, rather than as the obedient party cipher who was willing to "leave his brains outside", and he regretted the transition from the age of "men" to the age of party machines. At the Cape, too, the tradition of independence proved extremely tenacious. Against a background of Boer indifference, the parliamentary class of English- and Dutch-speaking townsmen had so far enjoyed a security of tenure which made political independence seem as desirable in practice as it was in theory to the individualists of the Victorian era. Nor, at the moment when the Afrikaner political movements began to appear on the scene, had the complexity of government business or the size of the electorate yet created the conditions which necessitated the introduction of full-scale party government.

At the start of his political career, Hofmeyr shared the dislike of his contemporaries for a rigid party system, disagreeing with the suggestion of John Paterson, member for Port Elizabeth, that the Colony needed an arrangement on British lines, even if the names 'Conservative' and 'Liberal' were to give place to "die van 'Pas op' en 'Press on'". In reality, he wrote, "onze partijen groepeeren zich enkel naar den eisch van ééne groote questie", and he was content with a fluid political system of this sort even after Shepstone had moved into the Transvaal<sup>4</sup>. Furthermore, although his

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4. Zuid Afrikaan, 14 Apr. 1877.

efforts led to the establishment of something like a party system in Parliament, he persistently refused to apply the primary convention of such a system inside the House. On every occasion when he was invited, as leader of the largest following in Parliament, to form a government, he turned the invitation down, to the indignation of many who considered that the man who had effective power ought to take on the responsibility. This is not to say that he would have ignored this convention under different circumstances, however, for Hofmeyr was nothing if not a realist, and his critics erred in supposing that he actually had the necessary power.

The Afrikaner Bond never had a majority of seats in the House of Assembly, nor the expectation of attaining undisputed control there. This statement requires an explanation, as the opposite is often thought to have been the case, especially in the light of the Bond's supposed monopoly of political opinion on the platteland and the generous allocation of parliamentary representation to the country districts<sup>5</sup>. The answer seems to lie in the following facts. First, its net, though spread widely over the Colony<sup>6</sup>, was not of such fine mesh as is often imagined. In no constituency did Bond membership reach fifty per cent of even the rural voters, let alone of the entire electorate<sup>7</sup>, while total Bond membership in the Colony as a whole did not rise above one-tenth of the total numbers on the voters' roll<sup>8</sup>. It could, of course, count on the votes of many non-members during elections; but as a general rule the votes polled by successful Bond candidates in the 1898 election, even in those constituencies where the Bond was strong, were far fewer than even the number

5. In 1897, the average number of voters per member of Parliament over the Colony as a whole was 1390. In the Midland, North Western and North Eastern Circles, which were the chief Bond strongholds, the average figures were 1298, 1143 and 1055 respectively. Contrast the figures for the Western Province (2017) and the South Eastern (1582), where the hold of the Bond was weakest. For a full analysis, see Appendix J, Table I, cols. 2-4.

6. See Map 2.

7. See Appendix J, Table II, where this shortfall is illustrated in the case of constituencies where Bond membership figures were highest.

8. In 1891, Bond membership stood at 5610 in an electorate of 73,816. By 1897, these figures had risen to 8355 and 109,886 respectively. See Appendix H.

of rural voters on the roll<sup>9</sup>. Secondly, it was only in the North Western, Midland and North Eastern Provinces that the Bondsmen had a reasonable expectation of being able to sweep the board. Here, with the exception of the problem constituency of Namaqualand, they were in control. But in the Eastern Province, where the British settlers predominated, and in the Western and South-Western Provinces, where rural Afrikaners failed on the whole to respond to its appeal, the hold of the Bond was very tenuous indeed. In certain Eastern Province constituencies where the Bond was numerically strong, like Wodehouse and Aliwal North, its hold was precarious on account of the strength of the African vote, which in normal circumstances could be presumed to be hostile, just as a large section of the Coloured vote could in the west. Of the newer electoral provinces, British Bechuanaland belonged morally to the Bond, but circumstance and Progressive subterfuge denied them control there until 1899, while Griqualand West went mainly to their opponents.

The inability of the Bond to secure an outright majority in the House of Assembly should not therefore be regarded as a matter for surprise. It never attempted, as a party, to pit its strength against all comers, partly because the combined voting strength of non-Bondsmen would have been too strong for it, but more especially because its leaders never felt that they could dispense with certain talents which only sympathetic outsiders were able to supply. The best illustration of this is Hofmeyr's admission at the time of the 1894 general election, that if Schreiner's candidature were not secured, the Bond had nobody among its candidates capable of handling the law department. O'Connell Jan was acutely aware of the Bond's shortage of professional and commercial men, as well as of members of Parliament who could hold their own in debate<sup>10</sup>. He was also aware of the sensitivity

9. See Appendix J, Table II.

10. It should be emphasized that even the Bond's electoral victory of 1898 was really the victory of a coalition, following which three of the five ministerial posts were allocated to non-Bondsmen.

It is not possible to devise valid criteria for assessing the debating ability of the Bond parliamentarians, especially for the period before debates were published in direct speech; but it may be confidently asserted that this was not high.

of the English colonial towards any manifestation of Afrikaner nationalism, and for all these reasons judged it best to let power appear to reside in other hands, thankfully grasping what he could of the substance, which he could only have held under those conditions.

His method, used time and again with success, was to lend the support of his parliamentary following to whichever candidate for the premiership was prepared to comply with the Bond's legislative requirements of the moment, and to withdraw that support either when their adopted leader ceased to fit in with their needs, or when a rival politician offered better terms. Thus it was that South Africa's Parnell backed Scanlen in order to secure the recognition of the Dutch language, but rejected him on account of his frontier policy two years later, and supported the Uppington and Sprigg Ministries in the mid-'eighties because their customs, railway and frontier policies were acceptable, but moved over to Rhodes when he offered partnership in the North. In this way, Hofmeyr was able to maintain his party in a position of power for most of the time between the fall of Sprigg's first Government in 1881 and the outbreak of the South African war. It was able to use this power to win victory after victory for the Dutch language, to maintain the protective tariffs which the farmer desired, to win the battle of the brandy excise, to safeguard its position against possible swamping either by the African vote or by the towns, and so far to influence the external policy of the Government that the Colony's active participation in the South African war became unthinkable. These were solid achievements, which went far to offset the Bond's major failures in statesmanship in the matter of Basuto policy, in the Stellaland crisis, in the striving after a customs union after 1886, and in various other fields.

Hofmeyr's manoeuvres called not only for great judgment on his part, and for a good deal of quiet lobbying whenever a change of ministry was in prospect, but also for a strong sense of discipline and party loyalty on the part of his parliamentary

followers. His home in Camp Street became the meeting place of what may be loosely termed a party caucus at least from the time of Kruger's visit to the Western Province in April 1880, and almost certainly earlier<sup>11</sup>. His supporters were nicknamed the "White House party" from about this time, though in due course the venue changed to the Ons Land office. It is in the nature of caucuses that information on their procedure is extremely difficult to obtain, and no memoirs have come to light in which the working of the Bond caucus is described. We do not even know if meetings were held regularly, or only when matters of special importance needed to be discussed. Such information as has come to light gives ground to suppose that when the Bond caucus met non-parliamentarians might be admitted<sup>12</sup>; and that this caucus was an ad hoc gathering rather than a formally organized group, for there is no evidence that it had either office-bearers<sup>13</sup> or written rules of procedure, or indeed that it ever possessed disciplinary powers. In the early part of 1892, Ons Land ran a series of editorials discussing a current proposal for the setting up of a Bond executive committee (Uitvoerende Commissie) to ensure that steps were taken to secure the passage of congress resolutions into law, and in the course of these articles the editor attacked those critics of the Bond parliamentarians who accused them of not pressing hard enough for the enactment of congress proposals. The function of an executive committee should not be that of a party whip, he contended, to enforce conformity among the Bond members or require them to make any declaration of obedience to the 'party line':

Not one desirable candidate will be found ready to make such a declaration. And if perchance such a cringeing aspirant were to offer himself for Parliamentary distinction, he would stand very small chance of being elected<sup>14</sup>.

11. J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, p.170.

12. See above, pp.266-7. (the admission of D.F. du Toit).

13. R.P. Botha summoned the Bond caucus, in his capacity as "chairman", to meet Rhodes in July 1890, but it is not clear whether the chairmanship referred to was that of the caucus or that of the Provincial Bestuur.

14. Ons Land, 27 Feb.; 12,17 Mar.; 9 Apr. 1892.

Editor Hofmeyr must have been writing with inside knowledge, and the implication of his remarks, that the Bond parliamentary caucus did not enforce strict discipline, is borne out by other evidence, more particularly that of the parliamentary Votes and Proceedings.

Among the Vereeniging men in the sixth Colonial Parliament (1879-83), discipline was lax. Hofmeyr's colleague from Stellenbosch, P. A. Myburgh, voted against the majority of his Vereeniging fellows as often as he voted with them. If his vote is excepted, it is possible to find a few occasions when all the representatives of the Vereeniging voted together in an important division<sup>15</sup>, but otherwise one or two of them invariably voted against their colleagues. In the Upper House, the persistent opposition of W. A. J. de Smidt to the ideas of most of his party colleagues was mainly responsible for the fact that on no major political issue over which the Council divided during the five sessions did all the Vereeniging's supporters vote the same way. Nor did the Vereeniging's representatives in the Council always agree with the views of its representatives in the Assembly. When Merriman moved a vote of no confidence in Sprigg's Government in the Assembly on 23 July 1880, all the Vereeniging members save Myburgh supported it; but all their colleagues in the Upper House save one voted in favour of a contrary motion by Alfred Ebdon on the same day<sup>16</sup>.

Yet there were signs during the life of the same Parliament that the tradition of proud independence was coming under pressure. The Sprigg Government, during its death agonies in April 1881, survived Scanlen's motion of censure by the narrow margin of thirty-seven votes to thirty-four. The

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15. For example, in favour of the repeal of the Griqualand West Annexation Act on 4 Aug. 1879, and Scanlen's motion of censure on Sprigg's Basuto and Transkeian policy on 27 April 1881.

16. Merriman moved simply "That the Ministry no longer possesses the confidence of the House". Ebdon's motion was "That this Council, without entering into the merits of the railway question, desires to record its confidence generally in the Ministry, and to express the opinion that their removal from office at the present juncture would be uncalled for and fraught with danger to the best interests of the Colony".

Vereeniging men were reasonably solid in their support for the motion, but their fellow-Afrikaners were not, and the Zuid Afrikaan commented, sadly but discreetly, that

men vond in de miserabele meerderheid ook echte Afrikaanders, zoogenaamde warme patriotten, mannen die gewoon waren, zoo luid als de besten te roepen over het onregt, den Transvaalschen en Vrijstaatschen Boeren aangedaan, maar die thans niet aarzelden, den minister te ondersteunen ... De een had het oog op een brug, ... de ander op de wisselvaligheden, verbonden aan het nog in wording zijnde ministeriele spoorwegschemata ...<sup>17</sup>

The Patriot, with greater audacity, suggested that petitions should be sent to the "Settlaars Ministerie", urging it to resign, by Myburgh of Stellenbosch, Sichel of Albert, van Zyl of Richmond and Watermeyer of Hanover<sup>18</sup>. Myburgh had already been hauled over the coals at a meeting in Stellenbosch on 1 March for not having supported the 'no confidence' motion of the previous session, and for having allegedly aided in the subjugation of the Transvaal by selling horses and donkeys to the Imperial authorities<sup>19</sup>. Sichel was soon to face the music at the hands of his Albert constituents<sup>20</sup>; van Zyl received a vote of censure from the Petrusvillers on 20 May; and Watermeyer was a butt for the attacks of the Zuid Afrikaan periodically throughout the year<sup>21</sup>. The last three were not returned to Parliament in the 1884 election. This unusually good example of how pressure came to be applied to individuals to make them toe the party line is indicative of the growing power of the press, and also of the growing political consciousness of the public in regions where the Bond and the Boeren Vereenigingen were beginning to be active, and it goes without saying that such pressure could only lead to a greater emphasis on party loyalty inside Parliament. But it was a loyalty enforced by external pressures and not by internal machinery.

This generalization applies to the whole period down to the outbreak of the South African war. No Bond member of Parliament was ever formally expelled from the party for voting

17. Zuid Afrikaan, 30 Apr. 1881.

18. Patriot, 6 May 1881.

19. Zuid Afrikaan, 3 Mar. 1881.

20. Burghersdorp Gazette, 13 May 1881.

21. Zuid Afrikaan, 25 Jan., 17 Feb., 4 June, 25 Aug. 1881.

against party policy in the House. The disciplinary authority of the *Commissie van Toezicht* stopped short at the doors of the Chamber, and when the de Naal test case occurred in November 1898<sup>22</sup>, the absence of a disciplinary whip, combined with considerations of party tactics, prevented punitive action being taken against him, even though David's relationship with the Bond leadership was strained to breaking point. He was bombarded with telegrams urging him to resign, which were sent by his constituents but inspired by Hofmeyr himself<sup>23</sup>; but he ignored these and continued to cast his vote against the Bondsmen during the remainder of the 1898 session with complete impunity. Nevertheless, the growing control of the *Commissie van Toezicht* over the nomination of parliamentary candidates largely dispensed with the need for a disciplinary caucus. The fate of S. J. du Toit was an effective object lesson to all would-be deviationists, and the solidarity of the Bond vote in the House of Assembly during the sessions of 1898 and 1899 was impressive, in divisions ranging in importance from Schreiner's 'no confidence' motion of October 1898 to Sir Henry Juta's proposal a year later for the payment of weekly benefits to sick railway employees: all were party questions, and the free vote was now the exception, not the rule<sup>24</sup>.

Reference to the pressure of the electorate on individual members raises the question of where power in the Bond really resided. In theory, as S. J. du Toit expressed it, the Bond was governed, not from the roof, but from the foundations. Bond policy was indeed determined in the first instance by the majority decision of the representatives of the District Besturen meeting in Congress. This democratic decentralization of power was particularly strong in the early

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22. See above, p. 396.

23. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 2. Tielman (Hofmeyr?) to Reverend Mostert, Porterville (draft telegram), 3 Nov. 1898.

24. Votes and Proceedings (Assembly), 11 Oct. 1898; 3 Oct. 1899. The observation is based on an analysis of divisions in the first two sessions of the tenth Parliament, 1898-9.

years of the Bond, and although it tended to diminish as the years went by, it was at all stages possible for the rank and file Bondsmen to band together and compel the leadership to listen to their views. The spirit which had led the Cra-dock Congress to deny a deliberative vote to the parliamentarians who were present manifested itself again in the great scab agitation of 1895. The same spirit was present in the decision of the 1891 Congress to ensure that parliamentary candidates were democratically elected, by altering the procedure of the Cirkel- and Benoemings-vergaderingen so that individual Districts and Wards, instead of being represented by two delegates with discretionary powers of voting, were to be represented by one delegate with a block vote equal to the number of Bondsmen who had sent him, and with instructions to use that vote in support of the candidates chosen by his branch. His vote could be invalidated by the Commissie van Toezicht if it could be shown that he had not done so<sup>25</sup>.

But if the Bond was decentralized and democratic in much of its working, in some important respects it was the reverse. The explanation of this paradox is partly institutional; but the peculiar arrangement of Bond government at the higher levels a discussion of which follows, was probably designed mainly to meet the situation in which the parliamentary party found itself. The bare facts of the case are that, although decisions were made democratically at all levels up to and including that of the Provincial Bestuur which met annually in Congress, no formal machinery existed in either the central or the Cape provincial constitutions of the Bond for the making of political decisions binding on the party when Congress was not in session. It was taken for granted that all Bond committees would have office-

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25. Appendix E, below. Cape Constitution (1898), Arts. XI, XII. This was devotion to the majority principle rather than to the spirit of democratic accommodation. Accommodation was not a conspicuous virtue among Bondsmen.

bearers. In the case of the provincial congress, a new bestuur was elected, in terms of the central constitution<sup>26</sup>, every two years. In terms of the Reglement van Orde, this bestuur had to include a chairman, vice-chairman, secretary and treasurer<sup>27</sup>; but no official Bond document carried a definition of their functions, and it was nowhere suggested that these office-bearers should regard themselves as an executive committee when congress was not in session. They were indeed responsible, as individuals, for the continued running of the Bond. They occasionally issued circulars dealing with current issues on which guidance was considered necessary - for example, the instruction how Bondsmen should behave in the event of war in 1899. The secretary-treasurer, the only Bond office-bearer in receipt of an honorarium<sup>28</sup>, was always ready to receive and pay out money. But they were usually too far distant from each other to meet regularly in committee, and were certainly not required to do so.

The Provincial Bestuur therefore had no effective continuing leadership. To a limited extent, this hiatus was filled by the Commissie van Toezicht, which not only controlled elections and the related matter of party discipline, but also reported annually to Congress, to which it was responsible<sup>29</sup>. But there are three reasons why it would be incorrect to regard the Commissie van Toezicht as a full-fledged executive committee of Congress: first, its functions were not all-embracing, but limited to matters concerning elections - it had no power to make policy decisions. Secondly, as already noted, it had no authority over the parliamentary party beyond such as may have come from the accidental fact that Jan Hofmeyr

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26. Art. 7 (See Appendix D).

27. Officieële Stukken, 1898, p.17. Art. 6 of the Reglement van Orde. They had no official status in the Cape provincial constitution (See Appendix E).

28. The offices of secretary and treasurer were combined from 1888 (See Appendix H). The secretary received £25 a year at first, but this was ultimately raised to £50.

29. For the powers of the Commissie van Toezicht under the constitution, see Appendix F.

dominated both. Thirdly, owing to the dominant personality and leadership of Hofmeyr, and to the steady growth in the Commissie's authority over the years, especially in 1898, it became too strong to be regarded in the proper sense as a committee of Congress - it was able to take liberties with the constitution under which it operated, notably during the general elections of 1894 and 1898<sup>30</sup>, on the assumption that it would be able to secure ex post facto validation of its decisions. To this extent, though within a limited field, it was a rival authority to Congress. It was the agency through which Hofmeyr was able to build up his personal control over the party outside Parliament. It is clear from the Commissie's aanteekeningen on the general run of electoral complaints that it was nearly always Hofmeyr who made the important decisions. The angry letters reached him first, as chairman. He would send his observations on each case to his colleagues through the post, and they in turn would add their own comments, which nearly always endorsed Onze Jan's judgment, and return the document to him for filing. Hofmeyr was willing to forego the treasurership of the Provincial Bestuur and his seat in Parliament, but he did not relinquish the chairmanship of the Commissie van Toezicht until his death.

The chief limitation on the power of the Provincial Bestuur however, arose from the fact that it had no direct means of controlling the parliamentary party. An attempt was made to establish such control at the Congress of 1898, with the establishment of a Commissie tot Uitvoering van Bondsbesluiten, consisting of six members of Parliament drawn from both Houses<sup>31</sup> but this arrangement was soon regarded as unsatisfactory by the Bond M.P.'s themselves, chiefly because they looked upon it as a reflection on their own party loyalty and competence. In 1892, therefore, Congress accepted the proposal that the Chairman should informally assign to two Bond M.P.'s the task of reporting at the following Congress on the progress made

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30. See above, pp. 319-23, 368-70.

31. Notulen, 1888 Congress, p.18. See also Patriot, 19 Mar. 1891.

over the implementation of earlier Congress resolutions<sup>32</sup>. Such reports were thereafter regularly made, but incorporated in the annual statement of either the chairman or the secretary<sup>33</sup>. The establishment of a standing executive committee of Congress might conceivably have bridged the gap between Congress and the parliamentary caucus; but there were practical objections against the creation of such a body. It is doubtful if the Bond could have maintained a large executive in permanent or even periodic session without increasing the capitation levy on its branches, for the dispersal of the branches would have made the summoning of such a committee costly as well as inconvenient to arrange. The practical alternative adopted, which fitted in with Hofmeyr's desire to keep as much control as possible in his own hands, was to establish an unofficial head office in the capital, and allow the parliamentary party, or the Cape Town branch when Parliament was not in session, to take the lead whenever necessity required<sup>34</sup>. This was dictated, too, by the parliamentary position of the Bond, which would have been untenable had the caucus been rigidly subordinated to Congress or to a committee responsible to Congress. Because the Bond had no outright parliamentary majority, Hofmeyr was obliged to make what terms he could with political leaders outside the party, and for this he and his followers required freedom of movement. Had the Bond acquired an absolute parliamentary majority at any time, then the importance of the Provincial Bestuur would have been immediately enhanced, and the way laid open for a struggle for power within it; but as things were, the requirements of the Bond inside Parliament reacted on the form of its organization outside, by strengthening that tendency towards 'government from the roof' to which the foundation fathers had taken

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32. Notulen, 1891 Congress, pp.35-7; 1892 Congress, pp.11,13.

33. Notulen, 1893 Congress, pp.5-8; 1894 Congress, pp. 9-13; 1895 Congress, pp.7-10; 1896 Congress, pp.3-4; 1897 Congress, pp.6-10; 1898 Congress, pp.15-7; 1899 Congress, pp. 8-10.

34. It was the Cape Town branch which approached Sprigg on the matter of a customs convention in Jan. 1887, and set in motion the spate of protests against the policy of the Imperial Government in July 1899.

such strong exception.

The parliamentary party, which normally did its best to secure the implementation of Congress resolutions so far as this could be done without jeopardizing its parliamentary position, was itself led by Hofmeyr. When Hofmeyr left Parliament in 1895, and no man took his place as leader inside the Assembly unless it could be said that Schreiner, a non-Bondsman, did so, the important decisions still appear to have been made by him. This was very evident during the post-Raid crisis, and again in the months preceding the South African war. The fact may be illustrated from a letter written by Theron to Hofmeyr on 22 June 1899<sup>35</sup>. He wrote from Britstown, explaining that he had followed the crisis in Ons Land and the South African News, and "admired" the manner in which Hofmeyr and the Government were conducting affairs. He awaited instructions from Hofmeyr as to when Bond meetings should be called and what resolutions ought to be carried. He who thus waited for orders was at the time M.L.A. for Richmond and chairman of the Provincial Bestuur - but he could hardly have been expected to play a prominent part in the negotiations from his farm in the Karroo.

A recent authority on party organization has drawn a broad distinction between parties which operate from the branch upwards and those which operate from the caucus downwards. He has noted "the general coincidence in practice of the caucus system with weak articulation, of the branch system with strong articulation", observing as a characteristic of highly articulated parties a "multiplying [of] co-ordinating bodies, ... creating, instead of a weakly organized embryonic authority, a veritable machinery of government, including a separation of powers: legislative power devolving upon the 'Congress' ..., executive power residing in an Executive Committee ..., juridical powers being entrusted to committees of 'Arbitration', or 'Control' or settlement of

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35. Hofmeyr Papers, vol. 11.

'Disputes'<sup>36</sup>. In the case of the Bond, we have seen how the principle of strong articulation applied with respect to the legislative authority of the Congress, which was designed ultimately to reflect the views of the Bondsmen in the Wards; but also how - and here is to be seen the influence of the caucus principle - the executive authority, in which must be included the power to determine the tactics of the party in the political arena, was essentially informal, and devolved on the parliamentary leadership, whose constitutional relationship with the party outside Parliament was entirely undefined. The fact that the parliamentary leader also supervised party discipline had the effect of further emphasizing this tendency, to the point at which a dissatisfied member of the Bond, with pardonable exaggeration, could imagine that he saw "a Bond Dictatorship ... established at the Ons Land office". Du Toit, of course, wrote thus in pique; but the party's experience in connection with the Western Province election of 1898 exposed the anomalies in an organization in which power was polarized without the relationship between the two extremes of power, the branch and the party leadership, being governed by any written rules at all. In the last resort, however, the autonomy of the branch could be destroyed by the Commissie van Toezicht interpreting the sense of the party as a whole, and Congress would endorse this kind of action taken on such grounds. In the last resort, too, Congress could bring the parliamentary party to heel, as it did in 1895 over scab; but it normally chose not to interfere.

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36. M. Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, p.47.

## II

The structural features of the Afrikaner Bond discussed in the preceding pages throw light on its nature as a political party, but do not in themselves illustrate the purposes for which it was created or the ends for which it was used. These, however, are the most fundamental questions which can be asked about it; but, since they are questions which draw the historian into the field of human motives, it is perhaps unavoidable that the answers offered should be no more than tentative. There is, however, one fruitful generalization which can be made, because in some sense or other it is undoubtedly true, and because it opens up a series of further questions which have a real bearing on the problem: the Afrikaner Bond was the vehicle of a nationalist movement.

To categorize the Bond thus baldly, though, is to do no more than group it together with a multitude of such movements which have filled the pages of historical works in modern times, and to impart no real distinctiveness to it. It is necessary, therefore, to draw further distinctions, of which the most useful, as a starting point, is that between nationalist movements which support, and those which are ranged against, the authority of the state. The nationalism of revolutionary France, which is usually regarded as the prototype of the dynamic nationalist movements of modern times<sup>37</sup>, was étatiste in conception and aim, designed to buttress the state by providing the French people with an alternative focus of political loyalty to the monarchy which they had rejected. The nationalisms of central Europe which developed after the Napoleonic era, on the other hand, were usually ranged against the constituted authorities, because their objectives included the breaking-up and re-drawing of existing political frontiers so that national groups could become political nations in their own right. The importance of this distinction lies chiefly in the fact that, depending on whether or not they have achieved political consolidation and can therefore afford

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37. See Carleton J.H. Hayes, "Nationalism" (in the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences); H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism, p.3; A. Cobban, National Self-Determination, pp.4-5.

to be étatiste, nationalist movements have tended to breathe rather different kinds of fire. In the case of revolutionary France, the nationalist spirit was outward facing, assertive against external powers, but within the French frontiers it was reconciled to the existing framework of law and order, and behaved, so to speak, 'normally'. In central Europe, on the other hand, the nationalist leader tended to develop an antagonism towards existing political authority and sought, by building up the group consciousness of his fellow-nationals, to prepare them for political self-realization. The nationalism of a politically subject people, whether it has arisen out of frustration, or humiliation, or whatever cause, has normally been built upon the revival of a broken or derelict cultural heritage, with the emphasis laid in varying degrees on those factors which tend most to differentiate the subject people from their political overlords. There is a danger, of course, in pressing the distinction between these two forms of nationalism too far, for nationalism, whether in the 'French' or 'German' sense as used above, has always depended for its vitality on the union of cultural and political pressures. It was the political act of state-making or state-breaking which gave rise to the revival of group traditions in the minds of central European nationalists, just as a conviction of his nation's cultural superiority helped to produce the French assimilationist or the British jingo. But the quality of the nationalism affects the mood of the nationalist, and mood is perhaps the most important underlying factor.

In a discussion of nationalist sentiment in late nineteenth century South Africa, it is helpful to keep these two different concepts of nationalism distinct. Most South African nationalists at that time, it is safe to say, wanted to see a greater degree of unification, under more centralized government, of politically separated people. Their general aim, that is, was to consolidate rather than to disrupt, on the analogy of the nationalist movements in Germany or Italy rather than those within the Habsburg Empire. Beyond

this, however, the South African nationalist could have desired, basically, one of two things, but not both of them together. On the one hand, he might have wanted the creation of a single South African state, unitary or federal, on the lines perhaps of the schemes envisaged by Sir George Grey or the Earl of Carnarvon, in which cultural distinctions between racial or national groups were relegated to a subordinate position, and the main stress lay on the machinery to be devised to consolidate and harmonize the different political, economic, regional and cultural interests of the people. Alternatively, he might have intended the creation of a single state, the main purpose of which would be to give expression to the cultural, economic or other needs of the national group to which he belonged, perhaps at the expense of the interests of other groups, in which case the state would be conceived, not as an arbiter for the reconciliation of divergent interests, but as an instrument of power for the better protection of one.

To determine the position of the Afrikaner Bond in relation to these two lines of thought is not easy, because at one time or another different groups within it committed themselves to both. The Bond had arisen in the first instance in response to a deeply felt cultural need. Had it continued in existence with the sole object of satisfying that need, it would probably have anticipated by fifty years the "purified" nationalism of the mid-twentieth century, with which it had certain roots in common. But the outstanding fact about the Afrikaner nationalism of the Cape in the period before 1900 is that the spirit of narrow exclusivism failed to crowd out the broader spirit of tolerance. There were two occasions, in particular, when it might have done so. The first was in the years between the British annexation of Basutoland in 1868 and the British annexation of Bechuanaland in 1885; the second was in the short period between the Jameson Raid and the opening of the South African war.

Between 1868 and 1885, many of the normal manifestations of a vigorous cultural nationalism were apparent - the awakening among the Afrikaner people of an awareness of the danger of cultural conquest, and of a sense of the epic quality of their own history, which helped to build up a strong feeling of group unity around the twin pivots of language and religion, fired in due course by the Transvaal's military success against the supposedly superior forces of the Imperial veroveraar. Here was real grist to the nationalist mill, and this combination of favourable circumstances produced a language movement, a national History, a national newspaper, a national political party, together with projects for the development of a somewhat narrow national religion with its own system of education, and an economic policy rooted in the idea of group self-sufficiency. But for a multitude of reasons S. J. du Toit's movement failed to carry the Afrikaner people. He alienated the rank and file, as well as most of the leadership, by his unusually strict Calvinism. He was no match in politics either for Jan Hofmeyr or for Paul Kruger, who both had their reasons for rejecting his aims and ideas. Moreover, du Toit's early concept of Afrikaner volkseenheid made no progress in face of commercial rivalries between the South African states in the late 'eighties and early 'nineties, especially after Rhodes had tossed in his apple of discord by inviting help from all quarters in the opening of the North. Finally, though drawn up to fight a battle, the nationalists found when they came to the point that it was a battle hardly worthy of the name. In the Transvaal, it is true, the decision of the Imperial Government to annex lands to the west and north tended to keep anti-British feeling simmering; but there had been no new attempt to take away the independence which the Transvalers had won in their war of liberation. The Free Staters, who might have kept alive a similar resentment at the earlier British interference in their border lands, were satisfied

by the 'eighties to be rid of Basutoland, which the Cape had since proved unable to control, and of the Diamond Fields, which spared them an uitlander problem. In the Cape, the use of the Dutch language, the focal point of the Afrikaner's campaign for real equality, was extended as asked for without much parliamentary opposition, even if some resistance was still met outside the parliamentary field. If nationalism, in the words of a modern expert, is "essentially an anti-feeling [which] feeds and fattens on hatred and anger against other national groups, and especially against the foreign rulers of a subject country"<sup>38</sup>, then in the South Africa of the late 'eighties and early 'nineties it had to subsist on a spare diet.

The Jameson Raid gave rise to a new cry for Afrikaner volkseenheid, however. The call this time was for more vigorous soul-searching, as well as for solidarity in the face of immediate danger, and its fruits were seen in the defeat of those, like S. J. du Toit, who equivocated between support for Rhodes and loyalty to the Afrikaner cause; in the decision of Kruger's Government to eliminate so far as possible the Hollander influence in the Transvaal State; in fresh appeals to the Afrikaner not to allow himself to become tainted with alien mammon, and to return to his Bible. This new drive for volkseenheid was further stimulated from outside by the revival of the uitlander movement and the growth of the jingo South African League in the Milner period, coupled with increased Imperial pressure in local South African affairs. Yet, as had happened after Majuba, the Afrikaner national movement failed to gain real momentum. The Transvalers counted upon the unreserved support of the Cape Bond during the crisis of 1899, but they realized by August in that year that they would not be able to rely on it, even though the Free Staters were prepared to fall in behind them. Apart from their difficulties inherent in their situation as citizens of a British colony, the Cape Bond leaders were in any case too critical of the way in which the Transvaal Government had handled their side of the negotia-

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38. Jawaharlal Nehru, Towards Freedom, p.74.

tions to come in whole-heartedly on their side. So, as the first phase of the pan-Afrikaner movement had disintegrated for lack of an enemy to fight, the second fell apart because the inner bonds were not yet strong enough to withstand an unusual degree of external pressure.

The inability of the Bond to build on the Afrikaner's deep sense of community with his kinsmen across the political frontiers reduced the scale of the nationalist movement from a pan-South African to a territorial level. But this is not to say that the original spirit of S. J. du Toit's cultural form of nationalism was extinguished altogether. It survived most noticeably in the spheres of religion and language. Most Bondsmen professed adherence to the Reformed religion, and acted on their profession. This gave their society a distinctive flavour, and a wide range of common standards in public and private life, which even the differences of outlook between the Dutch Reformed Churches did not substantially affect, save on those rare but important occasions when these were reflected in divisions among the Bondsmen themselves. At the institutional level, first of all, we may note the importation into Bond procedure of various practices common to the vergaderingen of the Church, such as the calling for letters of credence (geloofsbrieven) from delegates to conferences, and more especially the almost universal practice at all levels of beginning and ending meetings with prayer. Bondsmen were, on the whole, very conscious of their church membership. Local Bond leaders were often members of their local kerkraden. Many clergy were members of the Bond, some of them participating actively in politics both inside and outside Parliament. From their point of view, the national revival had a spiritual as well as a secular side. As they had taken the lead in the early stages of the Dutch language movement, so they expected the politicians to supplement the influence of the pulpit; and many must have derived satisfaction from the amount of favourable attention paid by Bond Congresses to topics falling within the range of Sunday observance. The

Sunday sermon became a regular feature of the annual Congress proceedings, and it was thought proper, at any rate on special occasions such as these, to extol the nationalist virtues from the pulpit<sup>39</sup>.

Equally important as a unifying force was the central position given in Bond propaganda to the need for establishing the dignity of the Taal. Which language this was to be was not determined in our period, for tactics required the shelving of this question until the Afrikaner had secured the right to express himself anywhere in public in the language of his Church and of his Dutch forebears. But so great was the enthusiasm for linguistic emancipation, and so great the value of the Taal as an emblem under which Afrikaners of varying origins could unite, that it may be taken as the central symbol of the nationalist movement in these years. It proved a successful rallying point at a time when other types of appeal - for a republic under its own flag, for the winning of economic independence, for Christian National Education - all failed to win much support. The struggle for Dutch language rights took place both inside and outside the parliamentary field, and although parliamentary opposition was slight, the campaign required untiring effort on the part of its sponsors in order to maintain the necessary degree of public enthusiasm, and this helped to keep the nationalist spirit alive. If Dutch was to achieve equal status with English in practice, it had to be spoken; and if it was to be spoken, its use had to be made a matter of pride. The Taalbond took on this task, with its own range of incentives; and it received warm support from the Bond Congresses, which were still pressing in the late 'nineties for the extension of the use

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39. See, for example, the sermon of Ds. D.H. Cilliers addressed to the delegates to the Burghersdorp Congress (1896). He spoke on Mordecai the Jew, "zoekende het beste voor zijn volk", commending him, for retaining his Jewish identity in alien surroundings, as "den waren Patriot, den oprechten Bondsman", an example for all Bondsmen to follow. (Full text in the De Paarl minutes.)

of Dutch in public offices, and for the fuller recognition of Dutch in public examinations. They also voted contributions to the Taalbond itself<sup>40</sup>.

But once allowance has been made for the enduring influence of cultural factors such as these on the outlook of the Afrikaner, it remains true that the Bond, under Hofmeyr's guidance, did much to resist the tendency towards Afrikaner exclusiveness which was implicit in du Toit's earlier approach<sup>41</sup>. Its choice of the designation Afrikaner Bond has often been taken to imply the opposite, and the Bond slogan, "Afrika voor de Afrikaners", used as evidence of the narrow racialism of the movement. To the twentieth-century reader, for whom the term Afrikaner has come to signify a white Afrikaans-speaking South African, this argument must have some force. Even to the nineteenth-century reader, Afrikaner and its semi-anglicized form Africander carried a cultural nuance not present in the geographical though not yet politically meaningful term South African. Some English-speaking people, like J. T. Molteno, described themselves as Afrikaners. Others, like Innes, did not. Yet others, like Dormer, added the prefix "Anglo-", which corresponded with the expression Hollandsche Afrikaanders normally used by Jan Hofmeyr to describe people of his own language group. All that can safely be said, therefore, is that the word Afrikaner and its variants could be used to describe any white South African more naturally in the late nineteenth century than is the case in the mid-twentieth, but that it did not reassure the English-speaker

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40. Notulen, 1891 Congress, p.31; 1897 Congress, p.32; 1898 Congress, p.31.

41. It is, one imagines, for this very reason that the Bond has rarely attracted the attention of modern Afrikaner nationalist historians, and then usually in an unfavourable way. Their criticism has indeed sprung largely from the weaknesses of S.J. du Toit, more especially his 'deviationist' opposition to Paul Kruger, for it is not possible to separate du Toit from the nationalist movement within the Bond. One looks in vain, however, for articles on any aspect of the Afrikaner Bond in the Tydskrif vir Wetenskap en Kuns, in Historiese Studies, in the more recent Historia or in the Annale of the University of Stellenbosch - a remarkable gap in a field which has, on the whole, been very sketchily covered by research theses.

who was not prepared to be convinced.

The Bondsmen tried, nevertheless, to reassure English waverers in all their official policy statements. Even S. J. du Toit's Ontwerp van Bepalings of July 1879 had proposed to admit to membership

elkeen wat Afrika tot syn vaderland gekies het, en Afrika's welvaart bedoel, onverskillig wat syn nasionale afkoms is, of tot watter kerkelike of burgerlike party hy origens behoort.

The formula adopted at the Richmond Congress, which remained the accepted Bond doctrine throughout our period, stated that

De Bond kent geen nationaliteit hoegenaamd dan alleen die der Afrikaners, en beskouwt als daartoe behoorend een ieder, van welke afkomst ook, die de welvaart van Zuid-Afrika beoogt.

Hofmeyr explicitly stated on a later occasion that he included in the term Afrikaner

everyone who, having settled in this country, wants to stay here to help to promote our common interests, and associate with the inhabitants as members of one family. That is surely wide enough; it is neither narrow nor exclusive<sup>42</sup>.

So long as political advantage was to be gained by disarming English-speaking critics or attracting English votes, it would of course have been bad tactics to adopt a narrow definition, and for this reason some caution should be taken in accepting these policy statements at their full face value. But Hofmeyr certainly meant what he said, provided one limits the scope of his definition to white people, and his great personal influence on the Bond makes it reasonably certain that a very high proportion of its members thought like him. Such people, it seems, wanted to build a nation in which all white South Africans would feel at home.

The nationalism of the Afrikaner Bond, therefore, was something wider than the nationalism of an oppressed and exclusive cultural group, just as it was narrower than the nationalism of a united citizenry preoccupied with external rather than internal relations. Common sense told the Cape Bondsmen that a narrow cultural nationalism would lead them

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42. Hofmeyr, p.524.

into a cul-de-sac, for, unlike their Afrikaner kinsmen in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, they did not have political control of the state, nor the apparent prospect of having it except in alliance with others. They were therefore ready to welcome the support of white non-Afrikaners who looked sympathetically upon their cultural aspirations and were prepared to go part of the way along their road.

On the other hand, they neither had, nor normally asked for, the political support of the bulk of non-white people. From the strictly political angle, the decision to exclude such people from their ranks had been difficult to make. Coloured and African voters did not constitute more than a small fraction of the electorate; but they did hold the balance in a few constituencies. The Bondsmen nevertheless deliberately chose to forego the political advantages which the courting of such people would have brought in its train, and they were allowed to do so because, when it came to the point, their League opponents declined to make use of the opportunity which the squeamishness of the Bondsmen gave them. If the South African League had risen to the occasion in 1896 and created, out of a multi-racial electorate, a multi-racial party, instead of contenting itself with ill grace with a poorly developed system of non-white branches, the Bond would not have been able to afford the luxury of racial isolation. This, of course, is conjecture; but it seems safe to argue, in reverse, that the Cape liberal tradition could only have acquired substantial content, sufficient to enable it to withstand the buffeting which it received at the National Convention and afterwards, if it had been taken up and consolidated within the framework of the Cape political parties<sup>43</sup>

Here, then, is the real measure of Bond nationalism. The Bondsmen were able, on the whole, to keep their exclusive group feelings within bounds, save in reaction against the

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43. See L.M. Thompson, The Unification of South Africa, pp. 212-23, 315-20, and Walker, Schreiner, c. XIV, for observations on the franchise question at the time of the National Convention.

more extravagant manifestations of British imperialism. But together with, and to some extent in advance of, their political opponents, they did much to foster the more insidious racialism of the white colonial. The "black peril" was never immediate enough to fuse the white people of the Cape into a real unity. But the fear of black domination was an article of faith for most of the Bondsmen and many of their white opponents. They allowed it to distort their political judgment, and thus, through the medium of their increasingly efficient and increasingly impersonal organizations, they were instrumental in passing on the social and political assumptions of the age of the Great Trek into the society and politics of the twentieth century.

University of Cape Town

## A P P E N D I C E S

The more important documents of the Afrikaner Bond and related organizations are given below. Owing to the exigencies of space, some of them have been abridged. The selection and method of editing have been determined in each case by the importance of the document, the requirements of the text, and the accessibility of the document in other published works.

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## APPENDIX A.

## RULES OF THE GENOOTSAP VAN REGTE AFRIKANERS.

"Algemene Bepalings.

- I. Die "naam" van ons Vereniging is: GENOOTSAP VAN REGTE AFRIKAANDERS.
- II. Dáe "doel" van ons Genootskap is: om te staan ver ons Taal, ons Nasie en ons Land.
- III. Die "Bestuur" van ons Genootskap sal in die hande wees van een President, Sekretaris en Tresurier, wat alle jare weer moet gekies worde.
- IV. Op al onse vergaderings en in alle offisiële stukke moet die Afrikaanse Taal gebruik worde.

"Aparte Bepalings.

- V. 'n Man word lid deur die re'els te onder\_teken, en daardeur verklaar hy dat hy hom daaraan sal hou en ver die Genootskap sal doen wat hy kan.
- VI. Ider lid het reg om 'n ander lid in te bring; mar dan moet hy hom eers by die Bestuur anmelde. Bring die Bestuur dit an die vollende vergadering voor, en as twé-derde van die lede vóór hom stem dan kan hy inkom.
- VII. Ider lid moet gelowe in die Versoeningsdood van onse Heer Jezus Christus.
- VIII. As 'n lid die Re'els o'ertré dan kan die Genootskap hom uitset.

"Van ons Werk.

- IX. Ons eerste werk sal wees om alle maande 'n blad uit te gé, wat die naam sal dra van "DIE AFRIKAANSE PATRIOT" in die vorm van 'n boekie van sestien (16) bladsy'e.
- X. Van tyd tot tyd word daar prysvra'e uitgeskréwe.
- XI. 'n Woordeboek en Spraakkuns ge ons uit so gou as mo'entlik is, en verder ander skoolboekies.
- XII. Die Bestuur kom die eerste Saterdag van ider maand by makkaar met so veul lede as lus het om dit by te woon; en die Algemene Vergadering word alle drie maande gehou om ons werk voort te set.
- XIII. 'n Buitengewone Vergadering kan opgeroep worde deur die President en die Sekretaris, as hulle denk dat dit nodig is, of as tien lede daarom vra.
- XIV. As 'n lid die Algemene Vergadering versuim, dan moet hy daarvan vooraf an die President of an die Sekretaris syn rede opge, en as hy hieran nie voldoen nie, dan wort gehandel vollens Art. VIII.
- XV. As meer as 'n derde van die lede sonder wettige rede afwesig is, dan kan die Algemene Vergadering nie gehou worde nie.
- XVI. 'n Genome besluit kan nie weer verander worde nie, of daar moet op die dag as dit genome word, kennis van gege worde dat dit sal hersien worde op die vollende vergadering.
- XVII. Idere vergadering sal met gebed geopen en gesluit worde.
- XVIII. Die Genootskap hou die reg om die Artikels te verander, by te voeg en af te laat.

(From the Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Taalbeweging ver vrynd en vyand, attributed to Ds. S.J. du Toit, Paarl, 1880, pp. 51-3).

## DOCUMENTS OF THE BOEREN BESCHERMINGS VEREENIGINGEN.

## I. THE Z.A. BOEREN BESCHERMINGS VEREENIGING.

The Rules and Regulations (Bepalingen en Regulationen) of the western B.B. Vereeniging are published in J.H. Hofmeyr, The Life of Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, at pp. 643-5 and 706-8 in the English and Dutch editions respectively, the Dutch text being the original.

The text given by Hofmeyr is the unamended draft, as placed before the meeting in Cape Town on 31 ~~August~~ October 1878, at which the Vereeniging was inaugurated. The amendments made to this draft constitution at the Cape Town meeting are discussed in the text of the present work (pp. 49-51 above). They concerned Article VI, which was amended so as to enable more than one local Vereeniging to exist in any fiscal or electoral division, and Article XIII, which was amended so as to increase the size of the Hoofdbestuur to seventeen. Otherwise the constitution remained unaltered until the dissolution of the Vereeniging in May 1883.

## II. THE ALBERT BOEREN BESCHERMINGS VEREENIGING.

(1) The Nineteen Points placed before G. Sichel, M.L.A., by the Albert Vereeniging on 26 May 1879 are given below for the light which they throw on the aims of the Vereeniging at its inception:

"1. A strong Pass Law against Vagrants, who have to give an account as to how they get a living. 2. To give to Field-cornets the power, to settle small matters between Masters and Servants, at a distance of 18 miles from the magistracy. 3. The appointment of more Justices of the Peace at a distance of 12 miles from the magistracy, among the Farmers, to settle small matters. 4. Doing away with the House Duty Act, and imposing a Poll tax in its stead of 5 shillings on all persons between the ages of 18 and 100. 5. Every person whether white or coloured to remain personally responsible for his Poll Tax. 6. Prisoners of War to be sentenced to hard labour on the Public Works, without payment of wages, and only to receive food and clothing. 7. Education to be encouraged in a more liberal manner. 8. A Pass Law to be enacted for all coloured persons without any distinction, and chiefly for all Bushmen. Those not possessing such a Pass are to be put to service with a Farmer by the Magistrate or Field Cornet. 9. That all Captaincies are to be abolished and that the Burghers in time of war, serve under Field cornets and commandants. 10. That for the prosperity of Agriculture, the Burghers may be relieved as much as possible from Commando duties. 11. That stealing be punished with heavier corporal punishment, and that the condemned make good all losses. 12. A severer law for the Xanthium Spinosum. 13. To oppose Confederation with any State or Colony. 14. To oppose a Wool Tax. 15. To oppose a Fencing Act. 16. To oppose a Scab Act. 17. To oppose Separation to the utmost. 18. To abolish the Yeomanry at the first meeting of Parliament. 19. To impose a tax on all imported Mules".

(From the Burghersdorp Gazette, 30 May, 1879).

(2) The Regels van het Boerenbeschermings Comité, Albert, the Vereeniging's earliest constitutional document, in which

a similar preoccupation with matters agricultural is apparent:

1. "Het Boerenbeschermings Comité zal alle belangen van de boeren bevorderen of helpen bevorderen"
2. (Ward Committees of five members, including the Chairman, of whom three to be a quorum).
3. (Quorum for the General Committee).
4. "Het Sub-Comité heeft het recht, indien daartoe door zeven landeigenaren verzocht, het algemeene Comité byeen te roepen, en geeft daarvan kennis minstens acht dagen voor de byeenkomst".
5. "Het Comité zal op alle mogelyke wyze de rechten der boeren verdedigen die het Comité beschouwd verongelykt te zyn".
6. "Elke boer zal het recht hebben, eenig bezwaar of hetgeen tot bevordering van het land of District kan dienen, aan het Comité op te dragen".
7. (Chairman, after consultation, may dismiss unfounded complaints).
8. "Het Comité zal zoo veel mogelyk de boeren bekend stellen, met alle in Parlement of Afdeelingsraad voorgestelde maatregelen waardoor hunne belangen in gevaar kunnen gebracht worden".
9. "Het Comité belooft alle ondersteuning aan boeren, en verwacht dat zy niet op onvoorzichtige wyze requisities voor leden van Parlement of Afdeelingsraden zullen teekenen, zonder raadpleging of medewerking van het Comité".
10. "Het Comité vergadert vroegtydig wanneer er leden voor het Parlement of Afdeelingsraad gekozen zullen worden, en pleegt met de boeren raad tot bevordering van dezelve".
11. (Annual meetings of the Committee).
12. "Het Comité vergadert een of twee maanden voor het zitting van Parlement en verwacht van de boeren dat zy de behoeften des lands aan het Comité persoonlyk of per brief zal bekend stellen, die dezelve na goedkeuring aan het plaatselyk Lid zullen opdragen".
13. "Het Comité is bereid tot medewerking van eenig District tot bevordering van 's lands welvaart".
14. (Automatic dismissal for Committee members missing three consecutive meetings).
15. "Het Comité zal zoo veel mogelyk het doel van het invoeren van Machinerie, dat tot nut en gemak van de boeren kan zyn, helpen bevorderen".
16. (Committee empowered to amend these rules).

[Signed] J. JOUBERT (Voorzitter),  
H.J. PELSER, W.A. SMIT,

(From the Burghersdorp Gazette, 28 Nov. 1879).

(3) The Regels van de "Boerenbeschermings-Vereeniging" van Albert vereenigd met den Afrikaner Bond, in which cultural objectives are introduced alongside the agricultural:

- I. "De 'Boerenbeschermings-Vereeniging' van Albert, vereenigd met den 'Afrikaner Bond', zal bestaan uit al degenen die een bydrage van minstens vyf shillings per jaar zullen storten in de kast dezer Vereeniging. De zulken hebben dan aanspraak op de voorrechten verbonden aan deze Vereeniging, en zullen een stem hebben by de verkiezing van Comité Leden".
- II. "Het doel van deze Vereeniging zal zyn om alle belangen van onze Boeren, ons Land, volk en taal te bevorderen".
- III. (A General Committee of five members from each Field Cornetcy, elected every two years).
- IV. (Ward Committees of five members, of whom three a quorum)
- V. (Outgoing Committee must report; its members re-eligible; one third of its members a quorum).

- VI. (Election of office-bearers, including a Sub-Committee, by the General Committee).
- VII. (Sub-Committee to consist of at least five members, including a Chairman, of whom three a quorum).
- VIII. (Sub-Committee to handle all matters requiring quick decisions, especially in relation to elections).
- IX. (Procedure for calling meetings of the General and Sub-Committees).
- X. (Procedure for calling meetings of Ward Committees).
- XI. (Expulsion of committee members for non-attendance).
- XII. (Rules of debate).
- XIII. "Niemand die een Lid dezer Vereeniging is ... zal het recht hebben tegen eenig besluit van het Comité te handelen, hetzy in het teekenen van requisities, memories of anderzins. In zoodanig geval heeft het Comité het recht zulk een persoon niet langer als Lid te erkennen".
- XIV. (Timeous meetings of the Committee before parliamentary and divisional council elections).
- XV. "Het Comité zal zooveel mogelyk de boeren bekend maken met alle in de Parlement, of in de Afdeelings Raad voorgestelde maatregelen waardoor hunne belangen in gevaar kunnen gebracht worden".
- XVI. (Committee to meet at least once a year).
- XVII. "Het Comité vergadert een of twee maanden voor de zitting van het Parlement, en zy verwacht van de Leden der Vereeniging, dat zy de behoeften des Lands aan de Comité persoonlyk of op geschrift zullen bekend maken, die ze na goedkeuring aan het plaatselyk lid zal opdragen".
- XVIII. (Committee will work with any district for the advancement of the welfare of the land).
- XIX. "Het Comité zal zooveel mogelyk het invoeren van werktuigen helpen bevorderen, die tot nut en gemak voor de boeren kunnen zyn".
- XX. (Procedure for collection of subscriptions).
- XXI. (Responsibilities of the Treasurer).
- XXII. (Responsibilities of the Secretary).
- XXIII. "Het Comité stelt een man aan, in, of zoo na mogelyk aan de Kaapstad, als consul om over hunne belangen te waken, benevens een procureur, om waar het noodig is, hunne zaken te bevorderen".
- XXIV. (Committee may amend these rules).
- "Bovengemeld Regulatien zyn aldus gevormd door de Ondergeteekende, Leden der Sub-Comité,

J. JOUBERT, Vice-Voorzitter,  
W. KRUGER SMIT, C. KRUGER, A. DU  
PLESSIS.

"Voorgelegd en goedgekeurd door het Algemeene Comité op eene Vergadering gehouden 12, Maart 1881. Bekrachtigd door eene Vergadering van het Comité 14den April 1881.

D.P. VAN DEN HEEVER."

(Printed document in the Hofmeyr Collection).

## APPENDIX C.

## CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE AFRIKANER BOND PRIOR TO THE RICHMOND CONGRESS, MAY 1883.

I. S.J. DU TOIT'S ONTWERP VAN BEPALINGS, JULY 1879.

This document, as its title implies, was intended mainly to promote discussion. It was never put into force as a functioning instrument.

"I. Beginsels.

1. Die Afrikaner Bond gaat uit van die Beginsel dat ons as Afrikaners ons eie algemene (sowel as besondere) Belange het, wat elk reggeaarde Afrikaner geroepe is voor te staan.
2. Om op die Maatskappy en die Staatskunde invloed uit te oefen is daar egter behoefte an 'n Vereniging of Organisasie wat alle kragte verenig; en dit bedoel die Bond.
3. Daartoe neem hy in sig op elkeen wat Afrika tot syn vaderland gekies het, en Afrika's welvaart bedoel, onverskillig wat syn nasionale afkoms is, of tot watter kerkelike of burgerlike party hy origins behoer.

"II. Doel.

1. Die Bond stel sig ten doel die welvaart en bloei van Suid Afrika in algemeen te bevorder, en insonderheid die ankweking van ware Nationaliteitsgevoel.
2. Daartoe neem hy die regte en belange van elk afdeeling der bevolking in beskerming, mar meer bisonder van onse Boerenbevolking, wat tot nog toe te veel op die agtergrond geplaas was.
3. Vernamelik ag hy sig geroepe die Volkstaal in beskerming te neem waar die verwaarloos word op kerklik, maatskaplik, en staatkundig gebied, veral in die skole.
4. In die staatkunde is hoofdoel: te sorge dat die verskillende klasse der bevolking behoerlik verteenwoordig word in die verskillende wetgevings, vollens hulle getalsterkte, en wel deur sulke verteenwoordigers wat die Beginsels van die Bond toegedaan is.
5. Die Bond sal oek waak o'er die Drukpers, om te verhoede dat nadelige beginsels verspreid word, en te sorre dat die ontwikkeling van die bevolking op regte en behoerlike wyse bevorderd word.
6. Bisondere andag sal die Bond wy an bevordering van degelyke en doelmatige onderwys, veral van onse Boerebevolking.

"III. Middele.

Die Lede moet trag om die doel te bereik deur die vollende middele:

1. Deur did Bond so veel mogelyk te help uitbrei, tot alle Kolonies van ons land, en alle klasse van onse bevolking.
2. Deur Volks- en Bestuurs- Vergaderings te hou.
3. Deur te sorge ver registrasie van kiesers, en nominasie, en eleksie van behoerlike verteenwoordigers.
4. Deur verspreiding van degelike en nuttige boeke en geskrifte, na die behoefte en vatbaarheid van die bevolking.

5. Deur goeje koerante te erken en te bevorder, en andere op te rig teenoer nadelige, of waar behoefte daaraan bestaan.
6. Deur Prysfrage uit te skrywe.

" IV. Inrigting (Organisasie).

1. Die Bond beperk sig nie tot die Kolonie, maar omvat heel Suid Afrika.
2. Elke stemgeregtigde burger kan lid van die Bond worde, deur betaling van 'n kleine jaarlikse bydrage en ondertekening van die reëls.
3. Elke distrikt het syn eie plaselike bestuur, gekose deur die plaselike lede met reg om eie huishoudelike bepalings te maak, mits nie in stryd met die algemene bepalings nie.
4. Elke Kolonie, of Staat, of Republiek het syn aparte Provinsiale Bestuur, verkose deur die plaselike besture, en lewenslange en algemene lede, wat ook weer hulle eie reëls opstel, o'ereenkomstig met die algemene bepalings.
5. Daar sal één Centraal Bestuur wees, bestaande uit lede, gekose deur elk Provinsiale Bestuur, geewenredig na die getal gewone lede; wat minsten eenmaal al jare moet vergader, en ook eie bepalings kan maak, behoudens die algemeene.
6. Die Centraal Bestuur sal jaarliks 'n Werkende Komité anstel, bestaande uit hulle eie President, Sekretaris, en Tresurier, met byvoeging van enige raadgewende lede om me te raadpleeg in gevalle waar dit mog nodig wees.
7. Ider lagere bestuur doet aan die wat onmiddelik hoër is verslag van syn besluite en handeling.

" V. Geldsake (Administrasie).

1. Ider lid ge jaarliks 'n kleine bydrage, seg 5s.
2. Deur 'n bydrage van seg £10 word iemand 'n lewenslange en algemeene lid, en kan dus in alle distrikte van syn Provinsie deelneem as lid an enige vergadering, en an die kiesing van 'n Provinsiale Bestuur.
3. Ider Provinsiale Bestuur regel syn eie geldsake.

(From Die Afrikaanse Patriot, 4 July 1879, and reprinted in the Afrikaanse Almanak ver 1882).

## II. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AFRIKANER BOND IN THE ORANGE FREE STATE.

The original constitution of the Free State Bond was published in the Express, Bloemfontein, on 7 April 1881, and adopted at a meeting on 16 May. It was revised at a further meeting in Bloemfontein on 2 December 1882. These two documents are referred to below as the Express Constitution and the Bloemfontein Revision respectively. Both are available in the Hofmeyr Collection.

In the following summary, the numeration of clauses in the Express Constitution is followed, and where differences occur that of the Bloemfontein Revision is given afterwards in brackets.

The first three articles in both documents concerned principles and objects, and the only significant difference between them was in the first: the Express Constitution contained no colour bar, but in the Bloemfontein Revision

the words italicized below were added:

1. "De Bond kent geene nationaliteit hoegenaamd dan die der Afrikaners, beschouwende als zoodanig ieder blanke persoon van welke afkomst ook, die zich verbinden zal om de voorspoed en de welvaart van Zuid-Afrika te behartigen. Het woord 'blanke' in dit art. gebezigd, zal verstaan worden als alleen betrekking te hebben op en verbindend te zijn voor de Oranje Vrijstaat".

Article 2 described the object of the Bond as the establishment of a South African nationality by the fostering of "ware vaderlandsliefde". Article 3 stated that Afrikaners (a term probably not used in a narrow racial sense) should be encouraged to assert themselves politically and socially as a nation, by establishing the Bond in all States and Colonies in South Africa, by developing a sound and efficient system of education, and (in the Express Constitution only) by keeping watch on the press.

The rest of the 29 articles (26 in the Bloemfontein Revision) were devoted to organization, and are important inasmuch as they provided the basic form of organization for the Bond throughout South Africa. The constitutions went on to define the functions of Ward Besturen (Arts. 4-7), District Besturen (Arts. 8-10), Provincial Besturen (Arts. 11-14), and the Central Bestuur (Arts. 15-18 - 15 in the Bloemfontein Revision).

Ward Besturen of five members, meeting monthly, were made responsible for the collection of subscriptions, the registration of members as voters, the spreading of useful literature, and the promotion of schools and pro-Bond newspapers. They also had to report quarterly to the District Bestuur.

District Besturen had to draw one representative from each Ward, to meet quarterly, supervise the Ward Besturen financially and otherwise, and make half-yearly reports to the Provincial Bestuur.

There was to be one Provincial Bestuur for each State or Colony, composed of one representative from each District Bestuur. It was to meet at the capital every six months, supervise the District Besturen, administer finances, and make an annual report to the Central Bestuur.

The Central Bestuur is the supreme co-ordinating authority in the Bond in the Express Constitution, under which it is made up of two representatives from the Cape and one each from the Free State, Transvaal and Natal, meeting annually in each capital in rotation. Not only must it supervise the work of the Provincial Besturen, and receive and spend money, but it must publish an annual report which included a policy statement for the following year. In the Bloemfontein Revision, however, its authority is much reduced, and its powers very nebulously defined. It is now made to consist of two representatives from each State or Colony.

Article 19 (16 in the Bloemfontein Revision) stated that anyone who accepted the conditions of the Bond constitution and undertook to pay the annual subscription of ten shillings and a small entrance fee could become a member. Art. 20 (17) contained instructions regarding the termination of membership (failure to pay subscriptions, violation of the constitution subject to appeal to District or Provincial Besturen, or written notice by the individual). Art. 21 (18) provided for the election of all committee members by ballot. Art. 22 (19) dealt with the suspension of committee members, and 23 (20) determined the duration of office of the various committees: Ward and District Besturen for one year, Provincial and Central for two. Committee elections were to take place, according to

Art. 24 (22) as follows: Wards on the first Tuesday in February, Districts on the first Tuesday in March, Provinces on the first Tuesday in April, and the Central Bestuur on the first Tuesday in May. Under Art. 25 (23) chairmen were empowered to call special committee meetings, and were bound to do so at the request of three committee members. Art. 26 (24) allocated travelling expenses to members of the Provincial and Central Besturen. Art. 27 admitted women as honorary members, but this concession to modernity did not survive the Bloemfontein Revision. Nor did Art. 28, empowering the District Besturen to excuse poverty-stricken applicants from the payment of entrance fees and subscriptions. Art. 29 gave the power of constitutional revision to the Central Bestuur; but Art. 25 of the Bloemfontein Revision took it away from this body and gave it to the Provincial Besturen, in consultation with ("in overleg met") the other Besturen. Finally, a new Art. 26 adopted in the Bloemfontein Revision gave all Besturen the right to make their own domestic regulations.

### III. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AFRIKANER BOND IN THE TRANSVAAL.

This document was drawn up by Ds. S.J. du Toit and Jacob Middel, appeared first in De Volksstem, and was republished in the Patriot on 9 June 1882. It carries the certification: "Vastgesteld op de vergadering van Vertegenwoordigers uit verschillende Districten der Z.A. Republiek gehouden in de Raadzaal te Pretoria, 16 Mei, 1882". It was revised in 1885 (See Library of Parliament Bond MSS., p. 5).

The first two articles, entitled Algemeene Bepalingen, read as follows:

1. "De Bond vestigt zich onder de blanke bevolking van geheel Zuid Afrika. Hy neemt in zich op allen, die Zuid Afrika als hun vaderland erkennen, en de Beginsels van den Bond aannemen, hetzy zy in Zuid-Afrika geboren zyn of van buitenlands derwaarts gekomen".
2. "Het haaste doel van den Bond is de vorming eener Zuid Afrikaansche Nationaliteit; door aaneensluiting en zamenwerking, als voorbereiding tot bereiking van het einddoel: een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika onder eigen vlag".

Under Organisatie (Arts. 3 and 4), membership of the Bond was declared open to all who declared acceptance of its principles in writing, and a system of Ward, District and Provincial-Besturen was outlined, as in the constitution of the Free State Bond. The main differences between this and the Free State document were that (a) Wards could be represented on the District Besturen by up to four members, in proportion to their numerical strength, and (b) the Transvaal constitution contained no reference to a Central Bestuur.

Art. 5, entitled Werkzaamheden, listed the Bond's activities as follows: extension of its own membership, proper registration of voters, careful selection of candidates for public office, promotion of education, vigilance over the press, and the establishment of a National Bank.

Arts. 6 and 7, entitled Geldzaken, laid down an annual subscription of five shillings for all members, and required all Besturen, which were given control over their own monetary affairs, to pass on one third of their income to the Besturen immediately above them. Superior Besturen could increase this levy if they furnished adequate reasons.

## APPENDIX D.

## THE CENTRAL CONSTITUTION OF THE AFRIKANER BOND.

A full analysis of the Central Constitution of the Afrikaner Bond would have to take into account the provisions of the constitutions listed in Appendix C which deal with the powers and functions of the Central Bestuur. But as the creation of a supra-territorial organization was never properly realized, our attention may be limited to the ~~only~~ two documents which alone imparted any real substance to the idea. The first was the Algemeene Constitutie adopted at the Richmond Congress in May 1883, which is printed in full in J.H. Hofmeyr, The Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, at pp. 649-50 in the English edition and pp. 712-3 in the Dutch. The Central Bestuur, when it eventually met in February 1886, was created under this instrument. But this constitution had no validity after February 1886, for the Central Bestuur replaced it with another, using the power of amendment given to it, "met inachtneming van het gevoel en der lagere besturen", under Article XIV of the same document.

The text of the Constitutie drawn up at the Central Bestuur meeting by S.J. du Toit, J.G. Grabe and T.P. Theron was printed in full in the Verslag van de Eerste Zitting van het Centraal Bestuur. Though the Bond's life as an efficient inter-territorial organization was brief, this constitution was not revoked, though its provisions respecting the Central Bestuur lapsed with the course of time. It was still printed in full in the Officieële Stukken in 1898, and ran as follows:

- "Artikel 1. De Afrikaner Bond vestigt zich in de verschillende Staten en Kolonien van Zuid Afrika.
- "Artikel 2. Het naaste doel van den Bond is de vorming eener Zuid Afrikaansche nationaliteit door aaneensluiting en samenwerking als voorbereiding tot het einddoel: Een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika. Dat doel tracht de Bond te bereiken langs constitutioneelen weg, waarbij alle rechtmatige ondersteuning aan de respectieve Regeeringen en Wetgevingen wordt verleend, en de rechten van een ieder worden gerespecteerd.
- "Artikel 3. Leden kunnen al degenen worden welke op behoorlijke wijze en door onderteekening van het navolgend formulier verklaren de uitgesprokene beginselen te zullen handhaven en de verplichtingen te zullen nakomen.

Onderteeknings-Formulier voor de Leden van den Afrikaner Bond.

De ondergeteekende verklaart hierbij met zijn naamteekening de uitgesprokene beginselen van den Afrikaner Bond te omhelzen en te zullen handhaven, en verbindt zich de verplichtingen aan het lidmaatschap van den Bond verbonden volgens de Constitutie getrouw te zullen nakomen.

- "Artikel 4. Het Bestuur van den Bond wordt uitgeoefend door:
- A. Wijkbesturen, in elke wijk, waar niet minder dan 10 gewone leden zich vereenigen om een tak van den Bond te vormen onder behoorlijk bestuur.
- B. Distriktsbesturen, in elk distrikt, waar twee of meer Wijkbesturen zich daartoe vereenigen, zullende een Distriktsbestuur zelf het getal vertegenwoordigers der respectieve Wijkbesturen bepalen. Waar slechts één Wijkbestuur in een Distrikt

bestaat, tellende minder dan 20 leden, kan zulk een tak zich aansluiten bij een nabijgelegen Distriktsbestuur, doch tellende meer dan 20 leden kan zulk een Wijkstak een vertegenwoordiger zenden naar het Provinciaal Bestuur.

- C. Provinciale Besturen in elke Republiek of elke Kolonie, waar niet minder dan 5 Distriktsbesturen zich daartoe vereenigen, blijvende het aan het Provinciaal Bestuur zelf overgelaten het getal vertegenwoordigers der verschillende Distriktsbesturen te bepalen.
- D. Een Centraal Bestuur, bestaande uit twee afgevaardigden van elk der Provinciale Besturen.

"Artikel 5. Elk Bestuur heeft het regt zijne eigene huishoudelijke bepalingen te maken, mits deze niet in strijd zijn met de erkende beginselen van den Bond, als neergelegd in deze Constitutie.

"Artikel 6. De werkzaamheden van den Bond, waaraan elk lid zal gehouden zijn naar zijne krachten deel te nemen, zijn als volgt:

- A. Zorg te dragen voor de registratie der stemgerechtigde burgers.
- B. De verkiezing te verzekeren van geschikte mannen voor burgerlijke en Staatsbetrekkingen.
- C. Het geven van doeltreffend, degelijk en Christelijk onderwijs te bevorderen.
- D. Mede te werken aan de volksontwikkeling door de verspreiding van gezonde lectuur, en
- E. Door het oog te houden op de belangen van onze nationale nijverheid, en vooral op den landbouw en veeteelt, als de voornaamste bronnen van 's lands rijkdom.

"Artikel 7. Voor den tijd van twee jaren zullen gekozen worden:

- A. Nieuwe Wijksbestuursleden door de gewone leden, en nieuwe Distriktsbestuursleden door de Wijksbesturen in de maand December.
- B. Een nieuwe Provinciaal Bestuur door de Distriktsbesturen in de maand Januari.
- C. Nieuwe leden van het Centraal Bestuur niet later dan de maand Mei.

Alle verkiezingen van bestuursleden zullen met gesloten stembriefjes plaats vinden.

"Artikel 8. Bij de jaarlijksche vergaderingen zullen de verschillende Besturen gehouden zijn meteen hunne jaarlijksche verslagen op te maken en onverwijld op te zenden aan de Besturen hooger in rang, met inbegrip van financieel verslag en geldelijke verantwoording.

"Artikel 9. Elke Bonds-Provincie regelt hare eigene geldzaken door haar Provinciaal Bestuur.

"Artikel 10. Het Centraal Bestuur zal, met inachtneming van de gevoelens der Provinciale Besturen, deze Constitutie mogen wijzigen.

De titel van deze Constitutie te zijn als volgt: "De Constitutie van den Afrikaner Bond in Zuid Afrika".

## APPENDIX E.

## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE AFRIKANER BOND IN THE CAPE COLONY.

The earliest Provincial Constitution of the Bond in the Cape Colony was that approved at the Richmond Congress in May 1883, which is reproduced in J.H. Hofmeyr, The Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, at pp. 650-2 in the English edition and pp. 714-6 in the Dutch. It was not a well constructed document, and contained provisions governing the procedure for amalgamation between the Afrikaner Bond and the Boeren Vereenigingen which would in due course have to be dropped once amalgamation had been effected. When this Constitution was revised at the Grahamstown Congress in 1886, seven of the articles adopted at Richmond were swept away.

The Cape Bond Constitution was by no means a static thing, but grew from a reasonably short document of 10 articles in 1886 to a very much longer one of 24 articles in 1898. The history of the growth of this Constitution illustrates in a graphic manner the growing experience of a somewhat harassed Provincial Bestuur, as it sought to grapple with disciplinary problems which arose mainly out of electioneering activities. As the constitution grew, so the numbering of individual articles changed. For the sake of clarity, therefore, the numeration followed in the summary given below is that of the text in the Officieële Stukken published by order of the Worcester Congress in 1898. Titles and references in square brackets are included for easy reference: they formed no part of the original document.

"Provinciale Constitutie voor de Kaap Kolonie,  
als herzien en vastgesteld op de Provinciale  
Vergadering te Worcester, Februari, 1898".

- I. "Deze Provincie zal worden genoemd 'De Afrikaander Bond en Boeren-Vereeniging van de Kaapkolonie'. [1883].
- II. (Annual subscription 5s., with deprivation of voting rights to members who fail to pay within four weeks) [1886].

Ward Besturen.

- III. "De Wijk-Besturen zullen belast zijn met
  - (a) de kiezing van gewone leden, die echter den ouderdom van achttien jaren zullen moeten hebben bereikt; [age qualification, 1895]
  - (b) de invordering der intekeningspenningen van de leden in hunne respectieve wijken; [1883]
  - (c) de uitwerping van leden, die door niet-betaling hunner intekeningspenningen of door wangedrag zich het lidmaatschap onwaardig hebben gemaakt; [1883]
  - (d) de opzeinding van minstens een-derde der hun wettig toekomstende jaarlijksche intekeningspenningen naar hunne respectieve Distrikts-Besturen; [1883]
  - (e) de behartiging in hunne respectieve Wijken en in overleg met hunne respectieve Distrikts-Besturen van de belangen der Provincie; [1883, revised 1886]
  - (f) het doen van geregeld verslag hunner verrichtingen aan hunne respectieve Distrikts-Besturen; [1883]
  - (g) het doen kiezen door de Wijkstakken van afgevaardigden naar de algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering, tot kiezing van kandidaten voor de Wetgevende Vergadering" [1889, but the function not new].

District Besturen.

- IV. "De Distrikts-Besturen zullen
  - (a) één vijfde van het hun wettig toekomstend deel der jaarlijksche intekeningspenningen opzenden naar het Provinciaal Bestuur; [1895 - previously one third]

- (b) geregeld verslag doen van hunne verrichtingen aan het Provinciaal Bestuur; [1883]
  - (c) in overleg met het Provinciaal Bestuur, zoowel als met de respectieve onder hen sorteerende Wijk-Besturen, de belangen der Provincie behartigen binnen hunne respectieve Distrikten; [1883, revised 1886]
- V.(a) (Newly established Ward and District Besturen to receive approval of their District and Provincial Besturen respectively before obtaining recognition). [1883].
- (b) (Ward and District Besturen which have not fulfilled their financial obligations may not be represented either on higher Besturen or at meetings for the nomination of parliamentary candidates). [1891].

The Provincial Bestuur.

VI. "Het Provinciaal Bestuur zal

- (a) zorgen voor de invordering en de besteding van alle de onder zijne zorg behorende gelden; [1886]
- (b) toezicht houden over ondergeschikte besturen, [1886] en
- (c) minstens ééns per jaar vergaderen, en vóór zijn uiteengaan bepalen wanneer en waar de volgende vergadering zal plaats vinden. [1886]

Op schriftelijk verzoek of met schriftelijk goedkeuring van minstens vijf Distrikts-Besturen zullen de ambtsdragers van het Provinciaal Bestuur eene Sessie van gemeld Bestuur kunnen beleggen, wanneer zij meenen dat bijzonder gewichtige landsomstandigheden zulks vereischen, met billijke kennisgeving van tijd, plaats en doel". [1895]

Continuity of Office-bearers.

VII. (Office-bearers to remain in office until appointment of their successors, and hand over their documents promptly). [1895]

Domestic Regulations.

VIII. (The various Besturen may make domestic regulations in conformity with this Constitution). [1883]

Power of Provincial Bestuur to dissolve and reconstitute lower Besturen.

IX. "Wanneer het Provinciaal Bestuur de overtuiging erlangt dat de Bond en Boerenvereniging in een of meer wijken of distrikten is geraakt onder invloed die nadeelig is voor, of vijandig is tegen de organisatie, zal het den Bond en Boeren Beschermingsvereniging in zoodanige wijk of wijken, distrikt of distrikten, per resolutie mogen ontbinden, de baten latende ter beschikking van de als dan in functie zijnde bestuursleden, en zal het stappen mogen nemen om den Bond en Boerenvereniging in zoodanige wijk of wijken, distrikt of distrikten, op meer gezonden grondslag te reorganiseeren". [1898. See text above, pp. 370-1]

Emergency Procedure.

X. (On occasions when speed is required, Besturen may communicate with each other without going through the regular channels). [1883]

Procedure for the Nomination of Candidates for the Legislative Council.

XI. "(a) Er zullen Cirkel-Comités in elke Kies-Provincie opgericht worden, om de belangen van den Bond en de Boerenvereniging in verband met de electies voor den Wetgevenden Raad te behartigen. [1883] Zij zullen ieder bestaan uit een afgevaardigde van elk Distrikts-Bestuur in hunne respectieve Kies-Provincies, en bijdragen kunnen ontvangen van de Distrikts-Besturen in die Kies-Provincies. [1891]

(b) Elk Distrikts-Bestuur zal bij het benoemen van kandidaten voor de Wetgevenden Raad de gevoelens der gewone leden in elke wijk in acht nemen, en

- schriftelijk bekend maken aan het Cirkel-Comité, of het verlangt, dat zijn afgevaardigde naar eigen oordeel zal stemmen, of wel, of de afgevaardigde verplicht is te stemmen voor een door het Distrikts-Bestuur bepaalden kandidaat of bepaalde kandidaten, en in het laatste geval zal het Cirkel-Comité gehouden zijn, bij elke stemming, zoolang de bedoelde kandidaat of kandidaten nog niet gestemd is of zijn van de lijst, de stem van zoodanigen afgevaardigde aan te teekenen als gegeven voor dien kandidaat of die kandidaten. [1891]
- (c) In geval de afgevaardigde geen schriftelijke bekendmaking voorlegt, zal hij evenwel moeten stemmen overeenkomstig opdracht van zijn Distrikts-Bestuur, en blijkt het later, dat hij in strijd met zoodanige opdracht heeft gestemd, dan zal de Commissie van Toezicht op Electies de totalen der uitgebrachte stemmen zoodanig wijzigen als zij zouden zijn geweest, had hij gestemd volgens opdracht. [1895]
- (d) De stem van elken afgevaardigde zal een getal vertegenwoordigen gelijk aan dat der gewone leden sorteerende onder het hem afvaardigende Distrikts-Bestuur, als blijkende uit de notulen van de jongste vergadering van het Provinciaal Bestuur (onderworpen echter aan de bepalingen in Artikel XIV). [1891]
- (e) De volstreckte meerderheid van het getal wettige afgevaardigden, gerechtigd op zitting in vergaderingen van het Cirkel-Comité, zal een quorum uitmaken op elke vergadering van gezegd Comité. [1889]
- (f) Geen Distrikts-Bestuur zal een afgevaardigde kunnen zenden, tenzij het erkend is door het Provinciaal Bestuur [1889], en tenzij het uit de notulen van de jongste vergadering van het Provinciaal Bestuur blijkt, dat het aan zijne financiële verplichtingen tegenover dat Bestuur heeft voldaan. [1891].
- (g) Verkrijgt een kandidaat op de wijze omschreven in (b), (c), en (d) van dit Artikel de volstreckte meerderheid der gewone leden, sorteerende onder de op het Cirkel-Comité vertegenwoordigde Distrikts-Besturen (onderworpen aan de bepalingen in Art. XIV), dan is zoodanige kandidaat de wettige Bondskandidaat der Kies-Provincie, maar mochten de getallen staken, en zelfs na herhaalde stemming blijven staken, dan zal of het lot moeten beslissen, of een nieuwe vergadering van het Cirkel-Comité worden belegd, of de beslissing van de Commissie van Toezicht op Electies worden ingeroepen, al naar het Cirkel Comité wenschelijk moge oordeelen. [1891]
- (h) Indien na afloop van drie verschillende stemmingen nog geen kandidaat de volstreckte meerderheid verkregen heeft, zullen alle kandidaten, met uitzondering van de drie hoogsten, beschouwd worden als van de lijst gestemd, en zal de vergadering afstemmen tusschen de drie hoogste kandidaten. In geval bij twee daarop volgende stemmingen nog geen kandidaat met volstreckte meerderheid gekozen is, zal de laagste der drie van de lijst geschrapt worden en zal afgestemd worden tusschen de twee hoogsten. [1892]
- (i) Als meer dan het verlangde getal kandidaten de volstreckte meerderheid bij eenige stemming bekamt, zal men de hoogste kandidaten op de stemlijst beschouwen als gekozen. [1892]

- (j) De stemopneming zal bij openlijke stemming geschieden. [1891]
- (k) Elke vergadering van het Cirkel-Comité zal bij meerderheid van stemmen beslissen omtrent de volgende zaken:-
- (1) Het al dan niet toelaten van een persoon, die toelating als afgevaardigde naar de vergadering eischt zonder voorlegging van een geloofsbrief ondertekend door den Voorzitter en den Secretaris van het Distrikts-Bestuur, dat hij beweert te vertegenwoordigen, mits echter dat de vergadering, indien zij zoodanig persoon toelaat, in gemoede overtuigd zal zijn, dat hij werkelijk is afgevaardigd door bedoelde Distrikts-Bestuur. [1895]
- (2) Het al dan niet kiezen van een secundus voor elken kandidaat gekozen voor den Wetgevenden Raad\*. [1895]
- \* Het Provinciaal Bestuur beveelt aan dat voor alle Parlementaire kandidaten Secundi zullen gekozen worden.
- (1) Komt een als in dit artikel omschreven wettig gekozen Bonds-kandidaat te bedanken, te overliden, of onbevoegd te worden vóór de Parlementaire Verkiezing, en komt hetzelfde te gebeuren met zijn wettig benoemden secundus (indien er een secundus is benoemd), dan zal het Cirkel-Comité met den meesten spoed (doch met inachtneming van den nog beschikbaren tijd en andere omstandigheden) door de Commissie van Toezicht op Electies worden opgeroepen, om een nieuwen kandidaat met of zonder secundus, te kiezen; doch is de tijd geheel ontoereikend voor zulk een oproeping (het bewijs waarvoor door genoemde Commissie zal worden geleverd aan de eerstvolgende vergadering van het Provinciaal Bestuur), dan zal de Commissie zelve, met inachtneming van de bekende zienswijze der Bondsmannen in den Cirkel, een kandidaat aanbevelen bij wijze van aankondiging in een of meer der erkende Bondsorganen (en ook bij wijze van circulaire, indien noodig geoordeeld); doch betrekkelijk een zoodanig aanbevolen kandidaat zal artikel XV niet gelden. [1895]
- (m) Een afgevaardigde zal, indien daartoe wettig gekozen, meer dan één Distrikts-Bestuur mogen vertegenwoordigen op het Cirkel-Comité, en alle alzoo vertegenwoordigde Distrikts-Besturen zullen worden bijgeteld ter vorming van het in (e) bepaalde quorum. [1895]
- (n) Indien een afgevaardigde wettig verhinderd is van het Cirkel-Comité, zal dat Comité, indien er een schriftelijke bekendmaking van het Distrikts-Bestuur van zulk een afgevaardigde ter tafel ligt, meldende hoe hij behoorde te stemmen, ware hij tegenwoordig geweest, de stem van zulk een Distrikts-Bestuur aannemen bij elke stemming zoolang als de opdracht van zulk een Distrikts-Bestuur dat onder de Constitutie toelaat! [1895]

Procedure for the Nomination of Candidates for the House of Assembly.

XII. "De benoeming van kandidaten voor de Wetgevende Vergadering zal geschieden als volgt:

- (a) Elke Wijkstak die in zijn geheel sorteert in eenige Kiesafdeeling zal op eene Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering, ~~tot dat doel, wanneer~~ noodig, te worden gehouden in gezegde Afdeeling door een daartoe door gezegden Wijkstak gekozen persoon vertegenwoordigd worden. [1891, replacing an earlier provision for representation by two persons]

- (b) Elke Wijkstak sorteerende in meer dan één Kiesafdeeling zal worden vertegenwoordigd op de verschillende Algemeene Benoemings-Vergaderingen van de Kiesafdeelingen waaronder hij sorteert, door een persoon daartoe door gezegden Tak te worden afgevaardigd naar elke zoodanige Vergadering. [1891]
- (c) (Ward branches given the option of binding their delegates to vote for a given candidate, or to vote according to their discretion, as for delegates to Circle Committee meetings in Art. XI(b)). [1891].
- (d) (Delegates from Ward branches to nomination meetings obliged to vote for candidates supported by their branches. Powers given to the Commissie van Toezicht to reverse votes improperly cast, as under Art. XI(c)). [1891]
- (e) (Delegates from Ward branches to nomination meetings given a block vote equal to numerical strength of their branches at previous Congress, as for delegates to Circle Committee meetings under Art. XI(d)). [1891].
- (f) (Absolute majority of delegates entitled to attend a nomination meeting to constitute a quorum, as under Art. XI(e)). [1891]
- (g) (An absolute majority of votes at a nomination meeting secures the nomination for a successful candidate. Procedure in event of a tie between candidates as under Art. XI(g)). [1891].
- (h) "Geen Wijkstak zal kunnen deelnemen aan gezegde Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering, tenzij dezelve erkend is door zijn Distrikts-Bestuur vóór het houden van de laatste Provinciale Bestuurs-vergadering, die de gezegde Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering heeft voorafgegaan [1889], en tenzij het behoorlijke bewijzen levert, aan zijne financiële verplichtingen tegenover zijn Hooger Bestuur te hebben voldaan". [1891].
- (i) "De plaats en tijd der Vergadering worden bepaald door den Voorzitter van het Distrikts-Bestuur van het hoofddorp in de Kiesafdeeling (of, indien er geen Distrikts-Bestuur bestaat in het Distrikt van het hoofddorp, dan door den Voorzitter van het oudste Distrikts-Bestuur in de Kiesafdeeling), minstens een maand vóór den nominatiedag in het Magistraatskantoor; en hij zal verplicht zijn, daarvan schriftelijke kennisgeving te doen aan den voorzitter en den secretaris van de Commissie van Toezicht op Electies en aan de Distrikts-Besturen in zijn Kiesafdeeling, welke laatste ze dan weder aan de Wijks-Besturen zullen opzenden". [1889. The bracketed section added in 1895].
- (j) "De stemopneming geschiedt bij openlijke stemming". [1891].
- (k) (Rule for deadlock in the voting, identical to Art. XI(h)). [1892].
- (l) (Identical to Art. XI(i)). [1892].
- (m) (Nomination meetings to determine by majority vote the questions of admitting delegates without credentials, and of electing secundi, as under Art. XI(k)). [1895].
- (n) (Procedure in event of a properly nominated candidate falling out before official nomination day. Identical to Art. XI(l), reading "Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering" for "Cirkel-Comité", and "Kiesafdeeling" for "Cirkel"). [1895].
- (o) (Delegates may represent more than one Ward branch at nomination meetings, all branches thus represented being counted for quorum purposes, as under Art. XI(m)). [1895].
- (p) (Rule governing legitimate absenteeism from nomination meetings, as under Art. XI(n)). [1895].

Procedure for the Nomination of Candidates for the Divisional Councils.

- XIII. (Chairman of the senior Ward branch in each Field Cornetcy to convene a meeting within eight days of the magistrate's call for nominations; the Chairman of the District Bestuur to act if he fails to do so; all Bondsmen living in the Field Cornetcy who are voters may attend, and participate in the election of the Bond candidate by ballot). [1893].

Eligibility to participate in Nomination Meetings.

- XIV. (Bondsmen who do not live within boundaries of an electoral province or electoral division may not take part in the choice of candidates for that province or division). [1895].

Disciplinary measures against Bondsmen who oppose Bond candidates.

- XV. (a) Bondsmannen, die zich niet kunnen vereenigen met een volgens Art. XVI(i) aangekondigden wettig benoemden kandidaat of kandidaten kunnen buiten stemming blijven bij de stembus, maar als zij gezegden kandidaat of kandidaten tegenwerken, of voor een kandidaat of kandidaten stemmen, die niet alzoo is of zijn genomineerd, maken zij zich onderhevig aan de uitspraak van hun Wijks-Bestuur, of (indien hun Wijks-Bestuur zelf zoodanig wettig aangekondigden kandidaat of kandidaten heeft tegengewerkt) van een hooger bestuur.
- (b) Een Bondsman, die zich kandidaat stelt voor de Wetgevende Vergadering of den Wetgevenden Raad, tegen volgens Art. XVI(i) aangekondigde Bonds kandidaten, of voor den Afdeelings-raad, tegen volgens Artikel XIII benoemde kandidaten, zal, wanneer hij dit doet, terstond ophouden lid te zijn van den Afrikaander Bond en Boerenvereeniging, en zal niet weder in eenigen Wijkstak opgenomen kunnen worden, tenzij zoodanige Bondsman daartoe schriftelijk verlof voorlegt van het Provinciaal Bestuur, waarna hij volgens Art. III(a) op nieuw zal mogen worden opgenomen door een daartoe bevoegd Wijks-Bestuur". [1895. Similar, less explicit clauses in the 1891 Constitution].

The Commissie van Toezicht op Electies.

- XVI. (This article is quoted and discussed in Appendix F).  
Election of Secundi.

- XVII. (Election of Secundi for candidates recommended for all nomination meetings). [1895. Previously their election had been obligatory].

The Handling of Electoral Disputes.

- XVIII. (This article is quoted and discussed in Appendix F).  
The Summoning of Nomination Meetings.

- XIX. "Bij de bepaling van tijd en plaats van Benoemingsvergaderingen (voor Wijken, Distrikten, Kiesafdeelingen, of Kiescirkels) zal rekening worden gehouden met afstanden, rivieren en andere plaatselijke omstandigheden, en zullen ook overigens in verband met bedoelde vergaderingen de algemeene beginselen van recht en billijkheid in het oog worden gehouden". [1895]

Recognition of more than one branch in a Field Cornetcy.

- XX. "(a) Het zal in 't vervolg geen Distrikts Bestuur geoorloofd zijn om meer dan één Tak in een onder hetzelfde sorteerende Veldkornetschap toe te laten of te erkennen, tenzij (1), overeenkomstig Art. 4 der Algemeene Constitutie, gezegde Tak bestaat uit niet minder dan 10 leden, (2) de uitgestrektheid der wijk de stichting van meer dan één Tak eischt, en (3) de differente Takken door duidelijke grenslijnen van elkander zijn gescheiden. [1895].
- (b) Voor het kiezen van afgevaardigden naar de Algemeene Vergadering tot benoeming van kandidaten voor de Wetgevende Vergadering zullen de verschillende

Takken in zulk een veldkornetschap verplicht zijn om eene gecombineerde vergadering te houden en daarop den afgevaardigde te kiezen die gemelde Takken zal vertegenwoordigen op de Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering, welke afgevaardigde aldaar afzonderlijk zal uitbrengen het getal stemmen van elken afzonderlijken Tak door hem vertegenwoordigd, overeenkomstig Artikel XII. [1895. More specifically phrased than the Constitution of 1890. Now, for the first time, the establishment of more than one branch per Field Cornetcy is discouraged].

(c) De gezegde Takken zullen met betrekking tot hun eigen zaken bestuurd worden even als alle andere Takken van den Bond. [1890]

(d) Elk Distrikts-Bestuur zal vrijgelaten worden om aan zoodanige Takken zulke vertegenwoordiging in het Distrikts-Bestuur te geven, als gezegd Distrikts-Bestuur zal goedkeuren". [1890].

Recognition of more than one District Bestuur in a Fiscal Division.

- XXI. "Het is niet geoorloofd in het vervolg meer dan één Distrikts-Bestuur te stichten in één en dezelfde Fiskale afdeeling, tenzij
- (1) Overeenkomstig Art. 4 der Algemeene Constitutie, elk Distrikts-Bestuur twee of meer Wijks-Besturen onder zich heeft;
  - (2) Door de uitgestrektheid of andere bloot territoriale omstandigheden van de Fiskale afdeeling de stichting van meer dan één Distrikts-Bestuur daarin wordt geëischt;
  - (3) Er een duidelijke grenslijn tusschen de differente Distrikts-Besturen is getrokken, en
  - (4) De toestemming van het Provinciaal Bestuur vooraf is verkregen voor de stichting van meer dan één Distrikts-Bestuur, alsmede van alle bijkomende Distrikts-Besturen in de Fiskale afdeeling". [1895].

Membership limited to one Branch.

- XXII. "Geen Bondsman mag lid zijn van meer dan één Wijkstak, Wijks-Bestuur, of Distrikts-Bestuur, maar het zal elk Bestuur vrij staan, een Bondsman als zijn vertegenwoordiger af te vaardigen naar een hooger Bestuur, al sorteert zoodanig Bondsman ook niet onder het afvaardigend Bestuur". [1895].

Courtesy.

- XXIII. "In alle klachten, geschriften en mededeelingen van of over Bonds-besturen en andere Bonds-lichamen zal men de voorschriften der beleefdheid en welvoegelijkheid nakomen". [1895].

Power of Amendment.

- XXIV. "Deze Constitutie zal mogen gewijzigd worden door het Provinciaal Bestuur [1883]. Doch wijzigingen die ter eerstvolgende vergadering van het Provinciaal Bestuur blijken te zijn afgekeurd door de volstrekte meerderheid der Distrikts- of Wijks-Besturen zullen ophouden kracht van wet te hebben". [1891].

## APPENDIX F.

## THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE COMMISSIE VAN TOEZICHT.

The Commissie van Toezicht was established at the Middelburg Congress in 1889 (see above, pp.254-5), with the insertion of a new article in the Cape Bond Constitution (no. XVI in 1898) which read as follows:

- XVI. "Een Commissie van Toezicht op Elekties voor den Wetgevenden Raad en de Wetgevende Vergadering, bestaande uit drie personen, leden van den Bond, zal alle twee jaren, tegelijk met de andere ambtenaren, door de Provinciale Vergadering worden gekozen met meerderheid van stemmen. De plichten dier Commissie zijn als volgt:
- (a) Een wakend oog te houden op alle Elekties en door correspondentie en andersints het staan van Bonds-kandidaten aan te moedigen en hunne verkiezing te verzekeren.
  - (b) Er voor te zorgen, dat algemeene vergaderingen tot benoeming van kandidaten behoorlijk opgeroepen worden, door bijtijds aan de Distriktsbesturen in hoofddorpen kennis te geven zulks te doen.
  - (c) Als eenig Voorzitter als bepaald in paragraaf ((i) Art. XII - the relevant reference in the 1898 Constitution) in gebreke blijft zoodanige kennisgeving, als daarin voorgeschreven, uit te zenden, zal de Secretaris der Commissie, op verzoek van eenig Voorzitter van een aldaar sorteerd Distriktsbestuur zelf de dag en plaats van de nomineerende vergadering bepalen.
  - (d) Alle disputen omtrent Elekties zullen kunnen gerefereerd worden naar de Commissie, wiens uitspraak finaal zal wezen.
  - (e) De Commissie is speciaal belast met het bijeenroepen van alle Cirkelcomités, met aanwijzing van tijd en plaats der vergadering.
  - (f) De Commissie ter voorziening in haar geldelijke behoeften, zal dezelve kunnen doen uitbetalen uit de Provinciale Kas, mits daarvoor kwitantie gevende aan den Thesaurier, geteekend door al de leden.
  - (g) De Commissie zal het recht hebben, op aanzoek van eenigen tak, om goed te keuren, dat eenig kandidaat, geen Bondskandidaat zijnde, ondersteund worde door den Bond, mits er geen kans schijnt om een Bondskandidaat in te krijgen en mits er geen Bondskandidaat volgens constitutie benoemd is, die daardoor zou schade lijden en alleen in zulke gevallen waar het noodzakelijk is in het belang van den Bond!

At the 1898 Congress (see above, pp.370-1), the following sentence was added to Art. XVI(g):

"Zij zal tevens mogen weigeren om iemand die onder artikel XI of XII is gekozen als Bondskandidaat aan te kondigen en artikel XV in zijn voordeel toe te passen, indien zij meent dat zij met zoodanige weigering handelt in den geest van trouwe Bondsmannen en Bondsbelangen bevordert".

At the same Congress the following two sub-sections, originally incorporated in 1895 but deleted in 1896, were restored to Art. XVI:

- (h) "Geen lid van de Commissie van Toezicht op Electies mag als zoodanig deelnemen aan de over-

weging van zaken waarin zijn eigen kandidatuur, kiesafdeeling of kiesprovincie is betrokken.

- (i) De Commissie van Toezicht zal zoodra de omstandigheden zulks veroorlooven in één of meer der erkende Bondsorganen de namen aankondigen van wettig benoemde Bondskandidaten".

This represents the sum of the positive powers conferred on the Commissie van Toezicht under the Constitution. To these, however, must be added the complementary obligations to the Commissie imposed on the branches elsewhere in the Constitution, without which the Commissie's authority would have been very much less effective:

- XVIII "(a) De Voorzitter en Secretaris van elk Cirkel-Comité, en ook van elke Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering, als omschreven in Artikel XII, zullen dadelijk aan de Commissie van Toezicht op Electies de namen mededeelen van de door die lichamen benoemde Parlementaire kandidaten. (1891).  
 (b) In gevallen van bezwaren tegen de handelingen van een Cirkel-Comité of van een Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering zullen de klagers, schriftelijk, staande de vergadering of onmiddellijk daarna, of, indien niet op de Vergadering tegenwoordig, binnen een week, aan den Voorzitter of Secretaris van het Cirkel-Comité of van de Algemeene Benoemings-Vergadering, en aan alle kandidaten tegen wier benoeming zij bezwaar maken, kennis geven van hun voornemen om zich op de Commissie van Toezicht te beroepen, zoowel als van hunne punten van bezwaar; en de Voorzitter of Secretaris van het geïncrimineerde lichaam sal zonder verwijl de Commissie van Toezicht voorzien van afschriften der ontvangen punten van bezwaar, zoowel als van uittreksels uit de notulen en van verdere door hem noodig geachte ophelderingen, betreffende bedoelde punten, - hetwelk ook, zoover toepasselijk, zal worden gedaan in alle disputen omtrent Afdelings-Raads benoemingen. (1895, based on a less specific rule of 1891).  
 (c) De Klagers zullen de Commissie van Toezicht dadelijk voorzien, in duplikaat, van:- 1. een duidelijk klachtschrift, 2. bewijzen ter staving hunner bezwaren, 3. bewijzen dat de uitslag der verkiezing van kandidaten werkelijk anders zou zijn geweest, indien hetgeen waarover geklaagt wordt niet ware gebeurd, en 4. een acte van onderwerping ten genoegen van de Commissie" (1895).

In 1893 the work of the Commissie was made easier by the establishment of a Commissie van Organisatie, which was intended to take routine work off its shoulders (See Notulen, 1893 Congress, p. 31). This Commissie consisted of four members, with their respective secundi, elected by the Congress from a panel of eight chosen by the chairman, vice-chairman and secretary. Two were to operate in the east and two in the west. Their function was to extend and strengthen the organization of the Bond,

- "(a) door de stichting van nieuwe takken en vermeerdering van ledental; (b) door versterking en aanwakkering van bestaande takken en besturen; (c) door wegruiming van geschillen en bezwaren, en bevordering van eenheid en samenwerking".

They were to work in collaboration with the Commissie van Toezicht, and assist it by certifying that the papers of new branches were in order and their subscriptions paid. The Commissie van Toezicht would grant recognition to new branches on the evidence of a certificate from the Commissie van Organisatie and the approval of the District Bestuur

concerned. The accurate determination and certification of branch membership became important after the introduction of block voting at nomination meetings, and the Commissie van Organisatie was largely employed in this work. Its efforts to remove discord, however, were not always attended with success (See above, p.320).

Various other experiments were made from time to time in relation to the powers and functions of the Commissie van Toezicht, but these proved unpopular and were deleted. Thus at the 1893 Congress a new article was added (almost identical to Art. XIII in the 1898 Constitution) laying down the procedure for Divisional Council nominations and empowering the Commissie van Toezicht to summon meetings of the Ward branches for this purpose should a local chairman neglect to do so. Until 1898, therefore, when this responsibility was thrown back on to the District Besturen, the Commissie was theoretically concerned with even Divisional Council elections. Even in 1898, it was left with the vague authority in this field conferred under Art. XVIII(b), quoted above; but this may well have been due to an oversight.

Following the Assembly elections of 1894, the 1895 Congress sought to lighten the burden of the Commissie by setting up Sub-Commissies van Toezicht of three Bondsmen in each of the electoral provinces, the intention being that disputes should be handled in the first instance by these bodies and only referred to the main Commissie in the event of their being unable to settle them. But in 1896 the Sub-Commissies were considered redundant and abolished.

The 1895 Congress also conferred on the Commissie and the Sub-Commissies the additional power of intervening in electoral disputes without the invitation of the branches concerned. The Burghersdorp Congress (1896), however, regarding this extension of the Commissie's power as unwarranted, deleted the sub-section. It conferred, in fact, less power than was subsequently conferred on the Commissie by the addendum to Art. XVI(g) in 1898 (see above).

## THE PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES OF THE AFRIKANER BOND.

I. S.J. DU TOIT'S PROGRAM VAN BEGINSELS OF FEBRUARY 1882.

The text of this Program is given in full, with revised spelling, in J.D. du Toit, S.J. du Toit in Weg en Werk, pp. 185-9. That given below, with the original spelling, is derived from a printed copy in the Hofmeyr Collection.

In 1886, D.F. du Toit drew up a revised version of this Program with the object of making it more palatable to the members of the Afrikaner Bond. In the text which follows, omissions made by D.F. du Toit from his brother's draft are given in square brackets, and his addenda in italics. The numeration of articles is that of the original document, with that of D.F. du Toit given in brackets where it differs. For D.F. du Toit's amendments, see Notulen, 1886 Congress, Bylage A, and for the significance of his proposed changes, see above, pp. 255-8.

This document was never officially adopted by the Afrikaner Bond.

" Program van Beginselen van de Nationale Partij.

- " I. De Afrikaander Bond vertegenwoordigt in Zuid Afrika de grondtoon van ons Volkskarakter, gelijk dit gevormd werd door overplanting en ontwikkeling van een kolonisatie van Europeanen, [voornamelijk Hollanders en Hugenoten] op Afrikaanse bodem; en wenscht dit overeenkomstig onze tegenwoordige volkstoestand, in een vorm die aan de behoeften van onze tijd voldoet, te ontwikkelen.
- " II. Noch in de volkswil noch in de wet, maar alleen in God vindt zij de bron van het soevereine gezag, en verwerpt mitsdien enerzijds het beginsel van een wettelooze volks-sovereiniteit en anderzijds alle wederrechtelijke [vreemde] overheersching, [terwijl zij erkent in de Kaapkolonie en Natal de Britsche soevereiniteit van Godswege langs historischen weg geworden, en in den Oranje Vrijstaat en de Zuid Afrikaansche Republiek den Republikeinschen Staatsvorm als onder de leiding Gods in onze geschiedenis geworteld, door de Uitgeweken Boeren tot ontwikkeling gebracht, door Britsche Traktaten erkend, en door de Grondwet van beide Republieken als zoodanig bevestigd].
- " III. Ook op staatkundig [terrein] gebied belijdt hij de eeuwige beginselen van Gods Woord; zóó evenwel dat het staatsgezag noch rechtstreeks door de uitspraak van eenige kerk, maar alleen in de konscientie der overheidspersonen, aan de ordonantien Gods gebonden zij.
- " IV. De overheid, zoo leert ze, is als dienaarssé Gods, in een Christelijke en dus niet-godsdienslooze natie, gehouden tot verheerlijking van Gods naam en behoort diensvolgens (a) uit bestuur en wetgeving alles te verwijderen, wat de vrije invloed van het Evangelie op ons volksleven belemmert; (b) zichzelf als daartoe in volstreekte zin onbevoegd, te onthouden van elke rechtstreeksche bemoeiing met de geestelijke ontwikkeling van de natie; (c) alle kerkgenootschappen of godsdiensstige vereenigingen, en voorts alle burgers, onverschillig welke hun denk-

- wijze aangaande de eeuwige dingen zij, te behandelen op voet van gelijkheid; en (d) in de konscientie, voor zoover die het vermoeden van achtbaarheid niet mist, een grens te erkennen voor haar macht.
- " V. Zij belijdt dat de overheid regeert bij de gratie Gods, en, hieraan haar regeringsmacht ontleenende, het recht heeft den eed te vragen; en, ter vrijlating van den dag des Heeren, en alzoo mede in 's volks belang, onder regeling van een behoorlijke Zondagswet, zoowel zelve zooveel doenlijk in al haar vertakkingen op dien dag behoort te rusten, als in haar concessien aan maatschappijen van vervoer geheelen of gedeeltelijken stilstand van zaken voor dien dag heeft te bedingen.
- " VI. Op zichzelf geen enkele Staatsvorm den eenig bruikbare keurende, en de alsnu bestaande vormen erkennende (II), zoo meent zij toch, dat het einddoel onzer nationale ontwikkeling zijn moet, EEN VEREENIGD ZUID AFRIKA [ONDER EIGEN VLAG].
- " VII. De bestaande constitutien van de Kaapkolonie en van Natal, en de Grondwetten van de Oranje Vrijstaat en de Z.A. Republiek aanvaardt zij als uitgangspunt, om langs [wettige] constitutioneelen weg, door hervorming van bestaande instellingen, tot dat einddoel te geraken.
- " VIII. Zij verlangt daartoe bevestiging van den rechtmatigen volksinvloed, die, krachtens de zedelijken band tusschen kiezers en gekozenen, door de respectieve Wetgevingen naar eisch van onze historie, op het staatsgezag wordt uitgeoefend.
- " IX. Zij wil dat de autonomie van de verschillende districten voor zoover deze niet strijdt met de eischen der staats-eenheid en de rechten van de enkele personen niet onbeschermd laat, worde geeerbiedigd, of waar zij verkort is, door decentralisatie worde hersteld.
- " X. Om de Grondbezitters het hun toekomst recht te verzekeren als de meest belanghebbenden en grootste belastingschuldigen, om [vreemde] fortuinzoekers uit het regeringskasteel te weren, en om de zedeloze onkooperij van het belangeloos gepeupel te voorkomen, eischt zij hervorming van het bestaande kiesstelsel [en in de eerste plaats verhooging van kiesrecht in de Kaapkolonie].
- " [XI. Zij wil dat de staat (voor zoover ontstentenis van veerkracht bij de burgerij hiertoe niet noodzaakt) het beginsel late varen, alsof de overheid geroepen zou zijn om van hantwege onderwijs te doen geven; voorkome dat de overheidscholen, voor zoover noodig, tot propaganda van godsdienstige of tegen de godsdienst gekeerde begrippen misbruikt worden; en alzoo ook in zake onderwijs aan alle burgers, onverschillig welke hun godsdienstige of paedagogiese zienswijze zij, gelijke rechten gunnen].
- " XII (XI). Van den Souverein wil zij, dat door eene onafhankelijke rechtspraak, die onder ieders bereik valle en in verband sta met het zedelijke rechtsbesef der natie, volgens wetten die op de eeuwige rechtsbeginselen rusten, ten 1ste beslissing uitga voor alle geschillen van partijen, zoowel van burgerrechtelijken als van administratieven aard; ten 2de vonnis kome tegen een iederlijk, die zich vergrijpt aan de gemeene orde van de dingen; en ten 3de voltrekking van straf aan den gevonniste volge, niet slechts om de maatschappij te beschermen of den overtreder te beteren,

maar allereerst tot herstel van de geschonden gerechtigheid. Desnoods door de doodstraf, waartoe het recht in beginsel aan de overheid toekomt.

- "XXXI. (XII). Op de overheid, zoo oordeelt zij, rust de plicht om te waken voor de publieke eerbaarheid [op den weg en in publieke plaatsen; de gelegenheid tot het gebruik van sterken drank te beperken; den uitstal te verbieden van onzedelijke boek-, plaat- of prent-werken; verleiding van minderjarigen tot onzedelijke daden strafbaar te stellen en met de hoererij op generlei wijze, noch preventief, noch beschermend, en derhalve anders dan werend, in aanraking te treden], onder dien verstande echter dat ze zich bij elken maatregel, die uit deze verplichting voortvloeit, stiptelijk verre houde van wat tot het terrein des huiselijken levens behoort.
- "XIV (XIII). In het belang der openbare gezondheid acht zij, dat de overheid te waken heeft tegen vervalsching van levensmiddelen; tegen verontreiniging van de publieke weg en tegen vergifting van den dampkring of het water; zorg heeft te dragen voor zindelijkheid in haar eigen huishouding; en een eerbare begrafnis der lijken; en voorts bij het zich vertonen van besmettelijke ziekten (behoudens de vrije beschikking van een iegelijk over zijn eigen lichaam en zijn eigen konscientie) al zulke maatregelen heeft te nemen, als strekken kunnen en onmisbaar zijn om te voorkomen, dat iemand onwillens of onwetens, met de smetshof dezer ziekten in eene voor hem gevaarlijke aanraking zou treden.
- "XV (XIV). Zij wenscht dat bij het financieel beheer van den staat de verhouding tusschen overheid en burgers [niet die van verdrag, maar] een zedelijk organische zij, en dat het evenwicht tusschen ontvangsten en uitgaven geregeld worde niet door drukkende vermeerdering van de lasten der natie noch door bezuiniging op het noodige, maar door beperking van staatsbemoeding; en dat voorts ons belastingstelsel hervormd worde in dien zin dat de ontwikkeling van het volksleven minder schade lijde, de hooge opbrengst der middelen niet eenige maatstaf, de druk minder ongelijkmatig zij; en [de kosten van inning afnemen] de kosten van inning zoo laag mogelijk zij.
- "XVI (XV). Kracht tot handhaving onzer nationale zelfstandigheid zoekt zij in de erkenning, handhaving en beoefening onzer landstaal; in het onderwijzen onzer verachterde boeren bevolking; in de bevordering van kennis onzer historie; in de opkweeking van vrijheidszin en patriotisme bij onze bevolking, vooral bij de jeugd; en voorts in eene doeltreffende Burgerwet, die in de burgerij de eigenlijke strijdkracht des lands erkent en ontwikkelt.
- "XVII (XVI). Zij erkent de noodzakelijkheid om ook door middel van onze wetgeving, beter dan thans, er toe mede te werken, dat de verhouding tusschen heeren en dienstdoden zooveel doenlijk beantwoorde aan de eischen van Gods Woord en een gezonde Staatshuishoudkunde.
- "XVIII (XVII). Uitgaande van de overtuiging dat de verwickelingen in onze Inboorlinge kwestien grootendeels haar ontstaan verschuldigd zijn aan eene onbetamelijke inmenging der Britsche Rijksregeering, en dat de eenige Inboorlingspolitiek die ooit beantwoorden zal geregeld zal moeten worden door plaatselijke regeeringen in Zuid Afrika, in onderlinge overeenstemming, en onder leiding van [staatkundige] ervaren staatslieden,

eischt zij eene zelf-standige en onderling overeenstemmende Inboorlingspolitiek, gegrond op recht en gerechtigheid, en daartoe rekening houdende met de van God gestelde en in de maatschappij erkende rangen en standen.

"XIX (XVIII). Zij verklaart, dat het de staat niet toekomt, zich met de inwendige aangelegenheden van de kerkgenootschappen in te laten.

"XX (XIX). Dat zij, om deze beginselen ingang te doen vinden als zelfstandige partij optreedt; zich bij geen andere partij laat indeelen; en slechts dan samenwerking met andere partijen aanvaardt, indien die door een vooraf wel omschreven program met ongekreukt behoud van hare beginselen, kan worden verkregen. Reden waarom zij gemeenlijk met een eigen candidatuur aan de staatkundige verkiezingen deelneemt, en als zoodanig optreedt in de wetgeving door hare vertegenwoordigers."

## II. THE PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES ADOPTED BY THE MIDDELBURG CONGRESS OF THE AFRIKANER BOND, MARCH 1889.

The text of this document first appeared in the Rapport der Commissie over het 'Program van Beginselen', and was reprinted unaltered in the various editions of the Bond's Officieële Stukken.

### "Program van Beginselen van de Afrikaander Nationale Partij.

- "1. De Afrikaander Nationale Partij erkent de leiding der Voorzienigheid, ook in de loggevallen van landen en volkeren.
- "2. Zij bedoelt, onder de leiding der Voorzienigheid:- de vorming eener zuivere Nationaliteit, en de voorbereiding van ons volk voor het vestigen van "een Vereenigd Zuid Afrika".
- "3. Daartoe, meent zij, behoort
  - (a) Verkregen te worden een hechte AANEENSLUITING van de differente Europeesche Nationaliteiten in Zuid Afrika, en
  - (b) Zuid Afrika's ZELFSTANDIGHEID te worden bevorderd.
- "4. Zij meent, dat de AANEENSLUITING, bedoeld onder Artikel 3(a), behoort te rusten op een helder en duidelijk besef van malkanders gezamenlijk belang en staatkunde, landbouw, veeteelt, handel en nijverheid, en op de erkenning van ieders bijzondere rechten, betreffende godsdienst, onderwijs en taal, zoodat alle nationale ruijver tusschen de differente bestanddeelen van ons volk worde weggeruimd en plaats make voor een onmiskenbaar ZUID AFRIKAANSCH nationaliteitsgevoel.
- "5. Ter bevordering van de onder Artikel 3(b) bedoelde ZELFSTANDIGHEID verwacht zij:-
  - (a) Dat het gevoel van nationaal zelfrespect en van vaderlandsliefde jegens Zuid Afrika, vooral op de school, in het huisgezin en door de drukpers zal worden ontwikkeld en gevoed;
  - (b) Dat een kiesstelsel zal worden toegepast, dat niet slechts de rechten van het getal, maar ook die van het eigendom en van de verstandsontwikkeling erkent en dat omkooperij en dwang bij de stembus zoo veel mogelijk weert;

- (c) Dat onze landbouw, veeteelt, handel en nijverheid op elke geoorloofde wijze worden gesteund, zooals o.a. door middel van een doeltreffende wet op meesters en dienstboden en ook van een omzichtig en oordeelkundig toegepast stelsel van protectie;
- (d) Dat de Zuid Afrikaansche Koloniën en Staten hare naturellen-quaesties zelve, hetzij ieder afzonderlijk of in overleg met elkander, zullen regelen, daartoe de strijdkrachten des lands door middel van doeltreffende burgerwetten ontwikkelende; en
- (e) Dat inmenging van buiten met de huishoudelijke aangelegenheden van Zuid Afrika zal worden geweerd.

"6. Terwijl zij de in Zuid Afrika bestaande Regeeringen erkent en zich voorneemt hare verplichtingen tegenover dezelve trouw na te komen, meent zij, dat daarentegen op die Regeeringen de verplichting rust, om de belangen van Zuid Afrika te bevorderen in den geest der voorgaande artikelen, en om, terwijl zij aan den eenen kant waken tegen onnoodige of lichtvaardige inlatingen met de huiselijke en private zaken van den burger, tegen alle rechtstreeksche bemoeiing met de geestelijke ontwikkeling der natie en tegen wetsbepalingen die den vrijen invloed van het Evangelie op ons Volksleven zouden kunnen belemmeren, zich aan den anderen kant te kwijten van alle positieve plichten eener goede Regeering, waaronder moeten worden gerekend:-

- (a) Rekening te houden bij hare verrichtingen in het algemeen met het Christelijk karakter des volks;
- (b) Handhaving van vrijheid van godsdienst voor een ieder, zoolang zulks de publieke orde en eerbaarheid niet benadeelt;
- (c) Erkenning van en gevolggeving aan de godsdienstige, maatschappelijke en lichamelijke behoefte des volks aan den bestaanden wekelijkschen rustdag;
- (d) Toepassing van een gelijkdrukkend en oordeelkundig belastingstelsel;
- (e) Het in beoefening brengen van een onpartijdige en zoo onkostbaar en doeltreffend mogelijke rechtsbedeeling; en
- (f) Het waken voor de publieke eerbaarheid en tegen het vervalschen van levensmiddelen en het verontreinigen van grond, water of lucht, zoowel als tegen de verspreiding van besmettelijke ziekten.

"7. Om deze beginselen ingang te doen vinden, treedt zij op als zelfstandige partij en aanvaardt zij slechts dan samenwerking met andere partijen, indien die met ongekrenkt behoud van hare beginselen kan worden verkregen."

## APPENDIX H.

AFRIKANER BOND  
CONGRESSES, BRANCHES AND MEMBERSHIP, AND OFFICE-BEARERS.

## I. List of Congresses of the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape Colony, with branch and membership figures as provided in the Congress Notulen.

<u>Serial Number of Congress</u>	<u>Where held</u>	<u>Opening date.</u>	<u>Total District Besturen</u>	<u>Total Membership.</u>
1.	Richmond	22 May 1883	24	?
2.	Graaff-Reinet	12 Mar. 1884	27	?
3.	Beaufort West	23 Mar. 1885	27	?
4.	Grahamstown	22 Mar. 1886	28	?
5.	Uitenhage	28 Mar. 1887	27	2002
6.	Paarl	21 May 1888	31	2980
7.	Middelburg	4 Mar. 1889	33	3923
8.	Somerset East	12 Mar. 1890	44	4428
9.	Kimberley	25 Mar. 1891	51	5610
10.	Stellenbosch	20 Apr. 1892	59	7727
11.	Queenstown	2 Mar. 1893	65	9237
12.	Cape Town	1 Mar. 1894	73	9748
13.	Port Elizabeth	14 Mar. 1895	73	8733
14.	Burghersdorp	12 Mar. 1896	76	8511
15.	Malmesbury	11 Mar. 1897	65	8355
16.	Worcester	16 Feb. 1898	68	10675
17.	Victoria West	9 Mar. 1899	70	11487

The figures given in the last two columns were accepted by the Bond Congresses as correct. They should be treated with caution, however, owing to the fallibility of branch secretaries on whose returns they were based, and to different methods of computation from year to year with regard to branches from which no returns had been received. The apparent decrease in the number of District Besturen in 1897 does not accord with the facts, for the figures given for 1894-6 are certainly too high. There may, on the other hand, have been a fall-off in membership. The figures for 1894 and 1897 tally approximately with the sum of individual branch returns. It seems likely that this decrease in membership was due mainly to indifference or secretarial inefficiency throughout the South-Western electoral Province, for which there is no obvious explanation (see Appendix J, Table I, col. 5).

## II. Office-Bearers of the Provincial Bestuur of the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape Colony.

Chairman: 1883-6, J.J. Janse van Rensburg (Cradock); 1886-92, R.P. Botha (Graaff-Reinet); 1892-8, P.J. du Toit (Richmond); 1898-, T.P. Theron (Richmond).

Vice-Chairman: 1883-4, D.F. du Toit (Paarl); 1884-6, G.F. Joubert (Graaff-Reinet); 1886-92, P.J. du Toit; 1892-8, J.P. du Plessis (Cradock); 1898-, D.J.A. van Zyl (Clanwilliam).

Secretary: 1883-8, T.P. Theron.

Treasurer: 1883-8, J.H. Hofmeyr (Cape Town).

Secretary-Treasurer: 1888-98, T.P. Theron; 1898-, N.F. de Waal.

Assistant Secretary: 1890-8, N.F. de Waal; 1898-, J.J. Michau (Kimberley).

Members of the Commissie van Toezicht: 1889-92, J.H. Hofmeyr (chairman), R.P. Botha and N.F. de Waal. 1892-8, J.H. Hofmeyr (chairman), N.F. de Waal and S.J. du Toit. 1898-, J.H. Hofmeyr (chairman), J.M. Hoffman (Paarl) and T.P. Theron.

## APPENDIX J.

## THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE AFRIKANER BOND.

I. Table showing Bond Membership in relation to Population and Parliamentary Representation.

Constituency	1 Population		2 Total Voters,		3 No. of M.P.'s 1897	4 % Ratio Voters to M.P.'s	5 Bond Members 1897
	1891 White	Census Other	1891	1897			
<u>Western Province</u>							
Cape Town	25393	25858	5485	7798	4	140	} 53
Cape Division	23151	22881	3861	8122	2	191	
Stellenbosch	4420	8360	1442	1632	2	59	?
Paarl	8226	13137	1978	2619	2	94	159
<u>N.W. Province</u>							
Worcester	11387	16422	2806	3752	2	134	514
Malmesbury	10120	13208	2125	2508	2	90	147
Piquetberg	6515	5072	942	1481	2	53	71
Namaqualand	3718	13227	1193	1479	2	53	38
Clanwilliam	9554	14341	1496	2209	2	79	438
<u>S.W. Province</u>							
Swellendam	10723	10238	2009	2372	2	85	?
Caledon	9092	9707	1719	2074	2	75	?
Riversdale	9855	8215	1228	2047	2	74	?
Oudtshoorn	12348	12895	2068	2855	2	103	?
George	15314	16125	2850	3519	2	127	?
<u>Midland Province</u>							
Graaff-Reinet	11262	16734	1893	2283	2	82	454
Richmond	7701	12006	1462	2360	2	85	664
Beaufort West	9345	10676	1672	2727	2	98	607
Victoria West	14092	15838	2133	3013	2	108	728
<u>S.E. Province</u>							
Port Elizabeth	13939	11469	3662	6560	2	236	0
Uitenhage	19560	36840	3541	5337	2	192	311
Grahamstown	6297	4201	1292	1695	2	61	0
Albany	4927	17149	1215	1441	2	52	72
Victoria East	2559	22429	658	782	2	28	0
<u>N.E. Province</u>							
Somerset East	9041	21648	1645	2646	2	95	367
Fort Beaufort	4795	17656	1322	1416	2	51	163
Craddock	9874	16990	1712	2384	2	86	431
Albert	9228	10343	1089	2028	2	73	618
Colesberg	8462	10856	1532	2075	2	75	435
<u>Eastern Province</u>							
Kingwilliamstown	11883	87773	2875	2999	2	108	75
East London	7994	18451	1213	3081	2	111	0
Queenstown	9792	43002	2597	3100	2	112	316
Aliwal North	5230	30920	1167	1759	2	63	187
Wodehouse	9115	26906	1755	2592	2	93	507
Tembuland	6095	327675	1429	2110	1	152	55
Griqualand East	4253	148573	1080	1333	1	96	?
<u>Griqualand West</u>							
Kimberley	20306	28000	4453	5674	4	102	129
Barkly West	9364	25705	1217	2865	2	102	327
<u>British Bechuanaland</u>							
Vryburg	4393	} 67472	-	2554	2	92	364
Mafeking	861		-	605	1	44	?

Notes. Figures in Col. 1 are derived from G.8 of 1898, Appendix A, and in Col. 2 from *ibid.*, Appendix D. In Col. 4, figures give the discrepancy from the norm, where 100 represents the Colonial average of 1390 voters per member. Figures in Col. 5 are taken from the Notulen, 1897 Congress, pp. 28ff (they add up to 125 less than the official figure given for total Bond membership in that year, which was 8355).

II. Table to illustrate Bond Membership and Voting Strength in districts where its influence was greatest.

<u>Constituency</u>	<u>1.</u>	<u>2.</u>	<u>3.</u>	<u>4.</u>	
	<u>Total Voters 1897</u>	<u>Total Rural Voters 1897</u>	<u>Total Bond Members 1897</u>	<u>Votes cast for Bond Candidates in 1898 Assembly Elections</u>	
				(1)	(2)
<u>N.W. Province</u>					
Worcester	3752	2564	514	1872	1865
Malmesbury	2508	2004	147	1449	1349
Piquetberg	1481	1322	71	778	646
Namaqualand	1479	1059	38	346	320
Clanwilliam	2209	2039	438	1134	1030
<u>Midlands</u>					
Graaff-Reinet	2283	1287	454	1289	1250
Richmond	2360	1342	664	1067	1046
Beaufort West	2727	1693	607	1198	1094
Victoria West	3013	2251	728	1566	1424
<u>N.E. Province</u>					
Somerset East	2646	1965	367	1110	1076
Fort Beaufort	1416	393	163	No candidates	
Cradock	2384	1636	431	Returned unopposed	
Albert	2028	1559	618	Returned unopposed	
Colesberg	2075	1402	435	1055	958

Notes. Figures in Col. 1 are derived from G.8 of 1898, Appendix D; in Col. 2, from *ibid.*, Appendix C; in Col. 3, from the Notulen, 1897 Congress, pp. 28ff; and in Col. 4 from contemporary press reports.

## APPENDIX K.

## THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COLONIAL UNION (KOLONIALE UNIE).

## " I. BEGINSSELEN.

De uitgesprokene beginselen dezer Unie zijn:

1. Erkenning en handhaving, onder de leiding der Voorzienigheid, van England's oppergezag in Zuid Afrika, alsmede van de bestaande verbintenissen met naburige Staten en Kolonien.
2. Erkenning van de verschillende hier gevestigde Europeesche nationaliteiten, vooral de Hollandsche en Engelsche, en bevordering van eene goede verstandhouding en samenwerking tusschen deze rassen met weering van alles dat rassenhaat of verwijdering kan werken.
3. Samenwerking met de naburige Staten langs constitutioneelen weg en bevordering van inwendige harmonie, ter voorbereiding van een inwendig Vereenigd Zuid Afrika.
4. Ontwikkeling eener gezonde en progressieve Koloniale politiek.
5. Samenwerking in de uitbreiding van handel en beschaving naar het Noorden.
6. Erkenning van beide talen, Hollandsch en Engelsch, zoowel binnen deze Unie als op maatschappelijk en staatkundig gebied.
7. De vorming eener gematigde progressieve partij in de wetgeving.

## " II. ORGANISATIE.

- 1(a) Wijkbesturen ...
- (b) Distriktsbesturen ...
- (c) Een Centraal Bestuur, bestaande uit een vertegenwoordiger uit elk Distriktsbestuur ...
- (d) Een Uitvoerend Comité, bestaande uit den Voorzitter en Secretaris van het Centraal Bestuur en 3 leden door dat Bestuur gekozen bij het jaarlijksch Congres.
2. Elk bestuur heeft het recht zijne eigene huishoudelijke bepalingen te maken, mits niet in strijd met de verklaarde beginselen der Unie als neergelegd in deze Constitutie.

## " III. PLICHTEN EN WERKZAAMHEDEN.

1. Elk lid dezer Unie zal gehouden zijn
  - (a) de belangen der Unie te bevorderen naar vermogen; en
  - (b) een werkend aandeel te nemen in belang van onderwijs, landbouw, veeteelt, handel, en alle maatschappelijke en staatkundige aangelegenheden en verder in alles wat in betrekking staat tot eene algemeene welvaart des lands en der bevolking.
2. [Obligations of Wijkbesturen: membership; subscriptions - 1s. per annum, and 5s. in the year before a general election, of which two-thirds to be passed on to District Besturen; nomination of candidates for Field Cornetcies, Municipal Boards, Divisional Councils and Parliament].
3. [Obligations of Distriktsbesturen: to send at least two-thirds of their subscription income to the Central Bestuur, report annually, and supervise nomination of candidates in the Wards].
4. [Obligations of the Centraal Bestuur: financial and administrative supervision; organization of an annual Congress in March, at which the Executive Committee is to be elected].
5. [Obligations of the Uitvoerend Comité) to act on behalf of the Central Bestuur whenever it is not in session].
6. Minstens een maand vóór de inzending van requisities door kandidaten voor het Hoogerhuis en de nominatie van kandidaten voor het Lagerhuis in de kantoren der Civiele

Commissarissen, roept het bestuur van elken tak zijne leden op om bij meerderheid van stemmen kandidaten te benoemen. Alle takken zenden onverwijld den uitslag dezer benoemingen naar den Algemeen Secretaris en de kandidaten die de meeste stemmen hebben worden door het Uitvoerend Comité geproclameerd als de kandidaten der Unie, voor wie elk lid gehouden is te stemmen en te werken, of zich van alle deelname aan de electie te onthouden.

7. Het Uitvoerend Comité zal de macht hebben in electiezaken in samenwerking te treden met andere geestverwante vereenigingen waar zulks kan strekken tot bevordering van de uitgesproken beginselen dezer Unie.
8. [Annual Congress may amend these rules, provided two-thirds of the delegates accept the change, which has to be published in advance on the agenda].

(From Het Dagblad, 26 Apr. 1898).

University of Cape Town

## APPENDIX L.

## NOTES ON

THE BOND AND THE TRANSVAAL SECRET SERVICE FUND  
DURING THE 1898 GENERAL ELECTION.

(See text, p. 386).

The earliest reference to the use of secret funds and special agents in the Cape Colony by the Government of the South African Republic which has come to the notice of the present writer occurs in an extract from the Transvaal Critic, quoted by J.C. Smuts in a letter to Hofmeyr dated 31 Jan. 1897. The extract referred to

"gross tactical errors (on the part of "a certain section" in Pretoria) as that of openly sending emissaries to the Paarl and elsewhere for the purpose of stirring up the Dutch people in those districts ... The result of the foolish move is that the whole colony is ringing with indignation because of those emissaries being sent to spread a republican propaganda. Surely with the unlimited Secret Service money at command better methods might have been employed to attain the ends those who control the funds have in view. Even in the choice of men no circumspection whatever was shown. One of the envoys, for instance, Mr. Advocate Smuts, enjoys anything but an 'envoy-able' reputation in the Colony, for it is notorious that he was on Mr. Rhodes's 'bounty' list a short while ago, and the inevitable conclusion is drawn, that his previous attacks on that gentleman are due, as much to a cessation of 'supplies' as to the Jameson Raid ..."

Smuts underlined the offending passages, and was very indignant about the charge of personal corruption, but gave no information about agents or the fund, save to mention incidentally that the latter was controlled by Dr. Leyds.

Michell states (Life of C.J. Rhodes, vol. II, pp. 217-8) that at the end of ~~July~~ 1897 Rhodes was informed by "an influential group of friends and political supporters ... that Transvaal secret service money was being disbursed with a lavish hand" - a rumour which also found its way into the columns of Het Dagblad. There followed a spate of denials - by Kruger and Leyds that the reports were true (followed by an admission in Het Dagblad of 12 Jan. 1898 that nothing had come into the Bond treasury from the Transvaal so far), and by Jan Hofmeyr of further rumours, made in the course of a speech at Paarl reported in Ons Land on 15 Feb. 1898: these concerned the allegation that Leyds had transferred £25,000 to the Afrikaner Bond in the Colony through Carl Borckenhagen, and a visit to the Ons Land office of a certain Mr. Botha.

So far from dying, however, the rumours grew. Professor Marais (The Fall of Kruger's Republic, c. VIII), quotes the following from Fraser, the acting British Agent in Pretoria, to Milner, dated 24 June 1898:

"I am informed that the Transvaal Government have received advice from Cape Colony that more funds are urgently required to assist Mr. Hofmeyr's party. The Executive Council consider that in spite of the sums already sent ... they must needs comply" (though the President would have to be consulted first).

This report, on which Headlam built a great deal (see Milner Papers, vol. I, p. 264 note 3), received some support from a British intelligence report to the Colonial Office to the

effect that J.W. Sauer was the distributing agent of Transvaal funds, "and not J.H. Hofmeyr ... as was supposed" (Marais, loc. cit., quoting Major H.J. du Cane to E.A. Altham, Director of Military Intelligence, 30 Aug. 1898). At about the time du Cane was writing this letter, Sauer was openly distributing material largesse to his African supporters in Aliwal North, which "cost him dear in cash" and nearly led to the loss of his seat on petition after the election (see E.A. Walker, Lord de Villiers and his Times, p. 326). It is possible that du Cane's intelligence was based on reports of Sauer's electioneering activities, and this, if true, would tend to diminish its reliability. Further allegations of a more general kind relating to the spending of money by the Bond during the elections were made in Het Dagblad, 26 July 1898, and in J. Scoble and H.R. Abercrombie, The Rise and Fall of Krugerism, pp. 236-40.

The charges were, of course, vigorously denied by the leaders of the Bond (see Hofmeyr to the Editor, Ons Land, 23 July 1898; J.H. Hofmeyr, Life of J.H. Hofmeyr, p. 527; Sir J.T. Molteno, The Dominion of Afrikanderdom, pp. 142-3). When Rhodes accused his Bond opponent in the Barkly West election of fighting with Transvaal funds, Stiglingh took him to court and won his case. The Commissie van Toezicht, in its report to the Victoria West Congress (Notulen, p. 20), declared that

"Aan haren kant had uwe commissie haast geen geldmiddelen, of schaarsch genoeg om de noodige drukkosten te dekken, en een toelage van zegge £25 te veroorlooven aan enkele kandidaten ten wier behoefte hulp werd gevraagd. 'De Transvaalsche fondsen' die uwe commissie zou hebben ontvangen bestaan natuurlijk slechts in de rijke verbeelding van sommigen onzer tegenstanders."

The records of the Commissie van Toezicht do not contain consolidated election accounts giving details of income and expenditure for either the Council or the Assembly elections of 1898. Contrary to normal practice, the financial statement at the 1898 Congress was tabled but not minuted. The next year the Treasurer's report to Congress showed a payment to the Commissie van Toezicht of just over £300, which can only have been drawn for electoral purposes, while the Bond's main capital asset, a fixed deposit in the Standard Bank which stood at £450 in 1897, had now fallen to £300. These figures show that the election outlay from central funds was on a small scale. The disbursement of election grants to particular candidates was controlled by the Commissie van Toezicht, and its handling of petitions for financial aid conforms to the same scale, though the absence of systematic records must make even this generalization tentative. An undated balance sheet in the Hofmeyr Papers (vol. 3, general folder) indicates that the Commissie had only spent £113.16.6 on the Council elections, of which they had been able to recoup £56.12.0 from branch and private contributions. Grants made to candidates for Assembly seats out of Provincial Bestuur funds by the Commissie were usually for amounts of £25 and £50, and it is impossible from the Commissie's records to account for more than about £250 distributed from this source. Hofmeyr also made over other sums of money from a fund which was contributed by "Cape Town friends", amounting to between £400 and £500. If payments of £25 were also made to candidates in constituencies for which there is no record of any financial grant, but which were at the same time contested, the sums paid out would have corresponded, approximately, with the amount of money which the Commissie had available.

It is therefore quite certain that if the Bond received outside financial help, this did not pass through the official channels. It also emerges fairly clearly that the Bond was

forced to fight the 1898 elections on a shoestring, a fact which should be compared with the large disbursements made by Rhodes to the Progressives (e.g. of £11,000 in January 1897 for registration purposes, as indicated in Michell, vol. II, pp. 198, 222). On the other hand, the possibility of money having been paid over unofficially to individuals, emanating from Transvaal fund has been neither proved nor disproved. It seems therefore that for the present the Bond should be given the benefit of the doubt.

With regard to the employment by the Transvaal of agents in the Cape Colony, it is equally difficult to be sure how far the stories have a sound basis in fact. Het Dagblad, 3 Dec. 1897, picked up a remark made by Kruger in a speech at Standerton, in which he had affirmed that he had his "secret agents all over the Cape, Rhodesia, Natal, Portuguese territory and abroad". The paper added that "everyone who was not deliberately blind saw that certain persons from Transvaal paid visits to Cape Town, Stellenbosch, the Paarl, and other places, persons who, we surmise, did not come to see us for the benefit of their health or for the sake of pleasure". Scoble and Abercrombie went further: they referred to

"ample evidence that for many years past Transvaal agents have been at work among the farmers inhabiting the north-western districts. Some of these agents have held high positions in Pretoria officialdom, such as the late Henning Pretorius and General Smit. Quite shortly anterior to the war large numbers of persons were sent into the Colony and Natal to feel the pulse of the Dutch farming population there. No fewer than thirty young men from the public offices who were known to be good cyclists, and could speak Dutch and English equally well, were sent from Pretoria to gather statistics and report" (The Rise and Fall of Krugerism, pp. 236-7).

To some extent, these are the outpourings of contemporary hysteriography. It is in any case necessary to distinguish between agents sent to the Cape to sound Colonial Afrikaner opinion in relation to the crisis between the South African Republic and the Imperial Government (a common sense precaution which the Republican Government was surely bound to take), and agents sent with the express object of helping the Bond to win the elections. The same distinction must also be made with respect to the use made of the Secret Service Fund.

## B I B L I O G R A P H Y

In the following arrangement of sources consulted, the primary material has been classified in a manner designed to give prominence to documents relating directly to the Afrikaner Bond and kindred organizations. The only sub-division made in the secondary material is that between published and unpublished sources. It is felt that a simple alphabetical classification by authors' names makes for easy reference.

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## BIBLIOGRAPHY.

## A. PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL.

## I. MANUSCRIPT.

1. The Hofmeyr Papers, in the South African Public Library, Cape Town. The largest manuscript collection relating to the Afrikaner Bond. Vols. 1 to 9, as catalogued by J.M. du Bois and J.H. Davies in 1942, contain the records of the Commissie van Toezicht, covering the years from its foundation in 1889 to 1908. Most of the other volumes in the Hofmeyr Papers contain material which has been drawn on in the present study.
2. A bound volume of Afrikaner Bond Manuscripts in the Library of Parliament, Cape Town, contains a small collection of documents relating to the Afrikaner Bond in the Transvaal between 1881 and 1886. These are the records kept by Ds. S.J. du Toit as secretary of the Transvaal Provincial Bestuur, and contain the Notulen for the Congresses of May 1882, January 1884 and February 1885.
3. The Te Water Papers in the Cape Archives, folios 56-60, contain the political correspondence of Dr. T.N.G. te Water, one of the few Bondsmen to hold cabinet rank in the period before the South African War. These papers throw much light on the inner history of the Bond, especially in the Cape Midlands, and are particularly valuable for the general election of 1888, an event not covered in the archives of the Commissie van Toezicht.
4. The collection of Rhodes Papers in the library of Rhodes House, Oxford, has also proved useful. Much of the correspondence between Rhodes and members of the Bond has not been directly utilized by Rhodes's biographers.  
Photostat and typed copies of other Rhodes Documents, in the Cape Archives, are of less value.
5. The Sprigg Papers, consulted by courtesy of Mr. J.G. Sprigg of Fairwood, Grahamstown, contain relatively little material relating directly to the Bond.
6. The Merriman Papers, in the South African Public Library, Cape Town, have also been consulted.
7. A few minute books of the Afrikaner Bond branches have survived in public collections. Three such survivals have been consulted in connection with the present work:
  - (a) Notulen Boek van de Afrikaner (-ander, -aander) Bond, Kaapstad, 3 vols., 26 Apr. 1883 to 18 Jan. 1912 (in the S.A. Public Library);
  - (b) Notulen, Tak No. 3, Hope Town, 8 Feb. 1888 to 26 Jan. 1912 (in the Cape Archives);
  - (c) Notulen, Oost Uitvlugt Tak van de Afrikaner Bond, Richmond district, 25 Apr. 1882 to 11 Feb. 1914 (in the Cape Archives).

II. PRINTED RECORDS OF THE BOEREN VEREENIGINGEN AND THE AFRIKANER BOND.

1. The Z.A. Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging.

A bound booklet in Volume 2 of the Hofmeyr Papers contains the Notulen of the annual meetings of 1879, 1881 and 1882, as well as of the special meeting of March 1882. For the annual meetings of 1880 and 1883 it has been necessary to rely on press reports.

2. Other Boeren Vereenigingen.

None, apart from those quoted in the press.

3. The Afrikaner Bond.

(a) Congress Notulen.

Official Notulen of all Congresses save those of 1884 and 1885 are bound in three volumes in the Hofmeyr Collection in the S.A. Public Library. These also include the Notulen van het Afrikaansch Nationaal Congres gehouden te Cradock op Dingsdag 12 September 1882 (D.F. du Toit & Co., Paarl), which did not rank officially as a Bond Congress. The Notulen of the 1885 Congress may be consulted in the Library of Parliament, whose holdings are otherwise less complete.

The publishers of these Notulen, which should be distinguished from the various bound newspaper reports of Congress debates, were as follows: for the Congresses of 1883, 1888-91, 1894 and 1895 - D.F. du Toit & Co., Paarl; for the Congresses of 1885 and 1887 - Hofmeyr & Regter, Cape Town; for the Congress of 1886 - Saul Solomon & Co., Cape Town; for the Congresses of 1892-3 - Ons Land, Cape Town; for the Congresses of 1896-9 - Van de Sandt de Villiers & Co., Cape Town.

Minutes of the 1884 Congress, reprinted from the Zuid Afrikaan, and of the 1896 Congress, reprinted from De Paarl, have also been used, the former being available in the Hofmeyr Collection and the Library of Parliament. In general, the newspaper reports are an indispensable adjunct to the official Notulen, which do not record the debates.

(b) Other Documents.

The following are available in the Hofmeyr Collection, unless otherwise stated:

Rapport van den Commissie over de Ineensmelting van den Afrikaander Bond en Boeren Beschermings Vereenigingen (1883).

Het Program van Beginselen van de Nationale Partij, opgesteld, verklaard en toegelicht door Ds. S.J. du Toit (Paarl, no date - 1884?)

Rapport der Commissie over het Program van Beginselen (Cape Town, no date).

Verslag van de Eerste Zitting van het Centraal Bestuur te Bloemfontein, op 17 en 18 Februari 1886. Also printed as Bylage C in the Notulen of the 1886 Cape Congress.

Een Kort Overzicht van de Geschiedenis van den Afrikaander Bond, zijn Ontstaan, Voortgang en Doel (Paarl, 1890). An address given by T.P. Theron at the 1887 Congress. Dutch and English versions available in the S.A. Public Library bound pamphlet collection. See also, Afrikaner Bond Officieële Stukken (various editions).

Officieële Stukken van den Afrikaander Bond en Boerenvereniging (editions of 1890, 1892, 1895, 1896 and 1898).

Afrikaander Bond en Boeren Vereeniging. Naamlijst van Leden (Cape Town, 1893). Also in the Library of Parliament.

De Afrikaander Bond en het Dreigende Botsing in het Noorden (Cape Town, 1891). (On the Adendorff Trek). In the S.A. Public Library.

De Afrikaander Partij en de Oorlog (Cape Town, 1900). (Documents printed by order of the congress at Paarl, June 1900). In private possession.

### III. PRINTED OFFICIAL RECORDS.

#### 1. Great Britain.

The following Parliamentary Papers are referred to in the text:

- C. 2964 - Correspondence respecting the affairs of Basutoland, 1881.
- C. 3112 - Correspondence respecting Basutoland, Pondoland and the Transkei, 1882.
- C. 3493 - Correspondence ... respecting Basutoland and other native territories, 1883.
- C. 3708 - Correspondence respecting the affairs of Basutoland, 1883.
- C. 3717 - Correspondence respecting the Cape Colony and adjacent territory, 1883.
- C. 3855 - Correspondence respecting the Cape Colony and adjacent territory, 1884.
- C. 9404 - Correspondence relating to the Bloemfontein Conference, 1899.
- C. 9415 - Correspondence relating to proposed political reforms in the South African Republic, 1899.
- C. 9518 - Correspondence relating to proposed political reforms in the South African Republic, 1899.
- C. 9521 - Correspondence relating to political affairs in the South African Republic, 1899.
- C. 9530 - Correspondence relating to political affairs in the South African Republic, 1899.

#### 2. Cape of Good Hope.

In the following list of Parliamentary Papers referred to in the text, the prefix 'C' denotes papers ordered to be printed by the Legislative Council, the prefix 'A' denotes papers ordered to be printed by the House of Assembly, and the prefix 'G' denotes papers ordered to be printed by the Government:

- A.13 of 1880. Report of the Select Committee on District Justice Courts.

- G.75 of 1880. Report of the Commission on the Working of the Education Acts.
- G. 39 of 1882. Report of the Superintendent-General of Education.
- G.66 of 1883. Report of the Tembuland Commission.
- G.42, 42A of 1886. Correspondence relating to Tariffs.
- G.37 of 1887. Report of the Commissioner of Crown Lands on his Mission to the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.
- A.19 of 1888. Report of the Select Committee on Queen's Town Registration.
- A.7 of 1891. Report of the Select Committee on Trade and Business in Griqualand West.
- A.3 of 1892. Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the Tenure of Land &c. in the Glen Grey District.
- C.2, 2A of 1892. Report of the Select Committee on the Labour Question.
- A.10 of 1893. Report of the Select Committee on the Native Location Act.
- G.1 of 1894. Report of the Scab Disease Commission.
- G.8 of 1898. Report of the Redistribution of Seats Commission.

Statistical information is derived, except where otherwise stated, from the Cape of Good Hope Blue Books (to 1885) and Statistical Registers (from 1886).

The Cape Times edition of Debates in the House of Assembly has been used throughout, together with the official Notes and Proceedings.

#### IV. THE NEWSPAPER PRESS.

##### 1. Papers which were, at one time or another, organs of the Afrikaner Bond.

Afrikaanse Patriot, Die. (Paarl, 1876-1904). Original organ of the Genootskap van Regte Afrikaners. Edited by Ds. S.J. du Toit, 1876-82, 1891-1904, and by D.F. du Toit, 1882-91. Usually opposed the Zuid Afrikaan before 1883, but developed a more moderate policy, sometimes antagonistic to the Transvaal Government, in the late 'eighties; supported the Hofmeyr-Rhodes alliance in the early 'nineties, but lost its status as a Bond organ in 1897 on account of its continued support of Rhodes. Afrikaans language.

Albert Gazette verband met de Bondsman, De. (Burghersdorp, 1894-9). Edited by F.S. Collett. Successor to the Burghersdorp Gazette. Dutch and English languages.

Express, De. (Bloemfontein, 1875-99). Edited by C. Borckenhagen, a German immigrant. Became the official organ of the Afrikaner Bond in the Orange Free State. Separate Dutch and English editions.

Graaff-Reinetter, De. (1885-1902). Edited by J.E. McCusker, who resigned from the Afrikaner Bond in 1891. Especially important for the years 1890-1, when the paper opposed the Hofmeyr-Rhodes alliance and supported the Adendorff Trekkers. Dutch language, parallel to the Graaff-Reineter Advertiser.

Middelburg Getuige, De. (1882-5). Began as the Middelburg Gazette, edited by J.N. Heathcote. Taken over for three years in Jan. 1882 and renamed by N.F. de Waal. Superseded by De Nieuwe Middelburger (1885-1902), also edited by N.F. de Waal, who drove the Getuige out of business. Dutch language.

Ons Land. (Cape Town, 1892-1930). At first edited by J.H. Hofmeyr, cousin to Onze Jan, and founded in opposition to the Zuid Afrikaan, in response to a general feeling within the Bond that Dr. van Oordt's editorial policy was not sufficiently accommodating towards the English-speaking section. After two years' rivalry, the Zuid Afrikaan was obliged to amalgamate with it. F.S. Malan became editor, 1895. Dutch language, with some English editorials.

Onze Courant. (Graaff-Reinet, 1892 - ). Edited by C.H.O. Marais, and founded to offset the influence of the Graaff-Reinetter. Correspondence on the origin of this paper, which became the leading Bond organ in the Midlands, survives in the Te Water Papers. A very well produced newspaper. Dutch language, with some English editorials.

Oosten, Het. (Somerset East, 1893 - ). Edited by J.A. Vosloo. The leading Bond organ in the Eastern Province. Dutch language.

Opregte Afrikaner, De. (Bedford, 1882-3). Edited by N.P. van der Meulen, a radical Bondsman. Of special importance for the part it played in hindering fusion between the Bond and the Boeren Vereenigingen. Opposed to the Bedford Advertiser, Guardian and Volksbode until April 1883, when it merged with the last of these under the joint editorship of van der Meulen and H.W. de Beer. Dutch language.

Paarl, De. (1883-98). A Bond organ in the Western Province, edited from the Patriot office.

South African News, The. (Cape Town, 1899 - ). Edited by A. Cartwright, a friend of W.P. Schreiner's, "to put the ministerial policy to English-speaking readers who were beyond the reach of Malan's Ons Land" (E.A. Walker). English language.

Tolk, De. (Paarl, 1882-5). Edited by D.F. du Toit. Organ of the Afrikaner Bond, containing no news other than reports of Bond meetings. A monument of editorial devotion to a cause, throwing much light on branch activities. Dutch and Afrikaans language.

Volksstem, De. (Pretoria, 1873- ). Became, under the editorship of J.F. Celliers, the official organ of the Bond in the Transvaal.

Weekblad voor Philipstown, Het. (1892 - ). Edited by J.E. van Minnen. A Bond organ. Dutch language.

Zuid Afrikaan, De. (Cape Town, 1830-94). Edited by J.H. Hofmeyr (Onze Jan), 1871-83, and then, after a short interval, by Dr. J.W.G. van Oordt. Having itself merged with Hofmeyr's Volksvriend in 1871, it was united with Ons Land in 1894. Until 1892, it supported Hofmeyr's policy. Dutch language only, for the period covered by this work.

2. Other papers which, though not Bond organs, throw light on the history of the Bond.

Burghersdorp Gazette, The. (1860-93). Edited by St. P. O'S. O'Brien, who eventually became a Bondsman. The best, though not a fully adequate, source on the Albert Boeren Vereeniging, to which the editor was initially hostile. English and Dutch news and comment.

Dagblad, Het. (Paarl and Cape Town, 1896-8). Edited by Ds. S.J. du Toit. The key paper for the point of view of Bondsmen who broke away from the Bond majority over the question of what attitude should be adopted towards Rhodes after the Jameson Raid. Organ of the Colonial Union. Refused recognition as a Bond organ at the 1897 Congress. Dutch language, with some English news and editorials from May 1897..

Imvo Zabantsundu, becoming Imvo Neliso Louzi in later years. (Kingwilliamstown, 1884 - ). Edited by Tengo Jabavu. Consistently hostile to the Afrikaner Bond until March 1898, when it began to give Bond parliamentary candidates qualified support. Xosa language, with some English news and editorials.

With this paper should be compared Izwi Labantu, founded by Rhodes in 1898 and edited by A.K. Soga, with the object of counter-acting the pro-Bond influence of Imvo.

Volksblad, Het. (Cape Town, 1849-86). The leading exponent of the liberal Afrikaner point of view in theology and politics, until it lost its reading public to the Zuid Afrikaan, and succumbed.

The following newspapers are also referred to in the text:

Afrikaansche Boerenvriend, De (Colesberg); Beaufort Courier, Beaufortsche Courant (Beaufort West); Cape Argus, Cape Times (Cape Town); Cradock Register, Cradocksche Afrikaner (Cradock); East London Dispatch; Friend (Bloemfontein); Frontier Guardian (Dordrecht); Grahamstown Journal; Northern Post, Der Boeren Bode (Aliwal North); Port Elizabeth Telegraph, Eastern Province Herald (Port Elizabeth); Re-Echo (Humansdorp); South Africa, The Times (London); Uitenhage Times; Victoria West Messenger/Nieuwsbode; Worcester Advertiser; Bedford Enterprise; Colesberg Advertiser.

All the newspapers referred to in the text are in the S.A. Public Library, Cape Town. For information regarding their accessibility elsewhere, see D.H. Varley (ed.), Grey Bibliographies, No. 3. Union List of South African Newspapers.

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- " " " Die Geskiedenis van die Afrikaanse Taalbeweging (Paarl, 1880).
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MAP SHOWING DISTRIBUTION OF  
POLITICAL AND FARMERS'  
ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA  
ON THE EVE OF THE  
RICHMOND CONGRESS, MAY 1883.

- = Z. A. Boeren Beschermings Vereeniging.
- = Independent Boeren Vereenigingen.
- = English-speaking Farmers' Associations.
- = Afrikaner Bond.



# AFRIKANER BOND

DISTRICT BESTUREN, 1898,  
IN RELATION TO ELECTORAL  
DIVISIONS IN THE CAPE COLONY.

Besturen with under 100 members: ● Albany.

Besturen with under 250 members: ■ ABERDEEN.

Besturen with over 250 members: ■ ALBERT.

Constituency Boundaries:  
(before 1898 re-delimitation).

Provincial Boundaries: ~~~~~

## KEY TO CONSTITUENCIES.

### WESTERN PROVINCE.

1. Cape Town
2. Cape Division
3. Stellenbosch.
4. Paarl.

### NORTH WESTERN PROVINCE.

5. Worcester.
6. Malmesbury.
7. Piquetberg.
8. Namaqualand.
9. Clanwilliam.

### SOUTH WESTERN PROVINCE.

10. Swellendam.
11. Caledon.
12. Riversdale.
13. Oudtshoorn.
14. George.

### MIDLAND PROVINCE.

15. Graaff-Reinet.
16. Richmond.
17. Beaufort West
18. Victoria West.

### SOUTH EASTERN PROVINCE.

19. Port Elizabeth.
20. Uitenhage.
21. Grahamstown.
22. Albany.
23. Victoria East.

### NORTH EASTERN PROVINCE.

24. Somerset East.
25. Fort Beaufort.
26. Cradock.
27. Albert.

### EASTERN PROVINCE.

28. Colesberg.
29. Kingwilliamstown.
30. East London.
31. Queenstown.
32. Aliwal North.
33. Wodehouse.
34. Tembuland.
35. Griqualand East.

### GRIQUALAND WEST.

36. Kimberley.
37. Barkly West.

### BRITISH BECHUANALAND

38. Vryburg.
39. Mafeking (off map).

