NEW BRIGHTON, PORT ELIZABETH c. 1903-1953:
A HISTORY OF AN URBAN AFRICAN COMMUNITY

by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the history of New Brighton in the context of Port Elizabeth’s political economy. This port city was essentially an entrepôt until primary industrialisation commenced after the First World War. Jobs in the footwear and motor assembly plants were the preserve of unskilled white (Afrikaans-speaking) workers recently arrived from the city’s hinterland. A relatively stable African population grew in the absence of influx controls, and provided a large pool of unskilled labour. A fairly large Coloured population made it more difficult for Africans to acquire employment and skills. With the spurt in industrial growth from the mid-1940s, Africans were increasingly employed in the manufacturing sector. But the majority of the African workforce still performed unskilled work at or below the minimum wage. Port Elizabeth’s African population was amongst the most fully proletarianised but the poorest in the country.

The changing labour needs of Port Elizabeth’s employers meant that the powerful commercial-cum-industrial lobby sought to influence the City Council to ignore influx control measures introduced in the 1930s. Instead, routine control of New Brighton residents was dependent on a 'location strategy' which included the issue of registration cards as the key to obtaining houses and beer brewing privileges. The Advisory Board provided a channel for patronage dispensed by the Superintendent and a means of co-opting prominent residents and their supporters. The usual litany of social ills such as grinding poverty, overcrowding and breakdown of family structures led to the growth of a subculture of violence amongst some of the youth from the late 1940s. This fed into the simmering discontent caused by the Council’s insistence on rent increases and the heightened political expectations caused by the defiance campaign, which irrupted in the 1952 riots.

Meanwhile, a realignment of political forces in the local state had changed the balance of power in favour of those groups which advocated a tighter rein on labour regulation and the political activities of local Africans. Pressure from this source and the central state in the aftermath of the riots, was more telling than that of the 'liberal' lobby and business interests on the PECC. The combination of state repression and the Council’s hastily introduced curbs on political activities reduced the likelihood of ANC-led resistance to the imposition of passes. In 1953 the Council finally jettisoned its 'liberalism' and introduced influx control measures and labour registration. It applied the full force of the law against New Brighton residents whose reputation for being a law-abiding community had served to vindicate the Council’s 'progressive' policies towards Africans in the first place.
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Peter Mtuze and Luvuyo Wotshela gave of their time in helping me with translation work.

I should like to express my gratitude to the librarians and staff of the following institutions who provided courteous assistance with my research: the Cape Archives Depot, Cape Town; the Central Archives, Pretoria; the South African Police Museum Archives, Pretoria; UNISA's Documentation Centre for African Studies, Pretoria; Cullen Library, University of the Witwatersrand; the Intermediate Archives Depot, Port Elizabeth; Newspaper House, Port Elizabeth; University of Cape Town Libraries; and the South African Library, Cape Town. Special mention needs to be made of Margaret Harradine of the Port Elizabeth Public Library and Sandy Rowoldt and her staff at Cory Library, Rhodes University.

My thanks to the Schauder family for granting me access to the personal papers of Adolf Schauder.

Whilst writing this thesis, I have had to learn a new word processing programme. This has been possible due largely to the unstinting support of the Departmental Secretary, Cherry Charteris. Others, including Ian Dore and 'Monty' Paul, have also rendered assistance when...
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This thesis is dedicated to the children: my own, Stephen and Daniel; those of New Brighton and all of South Africa. My wish is that they may grow up in a peaceful non-racial democratic country.
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<tr>
<td>ACI</td>
<td>African Indigenous/Independent Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARM</td>
<td>Assistant Resident Magistrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BTI</td>
<td>Board of Trade and Industries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Cape Archives Depot</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>central business district</td>
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<tr>
<td>CeA</td>
<td>Central Archives, Pretoria</td>
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<tr>
<td>CHB</td>
<td>Central Housing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>Clr</td>
<td>Councillor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNETU</td>
<td>Council of Non-European Trade Unions</td>
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<tr>
<td>cola</td>
<td>cost of living allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CKD</td>
<td>knocked-down (kits)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Cape Provincial Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPSA</td>
<td>Communist Party of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUSA</td>
<td>Congregational Union of South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CYL</td>
<td>(African National) Congress Youth League</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPH</td>
<td>Eastern Province Herald</td>
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<tr>
<td>GM</td>
<td>General Motors</td>
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<tr>
<td>H&amp;SEC</td>
<td>Housing and Slum Elimination Committee</td>
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<td>Industrial Development Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNAD</td>
<td>Municipal Native Administration Department</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOH</td>
<td>Medical Officer of Health</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament (Legislative Assembly)</td>
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<td>Native Advisory Board</td>
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<td>NAC</td>
<td>Native Affairs Committee</td>
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<td>Resident Magistrate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIC</td>
<td>South African Indian Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAIIRR</td>
<td>South African Institute of Race Relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAP</td>
<td>South African Party/Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAR&amp;H</td>
<td>South Africa Railways and Harbours</td>
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<tr>
<td>SMQ</td>
<td>Single mens' quarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SNA</td>
<td>Secretary for Native Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>United Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMB</td>
<td>Village Management Board</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Port Elizabeth is a city of many different images. These include the 'friendly city' of current tourist propaganda and the 'progressive' city of the past. A song entitled eBhayi penned in the 1940s, celebrates the absence pass laws in Port Elizabeth. It exploits the pun suggested by its Xhosa name; the similar-sounding ibhayi which means blanket. Thus eBhayi the city, is declared to be a haven; a place that in comparison to other cities where harassment is commonplace, offers solace, strength and warmth - in short, the comfort of a metaphorical ibhayi:

Me too, here's mine, here it is
Me too, here's mine, here it is
Here, here it is, here in PE
You can talk about East London
You can talk about Jo'burg
I am talking about PE -
no about PE
Here in PE here!
There are no passes
It is honey and thick milk
Here in PE
You can even discard your blanket
It's hot in PE
But it's not a blanket
It's just a place.
When you arrive in PE
Even from King Williamstown
When you arrive in PE
Here in PE here
Your anxiety disappears
The you can see
It is quiet in PE.

Remembered now only by the older generation, they recount the lyrics with a mixture of nostalgia and cynicism. But it has to be asked whether this ambivalence comes with the advantage of hindsight, or whether such a song reflected a view of eBhayi which enjoyed

1 C. Ballantine, Marabi Nights: Early South African Jazz and Vaudeville (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 92. A recording of the song by Snowy Radebe and Company is to be found on the accompanying Cassette (Track #10). The lyrics were provided by Henry Johnson and translated by P. Mtuze.
considerable currency at the time? If songs can be said to communicate popular consciousness, an answer to this question might provide some insight into common perceptions about the city.

An image is a representation of reality. Just as the images on the television screen do not exhaust the 'real world' (as it used to be called), so the images represented in the song do not constitute Port Elizabeth's past in its entirety. It is not my purpose to examine the origins or development of such images here. That is beyond the scope of this thesis and best left to those with a different agenda who have embraced postmodernism as a critical theory - if it can be regarded as such. Instead of a discursive analysis of fragmentary images, I will attempt to construct a conventional narrative history of chosen themes in Port Elizabeth's and New Brighton's past.

My starting point is that economic shifts and accompanying structural changes play a fundamental role in shaping the history and character of any region or city. I accept that the structural situation and concomitant social relationships define objective conditions. Although mine is a historical materialist paradigm, I take exception to the structuralists insistence that individuals are subsumed by the larger social formation and incapable of making their own history. I would wish to assign an important role to human agency and regard experience as intrinsic to the contingent relationship between structure and agency. In other words, there is a need for a historically specific rather than an axiomatic answer to the problem of relations between agency and structure. Paul Maylam has expressed the need for a discerning approach as follows:

"The practitioner of urban social history is obliged to tread a careful path between the theoretical and the empirical, maintaining a sense of structure while at the same time keeping an eye on the human actors; [he/she must achieve] a balance: to capture and convey something of the lived experience of ordinary people, but also to delineate the structures that shaped or constrained that experience."

Belinda Bozzoli has identified consciousness, culture and ideology as key concepts for understanding how individuals or groups relate objective conditions to the subjective

experiences of everyday life.⁵ Whilst Bozzoli herself has made an invaluable contribution to the elaboration of such concepts in social history (sometimes used interchangeably with 'history from below'), much of it unfortunately suffers from a lack of theoretical rigour.

Mike Morris has decried the tendency of social historians to stress subjective experience as opposed to objective, abstract generalisation. He charges that social historians usually avoid explicit theorisation by reconceptualising the categories of analysis in the South African historical debate. He regards social history as a return to the discredited empiricism of earlier liberal historians and a departure from Marxist concepts, categories and modes of explanation.⁶ Tim Keegan has responded to these criticisms by arguing that microstudies have prevented social historians from succumbing to the temptation of reducing historical reality to a set of ill-defined processes. He writes that, "[t]he smaller the scale of investigation, the more likely it is that the intricacies and complexities of social interaction will stand revealed, stripped of schematic abstractions".⁷ Whilst mindful of the dangers of empathy and 'creeping empiricism' noted elsewhere by Keegan,⁸ I, too, believe that useful comparisons and meaningful generalisations are only valid on the basis of detailed investigation. At the same time, I recognise that unless studies focusing on the local communities retain a concern for the wider processes of social formation, capital accumulation and state strategy, they will degenerate into the anecdotal and the parochial.⁹

A leading exponent of the genre, Charles van Onselen, has lamented the tendency whereby social history has become uncoupled from "relations of production, instruments and tools of production, and the way they are appropriated by certain groups, the way that they struggled about them". As a self-proclaimed historical materialist, he would wish to "draw a very radical distinction between Marxist and non-Marxist social historians".¹⁰ Similarly, Bozzoli and Peter

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⁹ Bozzoli, Town and Countryside, p. 35.
¹⁰ Cited in H. Bradford, 'Highways, Byways and Culs-de-Sac: the Transition to Agrarian Capitalism in Revisionist South African History', Radical History Review, 46/7
Delius have recently attempted to distance themselves from the designation 'social historians'. But in wishing to detach 'social history' - and thereby much of the work which has been associated with the Wits History Workshop - from the 'radical' tradition of South African historiography, they have sought to reconstitute that tradition on their own terms. Social history, in Helen Bradford’s words, has been "forged by eclectic intellectual traditions" and "emerged as a loosely defined school that straddles paradigms". In my view, social history has not misappropriated the 'radical' tradition as Bozzoli and Delius aver. It has, instead, given it a vitality which the work of the structuralists lacked. Certainly, the pervasive influence on this work - both conceptually and methodologically - is social history.

An important trend in South African historical writing in the past fifteen years or so has been a concern with the social history of local communities. Studies with an urban focus have proliferated. These have ranged from the large cities through to the smaller towns and dorps, townships and peri-urban squatter settlements. But unlike Britain and the United States of America, a distinctive school of urban historians has never emerged in this country. There is no readily identifiable corpus of South African historical writing wherein the urban factor is regarded as an explanatory variable or dynamic in the historical process as has been the case overseas. If works with "an urban focus and concerned with the specifically urban

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11 B. Bozzoli and P. Delius, ‘Radical History and South African Society’, Radical History Review, 46/7 (Winter 1990), p. 43 n. 82.
12 Bradford, ‘Highways, Byways and Cul-de-Sac’, p. 73. Bradford would appear to part company with her editors on this point.
13 Although British and American historians have not agreed whether urban history is a distinct field of study or not, nor whether it has a distinctive methodology, there has emerged an immense volume of work with an urban focus which has been accorded the status of a sub-discipline. In Britain, the body of work has been referred to as the 'Dyos phenomenon' on account of the inordinate influence of that doyen of urban historians, Jim Dyos. See, for example, H.J. Dyos (ed.), The study of urban history (London, 1968); D. Cannadine & D. Reeder (eds.), Exploring the urban past (Cambridge, 1982); D. Fraser & A. Sutcliffe (eds.), The Pursuit of Urban History (London, 1983); D. Fraser, 'The Urban History Masquerade: Recent Trends in the Study of English Urban Development' (Review Article), The Historical Journal, 21, 1 (1978), pp. 253-264. In the United States, there has emerged the 'new urban history' movement with its practitioners like Steven Ternstrom pioneering the use of an interdisciplinary approach and statistical methods. For some representative literature, see P. Hauser & L. Schnore (eds.), The Study of Urbanisation (New York, 1965); L. Schnore, L. (ed.) The New Urban History (Princeton, 1985); T. Herschberg, 'The New Urban History: Towards an Interdisciplinary History of the City', Journal of Urban History, 5, 1 (1978), pp. 3-40.
experience" are to qualify as 'urban history',¹⁴ then this amounts to little more than the (spatial) delimitation of the historian’s field of study. In fact, the dominant approach in this country has been to simply regard the urban environment as a context wherein social transformation occurs; one which might exercise a formative influence on but is not necessarily a microcosm of the wider historical process. Most writers whose subject matter is situated in the urban context are, first and foremost, social historians. Because of the specific setting of their work, they might be termed urban social historians.

In South Africa, very few practitioners in the field of urban studies have reflected on the nature of their inquiry. Of those who have,¹⁵ it has been assumed that urban history is more than a field of study but is a sub-discipline with its own distinctive methodology. Saunders, however, has conceded that much of the methodology employed by urban historians "is common to all historical research".¹⁶ Certainly, practices such as an inter-disciplinary approach or statistical analysis do not qualify as 'distinctive'. Urban history has a pluralistic rather than a distinctive methodology precisely because it borrows from all sub-disciplines (especially social history). It also makes use of testimony and other sources pioneered by oral historians. The essential difference between so-called 'urban history' and (urban) social history is that the former claims an affinity to scientific practice which aspires to objectivity and is purportedly non-ideological, whilst the latter is politically committed to rescuing the underclasses from oblivion. In worst case scenarios, urban history can fall into the trap of antiquarianism (viz. the simple investigation of the past for its own sake) whereas (urban) social history - in the guise of people's history - can be reduced to 'activistic' history (viz. a history which seeks to use the past to change the present).

Port Elizabeth's public history has been constructed primarily by amateurs steeped in parochialism and the notion of 'history for it's own sake' (sic). Such antiquarianism is a

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14 Saunders, *Writing History*, p. 4.


16 Saunders, *Writing History*, p. 5.
feature of *Looking Back*, the journal of the Historical Society of Port Elizabeth, which has been in existence for over thirty years. The subject matter of articles are typical of the concerns of 'local history': the histories of buildings, families or genealogies, well-known personalities, and so on. The only two full-length histories of Port Elizabeth are largely anecdotal in approach and do not meet the standards of scholarly history. This history of the 'Friendly City' has been reproduced in publications by the Municipality and the PE Publicity Association, commemorative brochures and pamphlets by business and industry, and special supplements in the local press. Such 'potted' local histories have contributed to perpetuating the myth of pioneering British settlers and their descendants who have made a wholly positive contribution to the development of the Eastern Cape. Port Elizabeth's public history has assigned workers and women - black and white alike - to the 'condescension of the past' (to borrow E.P. Thompson's well-worn phrase). As such, it constitutes part of a hegemonic discourse.

The silences of public history are in themselves indicators of which groups have prevailed in making the world in their own image. Port Elizabeth's Councillors, who were supposed to be in a position to make informed decisions relating to the city's African population did not often venture into the Location. Their decisions were based on the reading of the reports submitted by Location Superintendents, Medical Officers of Health, and other officials. The 'facts' contained in such reports constituted a body of knowledge which, in the Foucauldian sense, defined the parameters of power relations between the rulers and the ruled. Ordinary white residents invariably had little first-hand knowledge or experience of the world of Africans. Most would have encountered Africans as employees or subordinates, either in their own homes or at the workplace. But apart from the handful of officials and traders who lived in the Location, Whites seldom set foot in New Brighton. The 'invisibility' of Africans has a number of dimensions: the denial of their agency, the engineering of spatial 'otherness' through the creation of locations, and the extension of this 'otherness' into the culture of the locations. One of the concerns of this thesis is to rescue the history of Port Elizabeth's

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When I commenced research for this study about five years ago, Port Elizabeth's historiography was in its infancy. Although the output on the city's history still does not match that of other major centres like Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg, and nor is it ever likely to (for reasons which I have suggested elsewhere), an increasing number of scholars are engaged in researching aspects of Port Elizabeth's history. These scholars include not only historians but also economic historians, historical/political geographers and industrial sociologists. I do not propose here to update a survey of Port Elizabeth's historiography attempted in 1991. However, some recently completed studies warrant special mention and discussion because they are invaluable contributions to Port Elizabeth's historiography and will be frequently referred to in the course of this thesis.

An aspect of Port Elizabeth's history which has received considerable attention has been the development of residential segregation/apartheid. A dissertation by the American historian, Joyce Kirk, describes how the African community resisted repeated attempts by the Town Council to remove it from predominantly white residential areas and municipal/private locations in the late nineteenth century. She adds depth to our understanding of the situation.  


24 J.F. Kirk, 'The African Middle Class, Cape Liberalism and Resistance to Residential Segregation at Port Elizabeth, 1880-1910' (Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison,
by explaining the inability of the African middle class leadership to withstand such pressures against the background of the waning influence of liberalism in Cape colonial politics. In the period in which our work overlaps, namely 1903-1910, Kirk is more concerned with resistance to the removals to New Brighton and why Africans preferred to relocate to Korsten, than with the New Brighton community per se. Therefore, our work is complementary.

Jennifer Robinson's thesis explores the use of state power and spatial organisation in effecting racial domination in South African cities through a case study of Port Elizabeth.25 Her theoretical approach is informed by a rigorous critique of (the mainly 'structuralist') writings on the nature of the South African state, as well as postmodernists like Foucault whose insights into the nature of power relations are only beginning to be appreciated and applied by South African historians. Robinson's work also provides useful insights into the nature of the relationship between the central and local states, as well as the character and operation of the latter. It evinces a a profound sense of change though time and provides an indispensable framework for much of this study. I have drawn extensively on Robinson's thesis, together with Glenn Adler's work in progress,26 in my analysis of Port Elizabeth's political economy.

Janet Cherry has recently completed a study of the making of Port Elizabeth's African working class.27 She has made a valuable contribution to our understanding of how the changing labour process and relations of production affected the levels of worker consciousness and the potential for organisation. Empirically, she has charted the course of unionisation amongst African workers in the period between approximately 1930 and 1960. In so doing, she has

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26 The draft thesis is entitled: "The Factory Belongs to All Who Work in It": the Organization of Non-racial Trade Unions in the South African Motor Car Industry, 1968-1983' (Ph.D., Columbia University). A paper based on the thesis was presented to the Conference on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and Historiography', Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992 as 'From the "Liverpool of the Cape" to the "Detroit of South Africa": the Automobile Industry and Industrial Development in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage Region'.

provided useful insights into the conditions in the workplace of African workers, many of whom were residents of New Brighton. Thus her work also complements my own.

As with most of the recent work on Port Elizabeth’s history, this thesis is concerned with the African population, and the New Brighton community in particular. Jeffrey Butler has commented that it might be "legitimate to write the history of only a part of a total community, but the intention to do so must be clearly set out and defended". When poor white Afrikaners, for instance, are studied without reference to Port Elizabeth’s wider society, then we are simply pursuing the apartheid agenda. There can be no objection in principle to the study of a particular segment of Port Elizabeth society provided it can make a contribution to our understanding of the total history of the city. I believe that a holistic approach in which the New Brighton community is portrayed in relationship to other social groups in the city can be fully justified. Only a greater appreciation of our people’s shared past can contribute to the development of a non-racial historiography. But until such time as we are in a position to synthesise the history of all groups in society, we shall have to make do with partial histories of Port Elizabeth.

It is necessary to delineate clearly the geographical area where the community which is the subject of this thesis lived. New Brighton, which is situated approximately ten kilometres to the north of Port Elizabeth’s CBD, consists of seven housing schemes constructed in the following phases [see Figure 1.1]:

(a) Red Location 1902-3;
(b) Newtown or White Location 1925-8;
(c) McNamee Village 1938-43;
(d) KwaFord 1948-51;
(e) Boastville 1948-9;
(f) Elundini 1951-4;
(g) Thembalethu 1962-3.

A more detailed description of the expansion of New Brighton will be provided in Chapter 3. It should be assumed that the term New Brighton includes all the areas in existence at any

Figure 1.1 NEW BRIGHTON TOWNSHIP DEVELOPMENT, 1902/3-1952/3
given point in time, unless a specific area is identified. Because the thesis is confined to the first fifty years of New Brighton's history, this obviously means that Thembalethu is excluded from its purview.

The demarcation of fifty years for this study was not determined by a wish for a tidy periodisation. It commences with the establishment of New Brighton in 1903 and closes in 1953. Robinson has shown that the latter year was a watershed as far as Port Elizabeth's policies towards Africans in the city were concerned. Following the riots of the previous year, the reputedly 'progressive' PE City Council adopted measures to curb political activities in the township and implement influx controls. The choice of period thus hinges on administrative and political decisions which affected the lives of the people of New Brighton, the subject of this thesis, substantially. But it is necessary also to situate the history of New Brighton within the context of structural changes in Port Elizabeth's political economy.

CHAPTER 2
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PORT ELIZABETH, c.1903-1953

This chapter commences with an outline of the economic development of Port Elizabeth. The major phases thereof have been represented somewhat schematically by the epithets: the 'Liverpool of the Cape' and the 'Detroit of South Africa'. Essentially, this depicts a progression from a merchant base in the mid-nineteenth century when trade (primarily wool) was paramount to roughly a century later when the rise of manufactures (especially motor vehicles) provided an industrial base. There has been a tendency to replicate phases in the economic development of the Witwatersrand in the secondary regions in this country. But rather than employing specious similes or likening the development of the local economy to that of the country's industrial hub, it is more useful to identify its own regionally specific features.

Each economic phase also had particular implications for the labour process and relations of production in Port Elizabeth. The demographic profile of the town's workforce - its numbers, racial composition and distribution of skills - changed. We will be concerned primarily with the African population. Because they are treated as statistics and something of a monolithic group in the records, there are difficulties in constructing a comprehensive social geography. During our period the Municipality assumed responsibility for the majority of the local African population - with the incorporation of New Brighton in 1923 and Korsten in 1931. And seldom is there any attempt to identify which Africans lived and worked where. Therefore, we cannot always differentiate between residents of one area and another. But this chapter provides essential background information for understanding the conditions of reproduction and social relations in New Brighton.

The analysis of the local economy and state will provide a framework for understanding Port Elizabeth's politics and the policies of the Council towards its African population. The Council fashioned a 'native' administration for which it earned a 'progressive' reputation. Robinson has contended that this reputation, which rested on the absence of influx controls, was not entirely warranted. Instead of the type of regulation envisaged in the urban areas legislation, steps were taken to control and monitor New Brighton residents by means of spatial organisation, close

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1 G. Adler, 'From the "Liverpool of the Cape" to the "Detroit of South Africa": the Automobile Industry and Industrial Development in the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage Region' (Paper presented to the Conference on Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and Historiography, Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992).
supervision and surveillance. But the efficacy of this 'location strategy' depended on the extent to which Africans could be forced to reside therein. The 'location strategy' and influx control measures were two sides of the same coin; different methods of achieving social control of the African population in order to ensure white political domination. In the final section we will focus on influx control for it allows us to examine the relationship between the central state, the local state and capital/employers. It will be shown, contrary to what has previously been asserted, that the PECC did implement influx control measures in the 1930s. A question that needs to be answered, then, is why did it not enforce these mechanisms and allow them to fall into disuse?

**Port Elizabeth’s Economic Development to the 1950s**

Port Elizabeth’s early economic growth centred on the development of commercial wool-farming in the eastern districts of the Cape Colony which coincided with a boom in the British textile industry. The town was also well situated to take advantage of a rapidly expanding transit trade comprising angora hair, hides and ostrich feathers. In spite of inadequate harbour facilities and labour disputes, Algoa Bay’s export trade eclipsed that of Table Bay by the late 1850s. Port Elizabeth became known as the 'Liverpool of the Cape' for she was the premier port of the Colony by the mid-nineteenth century. She also became a financial centre as two major imperial banks established their Cape headquarters in the town during the early 1860s. Initially, the failure to raise sufficient local capital created a dependency on imperial sources. But London-based investments promoted the growth of local sources of capital.

Port Elizabeth’s incorporation into the world capitalist system meant that the town’s economy became subject to the cycle of boom and bust. In the mid-1860s depressed wool prices and contracting markets caused a recession in the Cape economy. However, the opening up of the Kimberley diamond fields renewed investor confidence and the consequent recovery provided a fresh stimulus to diverse economic activities. Many of Port Elizabeth’s merchants branched

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into the diamond business whilst others invested in property or the production of a wide range of commodities for this new market. Despite being physically closer to the diggings than Cape Town, the poor harbour facilities and inadequate rail network favoured the Mother City in the competition for the traffic. As the seat of the Colony’s Parliament and bureaucracy, Cape Town’s interests were better served. Port Elizabeth was poorly placed to influence government appropriations for harbour works and other infrastructures such as railways and roads.  

The exploitation of the Witwatersrand’s gold contributed further to Port Elizabeth’s underdevelopment. As the transit trade to and from the Reef outstripped the export value of pastoral products from it’s hinterland during the 1880s, the town increasingly assumed the role of an entrepôt. Despite the growth of the service sector and the local market, commercial concerns diverted capital from the retail trade to the gold fields. In fact, the reorientation of colonial capital to the interior hampered the diversification of industry and productive activity in all sectors of the Cape economy. Consequently, Port Elizabeth’s small-scale manufacturers remained undercapitalised and her commercial position was increasingly eroded. In 1885-6, the value of commodities imported through Table Bay surpassed Algoa Bay for the first time in over three decades, and many of the banks also began to relocate to Cape Town. Port Elizabeth lost her standing as the commercial and financial capital of the Cape Colony.

Port Elizabeth’s limited industry was based on primary production and still in its infancy by the end of the nineteenth century. This is suggested by the mixed character of economic activity. Processing industries included tanneries and wool washeries, whilst factories made goods such as soap, candles, matches, cigarettes and leather goods. Local producers of confectionaries, food and beverages also made some inroads into the expanding consumer market. These enterprises were usually individually owned, labour-intensive employing many craftsmen alongside a large number of unskilled workers. But trade and commerce remained the backbone of the local economy.

Like other colonial ports, Algoa Bay handled an increased volume of traffic during the South African War (1899-1902). Employment opportunities were created in the transport services and


local industry. Between 1891 and 1904, Port Elizabeth's total population increased by about 83%, the number of Africans more than doubled.

### TABLE 2.1

**Population of Port Elizabeth 1855-1911**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>3,509</td>
<td>1,284</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4,793</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1865</td>
<td>6,940</td>
<td>1,716</td>
<td>2,117</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1875</td>
<td>8,728</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>2,454</td>
<td></td>
<td>13,049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>13,297</td>
<td>3,931</td>
<td>5,147</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>23,266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>22,336</td>
<td>9,750</td>
<td>9,432</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>42,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>18,973</td>
<td>8,058</td>
<td>12,746</td>
<td></td>
<td>39,777</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The burgeoning African population included a considerable number of migrants from Port Elizabeth's rural hinterland who were hired on a contractual basis. These "casual Natives were mostly raw and uneducated ... from the large tribal locations on the Border and across the Kei [River]". Many of these migrants failed to have their contracts renewed and were recruited to work on the mines. During the economic hardships after the War, not many resident Africans could rely on the support of kin groups and 'home boy' networks. As the Assistant Resident Magistrate remarked,

> the ordinary Native labourer in Port Elizabeth is not the raw Native who has come from the Transkei in search of work here, but has been born and bred in one or other of the many Locations that have existed here for many years.

The greater distance of Port Elizabeth than, say, East London from the reserves made for a more stable African population. Port Elizabeth's African population has rightly been

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9 Select Committee Report on Native Reserve Location Bill, *A. 22 - 1902*, Appendix A, Supplementary Report, p. ix. See also Cape Archives Depot (CAD): Native Affairs (NA) 623 f1965, Information collected for and by SANAC, recorded that the number of migrants to Port Elizabeth in 1902 reached 10,077 and came from the following districts: Albany, Peddie, King Williamstown, and Victoria East.


characterised as the most fully proletarianised in the country.\textsuperscript{12}

By far the majority of Port Elizabeth's Africans were unskilled workers. Apart from a few who did manual work in factories, most of the men worked for the Municipality, Harbour Board and merchant stores. The Harbour Board recruited from the large pool of casual labourers according to demand which fluctuated seasonally. With the decline in the woolwasheries, very few women were employed in industry by the 1900s. Those not engaged as domestic servants resorted to informal economic activities such as beer brewing, laundering and hawking in order to supplement family incomes. A small African middle class consisted of teachers, ministers clerks, interpreters, nurses, a few petty traders, and property owners.

Employment by sector in Port Elizabeth in 1911 was as follows:

\textbf{TABLE 2.2}

\textit{Employment in Port Elizabeth in 1911}\textsuperscript{13}

\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{Sector} & \textbf{Whites} & & & \textbf{Blacks} & & \\
 & \textbf{Male} & \textbf{Female} & \textbf{Total} & \textbf{Male} & \textbf{Female} & \textbf{Total} \\
\hline
Professional & 533 & 354 & 887 & 89 & 58 & 127 \\
Domestic & 200 & 5319 & 5519 & 823 & 7186 & 8009 \\
Commercial & 3216 & 295 & 3513 & 2821 & 14 & 2835 \\
Agricultural & 222 & 7 & 229 & 805 & 21 & 826 \\
Industrial & 2631 & 609 & 3240 & 4014 & 81 & 4095 \\
Totals & 6804 & 6584 & 13388 & 8552 & 7360 & 15892 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

It would seem that these figures do not include the considerable number employed by the Municipality, SA Railways & Harbours (formerly Harbour Board) and other employers in the service sector. The majority of white women and a fairly large number of black women in the domestic category were probably mothers and housewives rather than domestic servants. Port Elizabeth did not have the relatively large numbers of black male domestic workers that Durban and Johannesburg had. It is significant that workers in industry already outnumbered those employed in the commercial sector and that they comprised about a quarter of the economically active population.


\textsuperscript{13} Union of South Africa Parliamentary Papers, \textit{Report of the 1911 Census}, \textit{U.G.32d - 1912}, pp. 886-9, Table XXI.
Further impetus to the growth of Port Elizabeth’s infant industrial sector resulted from the First World War. Small scale manufacturers were able to expand under the stimulus of natural protection afforded by the War.\(^\text{14}\) Between 1916/7 and 1920/21 the number of industrial establishments increased by 29 (or about 16%) and the workforce by an average of six employees per establishment. Unit production increased about 78%, whilst the value of total output nearly doubled. The city’s average annual growth rate of more than 20% in industrial employment between 1915/6 and 1919/20 was higher than the national average of 11% per annum.\(^\text{15}\) The increase in the number of black workers employed in secondary industry during the war years exceeded whites by 80%, and was caused not so much by a drain of skilled white manpower but the creation of new openings in industry.\(^\text{16}\) In 1918/9 the average per capita annual wage of £132 earned by white workers was well below the national average, whereas the £50 earned by blacks was somewhat higher than the national average of £35. This was possibly because wages in certain scheduled occupations in Port Elizabeth’s manufacturing sector complied with the minimum determined by the Wage Board in terms of the Factories Act of 1918.\(^\text{17}\)

The largest industrial employers in Port Elizabeth at this time were the boot and shoe manufacturers. Some 19 tanneries and leatherware factories employed in excess of 1 000 hands in 1916/7. A contemporary brochure which advertised the advantages to industry of locating in Port Elizabeth claimed that the city was responsible for more than half of national production, and as the pre-eminent local manufacturer of footwear should be dubbed the ‘Northampton of South Africa’.\(^\text{18}\) The importation of new machinery, technology and skills enabled the industry to negotiate the transition from ‘bespoked’ to mass production and, consequently, to fulfil large military contracts and meet increased local demand caused by the war-time disruption of


\(^{18}\) B. Sankey and T.C. White (eds.), *The Industrial Facilities and Advantages of Port Elizabeth* (Port Elizabeth, 1917), p. 45.
imports. In the leather industry certain machines were operated by Coloured labour but skilled work that required an apprenticeship was done by Whites. As a rule, skilled and semi-skilled positions were occupied by Whites and 'Coloureds' in the manufacturing sector. Port Elizabeth's manufacturers preferred a stable workforce which could acquire skills, although it did not always pay wages commensurate with these skills.

The city's merchants were not unqualified supporters of industrial development. They welcomed the establishment of primary industry which exploited the country's mineral and other resources, but reckoned that Port Elizabeth should remain a trading centre as secondary industry was regarded as uneconomical. The merchants were fierce advocates of free trade and had disapproved of tariff barriers since increased local production reduced their potential market for imports. In 1919, the President of the PE Chamber of Commerce (PECoC) and general manager of the merchant firm Mosenthals, H.J. Harraway, criticised the government's protectionist policy for having the effect of fostering competition between traders and manufacturers. He argued that it was detrimental to the continued progress of the latter and appealed, instead, for some sort of partnership between the sectors. He suggested that manufacturers should utilise the available storage facilities and distribution networks of merchants in marketing their products. Although this statement might be construed as a conciliatory gesture, it underlines the unease merchants felt with the increasing competitiveness of local manufacturers. Thus, Bozzoli's contention that merchant and manufacturing capital constructed a solid partnership during the War appears unfounded in the case of Port Elizabeth. If anything, the War heightened the level of conflict between these two 'fractions' of local capital.

The revival of commerce after the War threatened to eliminate a number of undercapitalised and less competitive businesses in Port Elizabeth. Even the fairly well established industries, such as leatherware manufacturers, found themselves hard pressed to compete with the flood of cheap European merchandise. The volume and value of imports via Algoa Bay between 1919/20 and

22 Eastern Province Herald (EPH) 10 June 1919.
1920/1 increased by about 60% and 142% respectively. With the saturation of the local market by imports, manufacturers campaigned for protection of the infant industries developed during the War. They developed an ideology which equated manufacturing with patriotism and progress, using their political clout to further their economic objectives. The newly-established Board of Trade and Industries (BTI) drafted a new Customs Tariff Act which was enacted in 1925 and has been regarded as the high water mark of protectionist legislation.

With protectionist measures designed to encourage local manufacturing and import substitution, Port Elizabeth's merchants were forced to rethink their strategies of survival in an increasingly regulated market. Robinson notes that:

...in the 1920s their horizons shifted from promoting local conditions facilitative to their own activities to the active encouragement of industrial investment in the town. This new policy initiative was obviously also in the merchant's own interests because import and export trade would increase with industrial growth, as would local retail demand, marketing opportunities and so on.

The consensus about the need of capital investment in the local economy suggests that various 'fractions' of capital had become interdependent. Parochialism was placed above sectional interests and priority was given to industrial development. This Robinson has termed 'place entrepreneurialism'. The PECC commissioned the Publicity Association to advertise the advantages of industries locating in the city and offered incentives such as a ready supply of labour, well situated land, cheap electricity and gas. In 1936 the PECC established a new standing committee, the Industrial Development Committee, "whose primary function it is to communicate with prospective purchasers of industrial sites, and to offer every assistance in the establishment of such enterprises".

Port Elizabeth's claim to be the pre-eminent industrial centre of the future was founded on the establishment of motor vehicle assembly plants by the American multi-national companies, Ford and General Motors in the mid-1920s. Both expanded from disused wool warehouses to larger premises within a few years. By 1929, the combined production of vehicles reached a record high and sales peaked at over 20 000 units before the onset of the depression. The motor

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24 Bozzoli, 'Ideology of Local Manufacturing in SA', p. 201.
companies prided themselves on being able to market vehicles assembled wholly by white labour. Although hourly wages were above the minimum levels laid down by the Wage Board, average incomes tended to be relatively low due to the instability of work. With the exception of the few skilled workers (eg. mechanics), the non-automated local plants offered primarily unskilled or semi-skilled jobs to the increasing number of whites who had left white-owned farms in Port Elizabeth’s hinterland since the beginning of the decade. 28

Port Elizabeth boasted the highest rate of urbanisation in the country during the 1930s. 29 The population nearly doubled between 1921 and 1936.

**TABLE 2.3**

*Population of Port Elizabeth, 1921-1951*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Africans</th>
<th>Coloureds</th>
<th>Asians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>24 718</td>
<td>11 448</td>
<td>12 627</td>
<td>1 319</td>
<td>50 112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>48 600</td>
<td>25 800</td>
<td>21 898</td>
<td>2 396</td>
<td>98 694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>58 273</td>
<td>43 699</td>
<td>26 873</td>
<td>3 503</td>
<td>132 348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>65 507</td>
<td>57 737</td>
<td>22 934</td>
<td>3 618</td>
<td>149 796</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further evidence that the city’s African population was considerably more permanent than other major urban centres is provided by sexual ratios. By the 1920s the ratio of men to women in Port Elizabeth was virtually 1:1 compared to the national average of less than 20% females in the urban areas. The pattern of male migrancy in the city did not resemble mining towns like Johannesburg nor ports like Durban. 31 Migrants made up a relatively small proportion of the population. The growth rate of Africans for the thirty year period shown in Table 2.3 far exceeded that of other populations. Despite this, Africans only became the largest group in the city’s population during the 1950s when opportunities for employment in the industrial sector increased significantly. Whites thus remained the largest population group in Port Elizabeth during our study period.

It has been shown that of South Africa's major industrial centres, Port Elizabeth had the highest percentage of white labour between the mid-1920s and -1940s. The percentage of white labourers in industry rose from 52% in 1925/6 to 65% in 1935/6 and then declined to 49% in 1945/6 - as opposed to the national average of 36%, 40% and 32% for the same years. The most dramatic growth during the depression years was of white women. By the mid-1930s, women comprised about 37% of the white workers and 22.5% of the total workforce in the factories. The relatively high percentages of white workers in industry reflected a broader demographic trend that was changing the composition and character of Port Elizabeth's population. The number of Afrikaans-speakers increased from 20% in 1918 to 36,4% in 1936, and had reached 38.7% of the total white population by 1946. The perception of factory owners that as much as 90% of their labourers were Afrikaans-speakers was not far off the mark. Most of these were employed as unskilled workers in the motor and footwear industries. As the 'heartland of poor whiteism in the Cape Midlands' (to borrow Freund's phrase), Port Elizabeth provides a good example of the workings of the 'civilised labour policy'.

The drought in Port Elizabeth's hinterland in the early 1930s caused a massive influx - of Whites and Africans alike - to the city. However, only the former were partly cushioned from the ravages of the Depression. Whites were often employed in jobs previously held by Africans, albeit at low wages. Africans were precluded from any government or divisional council relief work. A total of 644 out of 2 131 adult able-bodied New Brighton male residents were unemployed in 1931. In the entire district area an estimated 2 000 were out of work. Given the existing levels of dependency, a total of at least six times that were without any means whatsoever. Pauper rations were provided by the Cape Provincial Administration and distributed by the local Magistrate to 'deserving cases'. Private aid to ameliorate the widespread distress took the form of a food kitchen in New Brighton and the work of the Bantu Relief Committee.

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34 Conradie, 'Port Elizabeth as Industriekern', p. 271.
36 PE Municipality, Mayors' Minute 1931, p. 9.
37 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/1634, Letter from TC, PE to Prov. Sec. 18 May and reply of 26 May 1931; Minutes of the NAC, 10 July 1931.
sponsored by the PE Joint Council. During 1931-2, the PECC provided ad hoc relief work for little more than a hundred Africans at rates which were half the current minimum wage. Typically, the sum voted for unemployment relief was charged to the Native Revenue Account, which was already in deficit, rather than to General Rates. The PECC claimed that it was already hard pressed to assist with Government-subsidised unemployment schemes for Whites and Coloureds. It rejected the repatriation of Africans to their rural homes as an impractical and inadequate long-term solution to the unemployment problem.

After the Depression, investor confidence in the local economy was revived following the expansion of the motor and ancillary industries. The location of both local and international manufacturers of component parts like tyres and glass in the city boosted production in an increasingly competitive vehicle market. Investment was considered safe and the margins of profit on capital outlays reportedly good. Foreign capital still purportedly accounted for more than half of the investment in local industry. Apart from the American motor companies, and British investment in assorted food, drink, confectionary establishments, an increasing amount of local capital was being reinvested in further industrial development. The estimated total fixed capital investment for ground, buildings, machinery and fixtures in 1936/7 amounted to £2 957 660. From a pre-Depression high of £113 182 000, Port Elizabeth's gross industrial production fell to £90 948 000 in 1932/3, but rose to a record £175 765 000 in 1936/7. The price of land and services, and scale of investment in overheads, made Port Elizabeth's industries relatively cost effective and profitable compared to other centres. Yet, Port Elizabeth's share amounted to a mere 3,8% of national capital investment in industry in the late 1930s.

Port Elizabeth's variegated pattern of employment, and especially the non-dependence on cheap

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38 University of the Witwatersrand, Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 1433 Cp 5.1, Letter from Sec. PE Joint Council to Rheinallt Jones, 12 Aug. 1932.
40 CAD: 3 PEZ 1/1280, Report of the Location Superintendent, 30 June 1032.
44 Conradie, 'PE as Industriesentrum', pp. 534-7.
African labour, made it fairly typical of this early phase of secondary industrialisation. Less than half the city's registered employees were involved in manufacturing. Nearly 60% of these were Whites, with Africans and Coloureds comprising 21% and 18% of the workforce, respectively. The largest employer, the motor assembly plants, had a total of 2 139 workers, of whom a staggering 92% were white. Relatively high numbers of Coloured workers were employed in factories producing foods and drinks, leather goods and clothing. But aside from these and a number of semi-skilled Coloured workers, the racial division of labour in Port Elizabeth's industries was little different from the rest of the country. The following Table shows the occupations of all Africans under 18 years of age in 1938.

**TABLE 2.4**

**OCCUPATIONS OF AFRICANS IN PORT ELIZABETH 1938**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Resident within PEM</th>
<th>Resident outside PEM</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>Males</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade &amp; industry</td>
<td>3 885</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic service</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>3 091</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal</td>
<td>1 546</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways</td>
<td>1 350</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholars</td>
<td>1 828</td>
<td>2 072</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>3 528</td>
<td>7 599*</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13 561</td>
<td>12 885</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures includes 3 976 classified as housewives.

The majority of economically active Africans were employed in the service sector - if this category is taken to include those employed by the Municipality and SAR&H, as well as domestic service. The distribution of Africans in the various industrial sectors of the economy is unknown. The unemployment rate appears high, but this category probably included 'casual' workers. The local authority provided no indication of what it deemed to be the 'reasonable'

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46 1AD, 25/196 No. 3, Occupational Statistics (Form 'C'), Oct. 1938.
labour requirements of the Port Elizabeth area. 47

At the end of the Second World War, Port Elizabeth was still the country’s premier commercial wool centre. It exported 37% of the annual wool clip, most of which was not processed on account of the absence of wool combing, spinning, weaving and production plants. The Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) sought to promote import substitution by developing manufacturing processes locally. At this time, European textile firms were looking to relocate production facilities from high-labour cost areas and the IDC was prepared to subsidise joint ventures with foreign investors. Port Elizabeth was an obvious site for the establishment of the wool processing industry. One such enterprise, Industex, an industrial fabric producer owned by South Africans and Belgians, established a plant in 1949. Within five years, an entirely new industrial sector had developed in Port Elizabeth. 48

Meanwhile, Port Elizabeth continued to attract investment in ancillary and vehicle component manufacturing industries. In 1947 General Tire (sic) opened a new factory on the edge of New Brighton. This together with expansion at Firestone, made Port Elizabeth the largest tyre and rubber manufacturing centre in the country. In addition, the two glass manufacturers, Shatterprufe and Armourplate, both moved into much larger premises with greater productive potential the following year. Even more important to the development of the local economy was the continued expansion of the motor industry itself. In the post-war boom, both Ford and GM acquired new plants and launched major expansion programmes following the introduction of conveyor belts and other automated features. Adler dismisses the assertion that the motor industry pioneered the transition from manufacture to machinofacture, 49 and describes the local assembly lines as labour-intensive operations. Unlike their American counterparts where the system of mass production was based on the strict division between technical and manual labour, 'Fordist' production techniques were only adopted from the 1950s and this coincided with the erosion, rather than the strengthening of the white monopoly on employment. 50

The transformation of the labour process increased the regularity and routinisation of employment in the motor industry. The improved supply of knocked-down (CKD) kits and an

50 Adler, 'The Automobile Industry', p. 42 n. 64.
increasing range of models with built-in obsolescence ironed out some of the irregularities in production. Workers were expected to clock up 40 to 46 hours for a 5-day week, with an annual paid vacation over the Christmas period, when the industry shut down. These changes necessitated a shift in the type of labour required in the industry. Where previously labour needs could be met by the large supply of seasonal white labour from farms in Port Elizabeth’s hinterland, in the post-war period the steady all-year round flow of production required the constant engagement of workers. Improved opportunities and the availability of technical training made it possible for white workers to obtain supervisory or skilled positions, rather than have to work on the assembly lines. By contrast, employment in automobile plants rated as the highest paid industrial work available to blacks. Although racial categories of employment were not legislated, informal job reservation had been practised in Port Elizabeth. In the 1950s, however, the established pattern whereby the motor industry had been the virtual preserve of Whites (especially males) had begun to break down, as was the case in other manufacturing sectors.51

Cherry has argued that Port Elizabeth’s early emphasis on white industrial labour, and the later preference for coloured labour, meant that Africans were only integrated into semi-skilled and skilled positions from the 1950s, and to a lesser extent than elsewhere. Yet, at the same time, the stable nature of the African working class made possible certain gains in wage levels, especially in those industrial sectors which were reliant on unskilled labour. The textile industry, for instance, changed from a preponderantly white to coloured workforce, with a small number of Africans employed in semi-skilled positions. The food and canning industry began to employ a significant number of Africans - including a considerable proportion of women. But these were the exceptions to the general race/skills division in Port Elizabeth’s industries. By and large, Africans were employed in unskilled positions, particularly in the service sector during the period under review. In short, the workforce was divided fairly rigidly into skilled and semi-skilled white and Coloured labour, and unskilled African labour.52

The Local State in Port Elizabeth and its Policy towards Africans

It is not my intention to attempt a general exposition of the nature of the South African state nor of relations between the central and local states. Suffice it to say, I do not regard the central state as an instrument of specific capitalist interests, nor the local state simply an agent of urban

capital. It is necessary to analyse and disaggregate the various interest groups in order to understand the influence they brought to bear on decision-making by local authorities. This entails examining the "locally dominant classes, their political configurations and alliances, and their economic interests". Precisely because the local state was not a monolithic power bloc, the interests of the subordinate classes should also be taken into account. The changing character of the local state was a major determinant of the PECC's policies towards the African population.

Port Elizabeth was upgraded from a town to a city in 1913. Before the 1920s, the Council was dominated by merchants and PECoC had been a powerful lobby. Thereafter, this position was challenged by a new alliance between commercial and manufacturing capital. The Midland Chamber of Commerce (MCC) and the Midland Chamber of Industries (MCI) lobbied for their respective sectors but often spoke with one voice. Although the Council was always dominated by businessmen with independent means, more and more professionals won election from the 1940s. Perhaps the best known of this group was Mrs May Holland. She served alongside merchants such as J.S. Young and Adolf Schauder, industrialists like T.C. White, and other stalwarts of the Council. The election of trade unionist, Mrs Katie Gelvan (nee Viljoen) and two Communist Party members, M.M. Desai and E.T. Dietrich, in the 1940s reflected the emergence of a sizeable working class constituency. They represented wards which consisted mainly of unskilled white workers, Coloureds, Indians and Africans. But while white workers obtained a greater say in Council matters, black people were increasingly excluded.

The local state had to negotiate the competing pressures of all parties with an interest in policies towards Port Elizabeth’s African population. These comprised functionaries of both the local authority (municipal officials, location administrators, etc.) and of the central state (magistrates, the police, etc.) based in the town. Given the dualism in the administration of urban Africans [see Chapter 4 for more details], the former were answerable to both the local and central states. As employees of an elected council, municipal officials had also to be responsive to the interests

53 There has been little theoretical work on the local state in the South African context. An exception is P. Wilkinson, 'The 'Local State' as a Conceptual Problem: An Exploration of Some Recent Marxist Work', Paper presented to the Workshop on African Urban Life in Durban in the Twentieth Century, University of Natal, Durban, 1983.
55 See PE Publicity Association, Port Elizabeth: City of Industry (Port Elizabeth, 1934) and Appendix C for biographical sketches of Cllrs mentioned in this paragraph.
of white ratepayers and local industrial or commercial concerns.\textsuperscript{56} The Council, too, had its own institutional interests. For instance, it had a vested interest in retaining direct control over the number of workers accommodated and employed within its area of jurisdiction which did not necessarily correlate with that of local capital. Thus, the divergence of interests between local state institutions and locally dominant classes went some way to ensuring that policy towards Africans in Port Elizabeth was not shaped by a single party.

The PECC had at least two identifiable 'factions' during our period: the self-styled 'humanitarians' and the 'budget watchdogs'.\textsuperscript{57} Spokespersons for the latter group included Cllrs Young and White. They advised financial stringency and contributed to the PECC's reputation for parsimoniousness, especially in respect of its management of the NRA. The former were represented by Cllrs Schauder and Holland who dominated the Native Affairs Committee (NAC) during the 1940s. These representatives of the local 'liberal' ideology set the tone of Council policy with respect to 'native affairs'. Their 'liberalism' was more of the pragmatic than principled type. In the popular imagination, 'liberalism' was regarded as being synonymous with such qualities as a sense of 'fair play' and justice. These typically British characteristics constituted part of the colonial legacy of Port Elizabeth. Demographic factors and active propaganda ensured that local English speakers retained strong ties and identified as much with Britain, usually referred to as 'home', as their country of adoption. This was reflected in the composition and workings of Council. Proceedings and all correspondence was conducted in English until the 1960s. Although the majority of Port Elizabeth's white population throughout our period were English speakers, the changing composition of the city's population had important consequences for the political character of the Council.\textsuperscript{58}

We have seen that Afrikaans-speaking poor whites moved to Port Elizabeth in growing numbers from the 1920s. Many were housed in racially-mixed slums before obtaining Council housing in Kensington, Holland Park, Sidwell and Southdene.\textsuperscript{59} Whilst these white Afrikaners acquired the municipal franchise, Coloureds were deprived thereof. The conversion from monthly to weekly tenancies in Schauderville, the Council housing scheme, effectively deprived Coloured occupants of the vote.\textsuperscript{60} By the late 1940s, the number of Afrikaans-speaking ratepayers had

\textsuperscript{56} Posel, \textit{Making of Apartheid}, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{57} \textit{Evening Post} 27 Feb. 1953.
\textsuperscript{58} Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 250-1.
\textsuperscript{59} Anon., 'New Life for 30 000 Slum-dwellers', \textit{SA Panorama}, 2, 1 (1957), pp. 4-5.
\textsuperscript{60} Kramer v. Port Elizabeth Revision Court, 30 November 1945; \textit{Cape Times} 1 Dec. 1945 ('Voting Rights of Municipal Tenants').
increased sufficiently to represent voting blocs in certain wards. The local pro-Nationalist Afrikaans-language newspaper, *Die Oosterlig*, became a daily by 1948,\(^6\) and the city had its first Afrikaans-speaking mayor in 1950. By this time, the balance of power within the Council was beginning to shift away from the group representing the local 'liberal' ideology.\(^6\) Councillors with a more conservative mindset challenged the previous consensus with regard to 'native affairs'.

Council elections were not fought on party lines although the political affiliations of certain candidates were common knowledge. The outcome of Legislative Assembly elections provides some indication of the state of local politics. Voting by Port Elizabeth's white population tended to be along lines of language and class. The Unionist Party - with its English support base - won seats in all the elections before the merger with the South African Party (SAP) in 1921. Labour Party candidates usually made a reasonable showing in the two urban constituencies as they had some working class support. The Nationalist Party (NP) only contested PE North (later Three Rivers), a partly rural and working class constituency which included North End, Korsten, New Brighton and the farming districts to the north of the city. All three constituencies were fairly safe SAP seats between the 1921 and 1934. In the 1938 Election, the 'Purified' NP was runner-up to the United Party in the PE North and PE District seats - which together corresponded roughly to the former Three Rivers constituency.\(^6\) Although the UP remained politically ascendant in Port Elizabeth until 1953, there was growing support for the NP amongst the local electorate.

Port Elizabeth's black voters tended to vote with their more liberal English-speaking counterparts. Although the city had more registered African voters than other Eastern Cape towns,\(^6\) they comprised less than 10% of the local electorate. The extension of the vote to white women in 1930 dramatically reduced the percentage of black voters, with the 1 065 African voters in the city comprising 4,5% of the total voters in 1932.


\(^6\) Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 251-2, Table 7.5.

\(^6\) This synopsis of voting patterns based on election results in H.O. Terblanche, 'Die Afrikaner in Port Elizabeth, 1902-1937: ’n Kultuurhistoriese ondersoek' (D.Phil. thesis, UPE, 1993), *passim*.

TABLE 2.5
PORT ELIZABETH VOTERS 1930 AND 1932

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PE North</th>
<th>PE Central</th>
<th>PE South</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1932</td>
<td>1930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White males</td>
<td>1 817</td>
<td>2 596</td>
<td>3 908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White females</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>2 066</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indians</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malays</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>4 489</td>
<td>6 359</td>
<td>4 360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Native Representative Act of 1936 removed African voters from the Cape's common roll. Only 1 449 out of an estimated 25 000 Africans in the city were eligible to vote in terms of the Act in 1942. Port Elizabeth was a portion of a large constituency embracing the entire Eastern Cape. Although the representative, Margaret Ballinger was an able and high profile liberal, she fought valiantly but unsuccessfully in Parliament to safeguard the interests of the region's African population.

Fewer Port Elizabethans of all races were registered on the municipal than the national voters rolls. I have no statistics which provide a racial breakdown of municipal voters but Africans were clearly in the minority. Although the Cape municipal franchise was colour-blind, it stipulated that voters had to either own property with a rateable value in excess of £100 or occupy property to the value of £200. The Korsten removals which commenced in the late 1930s, deprived the last remaining African property owners in Port Elizabeth of the vote. As municipal tenants, New Brighton residents did not qualify because the value of dwellings was insufficient. Calls to accord Africans direct representation on the PECC by the granting of

seats to one or more members of the Native Advisory Board were to no avail. As at national level, Port Elizabeth’s Africans became increasingly powerless as they were denied representation on the local authority.

The fact that the UP was politically ascendant in Port Elizabeth did not necessarily translate into co-operation with the UP Government before 1948. Attempts by the central state to enforce greater uniformity with respect to urban African administration met with little co-operation from the PECC. Humphries has argued that while there was a large degree of consensus between municipal officials and the Native Affairs Department, there was conflict between the larger, UP-controlled municipalities and the NAD over aspects of policy towards urban Africans in the 1940s. After 1948, the NP Government claimed that UP controlled municipalities were more interested in satisfying the labour needs of industrialists than in implementing state policy. Conflicts between the local and central states over urban policy were not simply the outcome of the former identifying with opposition party political positions. Robinson holds that such conflicts can best be explained with reference to the fragmented nature of the South African state, to conflicts between and within state institutions, and between local and central state apparatuses.

Local authorities were accorded considerable autonomy with respect to 'native affairs'. The NAD saw its role in urban areas principally as a facilitator between these authorities and their African populations. Yet, in some respects, local authorities served as agents of the NAD: first, the municipality accepted responsibility to provide its African population with essential services, housing and financial management in common with its responsibility to render such services to all ratepayers; secondly, a separate municipal department assumed responsibility for township administration and labour regulation. The provision of services such as water, sewerage, refuse removal, roads, transport, and health care were assigned to the relevant municipal departments. In addition, a specific municipal department assumed responsibility for the provision of housing in townships under its jurisdiction. The municipal treasurer was required to keep a separate Native Revenue Account (NRA) that comprised all income and expenditure relating to 'native affairs'.

69 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Minutes of the NBAB, 12 December 1933; EPH 4 June 1940.
The NAD had no cause to assume direct responsibility for urban Africans after 1923 nor any reason to challenge the autonomy of local authorities. Instead, it sought to implement central state policies by securing the consent or acquiescence of at least three key sets of actors: employers of urban African labour; Africans living and seeking work in the cities; and the municipal administrators of its policy. Any opposition by the first two parties to government policy could be defused. Although there was conflict between the NAD and the municipalities over specific issues, it was not of the order to suggest that interests were irreconcilable. The reasons for this were threefold: First, the NAD arguably lacked the capacity to ensure effective control of urban Africans without the co-operation of the municipalities. Secondly, the municipalities had discretionary powers in administering African townships, albeit subject to broad policy guidelines from the NAD established in legislation and stipulated in circulars. Thirdly, relations between the local authorities and the NAD gave the latter no reason to end municipal jurisdiction. Only in the 1950s when balance of power between the central and local state shifted in favour of the former, did it intervene in order to ensure compliance with its policies.

The development of coherent policies towards urban Africans by local authorities was determined largely by the appropriation of the ideology of segregation. Dubow characterises segregation as "primarily a defensive strategy aimed at consolidating white supremacy in the face of the challenge posed by the emergence of an African proletariat". The principal function of state ideology is to legitimate the exercise of power. Thus the ideology of segregation was concerned to legitimate white supremacy and preserve the racial character of the South African state. In Port Elizabeth, the implementation of an administrative ideology of urban segregation was not without its contradictions.

During the first two decades of this century the ideology of segregation became a dominant discourse. Public health concerns found expression in the rhetoric of the 'sanitation syndrome' which held the proximity of locations to white residential areas to be a potential health hazard. Pressure was brought to bear on the authorities to relocate location residents. Such concerns were amplified by periodic outbreaks of contagious diseases such as bubonic plague (1901-2),

74 Bekker and Humphries, *From Control to Confusion*, p. 2.
influenza (1918), as well as the widespread prevalence of tuberculosis. Swanson has suggested that in the first instance unreasonable fears were orchestrated by the propertied class to secure the relocation of Africans to the locations of Ndabeni and New Brighton, outside of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth respectively. Although undertaken at the behest of the central state, the local state - councillors, as well as municipal and health officials - was party to these forced removals.

Responses to the threat posed by disease were two-fold: preventative measures to contain its spread and interventionist measures authorising local health officers to demolish and remove occupants from unsuitable dwellings. The first of these measures was embodied in the Public Health Act of 1919 which empowered the central state to force local authorities to provide adequate housing, essential services and 'proper' management of locations from their own budgets. The Housing Act of 1920 and the Slums Act of 1934 made the municipalities responsible for the provision of housing for those resettled, for which they could obtain Central Housing Board funds. These provisions were seldom invoked because the enormous financial burden on the municipalities caused considerable opposition thereto. The PECC, however, was to avail itself of these provisions and undertake extensive sub-economic housing schemes for all races [see next Chapter for details].

Between the 1920s and the 1950s, the ideology of segregation attained hegemony amongst the white ruling classes and the concern for social control became paramount within the state. There were two major poles of thinking vis-a-vis the urban African during these years. These were not diametrically opposing ideologies as both started from the premise that white domination was non-negotiable. Rather, they amounted to competing strategies for solving 'the urban problem'. On the one hand, there was the view that urban Africans were 'temporary sojourners' in the white man's cities for as long as their labour was required. Known as 'Stallardism', it propounded the view that Africans should not have an unconditional right to live in urban areas. On the other hand, it was argued that the demands of industrialisation meant that Africans had to be accepted as permanent residents. First propounded by the Inter-Departmental Pass Laws (Godley) Committee in 1922, it was given its fullest expression in the

77 My periodisation is based on P. Maylam, 'The Rise and Decline of Urban Apartheid in South Africa', African Affairs, 89, 354 (1990), pp. 57-84.
78 Shorthand for the principles annunciated by the Transvaal Local Government Commission, 1921, TP 1/1922, chaired by Colonel C.F. Stallard.
Fagan Report of 1948 which proposed that labour bureaux should be created in order to co-ordinate and regulate the flow of labour to the towns.  

The key legislation for this period was the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act, and its subsequent amendments. Because it was enabling legislation, municipalities were able to apply its provisions in toto or in part. In 1924 the NAD had drawn up a set of 'Model Regulations' for the administration of locations based on the provisions of the Act. In a circular to urban local authorities which accompanied these regulations it was stated that:

There will ... be no objection to the introduction into the model a series of such amendments, additions or modifications as the local authority may deem necessary to meet local conditions which will be carefully and sympathetically considered by the Department in the scrutiny of regulations.

The Location Superintendent preferred uniformity in location administration to the 'local option' which he described as "each Municipality seemingly being a law unto itself". He saw the legislation making a considerable improvement in the condition and administration of 'native affairs' in general. But the Superintendent and the Council itself wished to continue with certain irregular administrative features in New Brighton such as the system of domestic beer brewing [described in Chapter 6]. Their determination to achieve this end caused considerable delay in obtaining the Government approval for proposed regulations. Although conforming broadly to the Urban Areas Act, New Brighton's administration retained some peculiar features [see Chapter 4].

The PECC embraced a 'Faganist' rather than a 'Stallardist' version of the ideology of segregation and guarded its autonomy from the central state rather jealously. This is apparent on a number of counts. For one thing, the objections of the PECC to certain provisions of the Urban Areas Act which delayed its implementation for nearly a decade suggests a reluctance to embrace its terms unreservedly. Secondly, the erection of housing schemes in New Brighton in

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81 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, NAD Circular No. 211/313 re Urban Areas Act, 21 July 1924.

the late 1920s and 1930s implied recognition of the permanency of the African population. Although security of tenure was not granted, the frequent debates in Council indicates that the 'liberal' lobby regarded it as a serious proposal. Thirdly, key municipal officials in Port Elizabeth regarded the Native Advisory Board as a possible step in the direction of self-government for New Brighton residents. And, finally, the PECC showed an unwillingness to implement influx control measures for reasons which will be examined in some detail below.

**Influx control in Port Elizabeth, c.1934-1953**

We noted in the Introduction the existence of a Xhosa song which celebrated the absence of pass laws in Port Elizabeth. This possibly reflected popular perceptions amongst the local African populace. The seemingly steadfast pursuit of an independent course of action with respect to influx control by the PECC won acclaim from visitors to the city. In 1947 the Rev. H.P. Junod of the Penal Reform League observed that:

> Port Elizabeth is an island in an ocean of petty repression that is the rest of the Union. You have no pass laws, no registration and you are providing your Natives with model housing.\(^83\)

Not only visitors, but the PECC congratulated itself on its exemplary treatment of its African population. In 1951 the Chairman of the NAC was reported to have remarked that "since Port Elizabeth is the only big city without passes for Africans, we are really an object lesson to the world".\(^84\) This view persisted until the 1952 New Brighton riots, when the combination of coercion from the central state and the changing balance of power in the Council itself, caused the PECC to abandon its previously 'progressive' standpoint on influx control.

The central state's intervention in the labour market, aimed at overriding the logic of supply and demand so as to ensure adequate supplies of labour to agricultural and mining sectors, came to be opposed by industry. Hindson has queried the emphasis of the revisionists on urban industry's long-standing dependence on cheap, unskilled labour. With the growth of a more capital intensive manufacturing sector, employers experienced an additional and growing need for a stable and semi-skilled African workforce. Accordingly, he has argued that the differentiated demand for African labour was reflected in state policy which increasingly became geared towards balancing the requirements of different capitalist sectors for either stabilised or migrant labour. Thus, influx control is explained as a means of satisfying urban industrialists' needs.

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83 Cited in *South Africa Outlook*, 1 December 1947, p. 188.
84 *The Guardian*, 15 March 1951, p. 4 ('PE Rejects Pass Laws for Africans').
interest in the reproduction of differentiated forms of African labour power in the cities.\(^5\) Posel reckons that explaining the differentiated labour market solely in terms of the interests of manufacturing capital and state institutions amounts to an instrumentalist view of the state. It presumes that local authorities had no institutional self-interests, ignores that they may have applied influx control measures in such a way to meet regionally specific labour demands, and also fails to consider how African resistance may have shaped the implementation of influx control.\(^6\)

We have already seen that in the case of Port Elizabeth, urban capital constituted a powerful pressure group in influencing local state policy. Lobbies such as the MCI frequently let it be known that they were opposed to regulation of the labour market. On the other hand, there were interest groups who opposed unrestricted access of Africans to the city for fear that this would be accompanied by an increase of unemployment and its attendant social evils. These included (white) ratepayers associations; the law enforcement authorities, especially the SA Police; and municipal officials. In the face of these contradictory pressures, the PECC’s response vacillated during the two decades under discussion. The policies with respect to influx control were far more ambiguous than has previously been depicted.

Davenport holds that control over African influx was not an important feature of the Urban Areas Act, and no special machinery was provided for enforcing it.\(^7\) It did, however, make provision for the implementation of rudimentary mechanisms of influx control through the issue and inspection of registration certificates. The PECC introduced these provisions in tandem with the application of the Urban Areas Act. As from 1 March 1934, workseekers in Port Elizabeth were to be in possession of either a temporary residence permit or a work permit obtainable from the local Magistrate. In the event that neither was granted, they had recourse to the council and, failing that, to the Minister of Native Affairs.\(^8\)

It soon became apparent that the provisions could only be enforced in New Brighton where the necessary administrative apparatus and personnel existed. Thus about two-thirds of Port Elizabeth’s African population were effectively excluded from the purview of these measures.

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In his evidence to the Young-Barrett Committee in 1935, the city's Superintendent of Natives expostulated,

The difficulty here in Port Elizabeth is in enforcing the provisions of that section [i.e. 5(6) of Act 21 of 1923] and it is also difficult to visualise just how any further laws created to control influx could be enforced without introducing the pass system of the northern provinces. The Cape natives are not likely to stand for that system.

He recommended, instead, the creation of a labour bureau under the supervision of Native Commissioners to be administered in conjunction with the NAD. The bureau should liaise with the relevant authorities in order to correlate the labour requirements of the city with the numbers granted work permits by magistrates in the reserves. The bureau should give preference to the employment of urbanised, rather than semi-urbanised and rural Africans. The implementation of a labour bureau system was deferred, but the administration in New Brighton already served as an informal labour bureau as it kept records on the unemployed. The practice of rounding up the unemployed for relief work which had commenced during the Depression had become established. It was not unusual for the administration to despatch workers upon request to local employers.

The Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937 increased the obligation upon local authorities to restrict the entry of Africans deemed 'surplus' to the 'reasonable labour requirements' of the area. It allowed work-seekers fourteen days in which to find employment in the town or face repatriation to the reserves, and put the onus on them to prove that they were not 'redundant'. But it presented the PECC with a dilemma: although not obliged to furnish statistical returns in respect of the labour requirements of the city, if it failed to do so, the Minister of Native Affairs could cause them to be completed at the Council's expense. It was the view of the Location Superintendent that it would be impossible for the Council to render such returns until such time as an enlarged Native Administration Department had been established to register service contracts and the bulk of the African population was residing at New Brighton. Meanwhile, the PECC sought exemption from providing statistical returns until the African population had been relocated and a feasibility study could be made with respect to the establishment of a labour bureau. This was not granted.

In 1938 the conditions governing the right of African workseekers to enter the urban area of Port Elizabeth promulgated four years previously were re-enacted. The reasons for this are unclear as, once again, the PECC chose not to apply these provisions despite the urging of the Location Superintendent and the Magistrate to do so. It was argued that in failing to do so, Port Elizabeth was out of step with most major urban centres and was likely to attract more than its fair share of workseekers. The newcomers and migrants would undercut the wages paid to the resident workforce. And the continued influx would hamper slum elimination. But the Council was unwilling to exercise its prerogative to register Africans entering the city.

As was the case with Cape Town, the PECC appeared reluctant to be seen to be taking the initiative in implementing influx control. In terms of the (amended) Urban Areas Act, the government could issue a proclamation restricting the entry of Africans into an urban area, and the NAD assume responsibility and revenue accruing for the registration of contracts. Whilst Cape Town was eventually compelled to comply with these strictures, the PECC was wary that it might encounter opposition to the their implementation as had been the case in both Grahamstown and East London. Under the circumstances, the PECC resolved in February 1940 that "consideration on the question of the registration of Native service contracts be deferred sine die". This was essentially a delaying tactic and the stock response of a Council not convinced that the advantages of registration contracts outweighed their disadvantages.

In 1941 the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) added his voice to those calling for the implementation of influx control in Port Elizabeth. The Housing & Slum Elimination Committee required no convincing that it was necessary to restrict entry into the city for in the space of five years an additional 4,783 Africans had had to be relocated from Korsten to New Brighton. It recommended to the NAC that steps be taken to institute the registration of Africans in accordance with the labour needs of the city, otherwise there would be no end to the municipal housing schemes. The NAC proposed that instead of a system of registration, a labour bureau be established. There was, however, no provision in the legislation whereby registration at

92 Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 210 of 30 Sept. 1938. Port Elizabeth was listed in a Schedule attached thereto.
94 Cape Times, 6 May 1939 ("City Council May Act "as Ordered").
95 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minutes for 1941, p. 27.
97 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1846, Minutes of the NAC, 22 June 1941.
such a bureau could be made compulsory. The Location Superintendent reckoned that the registration of service contracts would safeguard the permanent urban resident from unscrupulous employers who could exploit a labour surplus by taking on migrants prepared to work for lower wages. He believed that preference should be given by employers to the hiring of workers permanently resident in the city. In his opinion, registration was in the best interests of this category of person. Some Advisory Board members saw the merits of the Location Superintendent’s argument. But the majority regarded service contracts as a form of pass and therefore an infringement on their liberty. Again, the PECC equivocated on the matter of implementing the registration of service contracts.

The difficulties of supervising influx control and the extraordinary wartime demand for labour resulted in the temporary suspension of the pass laws in 1942. Whilst pressure from local authorities caused the NAD to attempt to close loopholes in existing legislation, the PECC refrained from introducing service contracts because the wartime industrial expansion demanded an increased supply of unskilled labour. Numerous interested parties made representations to the PECC - for and against - service contracts. The EP Trades Council put its case as follows:

... it has always been to the credit of the PECC that it has resisted government and other pressure... to introduce the registration of natives in this city, and we feel that this tradition of liberalism towards the native community should be strengthened and enhanced by the PECC and that no concession should be granted to those powerful elements in our community who are now urging the introduction of this retrogressive and reactionary regulation.

Whether impressed by this somewhat obsequious and self-serving statement or not, the PECC rejected implementing a system of registration. This decision taken early in 1946 and regularly reappraised in the years that followed, was not to be overturned for seven years.

By the late 1940s the UP and NP - while they diverged on the appropriate response to African urbanisation - agreed on the need for a far more interventionist state with the means to tackle the problems of labour distribution, low productivity and high labour turnover. But effective influx control measures depended on a scale of administrative intervention beyond the existing

98 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1846, SNA to TC, PE, 12 Aug. 1941.
100 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/32/15/15, Minutes of the NBAB, 17 July 1941.
101 Posel, Making of Apartheid, p. 44.
102 IAD, 25/279 No. 1, President (W. Meyer) and Sec. (K. Viljoen) of EP Trades Council to TC, PE, 26 Sept. 1945.
capacities of the central and local states. The passage of legislation in 1952 obliged municipalities to enforce influx control measures. It accorded the central state the wherewithal to intervene in the regulation of African labour by municipalities. And unlike its predecessors, the NP government showed itself to be less prepared to make concessions to meet particular local needs, and more determined to achieve a greater measure of centralisation and standardisation in urban policy. Port Elizabeth finally instituted influx control measures in 1953 (in circumstances which shall be examined in chapter 9).

Conclusion

The determinants of policy towards Port Elizabeth's African population were linked to the dynamics of the local political economy and the changing character of the local state. In Robinson's opinion, this "changed from a paternalistic, liberal administration to a bureaucratic, distant and overtly repressive regime". Although she fails to chart this process thoroughly, and is apparently unaware of the PECC's flirtation with influx control measures during the 1930s, the overall trajectory is accurate. Certainly, the ambivalence towards passes in the 1930s gave way to a definite unwillingness to implement influx controls in the 1940s which was largely due to the industrial growth and concomitant increase in demand for unskilled labour.

By the early 1950s, the balance of power in the local state had changed in favour of the proponents of influx control. The factors responsible for this state of affairs included: the extent to which the ideology of segregation/apartheid had become hegemonic at the level of the national and local states; the erosion of local autonomy and the greater conformity to central state policies; the increasing pressure brought to bear on the PECC by white ratepayers and other interest groups which favoured social control and the regulation of labour supplies; the loss of influence by the lobbies representing urban capital; and the limited degree to which the African population itself was able to influence decision-making by the PECC.

105 Posel, Making of Apartheid, pp. 104, 206.
CHAPTER 3
THE ESTABLISHMENT AND EXPANSION OF NEW BRIGHTON, c.1903-1953

A number of locations were established in Port Elizabeth during the nineteenth century.1 The Stranger’s Location (established 1855) was situated to the north of the cemetery abutting Hyman’s Kloof or Russell Road, as it has become. The origin of its Xhosa name, Emaxambeni (meaning that the houses were constructed with sugar pockets filled with sand), remains obscure. Stranger’s Location spilled over into Cooper’s Kloof in the 1860s and became a separate municipal location in 1877. The Reservoir Location off Mount Road was established by the Municipality in 1883 and was called kwaNiamobomvu (literally, 'place of the rooinek' which possibly denoted that an Englishman may have previously owned the land). The largest privately-owned location situated in present-day Mill Park, Gubbs Location, was established in the 1860s and known to its predominantly 'blanket' population by the far more descriptive name of kwaMpundu (literally, 'place of nakedness').2 A case of bubonic plague in Gubb’s Location in 19013 set in motion a train of events which led to the closure of these locations and the creation of New Brighton. These events are described in the first section of this Chapter.

The second section examines the growth of New Brighton and Korsten, both of which were initially situated outside the municipal boundaries. When the Port Elizabeth City Council (PECC) assumed control of New Brighton in 1923, the inclusion of Korsten within the municipality was left in abeyance. During the 1920s the city experienced an acute housing crisis. The incorporation of Korsten within the PE Municipality in 1931 exacerbated the housing crisis.

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2 These names and their meanings have been gleaned from a number of sources, the most important of which were communications from G. Soya Mama of New Brighton and Dr C.J. Skead of Summerstrand; M. de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition: A study of conciliar behaviour in a Black South African township (Ph.D. Thesis, Rhodes University, 1979), p. 4; J. McLaren, A New Concise Xhosa-English Dictionary (Cape Town, 1963), p. 182.

3 Eastern Province Herald (hereafter EPH), 17 April 1901; Christopher, 'Race and Residence', p. 11.
problem but also offered a means of eradicating the "worst slum in the world".4 The provisions
of the 1934 Slums Act empowered the PECC to rehouse residents whose abodes were deemed
unfit for human habitation. As had been the case with the bubonic plague after the turn of the
century, another outbreak of the disease provided the pretext for the Korsten removals in the
late 1930s.

In order to accommodate those Africans evicted from properties in Korsten, the PECC
undertook an extensive sub-economic housing scheme in New Brighton between 1938 and 1942.
The third section of this chapter describes the Korsten removals and the establishment of
McNamee Village. Named after the then Location Superintendent, it was feted as a 'model'.
The final section of the chapter outlines the post-war housing schemes which were established
in New Brighton to house Port Elizabeth's burgeoning African population. The main events
described in this chapter have been outlined elsewhere,5 but my account focuses more closely
on conditions in New Brighton itself. It is obviously impossible, though, to describe the
establishment and expansion of New Brighton without relating these to developments within the
entire city.

The closure of Port Elizabeth's inner locations and the creation of New Brighton, c. 1901-10
Port Elizabeth recorded a total of 105 cases - 21 Whites and 84 Blacks - of bubonic plague in
1901. The disease was more prevalent in certain wards of the town than in the locations.6 When
the first case had been reported, the Colonial Secretary mooted the possibility of a single
location being established outside the town being established under government supervision,
once the necessary legislation had been enacted.7 Location residents endorsed the proposal at
a public meeting. Apart from having greater faith in the bona fides of the Colonial Government

4 Korsten was described as such by Sir Edward Thornton, the British Minister of Social
Welfare and Housing during a visit to Port Elizabeth in the 1930s. Cited in G. Begg,
306 and Anonymous, 'Impressions of the McNamee Township at New Brighton', *The
South African Outlook* (March 1941), p. 46.
5 J. Cherry, 'Blot on the Landscape and Centre of Resistance: A Social and Economic
History of Korsten' (B.A. Hons. thesis, University of Cape Town, 1988); J. Robinson,
'The Power of Apartheid: Territoriality and State Power in South African Cities - Port
Taylor, *Controlling the Burgeoning Masses: Removals and Residential Development in
Port Elizabeth's Black Areas 1800s-1990*, Institute of Social and Economic Research,
6 *Cape of Good Hope Parliamentary Papers, Report on Public Health for 1903*, G. 35 -
1904, p. 91.
7 EPH 23 April 1901.
than the PE Town Council, the central state also had greater resources at its disposal. But because the plague never reached epidemic proportions, the Colonial Government appeared to hesitate in implementing its undertaking to assist the Town Council in resettling location residents. The Mayor commented sardonically that the procrastination of the Government seemed to suggest that they must cultivate the plague in order to have the locations removed.\

Meanwhile, the specially constituted Plague Board, which consisted of representatives of the local authority and public health officials, embarked on a campaign to eradicate the disease in Port Elizabeth. Although merchant stores were infested with rats and were the probable breeding ground for the disease, there were no municipal regulations to enforce the fumigation of these premises. The Board condemned dwellings which it considered insanitary although demolition could only be undertaken with the approval of the Council. Certain Councillors who were 'slumlords' were not above using their offices to hinder the proper implementation of sanitation measures, nor the demolition of dwellings declared unfit for human habitation. However, the Chairman of the Health and Location Committee rejected allegations that the Town Council could not press ahead with its work because of vested interests. Few dwellings owned and occupied by Whites were amongst those condemned by the Plague Board and expropriated by the Town Council. By contrast, location residents complained of personal harassment, arbitrary inspections and the destruction of homes without prior warning. In the end, demolished houses numbered over 325 were in the town proper and over 950 in the locations.

The clamour to remove the existing locations in the town was fuelled by unreasonable white fears that they posed a threat to public health. This objective, however, could not be immediately realised because the Plague Board was not empowered to effect the removal of people from properties not condemned as insanitary nor order the wholesale destruction of the locations. In terms of existing public health legislation, Africans could be forced out of town but not necessarily into a location. The removals contemplated by the authorities were made possible by the passage of the Native Reserve Location Act (40 of 1902), which effectively

8 EPH 19 Sept. 1901, p. 3 ('Town Council/The Removal of Natives').
9 Select Committee on the Native Reserve Location Act, A. 15 - 1903, pp. 97-101, Evidence of C.H. Mackay, Chairman of Health & Location Committee and member of the Plague Board.
12 A. 15 - 1903, pp. 100-1.
translated emergency public health measures into permanent urban locations legislation. Proposed in order to regularise the actions of the Cape Town Municipality in expropriating property from Africans in the town and relocating them to Ndabeni, the Act also provided the means for the local authorities in Port Elizabeth to consolidate the programme of mass evictions and slum clearance.\(^{35}\)

The establishment of New Brighton was facilitated by the Colonial Government’s purchase of the farms known as Cradock Place and Deal Party for the sum of £20 000.\(^{16}\) The portion set aside for the location was situated approximately eight kilometres to the north of the town on land deemed unsuitable for industrial purposes or white residential development.\(^{17}\) The choice of a site for New Brighton outside the municipal boundaries was determined only partly by public health concerns. The fact that the administration of the Location would be assumed by the Cape Government was another consideration. Equally important was that residential segregation provided the authorities with the capacity to effect social control of the town’s African population.

Residents of the municipal locations wished to obtain a guarantee of security of tenure before they moved voluntarily to New Brighton. Although none of the site holders or occupiers in the municipal locations held title to their lots, the PETC had previously agreed to grant title when planning their removal to the new (i.e. Race Course) Location and compensate them for their old dwellings.\(^{18}\) The removals to the Race Course Location had never occurred on account of the outbreak of the South African War but residents expected a similar undertaking to be made in the case of New Brighton - irrespective of whether the Government or the PE Municipality assumed responsibility therefore. Accordingly, in July 1902 a deputation representing location residents interviewed the Civil Commissioner and made application for the grant of titles to land

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16 See correspondence in Cory Library, MS 14,477 G.L. Galpin Papers, from Thos. Stevenson (Galpin’s agent) to Galpin, 10 May and to the Sec. of the South African Association, 12, 16 and 22 July 1901; A. Mabin and M. Comadie (eds.), *The confidence of the whole country: Standard Bank reports on economic conditions in Southern Africa* 1965-1902 (Johannesburg, 1988), p. 515.
17 *Cape of Good Hope, Report of the Select Committee on the Native Reserve Location Bill, A. 22 - 1902*, Appendix A: Report re the matter of establishing a large 'native’ location in or near Port Elizabeth, pp. iii-iv.
18 Cape Archives Depot (hereafter CAD), Native Affairs (NA), Vol. 527 File No. 516, Actg. TC. PE to RM, PE, 8 April 1902; *A. 22 - 1902*, p. 298, Appendix vide PETC Minutes, 26 June 1896.
in New Brighton. The official indicated that the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was not prepared to alienate land or grant title in the proposed location as this would then necessitate different regulations for property and non-property owners.19 But it was suggested, instead, that prospective New Brighton residents with the means to do so might be afforded the opportunity to build their own homes on leasehold plots. The SNA proposed that "only the simplest accommodation should be provided by the Government but facilities be given to the Natives to erect better class dwellings for themselves under the supervision of the Government, and subject to the carrying out of definite conditions as regards manner of construction, size, position and sanitary requirements".20 This did not meet with the approval of other state officials. The Secretary of the Public Works Department (PWD) insisted that for the sake of a uniform system of administration in Native Reserve Locations, Africans should remain simply as tenants paying a monthly rental which would cover service charges as was the case in Ndabeni.21 Section 11(3) of the Native Reserve Location Act made provision for regulating the erection and occupation of private dwellings, but not for the grant of freehold title.

Applications for title to sites in New Brighton by a number of mission churches which held title deeds in the municipal locations were adamantly refused by the Prime Minister (J. Sprigg) himself. Having refused to alienate land in Ndabeni for the purpose of erecting churches, he did not see why New Brighton should be any different.22 He ignored the fact that churches in Cape Town for Africans had not been nearly as substantial as those in Port Elizabeth. Nor was due consideration given to the fact that church authorities would be unable to obtain loans for building purposes without having title to their sites. In asking the Prime Minister to reconsider his decision, it was pointed out that the trustees of the Congregational Union of South Africa (CUSA) were unlikely to agree to the re-erection of church buildings unless the property was secured by title, and that if clergy were alienated they might use their influence to sway their flocks against the authorities.23 In spite of persistent approaches to the Colonial Government, it categorically denied title to churches and siteholders were to have the right of occupation only.

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19 CAD, NA Vol. 527 File No. 516: Report of CC, PE to SNA, 10 April; Schedule of Asst. SNA to Prime Minister, 22 April 1902.
20 CAD, NA V734 f348, SNA to PM, 10 Dec. 1902.
21 CAD, NA Vol. 734 File No. 348, Memo of Conference held in office of CC, PE, 28 July; Sec. PWD to SNA, 2 Sept.; Chief Inspector PWD to Sec. PWD, 28 Oct. 1902.
23 CAD, NA 527 f516, Rev. H. Newell, Minister Edwards Memorial Church, to SNA, 20 May and extract from untitled NAD Report, 28 Feb. 1903.
Churches were allocated sites in New Brighton according to the date when they had established missions amongst the local African population - unlike Ndabeni, they were allocated by drawing lots. Thus, the first choice of site was given to CUSA, the successor of the London Missionary Society which had established the earliest mission to Africans in the Bay. A further 9 sites were allotted to: the Basuto Independent Church (affiliated to CUSA); the Wesleyan Methodist Church (x2); the Church of the Province of South Africa (i.e. Anglican); the Roman Catholic Church; the United Free Church of Scotland (i.e. Presbyterian); the SA Baptist Missionary Society; the Salvation Army; and the Bishop of Grahamstown on behalf of the Order of Ethiopia [see Appendix C]. The grant of a site to the Order of Ethiopia was not at first countenanced because it was regarded as a branch of the Anglican Church and not a distinct body. Representations from the minister of St Stephen's Mission Church appear to have convinced the authorities of the merits of granting a site to the Order. These portrayed the Ethiopians as a group which would serve to counter the influence of the American Methodist Episcopalians who were 'becoming a danger to the state'. It was argued that the Order had a strong claim to a site at the new location for three reasons: the existence of its local congregations prior to its admission into union with the Anglican Church; the fact that these congregations were distinct from those of the Anglican mission; and its numerical strength which was estimated at about 600 members. Other 'Ethiopian' churches - which had seceded from mission churches but whose doctrines and liturgies did not differ markedly from the mother church - were also granted sites if accorded recognition by the Government.

Accommodation for individuals in New Brighton was allotted on a first-come-first-serve basis. The Government initially planned to rehouse only about 1,500 people in the Location even though estimates suggested that about three times that number of Africans resided in the town's locations and slum areas, and that a similar number lived outside the municipal boundaries. Accordingly, it was proposed to erect a roughly equal number of blocks of huts for three different classes of would-be resident: one and two-bedroomed family accommodation for 'ordinary native labourers' and 'civilised natives', as well as dormitories for 'single men', to

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25 CAD, NA 527 f516, Minute 2/2771 in terms of Section 13, Act 40 of 1902, Schedule A, 10 Sept. 1903.
27 CAD, NA 527 f516, CC, PE to SNA, and reply 11 June 1903.
be known as Class 'A', 'B' and 'C' huts respectively. Towards the end of 1902, the Government approved the purchase of wood and iron huts from the dismantled concentration camp at Uitenhage in order to rehouse greater numbers and reduce costs.28 These were subsequently converted into Class 'C' huts for about 2 800 'single' men or migrants. The subsequent decision to reduce the number of Class 'A' and 'B' huts meant a shortage of suitable family accommodation.29

For the want of experienced personnel to oversee the New Brighton removals, a Senior Inspector was seconded from Ndabeni to take charge of the operation.30 His instructions suggest that the Government’s *modus operandi* was designed to pre-empt any resistance.

It is not desired that the Natives should be removed en masse, but that they should be transferred in batches sufficiently small to allow their being easily and effectually manipulated.

Eviction notices were to be served on location residents by the Police acting under the direction of the Civil Commissioner and Magistrate.31 The Stranger’s Location - which was situated on prime real estate - was earmarked as the first site to be cleared of its residents. A number of these residents moved to New Brighton before the deadline for the Municipality’s general eviction notice had expired on 1 June 1903, which was the date upon which the Native Reserve Location Act came into force.32 Most residents, however, remained until evicted and all the huts in Stranger’s Location were cleared and razed to the ground during June [see Illustrations 3.1].33 Cooper’s Kloof Location experienced a similar fate three months later.34 The expulsion notice issued to residents of both locations stipulated that they should proceed to New Brighton.35 But because the Native Reserve Location Act applied only to the municipality itself, the authorities did not have the means to force those Africans who relocated to Korsten and other areas on the periphery of the town into New Brighton [see Figure 3.1].

Private locations within the Port Elizabeth Municipality (PEM) were also subject to the

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28 CAD, NA V734 f348, Chief Inspector to the Secretary for Public Works, 20 Dec. 1902.
29 CAD, NA V734 f348, Sec. PWD to SNA and reply, 16 Dec. 1902; PE Town Clerk’s Files, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of Health & Location Committee, 27 Oct. 1903.
30 CAD, NA V602 f1616, SNA to PM, 23 March 1903.
31 CAD, NA V602 f1616, SNA to Allman, Ndabeni, 3 April 1903.
32 *Cape Daily Telegraph*, 23 June 1903; *A. 15 - 1903*, pp. 72-3.
33 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of Health and Location Committee, 5 and 18 June 1903.
34 *EPH* 29 Sept. 1903.
35 *Port Elizabeth Advertiser*, 22 June 1903. See also *A. 15 - 1903*, pp. 72-3.
Figure 3.1 THE CLOSURE OF PORT ELIZABETH'S LOCATIONS AND THE RESETTLEMENT OF RESIDENTS, 1903-1909
Illustration 3.1 Burning of huts in Strangers' Location, June 1903. (Private collection of T.S. Bodill)

Illustration 3.2 Original huts in the Red Location, New Brighton, c.1990 (Weekend Post).
provisions of the Native Reserve Location Act. The syndicate which owned Gubbs Location sought to exact compensation from the Government for the loss of income which would follow the eviction of African tenants forced upon them by the legislation. This was turned down on the grounds of the enormous profits that the company had made from its tenants to date and the amount it was likely to secure upon sale of its site to the Municipality or property developers. The syndicate complied with its obligations without further demur and gave residents - in terms of their lease conditions - three months notice before evicting them without compensation. They commenced relocating in June 1903. As with the municipal locations, few of the residents of Gubbs Location moved to New Brighton. Many owners of huts chose to dismantle and re-erect them either in Korsten or even the Reservoir Location.36

Many former residents of the inner locations chose to use their compensation payments from the PETC to hire or purchase plots from speculators in Korsten and Dassieskraal.37 The hiring or leasing of property in such areas was a lucrative source of revenue, and landlords welcomed new tenants. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that slumlords encouraged the disaffected African community to resist relocation to New Brighton. But ultimately they exercised a choice in the matter; or as Odendaal has put it, 'voted with their feet' to go to Korsten instead of New Brighton.38 By the end of 1903 the population of New Brighton was 2 125 [see Table 3.1] which fell far short of the projected figure of 6 000,39 whereas more than twice that number of Africans had relocated to Korsten.40

For many Africans, Korsten provided an alternative, and in some ways preferable, place of abode to New Brighton. Perhaps the primary advantage of living in Korsten was that Africans were entitled to own property and build their own houses. Kirk has also suggested that the option of choosing one's area of residence or neighbourhood was important as many Africans complained of being separated from their friends in New Brighton.41 On the other hand, there were certain disadvantages to residing in Korsten. It was administered by the Divisional Council

36 CAD, NA V734 f348, Sec. Mill Park Estate & Land Co. Ltd. to SNA, 3 Feb. and Magt., PE to SNA, 27 June 1903.
37 CAD, NA V157 97/19/f348, RM, PE to SNA, 18 April 1903.
39 *Cape of Good Hope, Debates of the House of Assembly for 1904*, p. 224.
40 CAD, Colonial Office (CO) V8765 f78c, Magt. PE to Under Colonial Secretary, 29 April 1904; Christopher, 'Race and Residence', p. 13.
41 Kirk, 'Residential Segregation in Port Elizabeth', p. 236 tabulates the advantages/disadvantages of Korsten over New Brighton.
which did not have the means to collect rates and provide essential services. By contrast, New Brighton had its own water supply and sanitation, as well as medical services which were included in the costs of rentals. The failure to guarantee Africans exclusive trading rights in New Brighton limited entrepreneurial opportunities and discouraged the small African middle class from relocating. Others objected to the irksome restrictions which forbade domestic beer brewing and provided for close surveillance, including police searches for the possession of illegal liquor which were conducted at all hours. Workers, especially those who commuted to town on a daily basis, objected to the distance and cost of rail fares which amounted to 6s. per month. Rents in New Brighton of between 20s. and 30s. per month for family quarters and 8s. per month for single quarters were exhorbitant. By comparison, the charges for site rent and the provision of water, sanitation and refuse removals in the existing municipal location had been fixed at £1.2.6 per annum. The rents charged by slumlords in Korsten were not nearly as high as those in New Brighton. For all or some of the above reasons, many Africans opted to live in areas which lay outside the municipal boundaries and the ambit of the Native Reserve Location Act.

In any event, the shortage of accommodation in the location made the enforcement of the Native Reserve Location Act impractical. Consequently, the implementation of the Act had to be temporarily suspended during 1904 and the relocation of Reservoir Location residents to New Brighton stayed. In fact, many people took the opportunity to leave the location and the population reached a new low late in the year [see Table 3.1]. But following a short-lived recrudescence of the plague, the authorities invoked public health legislation in a bid to remove Africans residing illegally within the PEM. In December 1904, a Notice was proclaimed (in terms of the Public Health Act of 1897) which empowered the Colonial Secretary to direct non-exempt Africans in the Port Elizabeth magisterial district to remove to New Brighton. A rigorous effort was made to enforce these provisions despite the 'truculent' and 'obstinate' (terms employed by the magistrate) attitude of the Africans. They were threatened that they would be deprived of compensation if they did not move voluntarily. Whilst the SNA saw

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42 CAD, 3/PEZ, 1/3/1/2/1, p. 24, Minutes of the Health and Location Committee, 20 Feb. 1903.
44 CAD, NA V607 f1677, TC, PE to SNA, 8 Oct. 1904; NA V517 f371, ARM to SNA, 28 July 1904; Swanson, 'Sanitation Syndrome', p. 404.
45 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/30, Treasurer to Mayor, PE, 22 July 1904.
47 CAD, NA V607 1677, RM, PE to SNA, 20 March, 23 March and 18 April 1905.
the necessity for the presence of the police when enforcing the removals, he warned that it would be wise to

avoid as far as practicable any show of compulsion which would have a disturbing effect on the Native mind and thus hamper the movement.  

The steady increase of New Brighton’s population during 1905 from 1 197 to 4 516 was due either to the success of a strategy of intimidation employed by the authorities in effecting the removals, or to the inflation of population returns [see below].

**TABLE 3.1**

**NEW BRIGHTON POPULATION RETURNS, 1903-1910**

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</tbody>
</table>

Despite the increase of New Brighton’s population during 1905, the authorities were nowhere near to removing all unexempted Africans from Port Elizabeth. The special dispensation granted the SAR&H to maintain a compound for its workers in close proximity to the harbour established a precedent for ignoring the Native Reserve Location Act. The Council itself turned down applications by other employers who sought exemption from the provisions of the Act on behalf of their African workers but granted exemptions to numerous individual property

48 CAD, NA V607 f1677, SNA to CC, PE, 31 March 1905.
49 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of Health & Location Committee, 2 July 1903.
owners or lessees whose premises were declared to be sanitary. Convinced, too, that the threat to public health formerly posed by the existence of locations in the town was merely being relocated to its periphery, the PETC considered extending its boundaries so as to include Korsten and enforce its own bye-laws and regulations. Although negotiations on the matter with the Government reached an advanced stage and the necessary legislation was drafted, the authorities opted instead for an amendment to the Native Reserve Location Act (8 of 1905). This extended the Act’s jurisdiction to a distance of five miles (i.e. about 8 km) outside the municipal boundaries and, thereby brought Korsten under its scope. This legislation finally accorded the authorities the powers to compel non-exempt Africans in Korsten to move to New Brighton. The decrease in the African population of Korsten between from 4,943 in 1904 to 2,344 in 1911 [see Table 3.1] can be ascribed largely to the extension of the scope of the amended Act.

Nonetheless, the authorities still employed a strategy which combined intimidation and co-option to achieve the objectives of the Native Reserve Location Act. Section 7(18) of the amended Act provided for "the lease or grant under title of building lots to any Native residents desirous of erecting their own dwelling places within the Reserve Location". This made possible (in theory, at least) the implementation of a proposal which sought to induce 'respectable and better class natives' to resettle in New Brighton. Property owners in Korsten were to be given a plot of equal size in New Brighton and pay 4s. per month for services. Further plots would be demarcated for residents to erect their own dwellings provided these conformed with certain minimum building specifications. The plots would be leased at 1s. plus an additional 4s. per month services or acquired for a single payment of the equivalent of twenty-one years rent in advance. The authorities found a willing partner in this scheme in the person of Rev James Dwane, the founder of the Order of Ethiopia, who convinced over one hundred of his followers to avail themselves of the offer of plots in New Brighton. Dwane led prospective buyers to believe that a building society would be formed and that the Government would lend financial assistance. However, the scheme collapsed and Dwane was discredited because, by his own

50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of Health & Location Committee, 13 and 18 Aug. 1903; 3 and 25 Feb. 1904; 7 July 1904 and 4 Jan. 1906.
51 CAD, CO V8765 f78c, unsigned report, 30 Sept. 1904; Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 422, 14 Dec. 1904.
54 Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1905, G. 46 - 1906, p. 74.
55 CAD, NA V734 f348, ARM, PE to SNA, 13 Dec. 1904.
56 CAD, NA 587 f1435, Actg. CC, PE to SNA, 13 May 1905 and ARM, PE to SNA, 13 Nov. 1906.
admission, he had been co-opted. However, the Order of Ethiopia, along with the other churches originally allotted sites in New Brighton, were eventually granted title to these sites subject to the condition that "when no longer used or required for the purposes of grant, the land shall revert to the Government". It would appear that the Colonial Government took cognisance of the fact that the grant of title to the churches provided a means of social control.

In arguing the merits of individual tenure, the SNA suggested that it was preferable to encourage Africans to purchase property in the locations than outside, and that it was in line with the policy of segregation approved by Parliament. He also suggested that the provision of title "would provide an object lesson to local bodies which are as a rule averse to granting security of tenure to natives". Nonetheless, regulations stipulating the terms for granting title to individuals in the Native Reserve Locations were never promulgated. The Government's Legal Adviser and the Attorney-General were of the opinion that such regulations would conflict with the Statute Law of the Colony with respect to the transfer of property. It was agreed that "it would be wiser and safer" to allow Africans to have only occupation and not freehold rights in the locations. However, a subsequent legal opinion on this matter contradicted this view. It was held that because Sections 7 and 11(18) of the amended Native Reserve Location Act expressly authorised the Governor to issue regulations whereby leases or grants of land may be made within a Reserve Location, this overrode the general provision as to the disposal of Government property in Section 6 of Act 26 of 1891. In other words, Parliamentary sanction was not deemed necessary for residents of New Brighton to be granted title. In the event, the Colonial Government ignored the subsequent ruling. Thus the state could be seen to have dishonoured a pledge given by the PETC to grant title and permission to Africans to erect their own homes in the new location. With their inflexible approach to the question of property

57 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) 156 1703/f348, Various correspondence: Dwane to ARM, NB, 10 Aug. 1905; ARM, NB to SNA, 16 Aug. 1905; Dwane to ARM, NB, 26 Sept. 1905; ARM, NB to SNA, 27 Sept. 1905; Dwane to ARM, NB, 7 Oct. 1905. The quote is from the first letter.


59 CeA, NTS V178 1703/f348, SNA to Surveyor-General, 22 Feb. 1907.

60 Central Archives Depot, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) V178 1703/f348, Memo of SNA to PM, March 1908.

61 CeA, NTS V156 1703/f348, SNA to PM, 21 Aug. 1908.

62 CAD, Justice Department (JUS), V86 f21876, Sec. for Law Dept. to SNA, 16 Nov. 1909.

rights and tenure, the state ignored class distinctions and served to decrease the physical and social distance between the African middle and working classes. Kirk has suggested that New Brighton was established primarily to control the latter but, in treating the former no differently, the state alienated a group which might have co-operated with it.64

In 1909 Port Elizabeth’s Resident Magistrate (RM) lamented that the local authorities did not "take more active steps to encourage the removal and segregation of Natives residing in the urban area to the Reserve Location".65 Consequently, the last of the town’s old locations was closed when the PETC reached an agreement with the Colonial Government that provision would be made for siteholders in the Reservoir Location to receive compensation for the demolition of their dwellings and be allotted accommodation in New Brighton.66 As a result of these removals, the population of New Brighton increased from 2,099 to 3,105 between December 1908 and 1909 [see Table 3.1]. The 1,644 Africans still resident within the municipal boundaries included voters and other groups such as domestic servants who were exempt from removal in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act. The 375 estimated to be living in the town in contravention of the Act was probably well short of the actual figure.67 The Town Council prided itself in having removed virtually the entire non-exempt African population from the town and its peripheral areas to New Brighton.68 In fact, Port Elizabeth was one of the most highly segregated towns in the country at the time of Union.69

If the population returns are to be believed, New Brighton’s population fluctuated quite extensively before 1910. This was for a number of reasons. In the first place, the closure of the locations occurred in two stages: Stranger’s, Cooper’s Kloof and Gubb’s Locations during the second half of 1903 and the Reservoir Location during 1909. Secondly, the shortage of accommodation in New Brighton and the lack of effective means to preclude location residents from going to Korsten before the passage of Act 8 of 1905. Even then, many Africans not exempt from the Native Reserve Location Act still managed to avoid having to relocate to New Brighton. Thirdly, the location was not popular amongst the 'respectable and better class

64 Kirk, 'Residential Segregation in Port Elizabeth', pp. 206-7 and 330-1.
66 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/141, SNA to TC, PE, 10 July 1909; Mayor's Minute for 1909, p.4.
68 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minutes for 1909, pp. 4 and 89 and Mayor’s Minutes for 1910, p. 58.
natives' for numerous reasons, but especially on account of there being no provision for the purchase or long-term lease of land. Fourthly, the sizeable number of migrants and the economic recession meant that there was a constant coming and going of residents. Nonetheless, there was an increasing demand for family accommodation as the population became more permanent and stable in character.

The growth of New Brighton and Korsten, c.1910-1933

By 1910, New Brighton was said to be overcrowded despite the fact that the population numbered some 1,500 less than at the end of 1905. Apart from the closure of the Reservoir Location, improved trade and economic prospects in Port Elizabeth caused an influx of people to the Location. The increased demand for family accommodation was due partly to the decrease of rents from between 25s. and 30s. in 1903 to between 5s. and 8s. in 1909 [see Chapter 5]. Accordingly, many of the single mens' quarters (SMQ) or kwaNdokwenza were converted into family units, whilst kitchens were converted into quarters for single men. Single persons were placed five in each room and included a number of unmarried women with babies. The following Table shows exactly how the available accommodation was being utilised:

TABLE 3.2

ACCOMMODATION IN NEW BRIGHTON 1910

| Dwellings occupied by families | 768 |
| Dwellings occupied by single persons | 97 |
| Dwellings occupied by officials | 15 |
| Dwellings occupied by paupers | 12 |
| Vacant dwellings | 5* |
| Total number of dwellings | 897 |

*There were no empty dwellings as such, but accommodation for 5 families or 25 single persons was available if rearrangements were to be made. In addition, 13 kitchens were rented out for

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70 An explanation for the discrepancies in the figures given for population returns in New Brighton would seem to be that figures between 1905 and Sept. 1908 were inflated so as to convince the NAD of the effectiveness of the local officials in applying the provisions of Act 8 of 1905 to remove Africans from Korsten to New Brighton. A census taken in Oct. 1908, revealed that the population return showed 1,394 persons too many (or, as that included 41 absconders, 1,353). See CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, CC, PE to SNA, 10 Feb. and Supt. NBL, to RM, PE, 12 Feb. 1910.

71 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, CC, PE to SNA, 23 Dec. and SNA to Sec. for Finance, 30 Dec. 1910.

use as churches, schools and eating houses. Many families also took in lodgers who helped pay rents but added to the congestion. Thus New Brighton was in dire need of additional accommodation.\textsuperscript{73}

In 1910 the Magistrate - acting without due authorisation - approved a scheme to erect 25 traditional style huts (i.e. rondawels) as an interim measure to alleviate the overcrowding in New Brighton. However, the African builder who was awarded the contract was unable to complete the job as he was declared insolvent. A white contractor eventually finished the work, but not before there had been a considerable hold up.\textsuperscript{74} The following year, the NAD authorised the construction of a row of 11 semi-detached galvanised iron dwellings to house 22 families\textsuperscript{75} [see Illustration 3.3]. But the demand for accommodation in New Brighton exceeded the supply. All additional accommodation was immediately filled upon completion and many applications were turned down. The Superintendent reported having a waiting list of families living in town and Korsten wanting accommodation in New Brighton.\textsuperscript{76} This demand for accommodation in New Brighton was more out of necessity than choice. Pressure from white ratepayers for the strenuous application of the law that provided for the expulsion of unregistered Africans from the town following a 'black peril' incident in 1911 had increased the demand for the erection of additional accommodation in New Brighton.

In 1911 the Location Superintendent proposed and the NAD endorsed a scheme to advance loans to the 'respectable classes' of Africans to erect dwellings for themselves on sites in New Brighton allotted for the purpose. It was regarded as "a much more economical alternative to the erection of quarters by Government" for it would be at their own expense.\textsuperscript{77} However, the scheme was not implemented. Instead, further funds were voted for the construction of more accommodation in New Brighton which would be rented to residents. After considerable delay caused by squabbling between the Departments of Native Affairs, Finance and Public Works over the funding and suitability of the dwellings provided,\textsuperscript{78} provision was made for over 200

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{73} CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, SNA to Prime Minister, 14 Feb. and Memo to Minister of Native Affairs, Dec. 1910.
\item \textsuperscript{74} CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Internal NAD memo, Dec. 1910.
\item \textsuperscript{75} CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, SNA to MNA, 30 Dec. 1910; SNA to Sec. for Public Works, 30 Jan. and District Engineer to SNA, 13 Feb. 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{76} CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 14 June 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{77} CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, Inspector NBL to RM, PE, 29 May and Actg. SNA to Sec. for Finance, 10 Oct. 1911.
\item \textsuperscript{78} CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Minister of Finance to Minister of Native Affairs, 19 Sept.; Minister of Public Works to MNA, 9 Nov.; MNA to SNA, 22 Nov.; Medical Officer,
Illustration 3.3 Semi-detached huts erected in New Brighton, April 1912 (Central Archives, Pretoria).

Illustration 3.4 Entrance to the House of the Superintendent, New Brighton (SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria).
'single' men and 25 families. However, this additional accommodation provided no more than an outlet for the overcrowding at New Brighton itself. And the provision of further accommodation was put on hold because the question of whether the state or local authority should bear the responsibility was being thrashed out.79 Meanwhile, the NAD found itself in the awkward position of having to refuse Africans, who were obliged to live in New Brighton, admission to the Location.80 A raid on 33 houses in the early hours of a morning in June 1911 revealed 124 persons residing illegally in the town. It was estimated that at least three times that number of Africans lived within the Municipality in contravention of the Native Reserve Location Act, but that the Police and Sanitary Department were reluctant to evict them on account of the inadequate accommodation in New Brighton.81

In 1912 a member of the Advisory Board noted that "many people wish to come to New Brighton to live", and that outsiders regarded it as a good place in which to live.82 The apparent greater willingness of Africans to reside in New Brighton, according to the Superintendent, reflected shifting perceptions about the Location. He reckoned that the attitude of the Africans toward the Location had changed for they were now "as eager to get into it now as at one time they were eager to get out of it". This may have had something to do with the fact that the curfew was enforced in town, including peripheral areas like Korsten, but not New Brighton. The Superintendent also reckoned that the greater number resident in Korsten would move to New Brighton voluntarily, and only those "who have a good deal to fear from strict supervision would require compulsion".83 The Resident Magistrate, W.C. Scully, made known his view that it was impossible under the circumstances to compel people to reside in New Brighton. However, he made an exception and found room for any known 'bad character' or professional criminal because of the machinery which existed in the Location for exercising control.84 He claimed more than his fair share of credit for overcoming the objections of the 'respectable Natives' to residing in New Brighton.85 From 3 604 in 1911, the population

79 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, Actg. SNA to Sec. for Finance, 4 Jan. 1912.
80 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Actg. SNA to Actg. Sec. for Finance, 3 Aug. 1911.
82 CeA, NTS 156 3575/12/f348, Minutes of the NBAB, 18 June 1912.
83 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 9 May 1912.
84 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, CC and RM, PE to SNA, 23 May 1912.
peaked at 5,378 in 1913 before declining to 4,114 the following year. Thereafter, New Brighton’s population increased steadily and reached 4,711 in 1918.86

Persistent appeals by local officials and the Advisory Board to the Government to alleviate the acute shortage of accommodation in New Brighton were to no avail.87 The possibility of the imminent transfer of New Brighton to the control of the PE Municipality ruled out this possibility [see Chapter 4]. And the delay in effecting the transfer only served to exacerbate the problem of congestion and the generally deplorable living conditions in New Brighton.88 Whilst the PECC accused the Government of shirking its responsibility by not providing sufficient accommodation in the Location,89 it had itself shown similar neglect and parsimony in providing housing and services for its own poorer classes. The Influenza Epidemic Commission had recommended that immediate attention be given to poor housing and slum conditions in Port Elizabeth.90

By the end of the decade, the housing shortage had reached critical proportions owing to the influx of both Africans and ‘poor whites’ caused by the drought in Port Elizabeth’s hinterland. It was estimated that there were in excess of 1,200 Africans residing illegally in the city.91 The Housing Committee Report of 1920 reckoned that apart from New Brighton, there was a shortage of over a thousand housing units in Port Elizabeth. The Committee also singled out Port Elizabeth as "the most insanitary town they visited". The Chief Sanitary Inspector’s only saving grace was that he had been away on active service for the duration of the First World War. His deputy had been unable to withstand the vested interests of slumlords in the PECC and obtain the necessary authorisation for the demolition of dwellings condemned as unfit for human habitation. In this regard, the Housing Committee commented that municipal officials and prominent citizens who "should be looked to to give a lead in bettering the living conditions in the town" were exploiting the shortage of available housing for their own ends.92 And the

86 Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, U.G. 7 - 1919, p. 88, Annexure G.
88 EPH 6 June 1919 (Letter from 'Straightforward’); CeA, NTS 2443 4/291 Supt., NBL to Magt., 16 June and Minutes of the NBAB, 19 June 1919.
89 PEA 3 April 1920 ('Natives Forced into Town').
provisions of the Housing Act of 1920 which authorised the central government to assist local authorities in funding sub-economic housing schemes were of no consequence insofar as alleviating congested living conditions in New Brighton was concerned. In the first place, these funds were not available for African housing and, secondly, the PECC did not have jurisdiction over New Brighton.

When the PECC assumed control of New Brighton, accommodation was at a premium. A number of families were residing in kitchens attached to the dwellings in the location. The Municipality decided to regularise the situation and convert these into makeshift dwellings. Accommodation was available in the following types and quantities:

**TABLE 3.3**

*ACCOMMODATION IN NEW BRIGHTON, 1924*

**Married Quarters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>2 rooms and kitchen with verandah</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B, D</td>
<td>2 rooms and kitchen without verandah</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>partitioned into 2 rooms with outside kitchen</td>
<td>685</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>kitchens converted into rooms</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Partitioned into 2 rooms with outside kitchens</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Concrete Dwellings**

- 172

**Rondavels**

- 27

**Single Quarters**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Partitioned into 2 rooms with outside kitchens</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Third Grade and Grade C were the same type of structure, utilised for families and 'single' men, respectively. The allocation of these units depended on current demand. Although the SMQ accommodated little over 600 people, it was estimated that there were as many as 2 250 people in this category, of whom 1 530 were males, living in New Brighton. Thus the majority of adult singles actually lodged with families in the married quarters. At least half the tenants of these dwellings had lodgers. And in many cases these lodgers were not single persons, but families. The adult population numbered 4 800, which comprised about 2 250 couples. With a population of 3 400 children under the age of 16 years, this meant that the average household had more than seven occupants. And bed (or, in some cases, space) occupancy was little different in the married and the single quarters as there was an average of 4.5 persons per room.

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93 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 29 Aug. 1924.
The total population of about 8,200 was therefore far in excess of the optimum number of residents for which there was accommodation in New Brighton.94

Robinson has recounted how publicity given to the appalling living conditions in New Brighton by two clergymen sparked a controversy in 1925.95 In order to alleviate the congestion in the Location, the PECC erected a total of 60 'better class' three- and two-roomed brick cottages in 1926.96 Preference was given to those tenants who were considered capable of paying the relatively high rent, and applications from Africans resident in the city and Korsten were, with few exceptions, turned down.97 A further 250 houses and a hostel to accommodate 244 'single' men were constructed thereafter. There was considerable resistance on the part of 'single' men to move into the SMQ when it was opened in January 1929. The principal objection was having to pay a rent of 9s. per month which was three times the fees charged for previous accommodation for 'single' men.98 In order to compel them into the new SMQ, the administration resorted to setting a standard rent for 'single' men wherever they lived in the Location.99 In addition to the badly needed accommodation, two eating houses, three shops, an administration block, and charge office and police barracks were erected.100 The entire scheme became known as 'Newtown' or more colloquially as the 'White Location'. These structures were erected with a view to greater permanency than those in the 'Red Location', but also at a significantly greater cost because of the use of unskilled white labour in accordance with the Government's 'civilised' labour policy.

The erection of 'Newtown' and the departure of a considerable number of migrants from New Brighton during the Depression temporarily relieved the congestion in the Location.

### TABLE 3.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Males</td>
<td>4,079</td>
<td>3,709</td>
<td>3,918</td>
<td>3,742</td>
<td>3,225</td>
<td>3,338</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Females</td>
<td>3,315</td>
<td>3,438</td>
<td>3,409</td>
<td>3,291</td>
<td>3,332</td>
<td>3,369</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>7,394</td>
<td>7,147</td>
<td>7,327</td>
<td>7,033</td>
<td>6,557</td>
<td>6,707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

94 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute for 1924, pp. 28-9.
96 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Supt. NBL to NAC, 4 May 1927.
99 For a fuller account of this episode, see Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 181-3.
100 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute for 1928, City Engineer's Report, p. 53.
Figure 3.2 LAYOUT PLAN OF THE OLD LOCATION, NEW BRIGHTON
The Table shows that while the number of males decreased quite significantly, the number of females remained fairly constant. By 1930, there were as many as three to four hundred vacancies in the SMQ (including the hostel). It is possible that many of the migrants did not depart the city itself, but moved to Korsten and Dassieskraal which was wedged between the city proper and New Brighton. In 1933 New Brighton’s population comprised only about a third of Port Elizabeth’s total African population of 20,549. The majority lived in Korsten which had recently been incorporated within the PE Municipal boundaries.

The Korsten removals and the establishment of McNamee Village, c. 1934-1943

The inclusion of Korsten within the PE Municipality had been on the cards ever since New Brighton had been incorporated. The PECC had initially baulked at this suggestion because it foresaw that the elimination or upgrading of slum areas would require extensive capital investment. And the Council’s reluctance to tackle the housing problem is illustrated by the fact that during the 1920s the Municipality had built only 409 (economic) houses for Whites and Coloureds, 72 houses for Whites under the Assisted Housing Scheme, and 310 (economic) houses for Africans in New Brighton. Thus Port Elizabeth was faced with a general housing crisis of significant proportions. But a Commission appointed to investigate the proposed extension of Port Elizabeth’s municipal boundaries was swayed by arguments that the incorporation of Korsten and other areas on the periphery of the city under a single administration would facilitate the creation of segregated areas in the name of slum clearance. Conditions of overcrowding and poor sanitation with their attendant health risks for the city at large, as well as increasing lawlessness and demands for land for industrial development increased pressure for municipal intervention.

Korsten was incorporated within the PE Municipality in 1931 and the Medical Officer of Health (MOH) lost no time in advocating the removal of Africans to New Brighton. He pointed out that if the Urban Areas Act was to be enforced, then notices would have to be served on individuals requiring them to move; in other words, there could be no ‘blanket’ removals. Moreover, accommodation would have to be provided for those dislodged from dwellings declared

102 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1634, Return of TC, PE to NAD, 29 Nov. 1933.
'insanitary'. In terms of Proclamation No. 272 of 1933 issued under Section 5 of the Urban Areas Act, the PECC had the power to enforce the segregation of Africans in the urban area, and under the 1934 Slums Act the power to remove them from Korsten as part of a slum clearance programme. The PECC delayed applying the provisions of this legislation until July 1935, when the MOH was instructed to notify Korsten residents whose dwellings had been singled out for demolition.

As the PECC obtained the approval of the Central Housing Board (CHB) and NAD to effect the Korsten removals as a slum clearance programme, it qualified for loans on a sub-economic basis. The refusal of the Government to accede to an application for the use of non-union (i.e. unskilled African) labour in constructing the housing scheme in New Brighton created immediate concern about the viability of the scheme. The Council consequently declined to avail itself of sub-economic loans from the Government as this would have entailed an equal loss (1,25%) by both parties and a departure from its previous policy not to subsidise African housing from ratepayers funds. The PECC was eventually constrained to accept the necessity for borrowing 0,75% loans with the loss shared at a ratio of 2:1 in favour of the Municipality. But this was not before it had explored cheaper alternatives for providing housing for Africans. One such proposal was the creation of a freehold 'Native Village' which would have involved the Council in no cost whatsoever. Another was the establishment of such a Village on a leasehold basis with municipal assistance. The first of these propositions was received far more favourably by the Advisory Board and the 'respectable classes' than the first, and both were endorsed by the Superintendent who argued that there was scope for them under the provisions of the Urban Areas Act. Eventually the NAC determined that the Native Village would be superseded by a sub-economic housing scheme.

A Housing and Slum Elimination Committee was constituted by the PECC to oversee the programme. Initially it was planned to erect a scheme consisting of only 500 houses in New Brighton so as to remove pockets of Africans from insanitary dwellings in areas such as South

106 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/5/5, MOH to NAC, 24 June 1931.
108 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Memo re 'Housing in Relation to Slums Act 1934' by TC for NAC, 18 July 1935.
110 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/10, Memo by TC, PE for NAC re 'Proposed Establishment of Native Village', 16 July 1936.
End, Central and North End which were predominantly white.\textsuperscript{111} But when it became apparent that there were considerable benefits to be had from a large-scale programme of slum elimination - such as the releasing of well-situated land for industrial development - it was decided to make a more thorough assessment of the situation in Korsten. In April 1935, the MOH completed a preliminary housing survey in which he estimated that Korsten's population of 23 758 persons comprised 5 138 Whites, 5 082 Coloureds, 362 Asiatics and 12 456 Africans. There were 2 424 houses and 5 002 separately occupied yard-rooms, i.e shacks, comprising a total of 8 632 rooms. The average number of occupants per house was 6,89 persons and 1,43 persons per shack. It was reckoned that only 297 of the houses were 'reasonably fit' for human habitation; 1 063 required minor alterations or repairs to bring them up to the same standard; 941 required major repairs (requiring the houses to be vacated) before they could be made habitable; while 123 houses were incapable of repair or not worth repairing. As far as the shacks were concerned, it was recommended that 4 183 should be demolished. These figures indicate that more than 6 800 people would have to be removed from dwellings deemed 'unfit for human habitation'.\textsuperscript{112} It was eventually decided to scale up the programme but downgrade the quality of workmanship:

The plans finally adopted were the outcome of an endeavour to keep down costs to an absolute minimum so that the rentals would fall within certain prescribed limits [i.e. 16s. per month stipulated by the NAD] and yet all the essential requirements would be provided.\textsuperscript{113}

The scheme, to be known as McNamee Village in honour of the Location Superintendent, was to consist of 3 000 houses and was commenced in November 1937.\textsuperscript{114}

At the time, New Brighton accommodated 7 715 persons. An estimated 1 356 dwellings were used as family quarters and 33 buildings as single quarters. The addition of the new dwellings would mean that the projected population of McNamee Village would be nearly three times that of the existing Location. The size of the undertaking was nearly ten times that of 'Newtown'. It was part and parcel of a larger and comprehensive scheme to build 5 000 houses in five years at a cost of £1 500 000. The amount was to be repaid over 40 years at an interest rate of 0,75%. All in all, the new housing scheme was a bold step by the PECC which became convinced that it might solve its housing problem and enforce residential segregation in one go.

\textsuperscript{111} CA, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Memos of TC and MOH to joint meeting of NAC and Health & Markets Committee, 26 June 1934.
\textsuperscript{112} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Report of MOH referred by Health & Markets Committee to NAC, 29 April 1935.
\textsuperscript{113} G. Begg, 'Sub Economic Housing in Port Elizabeth', \textit{SA Architect} (Nov. 1940), p. 306.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{EPH}, 23 Nov. 1937.
Figure 3.3 LAYOUT PLAN OF MCNAMEE VILLAGE
Bubonic plague was discovered in Karsten after the completion of 100 houses of the McNamee Village scheme. As had been the case in the early 1900s, the discovery of about 25 cases of plague in 1938 provided the authorities with a post hoc justification for the removals. Because most of the deaths occurred in Karsten, residents were subjected to a rigorous programme to combat its spread. The anti-plague measures included the removal of a victim to the Lazarett and anyone suspected of contact with the victim was isolated, their possessions and persons disinfected, their homes demolished and they were ultimately removed to New Brighton.

Cherry has pointed to the gulf between the perceptions of the local authority and former African residents of Karsten as to the circumstances in which the removals in the late 1930s occurred. Unlike much of the oral testimony in which the removals are recalled as act of brutality, the authorities perceived that there were those who were not at all averse to moving to New Brighton. A leading liberal Councillor, Mrs E.M. Holland contended that "... when it was known that plague contacts were being moved into the new houses after quarantine, Natives crowded into plague houses in order to be eligible for one of the new houses". And according to the MOH, other slum dwellers moved into houses in Karsten that had been earmarked for demolition a few days before the occupants were scheduled to be moved to the Location. He expressed concern that without proper registration of those scheduled for relocation, that there would be no way of ensuring that only bona fide Karsten residents would be removed. It followed that if this practice was allowed to continue unabated then the original estimates for the number of people to be removed, as well as the number of houses needed in New Brighton would have been grossly under estimated. For whatever reasons, the total of those removed from Karsten was far greater than had been expected, and there was no concerted resistance to the removals.

Another factor complicating the removals was that a considerable number of Africans owned property in Karsten. Many still owed landlords money as they had not completed hire purchase

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116 Cherry, 'Blot on the Landscape', pp. 46-58, cites from the transcripts of numerous interviews conducted by Vista University students in 1987 (in my possession) which were not supervised or monitored. My own perception is that this testimony has to be treated with some caution as there is a tendency to confuse the removals of the late 1930s and late 1950s so that the qualitative experience of the one colours the other.
118 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/215/14, Memo of MOH re 'Influx of natives where slum clearance is taking place', 12 April 1940.
payments. A total of 483 lots with a valuation of nearly £47 000 were owned by Africans in the Municipality.\(^\text{119}\) Both the Advisory Board and the Vigilance Committee recommended that if freehold title was to be given in New Brighton in exchange for lots in Korsten, then the same facilities should be accorded to Location residents.\(^\text{120}\) A proposal was made that those with title should be expropriated and compensated, and given the opportunity of acquiring a piece of land to the west of New Brighton (i.e. Cradock Place) in lieu of their existing property in exchange on the basis of either freehold or leasehold title as may be mutually agreed upon.\(^\text{121}\) Two years passed before the PECC invited African land owners in Korsten to notify it if they were interested in exchanging their land for a site in the proposed Relton Village, New Brighton. Dwellings could be constructed under an assisted housing scheme. The scheme was conditional on obtaining the necessary consent of the CHB and the CPA; if housing funds were available; and if a sufficient number of approved applications was received.\(^\text{122}\) There were apparently no applicants but Advisory Board members claimed that not many residents had seen the advertisement.\(^\text{123}\) At a subsequent meeting between the Board and the NAC, the Committee ruled out any chance of freehold being granted but it was decided to allow the Board to canvass New Brighton residents to ascertain whether there was a sufficient number (i.e. fifty) of residents interested in acquiring leasehold sites and building their own houses to make such a scheme viable.\(^\text{124}\) As with the earlier proposal for a Native Village, the names of sufficient interested parties were not obtained and the scheme was abandoned.

The fact that Korsten residents were given preference to new houses in McNamee Village aroused resentment from many quarters. The PECC’s decision that lodgers in the old location would not be allowed to obtain houses in McNamee Village led to the Advisory Board recommending that additional houses should be erected to house such families. This was coupled to another recommendation that accommodation should be found in Schauderville for Coloureds occupying houses in New Brighton.\(^\text{125}\) Residents of 'Newtown' who were paying considerably more rent than that paid by McNamee residents for houses of similar quality, also believed that

\(^{119}\) Intermediate Archives Dept, Port Elizabeth (IAD), 25/196 No. 3, Return of Immovable Property in the Urban Area of Port Elizabeth owned by Natives (Form 'D'), Oct. 1938.
\(^{120}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282, Minutes of the NBAB, 22 April 1937 and 30 June 1938.
\(^{121}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Minutes of joint meeting of the Housing & Slum Elimination Committee and NAC, 6 July 1938.
\(^{122}\) EPH 2 April 1940, Municipal Notice No. 66 of 1940.
\(^{123}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/14/14, Minutes of the NBAB, 31 Oct. 1940.
\(^{124}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/15, Minutes of meeting of NAC and NBAB, 10 March 1941.
\(^{125}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282 and 1/3/2/15/12, Minutes of the NBAB, 10 Feb. and 30 June 1938.
they had grounds for dissatisfaction. A compromise proposal was made that the Council should approve the removal of as many single men as possible from Korsten to the brick houses in 'Newtown', while families already living in these houses should be afforded the opportunity to occupy the new dwellings in McNamee Village. As far as the PECC was concerned, this was preferable to having to reduce the rents of the brick cottages in order to bring them in line with rents charged for the new sub-economic houses. The City Treasurer, however, argued that such an arrangement was contrary to terms of the Slums Act whereby sub-economic loans were granted by the CHB for the express purpose of clearing slums and not providing alternative housing to existing residents of locations. But in 1940 a public meeting passed a resolution that long-standing residents and lodgers should be afforded the opportunity of acquiring better homes at reduced rates. This resolution was endorsed by the Advisory Board, with one member expressing the opinion that it was "unjust to give accommodation to newcomers and neglect the old residents". The PECC, however, stood by its earlier decision that only former Korsten residents would be rehoused in McNamee Village.

By July 1941, a total of 2 568 houses had been constructed by private building contractors and handed over to the PE Municipality. The MOH reported that the number of houses occupied at McNamee Village exceeded the number of families transferred from Korsten by his Department. He implied that the discrepancy was not due to any shortcoming on the part of his Department but on account of the administration’s practice of allocating houses to existing New Brighton residents to relieve overcrowding in the older parts of the Location in defiance of the PECC's decision to make the elimination of the Korsten slum its first priority. In response, the Acting Superintendent, D.B. Naude, pointed out that most of these dwellings had actually been utilised for headmen, nurses, schools, traders and members of the SA Police. He added that only in cases where tenants from Korsten had been found to be 'undesirable' were they evicted (and sometimes 'repatriated') and the vacant houses offered to lodger families from New Brighton. Naude expressed his concern that there were probably as many as one thousand lodger families already in the Location in need of their own dwellings. However, he gave the assurance that in future the Health Department would be informed whenever houses were vacant so that

126 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Joint Meeting of the NAC and NBAB, 27 June 1938.
127 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Minutes of the PECC, 10 Nov. 1937.
128 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Report re 'Assisted Housing for Natives' by City Treasurer to TC, PE, 25 April 1938.
129 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/14, Minutes of the NBAB, 1 Feb. 1940.
130 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/334, Reports of the MOH 12 June and 8 July 1941.
they might proceed with the slum clearance programme. And upon return from leave, McNamee gave the added assurance that the Council's policy in regard to the letting of houses in McNamee Village would be "rigidly adhered to".

The rate of construction of houses in McNamee Village depended very much on the availability of funds and building materials. In 1940, an average of about 150 families were being rehoused each month. From the second half of 1941, the rate of rehousing slowed down considerably to less than 70 families per month. By the end of 1942, the sum spent on McNamee Village amounted to more than half of the total of £1 276 138 spent on sub-economic housing altogether. The figure of £718 163 was considerably greater than the £570 100 originally budgeted but did not include a sum of £200 000 set aside for the expropriation of land in slum areas and compensation for demolished dwellings.

The sum put at the disposal of the PECC by the Government for expropriation purposes in slum elimination was never utilised for that purpose. The PECC reckoned it was under no obligation to pay compensation to Korsten residents or slumlords as the latter, especially, had "made their capital over and over again by extortionate rents". The reasons for the PECC being able to evade paying compensation to owner occupiers of property condemned at Korsten under the Slums Act were: first, the phrase 'owner occupier' was interpreted in such a way that those who occupied part of the house themselves but let out rooms to others did not qualify; and secondly, it was not prepared to compensate persons who proposed to rebuild the condemned property at Korsten. The merits of these arguments and the imperious nature of the PECC's course of action occasioned considerable debate in the columns of the *Eastern Province Herald*. Nonetheless, the money was diverted into the building programme for the erection of more houses in McNamee Village.

The PECC suspended all sub-economic building activities in mid-July 1942 for six months, seriatim. Later in the year, the H&SEC decided to review the situation and ascertain the number

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135 Correspondence in the *EPH* 23 Aug. (From 'Korstenite'), 28 Aug. (From 'Citizen', NBV) and 2 Sept. 1941 (From W.W. Jabavu).
136 *EPH* 16 July 1941 and 13 March 1942.
of houses still needed to rehouse the remaining occupants of insanitary dwellings in Korsten. They extended the brief to include an assessment of the extent of overcrowding in New Brighton itself and the number of houses needed to rehouse lodger families and those living in the tin kitchens.\textsuperscript{137} The Superintendent reported that there was a shortage of 180 houses in New Brighton but that priority should be given to completing the programme of slum elimination. The Acting MOH calculated that about 1 824 Korsten families had still to be re-housed, and the Housing Committee requisitioned another report from the Engineers Department to investigate the possibility of departmental building of sub-economic houses employing black artisans at reduced wage scales.\textsuperscript{138} The Report of the City and Water Engineer rejected this proposition on grounds that there was no merit in reversing the Council’s previous policy of constructing buildings by means of awarding tenders to private contractors and that it was not expedient to pay wages below the standard rate.\textsuperscript{139}

The central state also provided obstacles in the way of the PECC’s bid to prevent further delay in or the discontinuance of building operations altogether. The CHB refused to sanction the loan of further funds for building sub-economic homes until municipalities had met certain preconditions. The principal requirement was that plans for such dwellings should conform to specifications of experimental houses of the type introduced in Brakpan. It also insisted that these be built under the supervision of the City Engineer and by municipal labour rather than by private contractors.\textsuperscript{140} Only when the CHB reduced its demand to the erection of a minimum number of experimental houses and the City Engineer reluctantly agreed to supervise the operation, was the PECC in a position to authorise further building activities in McNamee Village. These were, however, on a relatively small scale involving the sum of £8 800. Apart from the eight experimental houses, additional houses for the poor aged, shops, market stalls, and public facilities were to be built. The remainder of the abovementioned amount of £200 000 was put aside for additional houses after the experimental houses had been built.\textsuperscript{141}

Escalating costs and a shortage of building materials during the latter stages of World War Two,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{137} CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Minutes of the H&SEC, 13 Oct. 1942.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Report of the City & Water Engineer to the H&SEC, 26 Jan. 1943.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Minutes of the H&SEC, 3 Nov. and PECC, 12 Nov. 1942.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Minutes of the H&SEC, 26 Jan. 1943; \textit{EPH} 6 Feb. 1943 ('New Housing Projects').
\end{itemize}
as well as the non-availability of funds, threatened to curtail the PECC's housing programme still further. The costs of the sub-economic housing scheme exceeded the original estimates by an amount of £275,223 or nearly 19% over and above the budget. The contract price of Type 'A.B' Houses had actually dropped from £163.10.1 per house in November 1937 to as little as £139.0.3 in September 1939. But following the outbreak of hostilities, the price had risen quite steeply to £208.4.1 per unit in April 1942.\textsuperscript{142} This represented an increase of nearly 50% in building costs over a period of less than three years. In these circumstances, the City Treasurer recommended that the PECC await the fall in building costs - of both labour and material - which he expected to accompany the cessation of the War. He also warned that further building operations would be liable to increase the deficit on the NRA and the consequent contribution from the (white) ratepayers which he estimated would amount to half a penny in the £ when the present sub-economic schemes had been completed.\textsuperscript{143} Heeding the City Treasurer's advice, the PECC decided to reject the recommendation of the H&SEC that 50 economic houses be erected as an experiment in assessing building costs. Instead, it deferred housing schemes for a further six months at the end of 1943.\textsuperscript{144}

The first phase of the PECC's sub-economic housing programme lasted five years. During this period, the number of persons removed from slum properties and allocated houses was as follows:–

| TABLE 3.5 |
| SLUM DWELLERS REHOUSED IN PORT ELIZABETH, 1938-42\textsuperscript{145} |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Families</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Ave. size of family</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>552</td>
<td>2,482</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coloureds</td>
<td>2,220</td>
<td>10,877</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africans</td>
<td>3,322</td>
<td>15,613</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5,936</td>
<td>28,249</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By far the majority of those relocated were living in Korsten, and the majority of these were

\textsuperscript{142} CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1122, Report of City & Water Engineer to H&SEC, 15 Feb. 1944.
\textsuperscript{143} CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Report of the City Treasurer re 'Necessity for Additional Housing: Preliminary Considerations', 29 Sept. 1943.
\textsuperscript{144} EPH 24 Dec. 1943 ('PE Housing Problem'); The Guardian 30 Dec. 1943 ('Housing Problem').
Africans who were relocated to McNamee Village. When complete, McNamee Village comprised 3,506 two-, three- and four-roomed brick dwellings with iron or asbestos roofs which were supplied with electricity and water-borne sewerage.

An anonymous contributor to *The South African Outlook* who had paid a series of visits to McNamee Village in the 1940s described the semi-detached houses as being of uniform construction but with sufficient diversity and variety so as to not to give a monotonous appearance. Each house had its own garden in which residents grew grass lawns and flowers or cultivated vegetables, and was fenced in by trim hedges. There was every indication of "a wholesome house pride" and a "self-respect and standard of living that were almost unbelievable". A Sunday afternoon stroll through the streets, evinced no drunkenness or rowdiness, but rather a general atmosphere of contentment and friendliness. The writer commented that "one could imagine oneself in an English country town". The impression was almost idyllic. A contemporary water-colour painting by the artist, George Pemba, who is known as the 'father of township art' and whose work is renowned for its realism, depicts a scene not unlike that described above [see Illustration 3.7]. In the view of Cllr Adolf Schauder, a prime mover behind the scheme, it was "a spontaneous tribute to the European authorities who have provided comfortable and attractive housing for Natives as a substitute for their former primitive accommodation". Even if one ignores the patronising and paternalistic attitude of Schauder, there seems to be no reason to doubt that Pemba himself had a favourable impression of the Village.

With the construction of McNamee Village, the PECC claimed that New Brighton was a 'model' location and that they were 'uplifting' the city's African population. By this time, as many as a third of Port Elizabeth's population was living in municipal houses. The PECC went to considerable lengths to publicise its achievement and thereby propagate a 'liberal' and 'progressive' reputation. It also received many accolades for its sub-economic housing scheme from visiting dignitaries. In July 1941 the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs had described Port Elizabeth's "gigantic social achievement" as "the closest

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147 A. Schauder, 'Generous Housing for South Africa's Natives', *Optima*, 3, 4 (1953), p. 2 note. The painting (which is in the possession of the Schauder family) is reproduced between pp. 2 and 3 of the article.
Illustration 3.5 Henen's Trading Store, New Brighton.
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria).

Illustration 3.6 Houses in McNamee Village (Lantern).
Illustration 3.7 Scene in McNamee Village. Water-colour painting by George Pemba, c.1944 (Optima).
approach to a municipal miracle I have seen". And during a ceremony the following month to mark the erection of the 3 000th house of the scheme, the Minister of the Interior and Public Health had pronounced it "a model for the whole country".

Post World War Two Housing Schemes in New Brighton, c.1944-1953

In March 1944, the Government proposed a new scheme for the provision of sub-economic housing because many local authorities - including the PECC - were not prepared to undertake further building for fear of incurring financial losses. Essentially, the proposals would have involved the transfer of the land required for housing schemes from the local authorities to the Governor-General in trust. Local authorities would be paid for the land, the cost of which would be charged against the housing scheme. Capital costs would thus include the cost of building and land, as well as all services rendered. The land and the properties, thereafter, would be vested in the Union Government and local authorities would become agents of the latter in respect of housing. They would implement housing schemes subject to the approval of the Government, which would acquire funds required at whatever rate was payable at the time on Government loans. The PECC was not alone amongst the municipalities which did not favour the transfer of housing schemes to Government ownership as it constituted "a negation of the principle of local autonomy". The proposals were unequivocally rejected by the PECC because in its view the loss on sub-economic housing borne by local authorities should not exceed 1.25%, and because the principle of differential rentals - to be determined according to wage levels - was considered unsuitable to South African conditions. At the end of June, the matter came up for discussion again when it became known that the Government intended making a sum of £8 000 000 available for a programme of national housing in the twelve months commencing 1 July 1944. But the two-thirds vote necessary to rescind the April 5th resolution was not forthcoming and, consequently, the PECC adhered steadfastly to its position that it would not erect further houses under prevailing conditions.

149 EPH 28 July 1941.
150 EPH 13 Aug. 1941 ('City Housing of Africans').
151 Synopsis of this scheme is based on two documents in CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, re Government's Proposals for National Housing Schemes by Cllrs J.S. Young and J.S. Neave, 22 March and the City Treasurer, 23 March 1944.
152 CAD, 3/PEZ 4/2/1/122, TC, Cape Town to TC, PE, 25 March and Minutes of H&SEC, 28 March 1944; EPH 30 March 1944 ('Union Plans for Housing Unacceptable to Municipalities'); EPH 31 March 1944 ('Government's Housing Plan Criticised').
153 EPH 6 April 1944 ('New Housing Proposals Rejected by the City Council').
154 EPH 30 June 1944 ('Union Housing Proposals/No Alteration of Council's Policy').
The Housing Amendment Act of 1944 conferred on the National Housing and Planning Commission (NH&PC) - the successor to the Central Housing Board - the authority to institute building programmes. But the Government had no intention of taking over this responsibility from the municipalities. It would only provide housing when local authorities did not have the means and would sustain financial losses if they used funds borrowed at market rates. Unable to own land itself, the NH&PC would build on municipal land at reasonable prices fixed by negotiation. In the case of Port Elizabeth, the NH&PC undertook to build 300 houses as its contribution to alleviate the housing shortage in the city. However, the Government would not interfere with building schemes initiated by private enterprise or the PECC. Despite the PECC's previous record in providing sub-economic housing, its insistence that the construction of housing should take place only on its terms exacerbated the city's already acute housing shortage. With the cessation of the Second World War and the return of demobilised soldiers seeking accommodation, the need for housing for all sections of the community became acute.

Korsten's total population had nearly halved in ten years (from 28 057 in 1936 to 15 473 in 1946). Although the African population had declined in real terms, it had actually increased as a proportion of the total population and numbered 10 344. By 1946 the population of New Brighton had reached 26 387, of which 8 517 and 17 870 were resident in the old Location and McNamee Village, respectively. These trends are indicative not of the failure of the Korsten removals as such, but rather of the rapid influx of Africans into Port Elizabeth between 1936 and 1946. The African population resident in the city and its periphery increased from 25 702 to 37 789 during this period, an increase in excess of 85%.

In order to cater for the burgeoning African population, the PECC eventually authorised the construction of 'austerity' houses, as well as timber dwellings from old motor car packing cases in areas adjacent to McNamee Village. The 'austerity' houses were the first in the city to be built with unskilled African labour. The scheme was named Boastville, after the then Manager of Native Administration. It consisted of 312 two- and three-roomed brick houses with iron roofs. The latter scheme was known as Kwaford and derived its name from the fact that the

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155 IAD, 25/169 No. 4, Interview with Director of Housing, 7 Aug. 1945.
156 See, for example, reports in the EPH 5 June 1946 ('City's Need in Housing') and 12 March 1948 ('City Housing Problem').
157 IAD, 25/196 No. 3, Census Returns showing Population of Municipal Housing Schemes and other Suburbs within Wards 6 and 7, 1946.
wooden crates were donated by the Ford Motor Company. When completed, it consisted of a total of 974 two- and three-roomed wooden houses with asbestos roofs. But unlike the earlier sub-economic housing schemes, these projects did not have as their object the immediate elimination of slum dwellings and neither did they represent a major attempt to alleviate the housing shortage for Africans. Rather, they were viewed as stop-gap measures to arrest the housing shortfall while the question of who should be responsible for African housing was resolved.

In 1951 the PECC obtained a loan of £209 651 from sub-economic national housing funds for a scheme of 900 houses at Elundini. The municipal labour unit which had worked on the Boastville scheme was employed to build a number of houses on an experimental basis in order to ascertain likely costs. It was found that dwellings could be constructed at the cost of £171 per unit using unskilled African labour, whilst white labour would add at least £60 to the cost. But when tenders from private building contractors were called for the 2 700 house scheme, the lowest received was for £45 222 or about £275 per unit. And the PE Master Builders estimated that it would be impossible to build the type of house designed for Elundini at less than £310 per unit. The first phase of Elundini was completed during 1952-3 when approximately 300 squatter families were removed from the Dassieskraal and Korsten areas. The scheme eventually comprised a total of 2 502 two-, three- and five-roomed brick under asbestos houses. It included a small hostel which provided quarters for 540 'single' men.

By 1953 New Brighton consisted of an assortment of housing schemes; from the fifty-year old dilapidated wood and iron structures of the 'Red Location' to the brick dwellings of McNamee Village and the timber 'austerity' homes of Kwaford. Although administered as a single unit, the township accommodated a cross-section of the African community whose social conditions varied considerably.

159 EPH 5 and 10 June 1948.
160 IAD, 25/196 No. 3, City Treasurer to TC, PE, 20 Aug. 1948.
161 Evening Post 14 Aug. 1951 ('Native Houses at £310 Estimate').
Illustration 3.8 New Brighton residents present Adolf Schauder with portrait of himself as Mayor by George Pemba (Jewish Affairs).

Illustration 3.9 Kwaford house built from packing cases donated by the Ford Motor Company (SA Panorama).
The constitutional position of Africans in the 1909 South Africa Act was ambiguous. Section 85, read with Section 81, vested the control of the local authorities in the Provincial administrations, while Section 147 reserved to the Governor-General-in-Council (i.e acting on the advice of the Cabinet) the control and administration of 'native affairs' throughout the Union. As Supreme Chief of all Africans in the country, the Governor-General was granted the authority to legislate by proclamation in respect of African affairs. A Native Affairs Department was established and the Minister assumed responsibility from his predecessors in the four colonies. But the Union NAD's jurisdiction over Africans resident in areas administered by local authorities was ill-defined. There was uncertainty as to whether an arm of the central state should be granted powers of interference beyond those specified by Acts of Parliament. The Minister of Native Affairs retained the right to intervene in respect of regulations promulgated by municipalities. On the other hand, the principle that urban local authorities were responsible for Africans within the municipal boundaries was upheld in the principal legislation pertaining to urban Africans.

Only in the Cape Colony had there been exception to the principle that local authorities should assume responsibility for urban Africans. The Colonial Government established two locations under the Native Reserve Location Act (40 of 1902). These were Ndabeni and New Brighton outside of Cape Town and Port Elizabeth, respectively. This chapter will first examine the workings of the administrative system of New Brighton in terms of regulations passed under the Native Reserve Location Act and its amendments. Thereafter, it will discuss the transfer of New Brighton to the control of the Municipality in 1923. The Port Elizabeth City Council (PECC) took a decade to apply the Urban Areas Act to New Brighton. Thus the Location was administered for thirty years in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act: for twenty by the central state - the Cape Colonial and Union Governments in succession - and for a further ten by the PECC. Dualism remained a feature of the administration of New Brighton during this time.

Although the local authority bore direct responsibility for New Brighton from 1923, the Minister of Native Affairs and the NAD was capable of some degree of intervention in the administration.

of the Location. The final section of the Chapter will describe the system of administration practised by the PECC. Some comparison will be made between regulations enacted in 1933 when the Urban Areas Act was applied and those existing previously. This account of the administration of New Brighton will, therefore, give attention to the changes and continuities between that of the central and local states.

The administration of New Brighton by the central state, 1903-23

Before Union, similar but by no means identical legislation pertaining to urban Africans existed in the former colonies and ex-republics. Municipalities controlled and administered locations either in terms of municipal by-laws or through legislation passed by the central governments. But neither the powers granted by statute to the local authorities, nor the practices of the central governments in the erstwhile colonies and republics were easily reconciled. Some had sought to restrict the actions of local authorities, whilst others had allowed "every latitude in the control of the Native population". Only the Cape Colony experimented with the idea that central government should assume responsibility for urban Africans. The Native Reserve Location Act provided for the creation of locations outside of municipal boundaries under state supervision. As already mentioned, only two such locations were established. Thus even in the Cape Colony, state control of urban Africans remained the exception rather than the rule.

The Native Reserve Locations were subject to the dual control of the Departments of Justice and Native Affairs. Administratively, the location was under the supervision of the Inspector and later Superintendent of Natives (or more commonly the Location Superintendent) who was appointed by the NAD. In matters of law, the Superintendent was directly answerable to the Resident Magistrate (RM) whose authority was at first delegated to an Assistant Resident Magistrate. The ARM presided over the weekly periodical court at which residents charged with petty criminal offences and contravention of location regulations appeared. In 1905, the office of ARM was abolished on account of financial constraints and the Superintendent was accorded the powers of a special justice of the peace with the powers to dispose of all minor cases. Although he served as an officer of the court, the Superintendent was not vested with unfettered legal powers. The Resident Magistrate (or his designate) exercised effective judicial authority

4 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Native Affairs (NA) 602 f1594, ARM, NBL to SNA, 23 Nov. 1905.
over the Location, and so dual control continued.

The fact that the principle of single control gave residents a definite 'head' or figure of authority was something in its favour. The control of New Brighton was virtually a 'one man job' performed by the Location Superintendent. As his designation implies, he was responsible for the general supervision and administration of the Location. He was assisted by an administrative and maintenance staff which included clerks, interpreters, sanitary workers, general labourers, and so on. They were expected to keep the books, complete returns of revenue and expenditure, process and deliver mail, maintain buildings, etc. The Superintendent and other white officials lived in quarters in the Location which meant that they were always in touch with the situation and well acquainted with many of the residents.

Many of those appointed as Location Superintendents had experience in the military or police, and others had been in the employ of the Justice Department. Such backgrounds invariably produced officials who were strong on discipline. But their major qualification for the job was usually the accumulated expertise from lengthy service in the NAD. During the period of central state control, only one of the incumbents served long enough to stamp his personal authority over the administration. Evelyn Grattan was appointed Acting Inspector in 1908 and obtained a permanent position the following year with the recommendation of the Chief Magistrate, W.C. Scully, who was obviously impressed by his abilities. He called Grattan 'a tower of strength' and reckoned that if given his due, he would one day hold an important position. In 1923 he requested a transfer within the NAD rather than accept service in the employ of the PECC for reasons which are not quite clear. We do not know much about his career, let alone his private life. He once offered to give a series of lectures on 'Native' history.

5 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) 156 1905/12/f348, SNA to Sec. for Justice, 17 May 1912.
8 CAD, NA 734 f348, Magt., PE to SNA, 9 Feb. and 3 June 1909.
9 Grattan accepted a parallel move to Herbert in the Transkei where he acted as Superintendent of Natives. He later claimed to have made the decision on account of the unsuitability of Port Elizabeth's climate for his wife's health. She either made a remarkable recovery within two years or he appeared to have regretted this decision and made enquiries about the possibility of reinstatement as Superintendent at New Brighton. This did not occur because he admitted to having published letters under a pseudonym in which he criticised the administration of New Brighton by his successor. He retired to Port Elizabeth where he died in July 1929. See CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Grattan to USNA, 12 May 1923; CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/15/2/3, Minutes of NBAB, 25 July 1929.
to New Brighton residents. Whether he fancied himself or was regarded by others as an 'expert' in this field is impossible to say.

Initially, the Superintendent and his staff of African constables were responsible for the maintenance of law and order. They could obtain assistance from the South African Police (SAP) in the performance of their duties, but the latter generally undertook only criminal investigation work. In 1918 these constables were attested to the SAP, and a white non-commissioned officer was placed in charge of the New Brighton police station. However, this arrangement appears to have caused some friction between the Superintendent and the NCO, as well as considerable dissatisfaction amongst residents. It also amounted to the introduction of dualism with regard to the policing of New Brighton. Within the space of little more than a year, the Superintendent resumed overall responsibility for the policing of the location. One Native Sergeant and 13 Constables were under his jurisdiction. Of these, the Sergeant and 7 Constables were deployed in police work proper, whilst the remaining Constables were known as Wardsmen of Headmen and performed other duties in assisting the Superintendent and SAP maintain control in the Location.

The Headmen were placed in charge of wards and were responsible for ensuring that all residents were in possession of registration cards, paid their rents, and for conducting daily inspections and reporting all cases of sickness, death, and so on. But their duties went far beyond their primary function of seeing that regulations were observed. They were expected to help uphold law and order. To this end, they were appointed as peace officers in terms of Act 31 of 1917 (as amended) and, as such, had powers of arrest. They were expected to assist the police when necessary, especially in conducting raids for illegal liquor and beer brewed in contravention of the regulations. They were also required to settle minor disputes between residents of their wards according to custom, and even intervene in domestic disputes when necessary. They served as the 'eyes and the ears' of the Superintendent, through their surveillance of and passing on of information about residents to the authorities. Drawing on Foucault's analysis of the relationship of knowledge and power, Robinson has suggested that

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the New Brighton administration was able to subject residents to strict control. She regards this as a vital aspect of what she terms Port Elizabeth’s 'location strategy'.

The abovementioned registration cards, which were passes by another name, constituted a vital component of the 'location strategy'. In terms of Section 11(15) of the Native Reserve Location Act the Colonial Governor was empowered to prescribe and regulate "the issue of passes to natives entering or leaving any Native Reserve Location", and provide for "the registration of all such natives". Consequently, regulations were promulgated for this purpose and applied to New Brighton. These registration cards served a threefold purpose: determine eligibility to vote in Advisory Board elections, provide a record of rent payments and a means of restricting access to and from New Brighton. The location was fenced off and people entering had to report their presence to the Superintendent within 24 hours or were liable to be prosecuted. Registered New Brighton residents had to carry their cards with them at all times as it had to be produced on demand. Early morning raids to flush out unregistered (and non-paying) residents were a commonplace occurrence. Rents were, at this time, to be paid in advance on a monthly basis and failure to do so could lead to eviction. There was, however, no 'effective deterrent' to non-payment of rents until an amendment to the Native Reserve Act made provision for the prosecution of absconders (who could be traced). All in all, the 'location strategy' ensured an extraordinary degree of regimentation in the daily lives of New Brighton residents.

At first, New Brighton had its own Resident Medical Officer. However, this post was made redundant in the late 1910s and the District Surgeon served as the Medical Officer instead. He paid three routine visits to the Location per week and was also expected to attend emergency cases when required. The day-to-day medical supervision and treatment of residents was the responsibility of the District Nurse. Stock medicines could be obtained from the dispensary every day. Cases of infectious diseases and serious illnesses were admitted to the Location Hospital. If more specialised treatment was required, residents could be admitted to the Provincial Hospital. All attendance, medicines and hospital treatment were free of charge. Strictly speaking, residents paid a nominal fee of 6d. per month as part of the service charges and which comprised a proportion of the rent.

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13 CeA, NTS V178 1703/f348, Memo of SNA to Prime Minister, Mar. 1908.
14 Cape of Good Hope, Blue Book on Native Affairs for 1904, G. 12 - 1905, p. 70.
After Union, the charges for sanitary and maintenance services were transferred from the budget votes of the NAD to the PWD. This meant that the latter Department took over these functions and employed the personnel to carry them out. This led to frequent differences between these PWD and administrative (i.e. NAD) staff as to the measures necessary to improve sanitary conditions, especially in New Brighton. In 1918 it was proposed to return to the previous system whereby the NAD had complete jurisdiction over the Native Reserve Locations in order to avert problems associated with dual control. Another reason for favouring control by a single government department was that it would simplify the keeping of the Location accounts and enable calculations to be made to ascertain whether the NRA was self-supporting or not.  

The Transfer of New Brighton to the PE Municipality  
The administration of the Native Reserve Locations by the central state became increasingly anomalous and anachronistic. It had become apparent that the central state lacked the capacity to implement a policy to ensure the effective control of urban Africans without the co-operation of the local authorities.  But owing to the possible change in administration procedures envisaged in the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill whereby municipalities would assume control, the Government proved reluctant to make changes. Neither could the central state claim that the administration of Ndabeni and New Brighton was something on which local authorities should model their own systems. In an internal NAD memorandum, it was conceded that the administration of Ndabeni and New Brighton was far from exemplary. It stated:

The territorial separation of races is the cornerstone of the Government's native policy and the compulsory residence of natives in a location is one of the main provisions of the Natives (Urban Areas) Bill. Where carrying out of this policy is already in the hands of the Government it is therefore necessary, not only as an earnest of the sincerity of its expressed policy but as an example to the local authorities which it wishes to see assume the responsibility, that the Government should undertake the duties involved in the application of the principle in no niggardly spirit.

The self-indictment went further:

During the past few years the NAD has taken every opportunity of impressing upon local authorities what is due from them in the interests of black and white alike to their Native population and it is felt that we should be able to point to locations for which we are responsible as models of what ought to be rather than have them cast in our teeth as proof of our own ineptitude to practice what we preach.

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16 CeA, NTS 2443 8/291, Sec. PWD to SNA, 12 Jan. 1918.  
17 Robinson, 'A perfect system of control', pp. 29 and 36.  
18 CeA, NTS 2443 8/291, NAD Internal Memo, 18 Jan. 1918.  
19 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Memo of SNA to the MNA, 31 Jan. 1919.
This amounted to an admission on the part of the NAD that central government control of urban Africans had proved a failure. Nor was it in keeping with the direction of urban state policy. In actual fact, the 1918 Urban Areas Bill included contradictory objectives. On the one hand, it was committed the principle of local option and, on the other hand, "to give the Government larger power of control over local authorities in regard to native administration." Unlike the Cape, the Union Government accepted without reservation the principle of municipal responsibility for Africans in the Urban Areas Act.

With the Urban Areas Act still having to be finalised, the Native Reserve Location Act was amended (by Act 49 of 1918) to facilitate the transfer of Ndabeni and New Brighton to their respective municipalities. In both instances the transfer was delayed. In the case of Cape Town, on account of the intention of the City Council to first close Ndabeni and establish a new location (to be known as Langa); and in the case of Port Elizabeth, in order to allay the fears of the Council and residents as to the ramifications of the transfer of control. The local press, meanwhile, accused the Government of having abdicated its responsibility for the town's African population, and took the lead in campaigning for the incorporation of New Brighton into the Municipality.

The possibility of the imminent transfer of New Brighton to the control of the PE Municipality caused the NAD to place on hold "any large scheme of improvements involving heavy capital expenditure." The PECC was itself troubled by the financial implications of assuming responsibility for New Brighton. Certain Councillors expressed the view that the city would be inheriting an economic millstone from the central state because the Location was in drastic need of upgrading, a cost which would have to be borne by the Council and was likely to meet with stiff opposition from white ratepayers. A deputation which met the Prime Minister obtained a guarantee that all land and buildings which comprised the New Brighton grant and which was valued at about £50 000, would be transferred at no cost to the Municipality. Nonetheless, the PECC still baulked at the capital outlay of £32 500 which it deemed necessary to provide

20 Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, U.G. 7 - '19, pp. 16-17.
22 See, for example, EPH, 13 May 1920 (Editorial).
24 EPH 10 May 1920.
25 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, SNA to TC, PE, 17 May 1920.
adequate accommodation, and improvements to the sewerage, water supply and roads. A request that these matters be attended to before transfer took place was turned down by the NAD. A second PECC deputation sent to interview the SNA in December 1921 was also informed that the Government was not prepared to provide additional accommodation nor repair existing buildings. However, the Government agreed that if the PECC took over New Brighton as it stood, then it would hand over the farm Cradock Place and Deal Party on condition that:

(a) an area of 1 500 morgen would be reserved for the purpose of a Native location;
(b) any portion of the 1 500 morgen under (a) not immediately required for location purposes may be leased temporarily to Europeans provided that any revenue accruing in respect of such leases shall be paid into the Native Revenue Account;
(c) the remaining 977 morgen could be disposed of by the PEM Municipality, the proceeds thereof to be paid into the Native Revenue Account.

The rationale for allowing the PECC to sell or lease portions of the New Brighton grant was that it would provide a means to finance the improvements which the Council wished to effect and ensure an annual income for the NRA which would offset administrative costs. Moreover, the NRA was to be credited with the considerable value of the land and other assets paid for by central government. Making allowances for depreciation, buildings were valued at £36 450 in 1923. The Deal Party site was valued at £9 320, giving a total of £45 770. If the value of the site and buildings on Cradock Place are added, it can be adduced that the Union Government handed over land and buildings worth nearly £50 000 free of charge when New Brighton was transferred to the PEM. Even though there was a shortage of accommodation and the existing housing stock was in a bad state of repair, there was nothing to suggest that the PECC was taking on an economic burden. Indeed, not only did New Brighton appear to be capable of financing itself, its NRA had been given capital assets by the Union government.

The central and local states chose to ignore the concerns of New Brighton residents throughout the negotiation process. African opinion had been totally opposed to the Location being brought under the control of the PECC. At a public meeting held in New Brighton in May 1920, the residents expressed reservations about such a step for it was thought likely that the PECC would: raise rents; charge grazing fees for stock; charge for treatment and medicines at the dispensary and the Provincial Hospital; abolish the Periodical Court; replace the African police

27 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Transcript of an interview between the SNA and representatives of the PECC re transfer of NBL, 13 Dec. 1921.
28 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Note from SNA to MNA, 25 April 1922.
with white members of the SAP; and devise new forms of taxation. In short, residents wanted some sort of guarantee from the PECC that it would not unilaterally make changes to the administration of New Brighton. Although by its own admission the central state’s administration of New Brighton left much to be desired, residents reckoned that it had greater resources for the provision of essential services than the local state. The New Brighton community took the strongest exception to giving the PECC a free hand in disposing of a portion of the ground set aside for African occupation. It was thought that the leasing rather than the outright sale of the 977 morgen was more likely to guarantee income for the NRA in the long term. A member of the Advisory Board likened the PECC to an elephant which pretended to be the mother of the pups of a jackal (i.e. New Brighton residents) and succeeded only in crushing them when they were thinking to get shelter. The deep-seated suspicions harboured by the African population and projected by this analogy can, presumably, be attributed to the manner in which the Council had reneged on its promise to provide security of tenure when residents of the former municipal locations were relocated to a new single large location. Yet, such fears appear to have been allayed somewhat following a meeting between an Advisory Board deputation and members of the PECC’s Finance Committee. In any event, it was realised by this time that the transfer of New Brighton to the PE Municipality was inevitable and all that remained was to try secure the best terms possible.

Further delay in transferring New Brighton to the PE Municipality was caused by the insistence of the Provincial Administrator that Korsten should also be included within the municipality. Korsten was a Divisional Council area situated between the municipal boundaries and New Brighton [see Figure 4.1]. Although the Administrator - like the local health authorities - regarded Korsten as a slum and consequently a public health risk, the latter were not immediately prepared to take on the additional responsibility of administering the area. The Administrator’s objections were overcome by an agreement (which was not made public knowledge) that the inclusion of Korsten would be waived in the event of the Korsten Village Management Board being abolished and replaced by a Local Board under Ordinance No. 11 of 1921. This would accord the CPA greater powers than it would otherwise have had over a VMB.

30 CeA, NTS 157 97/1919/f348, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, and 1 June 1920.
31 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Magt., PE to MNA, 27 June and reply, 31 Aug. 1922; Minutes of the NBAB, 24 Aug. 1922.
32 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 12 Sept. 1922.
33 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 19 Oct. 1922.
34 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, MNA to Prov. Administrator and reply, 9 Feb. 1923.
Figure 4.1 PORT ELIZABETH MUNICIPAL BOUNDARY EXTENSIONS, 1927-1951
with respect to the provision of essential services and the enforcement of regulations. The grant of the Location and the farms Cradock Place and Deal Party to the PECC was approved in principle by Parliament in July 1922. However, it could only be effected after the PE Municipal boundaries were extended to include New Brighton. This was duly done in June 1923, and the control, administration and maintenance of the Location was vested in the PECC with effect from 1 August 1923.

The administration of New Brighton by the PE City Council, 1923-53

New Brighton continued to be administered under the Cape’s Native Reserve Location Act and the existing regulations remained in force. It was intended that the Location be brought under the Urban Areas Act pari passu with the proclamation of new regulations based on this Act. For reasons previously discussed, New Brighton was brought under the (amended) Urban Areas Act from 1 March 1933, and the new regulations took effect a month later. The PECC held that these regulations for New Brighton were based on the NAD’s 'Model Regulations' but some undoubtedly more closely resembled existing ones promulgated in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act. A perusal of the two sets of New Brighton regulations provides some indication of the accuracy of this statement.

During the ten year interregnum before the application of the Urban Areas Act, the procedure for promulgating regulations and establishing guidelines for the administration of New Brighton was regularised. Such matters were initially placed on the agenda of the Finance, Town Lands and General Purposes Committee. The low priority accorded 'native affairs' by this Committee was partly responsible for the controversy about conditions in the Location which caused the

35 CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, Prov. Sec. to Administrator, 17 Feb. 1923.
36 Cape of Good Hope Provincial Gazette, Proclamation No. 140 of 15 June 1923.
37 Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 175 of 17 Aug. 1923.
38 Government Gazette, Notices No. 42 and 244 of 24 Feb. 1933.
Council to dismiss its Superintendent and appoint a separate standing committee in 1926 to be known as the Native Affairs Committee.\textsuperscript{40} The Superintendent submitted a monthly report along with the minutes of the Advisory Board to the NAC. Copies of the NAC’s minutes were, in turn, attached to the agenda circulated to City Councillors [See Figure 4.2: \textit{Flow Diagram Representing Administrative Changes in New Brighton}]. The Superintendent reported back to the Advisory Board on the recommendations of the NAC and the resolutions of the Council. Consultation with the Board seldom went any further because the Council was under no obligation to explain its decisions to the Board for the latter had no statutory powers [see Chapter 8 for further discussion of Advisory Board].

The Urban Areas Act defined or prescribed the powers and duties of urban local authorities and their officials with respect to the African population within areas under their jurisdiction. Although New Brighton remained exempt for a decade, the remainder of the city had been included within the ambit of the Urban Areas Act from 1923. Under Section 11(2) of the Act, a Native Commissioner was appointed to Port Elizabeth with effect from 1 October 1928. He was entitled to inspect "any location, native village or native hostel and any premises upon which Natives are accommodated in any urban area falling within the magisterial district of Port Elizabeth".\textsuperscript{41} This implied the continued operation of dual authority with respect to the administration of Port Elizabeth’s African population. Thus the PE Municipality did not have complete autonomy as far as 'native affairs' was concerned, as administration was still subject to interference from the Departments of Justice and Native Affairs.

The apparatus to administer locations usually consisted of a municipal Native Affairs Department or Native Administration Department (MNAD) headed by a Location Superintendent or (in the larger municipalities) a Manager of Native Affairs. The extension of the responsibilities of the staff beyond the confines of the Location did not work in practice.\textsuperscript{42} Nonetheless, there was an increase in personnel from 1923 to 1948 which is shown below:

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{40} \textit{PE Municipality, Mayor’s Minute for 1927}, p.7; Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', pp. 164-5.
\item \textsuperscript{41} \textit{Government Gazette}, Notice No. 1865 of 26 Oct. 1928.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Robinson, 'The Power of Apartheid', p. 207.
\end{itemize}
Figure 4.2 FLOW DIAGRAM REPRESENTING ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES WITH RESPECT TO NATIVE AFFAIRS IN PORT ELIZABETH
**TABLE 4.1**

*Comparison of Native Administrative Staff, 1923 and 1948*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location Administration</th>
<th>Native Administration Department</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Administrative</strong> 1923</td>
<td><strong>1948</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Superintendent .......... *1</td>
<td>Manager of Native Affairs .......... *1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk ............................................. *1</td>
<td>Assistant Manager .................. *1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerks/Interpreters .......... 4</td>
<td>Sub-Accountant (Treasury) .......... *1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Senior Clerks ...................... *3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Revenue Clerks ..................... *2/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Junior Clerks ...................... 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Workers ..................... 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Housing Supervisors ................ 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>General</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charwomen ...................... 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maintenance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter/Foreman .......... *1</td>
<td>Artisans ............................. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourer ....................... 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Medical</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District Surgeon ............. *1</td>
<td>Senior Nurse ........................ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurses ......................... 2</td>
<td>Nurses ............................... 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospital Cook ................. 1</td>
<td>Midwives ................................ 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sanitary</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreman .......................... *1</td>
<td>Foreman ................................ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labourers ...................... 13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Police</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sergeant ....................... 1</td>
<td>Chief Headman ........................ 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constables ..................... 7</td>
<td>Assistant Chief Headman ........... 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headmen .......................... 6</td>
<td>Headmen ................................ 17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total .............................. 42</td>
<td>Total .................................. 65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Whites

The headmen listed in right-hand column were not charged with upholding law and order and were not therefore, strictly speaking, police. The SA Police (SAP) took over these functions from the beginning of September 1927. The Sergeant and two of the Constables were replaced by Whites. 44 By 1948 the SAP detachment consisted of a warrant officer and 4 White

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44 Mayor’s Minute 1927, pp. 8-9; CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Supt. NBL to NAC, 8 Sept. 1927.
constables, as well as 6 African sergeants and 25 constables. Thus for comparative purposes the total staff in 1948 should be given as 101. As can be seen from the above Table, Whites held not only the senior administrative positions but comprised an increasing proportion of the staff. Regular representations made to the authorities that a greater number of Africans should be appointed were to no avail.

As was the case prior to 1923, the Location Superintendent was responsible for the routine management of New Brighton affairs. As Manager of Native Affairs and head of the MNAD from 1937, his task became more bureaucratic in nature. An Assistant Superintendent helped with the day-to-day running of the Location. One Superintendent conceived of his role to be that of replacing the tribal chief in assisting the African to adjust to city life. As an 'urban chief' by appointment rather than by virtue of any claims to legitimacy, the standing of the Superintendent vis-a-vis the community was regarded by a Government Inquiry as crucial to his success:

where the official [Superintendent or Manager of Native Affairs] has gained the respect of the Natives, is possessed of personality and experience, and is sympathetic yet impartial in his dealings with the Natives, there one finds a contented community.

In New Brighton the Superintendent was undoubtedly a pivotal figure. He obtained the cooperation of certain community leaders and their followers by dispensing patronage. But the workings of clique politics will be the subject of further discussion in Chapter 8, and we must now return to strictly administrative matters.

The first Superintendent to be employed by the PECC was the retired 63-year old ex-Magistrate William Gibbon Bellairs. He had been able to take the position at short notice when the incumbent, Grattan, had declined to accept a transfer to the employ of the PE Municipality. Following the aforementioned controversy in 1925 when Bellairs had clashed with a prominent City Councillor and been made the scapegoat for the administrative shortcomings and poor conditions in New Brighton, the NAC resolved to dispense with his services and appoint a

45 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/7, Memo re 'Native Administration' by TC, PE to NAC, 27 Feb. 1933 which includes report re 'Native Administration Department' by Supt. NBL, 18 March 1931.

46 GP S. - 42, para. 62.

younger man. He was eventually forced to take retirement at the end of August 1926.48

Bellairs's successor, James Percival ('Paddy') McNamee was 45 years old when he was appointed as Location Superintendent in New Brighton. Having been employed as Inspector of Grahamstown's locations for nearly ten years and being fluent in Xhosa, he met the only two qualifications for the position: "experience of Native Administration and a knowledge of Native languages".49 He came not only with the recommendation of his previous employers but also that of Dr Loram of the Native Affairs Commission.50 A member of the Committee that appointed McNamee believed that he was likely to give meaning to the adage that "new brooms sweep clean". Unlike his predecessor, McNamee enjoyed the confidence of the PECC and was allowed to exercise a relatively high level of administrative discretion.51

In his very first report submitted to the NAC, McNamee advocated inter alia that firm steps should be taken to prevent the abuse of the beer permit system. His conduct in refusing to renew permits and evicting transgressors was declared to be 'high-handed' and 'irregular', and he was accused of having meted out "unjust, unfair and harsh treatment" against residents.52 He also earned the nickname uGilibatyi (literally 'he who destroys barrels') on account of vigorous campaign to clamp down on illegal brewing in New Brighton [see Chapter 6 for further discussion of this theme]. Neither did McNamee escape charges of partiality in allocating houses or being party to corruption despite his claims to a clean administration. In fact, irregularities related to the allocation of accommodation continued throughout the 1930s. McNamee was, however, given a vote of confidence whenever maladministration was alleged.53 This established a pattern and McNamee continued to receive the backing of the Council for his actions during his lengthy period of service as Superintendent.

48 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1489, Minutes of NAC, 3 Dec. and Bellairs to Mayor, PE, 10 Dec. 1925.
49 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1489, Municipal Notice No. 36 of 1926.
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/674, Testimonials accompanying Grattan's letter of application for the position of Location Superintendent at New Brighton, 21 April 1923. Although a firm favourite for the post, he was passed over in favour of Bellairs because he could not take it up immediately.
52 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Attorney L. Luyt to Supt. NBL, 16 April and Report of Supt. NBL, 19 April 1928.
53 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Minutes of the NAC, 19 July 1933.
Certain safeguards against the abuse of the Superintendent's powers did exist. In 1934, New Brighton residents were granted the right to appeal to the Magistrate against "any action of the Location Superintendent or official of the Council charged with the administration of the regulations". Although not anticipating undue interference from the Chief Magistrate in the management of the Location, McNamee expressed reservations about this regulation because it might "create in the minds of the residents the idea of dual control". But McNamee should have anticipated that this provision would have been invoked against him when he ejected Location residents for repeated violations of the conditions under which beer brewing permits were issued. It was alleged that McNamee used his powers as defined in New Brighton's regulations rather arbitrarily. The matter was referred to the Chief Magistrate who acted as a Court of Appeal. The ruling on the matter was regarded by McNamee as having important ramifications for the administration of the Location and it was recommended that the matter be taken to a higher court. Unfortunately, I have been unable to ascertain whether the matter was referred to the Supreme Court and what the outcome of the case may have been.

The Location Superintendent and his family resided in a house described as a 'sprawling classically colonial building' [see Illustration 3.4]. According to his son's memoirs, McNamee tempered his authority with genuine affection for and interest in the welfare of residents under his charge. McNamee was, by all accounts, a paternalist who administered the location as if it were a private estate. He prided himself on his familiarity with the residents, many of whom he knew by name. But it became impossible to maintain a professional let alone a personal interest in residents who numbered about 26,000 by the time he retired in 1945. In testimony before the Native Economic Commission, McNamee claimed to have no knowledge of conditions beyond the confines of New Brighton and that all his time was taken up with location affairs. But as Manager of Native Affairs, his successor was expected to be familiar with the conditions of Africans throughout Port Elizabeth.

The third Superintendent (or Manager of Native Affairs) during the period under review was Charles Travis Boast. A former senior Public Prosecutor, he was appointed Acting Assistant Superintendent while the incumbent, D.B. Naude, was on active military service. When the

55 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 7 Nov. 1934.
58 University of Cape Town Manuscripts, BC 630, K. 26 Evidence of J.P. McNamee to the Native Economic Commission, Port Elizabeth, 24 March 1931, p. 5945.
latter returned, Boast remained on as Additional Assistant Superintendent. And when McNamee retired with effect from September 1945, Boast was promoted above Naude to the position of Superintendent. Boast had a reputation for following the letter of the law but his integrity was beyond repute. Yet, he prided himself on always being available to township residents and apparently spent much of his time in consultation with them.

The Location Superintendent was effectively an interlocutor or liaison between New Brighton residents and the local authority. He served as Chairman of the Native Advisory Board (NAB) and was also responsible for the selection of the PECC’s nominees to the NAB, who numbered half of the Board members for most of the period under discussion. This augmented the Superintendent’s personal influence enormously. McNamee, for his part, claimed to have the necessary qualities to act as an impartial overseer of the Board’s activities. The NAC evidently concurred, for it ignored the recommendations of at least two Government Commissions that the Location Superintendent should not hold this office. And when NAB members proposed that a City Councillor act as Chairman of the Advisory Board, it respectfully suggested that this should not be construed as a personal attack on McNamee, but that an important principle was at stake. In their view, a Councillor was not an employee of the PECC like the Superintendent and his independence would safeguard the status of the Advisory Board as trustees of the Location residents. The only concession made by the NAC was that it would meet regularly with the Board in the absence of the Location Superintendent, to enable it express grievances without fear of recrimination. It was not until 1948 that the NAC agreed to amend the regulations so as to permit an appointee of the NAC to act as Chairman of the Advisory Board.

59 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/16, Minutes of NAC Sub-Committee, 27 Jan. 1943.
62 In terms of the regulations under the Urban Areas Act the Board consisted of 3 elected and 3 nominated members. In 1940 it was enlarged to 8 members of whom half were nominated, and in 1949 further enlarged to 12 members of whom 8 were elected.
63 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Port Elizabeth Town Clerk’s Files, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Memo of Supt. NBL re Native Economic Commission Report, 5 Aug. 1932.
65 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 23 March 1944.
66 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of meeting between the NAC and NBAB, 13 Oct. 1944.
The SAP's assumption of responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in New Brighton in September 1927 had considerable administrative implications. The advantage of cutting costs with the transfer of policing duties to the SAP, was offset by some loss of autonomy over the location by the PECC. Whilst the PECC might still frame the regulations, they were to be enforced by the SAP and interpreted by the courts. Previously, the police force had been subject to the Superintendent who had virtually single-handedly exercised jurisdiction over the location. The SAP detachment was smaller than the Council's law enforcement force had been, and consisted of different personnel. The 9 Native constables - excluding those who had also served as headmen and remained in the employ of the PECC - were reduced to six but two white constables were appointed. The Sergeant-in-charge of the SAP detachment was newly-appointed. The working relationship established between the Superintendent and the police was now on a new footing and the situation was fraught with difficulties.

With the notable exception of the Location Superintendent, most of the personnel had requested that they be transferred to municipal employ when the PECC took over New Brighton. Six of the Native Constables continued to serve as headmen and assist the Superintendent in ensuring that regulations were observed. But their duty of having to collect rent opened an avenue for bribery and corruption. One headman who apparently fell prey to temptation was Henry Nginza, a petty chieftain who married the Nurse Dora Jacobs [see Appendix C for biographical information]. Affidavits were signed by three Advisory Board members and 19 residents of Nginza's ward that they had not been issued with receipts for rent payments which they made. Nginza was suspended and finally dismissed in 1923 for misappropriating rent payments. Headmen were subsequently instructed to pay all rents and other revenue directly to the Clerk/Revenue Officer. Although applicants for the position of headman were closely screened and remuneration reasonable (i.e. salaries of £6.10.0 per month plus rent free quarters in 1928), this did not prevent a number from trying to augment their incomes over the years. Nginza was not the only headman to be dismissed by the administration for such offences.

The positions of Chief Headman and Assistant Chief Headman were instituted by the PECC. Although these posts were always advertised and appointments made on merit, an important criterion in the selection of headmen was that they should command the respect of the residents.

67 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Report of Location Supt. to NAC, 8 Sept. 1927.
68 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, Solicitors McWilliams & Elliott to TC, PE, 26 April 1924.
69 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/702, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 20 Nov. (with affidavits) and 26 Nov. 1923.
70 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1497, Minutes of NBAB. 12 April 1928.
of New Brighton. In fact, it became customary for the Chief Headman to be a man of royal
extraction. When the Superintendent chose to ignore such customs it led to considerable
dissatisfaction amongst interested parties.\footnote{Evening Post, 25 Feb. 1953, p. 4 (Letter: 'New Chief Headman').}

The appointment of I.P. Msimka as Chief Headman in 1932 caused a ruction in New Brighton
which eventually resulted in an administrative crisis. There was public opposition to Msimka's
appointment on the grounds that he was not a suitable candidate on account of doubts as to the
legality of marriage to his common-law wife (who happened to be a sister of A.F. Pendla)
without properly annulling a previous relationship, and was neither a regular churchgoer nor a
tee-totaler.\footnote{CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, G. Dubula, Asst. Sec. Vigilance Committee to Mayor, PE, 22 March 1932.} McNamee defended the appointment on the grounds that the position of Chief
Headman was in future to consist of mainly clerical work rather than direct involvement in
community and domestic affairs as had been the case with his predecessor. Msimka had been
employed as clerk-typist since 1923 and had performed his duties satisfactorily. Nor had
McNamee received any complaints as to Msimka's sobriety, marital status and attitude to the
public. Moreover, the Superintendent pointed out that the appointment had not been submitted
to the Advisory Board for its approval because the Council was under no obligation to do so,
and that the appointment of officials was not a matter for the general public. He also claimed
that certain unsuccessful applicants for the post were "endeavouring to raise an agitation against
the appointment".\footnote{CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 22 and 24 March 1932.}

One who fell into this category was the Headman Ellison Ntsonga. His services were terminated
in November 1934 ostensibly for neglect of his duties,\footnote{CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Reports of Supt. NBL, 26 Sept. and 8 Nov. 1934.} but more likely because he had alleged
that Msimka was trafficking in illicit liquor, frequenting shebeens and providing protection in
return for bribes from illegal brewers.\footnote{CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, E. Ntsonga to TC, PE, 29 Oct. 1934.} Allegations of misconduct were also made against the
Sergeant-in-charge of the SAP and other New Brighton officials, including the
Superintendent.\footnote{CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 7 Nov. and Minutes of NAC, 9 Nov. 1934.} Four members of the Advisory Board called for Ntsonga's reinstatement
because, amongst other things, he was "a very exemplary headman from the point of view of
Christian character" and "a leading member in his church". McNamee threatened to resign if
this request was acceded to. 77 Although the Superintendent won this particular round, the matter was not laid to rest. Subsequently, a public meeting resolved to make representation to the Council for Ntsonga's reinstatement. The NAC again stood by its Superintendent, but requested that McNamee make some effort to put an end to the feud between Ntsonga and his supporters and the Location administration. 78 McNamee stated that he would welcome an enquiry into the matter for he believed that a clique was intent on discrediting him and disrupting the administration. 79 The ramifications of these events for community politics are discussed in Chapter 8.

When the PECC had assumed control of New Brighton, public assurances had been given by the then Mayor that the weekly Periodical Court would be maintained. Unbeknown to the Council, the local Magistrate had recommended that the Court be retained "until the municipal authorities had acquired a complete grip of, and control over, the affairs of the location". Acting upon this advice, the Department of Justice announced in 1925 that in future all cases would be held at the Magistrate's Court in Port Elizabeth. 80 The Superintendent echoed the Advisory Board's objections to the abolition of the Periodical Court in the following words:

As an object lesson to the inhabitants of the Location... the Court has a very wholesome effect and, being in their midst where they can and do attend in large numbers, cannot fail to have a strong deterrent effect upon evil doers or those prone to commit crime, and thus tends greatly to the preservation of law and order. 81

Aside from its purported capacity for moral suasion, the Mayor objected to the abolition of the Court on the practical grounds that the logistics of having to have Location Police in attendance at trials would divert them from their ordinary duties in New Brighton. 82 As a result of these representations, the Periodical Court was granted a years reprieve. 83 A further six months reprieve was granted in September 1926, 84 but it was eventually abolished at the end of March 1927.

79 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 12 July 1935.
80 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Magt. to TC, PE, 14 Sept. 1925.
81 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 3 Sept. 1925.
82 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Mayor, PE to Minister of Justice, 17 Sept. 1925.
83 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Sec. for Justice to Mayor, PE, 7 Oct. 1925.
84 CAD, 3/PEZ Mayor, PE to Sec. for Justice for Justice, 10 Sept. and reply, 17 Sept. 1926.
Some four years later, the PECC made representations for the re-establishment of a Periodical Court in New Brighton. Apart from reaffirming the contention that the Court served as a restraining influence on residents who might be contemplating committing criminal deeds, it was held that more consistent sentences for the same offences would eventuate.\textsuperscript{85} As from September 1931, a 'branch' rather than a 'periodical' court held weekly sittings in New Brighton and heard cases of a minor nature.\textsuperscript{86} But two years later, a resolution at a public meeting called for the discontinuance of the court because it caused delay and inconvenience in the hearing of cases and increased charges had made it too expensive to defend cases. The Advisory Board suggested, instead, that representations should be made to the Magistrate and to the Side-bar of Port Elizabeth so as to address these questions.\textsuperscript{87} Ironically, the Advisory Board itself expressed itself in favour of the abolition of the Court in 1935, only to have its recommendation rejected by the NAC.\textsuperscript{88} A remark by Attorney J.H. Spilkin to the effect that the branch court was "nothing but a debt-collecting agency for the Superintendent",\textsuperscript{89} may have reflected a common sense perception. For his part, McNamee was of the opinion that the efforts from time to time to have the New Brighton branch court abolished were instigated by certain (unnamed) legal practitioners.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Robinson has depicted the 'location strategy' as peculiar to Port Elizabeth. Its features included: registration certificates with which to control the entry of inhabitants, the allocation of houses, and the payment of rents; the division of the Location into wards with close surveillance of residents by headmen and the Superintendent himself; and the control of social and political activities. These features developed during the period when the Location was supervised by the central state and were not devised by the PE Municipality. In fact, New Brighton had many things in common with Ndabeni - the other Native Reserve Location. If there was anything unique about the administration of New Brighton, it was the system of domestic brewing which is described in Chapter 6.

The 'location strategy' was part and parcel of an administrative nexus for controlling the daily lives of Port Elizabeth's Africans. The measure of its success depended on the availability of

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{85} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1279, Report of Supt. NBL, 5 March 1931.
  \item \textsuperscript{86} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Report of Supt. NBL, 24 Sept. 1931.
  \item \textsuperscript{87} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of NBAB, 19 Sept. 1933.
  \item \textsuperscript{88} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Minutes of the NBAB, 31 Jan. and Minutes of the NAC, 15 March 1935.
  \item \textsuperscript{89} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Report of Supt. NBL, 29 Jan. 1936.
\end{itemize}
accommodation in New Brighton and the elimination of alternative areas of residence in the Municipality or on its periphery. But we have seen that the inability of the PECC to provide housing for a rapidly growing population from the late 1930s undermined the effectiveness of this mode of regulation - in the absence of influx controls. Low wages, the parsimony of white ratepayers, relatively high rents and resultant African resistance all made reliance upon the 'location strategy' increasingly difficult as slum areas mushroomed in the war years. In its place, the PECC was pressured into applying central state legislation to control African population growth in the town. The eventual compliance with the central state's form of urban control was accompanied by, and remained dependent upon, the refinement and extension of earlier spatial and administrative methods of domination.90 We will discuss the reasons for the Council's eventual capitulation on this matter in Chapter 9.

CHAPTER 5
RENTALS, REVENUE AND THE COSTS OF REPRODUCTION: THE FINANCING OF NEW BRIGHTON, c. 1903-1953

In 1903 the Select Committee on the Cape's Native Reserve Location Act annunciated the principle that neither government nor municipalities should make a profit out of locations. Conversely, locations were not supposed to be an economic burden on municipalities or their ratepayers.\(^1\) Echoing this viewpoint, the Secretary for Native Affairs informed the PE Magistrate that:

> [T]he Prime Minister does not desire that the Government should make any profit out of the Location, [but] he considers it a reasonable proposition that it should pay its own way.\(^2\)

This remained the guideline for financing the Native Reserve Locations - New Brighton and Ndabeni - during the twenty years when they were administered by the central state. Thus the Port Elizabeth and Cape Town Municipalities were effectively relieved of much of the responsibility and financial burden for the reproduction of their respective African workforces.

Elsewhere, municipalities established locations for their African populations which were largely self-financing. The practice whereby local authorities used profits from municipal beerhalls to provide facilities for their African workforces originated in Natal but became fairly widespread. In some instances, municipalities used revenue derived from their African populations to reduce the rates of white ratepayers.\(^3\) The 1914 Tuberculosis Commission recommended that any surplus income "be strictly devoted to the betterment of the location and the improvement of conditions",\(^4\) and should not be appropriated to the general rate account.

The 1920 Housing Act made it the responsibility of municipalities to accommodate their poorer populations. The extent to which Africans could be housed in segregated locations depended on the provision of accommodation in areas proclaimed for that purpose. Given the widespread use of white labour, at union rates, in the construction of municipal housing and the low wages

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\(^1\) Cape of Good Hope, Select Committee Report on the Native Reserve Location Act, A.15 - 1903, p. 6.
\(^2\) Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS) 157 97/19/348, SNA to CC, PE, April? 1903.
\(^4\) U.G. 34 - '14, para. 252.
of African tenants, the charging of economic rentals by municipalities was virtually out of the question. Municipalities were able to obtain housing loans at rates of interest below current lending rates from the central state from 1932. With sub-economic rentals, it could be argued that the local authorities (and, indirectly, the central state) were being asked to subsidise the poor wages paid by employers.

The Urban Areas Act upheld the principle that the provision of housing and essential services for the country's urban African population should be borne primarily by local authorities. In the words of the SNA:

[I]t is a fundamental principle of the Natives (Urban Areas) Act that each local authority is generally responsible for the housing and control of the Native population necessary to meet the labour demands within its own area. Municipalities were required to create a separate Native Revenue Account (NRA) which was to be credited with all the revenue derived from rents, registration fees, fines, beerballs (if they existed). Estimates of expenditure which included administration costs such as salaries of officials had to be approved by the Minister of Native Affairs. When read together, Sections 8(6) and (7) provided that local authorities could meet a deficit on the NRA either by an advance or by a subsidy from general revenue, or by a combination of the two. This implied neither that the NRA should be self-balancing, nor that the Act underwrote 'financial segregation'. In other words, the Urban Areas Act did not actually legislate for the financial self-sufficiency of the locations.

In spite of the legislative situation, the stipulations of the Urban Areas Act with regard to the NRA were often deliberately ignored or abrogated. Most local authorities, including the PECC, were subjected to pressure by their ratepayers and sought to restrict expenditure on locations to no more than the revenue derived from residents. Alternatively, they relied on revenue derived from beerhall profits to bolster the NRA. Because there were no beerhalls in New Brighton, the administration placed much emphasis on securing rent payments. The issue

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6 Cape Archives (CAD), PE Town Clerk's Files, 3/PEZ 1/1282, SNA to TC, PE, 15 Jan. 1938.
8 Humphries, 'Administration Boards', p. 6.
of rents proved to be a constant source of friction between residents and the PECC. Employers, too, were generally unwilling to carry the costs of labour reproduction and resisted paying economic wages or subsidising housing for their African employees. Ratepayers, who were mainly white, also reckoned themselves to be under no obligation to subsidise essential and social services for cheap domestic labour. Thus Africans themselves rather than municipalities (and, by implication, white ratepayers) bore their costs of reproduction. The purpose of this chapter will be to ascertain exactly who paid for the reproduction of Port Elizabeth’s African workforce.

The Financing of New Brighton by the Central State, 1903-1923

The PE Town Council declined to assume responsibility for the establishment of New Brighton from fear that it might prove a financial burden. A group of merchants saw the Municipality foregoing a potentially valuable asset or source of revenue as a location could be profitable or, at the very least, self-supporting. But they were not either prepared to finance the scheme. In the event, New Brighton was established and financed by the Cape Colonial Government which made quite a substantial outlay. The farms known as Cradock Place and Deal Party were purchased at a cost of £20,000 after protracted negotiations with the owner, a certain Dr Galpin.

In seeking to recoup some of its capital outlay, the Colonial Government set the exorbitant rents of 30s. and 25s. for family accommodation and 8s. for single men in New Brighton. Although these rents included free medical and sanitation services, they were far in excess of the charges in existing municipal locations. In the latter, annual rates which comprised a site rent and charges for water, cleaning and latrines amounted to £1.8.6 per annum. Unable to attract tenants and with (as yet) no means to compel Africans to leave Korsten, the Native Reserve Location Act Select Committee recommended that rents be reduced. The authorities were compelled to make further rent reductions in the years that followed:

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9 Eastern Province Herald (EPH) 6 Sept. 1901 ('What PE Wants').
11 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Notice No. 406 of 1903.
12 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/1/2/1, Minutes of the Health and Location Committee, 20 Feb. 1903.
TABLE 5.1
NEW BRIGHTON RENTALS 1903-1909

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade Description</th>
<th>Monthly Rental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Married Quarters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Two-roomed</td>
<td>25/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd One-roomed</td>
<td>20/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Converted SMQ</td>
<td>17/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Single Men's Quarters</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd Dormitory room</td>
<td>8/-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The post-war recession and the termination of many casual labourers' contracts meant that there was a high turnover of tenants in New Brighton, including many of whom absconded when faced with prosecution for non-payment of rent arrears. In spite of further reductions in 1905, the greater number of residents generated a substantial increase in revenue. Thereafter revenue declined commensurately with the reduction in population and reached its lowest level since the establishment of the location in 1909. The decline in revenue was partly due to further rent reductions in that year shown in the Table above. Rents remained at these levels throughout the remainder of the period that New Brighton was administered by the Union Government.

Wages, too, remained static during this time but depreciated badly in real terms. Escalating prices and spiralling inflation made a huge dent in earnings. It was calculated that the cost of living index rose about 69% between 1914 and 1920. And price rises in Port Elizabeth were

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14 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Notice No. 990 of 1903, No. 1372 of 1904, No. 1144 of 1907 and No. 414 of 1909.
15 CAD, NA 656 2378, Inspector to ARM, NB, 23 Aug. 1905 and ARM, NB to SNA, 14 Nov. 1905.
17 Union of South Africa, Office of Census and Statistics, Quarterly Return, S.P. 25 No. 5 (January 1921). The c.o.l. index was calculated for an average white family on the basis of the following components: food 39.7%; fuel and light 4.4%; rent 22.6%; sundries 33.3%. As certain of these items are likely to have comprised a different percentage of the average black budget, these figures provide an unreliable but the only basis for c.o.l. calculations at this time. Cf. Labour World, 2 Oct. 1920 which suggests that official c.o.l. figures were underestimated by 20%.
considerably above the national average. According to the Schweizer Commission, the "increase in the cost of foodstuffs and other necessaries ordinarily consumed and used by the natives was 105% between 1914 and 1920." In its calculations, a staple diet consisted of maize, maize meal, animal fat, a small quota of meat, sugar, tea and coffee. During this period, the national average retail price of food had risen 78%, and the cost of maize meal - which made up the greatest part of the African's food budget - increased more than 200%. If necessities absorbed virtually the entire pay packet of average black wage earners, there was little chance of those earning the 4s. per day minimum wage to meet expenses such as rentals and transport.

Revenue collected during the 1910s in New Brighton amounted to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (£)</th>
<th>Judicial fines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>3 883</td>
<td>289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911/12</td>
<td>4 238</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912/13</td>
<td>4 787</td>
<td>242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913/14</td>
<td>5 689</td>
<td>488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914/15</td>
<td>4 931</td>
<td>211</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915/16</td>
<td>5 007</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916/17</td>
<td>4 903</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917/18</td>
<td>5 502</td>
<td>276</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918/19</td>
<td>5 378</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919/20</td>
<td>6 565</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total** 4 172 4 477 5 029 6 177 5 142 5 224 5 034 5 778 5 569  

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18 Union of South Africa, Official Year Book 1921, p. 338.
19 Union of South Africa Parliamentary Papers, Report of the Commissioners appointed to enquire into the causes of, and occurrences at, the Native disturbances on the 23rd October 1920, and the general economic conditions as they affect the Native and Coloured population, Ans. 143 - 1921 (Schweizer Commission), pp. 1-2. A table which has an itemised list of necessities included food and clothing, but made no allowance for rent and transport costs. This was based on the findings of a special committee of the PECC to investigate the cost of living for blacks. Their case studies concluded that the expenses (food, fuel, rent and train fare) of an average African family amounted to £1.4s.0d. and of a single man to 18s.6d. per week. See CAD, 3/PEZ 1/2/1/25, Minutes of Standing and Special Committees, Dec. 1920, p. 499.
Although fines imposed on New Brighton residents by the periodical court for breaches of location regulations and other minor offences were paid into Public Revenue and did not accrue to the location, they have been reflected in the above figures. The irrecoverable revenue written off on account of rent absconders seldom amounted to more than £100 per annum during the above period.

Exact figures for the expenses incurred in administering New Brighton by the Union Government are unavailable because services were undertaken and paid for by various state departments and not all were charged to the location. However, it was estimated that administration costs approximated £4 350 per annum between 1910/11 and 1918/19, £5 032 in 1919/20 and £6 000 was provided for in the estimates for 1920/21. These figures included the cost of supervision, sanitation, policing, medical services, maintenance and repairs, water and sundries, but no interest on capital outlay or depreciation. The central state also spent a total of almost £98 000 on the erection of buildings and other structures in the location. From the information available, it would seem that revenue was sufficient to meet the administration costs of New Brighton (if capital redemption is excluded).

The Port Elizabeth Municipality's Quest for a Self-Financing Native Revenue Account, 1923-1936

As the PECC had not been responsible for meeting capital costs and loan redemption with respect to New Brighton, it could afford to allow rents to remain at the levels set by the Government. The overcrowded conditions generated additional revenue because of the fact that the numerous (registered) lodgers paid the administration a fee of 3s. per month. The arrangements for the accommodation of 'single' men also generated more revenue than was budgeted for. The two-roomed dwellings occupied by an average of ten 'single' men who paid 4s. rent each meant that they fetched £1.16.0 per month. Comparable dwellings rented by a family fetched 9s. per month (or possibly £1 if there was a lodger). Thus rent accruals regularly exceeded the amount due on the housing stock, which meant that the NRA showed

20 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/701, Magt., PE to TC, PE, 17 Aug. 1923.
21 Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, UG 7-19, pp. 17 and 88 (Annexure G); Letter from SNA to TC, PE (n.d.) cited in EPH 23 Dec. 1920; PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute 1921, p. 6.
The 'Newtown' housing scheme which was erected to alleviate the overcrowding proved to be a financial headache. The PECC ignored the warning of the Housing Committee that it was impossible to develop a housing system for African workers "without entailing a loss on an economic basis". As opposed to the houses in the Red Location which had been acquired from the Government free of charge, capital redemption constituted a large proportion of the costs of the new economic housing scheme. From a loan of £175 000 granted by the central Government over a four-year period for the purpose of erecting houses for workers, the PECC allocated £28 000 to New Brighton. The sum of £9 959 was expended on the erection of the brick houses and cottages, as well as a SMQ. Interest on the unexpended balance was credited to the NRA. But the combination of the interest rate of 5% charged by the Government and the artificially high building costs as a result of the employment of white labour on the housing scheme, meant large overheads and capital redemption costs. It was probably envisaged that some of these costs would be offset by profits from a municipal beerhall which was then in the offing [see Chapter 6].

Meanwhile, other steps were taken to reduce expenditure carried by the NRA. The PE Municipality bore the costs of maintaining a police force in New Brighton. The expenditure on wages and equipment for the years 1924-26 averaged in excess of £1 500 per annum. When the Department of Justice declared itself unwilling to reimburse these costs, the PECC was not prepared to continue policing the Location and the South African Police (SAP) duly assumed these duties from the beginning of September 1927. It was also suggested that white employees in various positions in the location administration be replaced by Africans, and that medical costs be reduced by arranging that the location hospital be subsidised by the CPA or be administered as a branch of Port Elizabeth's Provincial Hospital. Neither of these suggestions were acted upon. In 1928 and 1929, the PECC sold off portions of the Location land which had been transferred into its possession by the Central Government some five years previously. Fairly large areas were sold to the Cradock Place Industrial Sites and to the Eastern Province Cement Company for the sums of £506 and £3 339, respectively. The

26  Report of the Housing Committee, UG 4 - '20, para. 93.
27  PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute 1927, p. 17.
28  CeA, NTS 2442 1/291, TC, PE to Magt., PE, 21 May 1927.
29  EPH, 23 Feb. 1927, p. 5.
proceeds from the land sales were used to reduce the deficit on the NRA and the overdraft against the Capital Account for loans not yet raised. But these *ad hoc* sources of income were not sufficient to offset the regular loss of revenue from rents in Newtown, which contributed to a deficit on the NRA.

The large capital costs meant that rents set by the PECC for Newtown were much higher than those in the Red Location. Compared to rents in the latter of between 6s. and 9s. per month, the new brick cottages were rented at between 20s. and 30s. per month. Given that the average wage of an unskilled African labourer in Port Elizabeth was between 2s.6d. and 4s. per day at this time, and had actually declined in real terms since the wage agreement of 1920, it is obvious that such rents would comprise an inordinately large percentage of wages. When transport costs - that is, the cost of weekly train tickets from New Brighton to the city - were added to the budget, the amount available for food, clothing and other necessities was very small indeed. With the strictly controlled regime of domestic beer brewing confined to the Red Location, not many women were able to supplement family incomes from this source either. In short, the relative comfort of Newtown houses was for most New Brighton residents unaffordable.

The situation deteriorated still further as the Depression took hold. In reviewing the estimates for the 1927/8 financial year, the NAC recommended a 1s. per month increase on all grades of rentals (except those of the newly-constructed three-bedroomed cottages which had the highest rates). The rent increase was duly approved by the PECC, and Newtown rents were set as follows:

**TABLE 5.3**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Monthly Rental</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Cottages (3-roomed)</td>
<td>30s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>(2-roomed)</td>
<td>20s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Houses (2-roomed)</td>
<td>20s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>21s.6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>(2-roomed with kitchen)</td>
<td>22s.6d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>(3-roomed)</td>
<td>24s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>(3-roomed with kitchen)</td>
<td>5s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Single Men's Quarters</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

30 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/4, City Treasurer to NAC, 4 July 1930.
31 *Mayor's Minute 1926*, Report of the MOH, p. 64.
The Location Superintendent argued that the rentals were excessive. He pointed out that if the redemption period for repayment of capital and interest should be extended from 20 to 25 years, this would have amounted to a net reduction of one-third of the 30s. per month charged for the 3-roomed cottages. The NAC, however, discounted this suggestion. It did, however, agree to equalise rentals for accommodation for single men. Instead of the proposed 6s. per month rent in the new brick dormitory, a rate of 5s. per month was set for both the old and new SMQs - thereby effectively increasing rent in the former by 1s. per month. Other rents in the Red Location remained as before [see Table 5.2]. Thus Newtown residents paid £1.1.6 for a two-roomed brick house with a kitchen, while those in the old location paid 9s. per month for a comparable wood and iron structure, although the latter was usually in much poorer condition. Such comparisons provide some indication of the disparities in rents which were so keenly felt by those resident in Newtown.

The Advisory Board accepted the necessity for the increase and pledged to support the NAC chairman at a public meeting to be called for the purpose of explaining the reasons for the increase to residents. However, the Board also appealed to the PECC to use its influence to "prevail upon employers of Native labour to pay fair wages to their employees". An agreement was brokered by the PECC in late 1929 whereby most local employers agreed to a minimum daily wage of 3s.6d. for general unskilled workers, which was increased by 6d. per day the following year. This did not amount to an increase; it was actually a return to wage levels agreed to a decade earlier and which had declined considerably in the interim. Nor was the wage agreement adhered to by employers. With the steady deterioration of the economic climate as the downturn turned into a full-scale Depression, the pressure on wages increased further. According to the BTI Cost of Living Inquiry (1931), wages and living standards in Port Elizabeth were well below but the cost of living index was well above the national average between 1925 and 1930.

The proportion of rent arrears on the new brick-buildings very soon exceeded that of the Red

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35 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/1, Minutes of NBAB, 15 and 22 Feb. 1927.
36 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/1634 and 1/3/5/2/3, Minutes of proceedings of Meeting of Employers re Native Wages, 14 Nov. and Minutes of City Council, 27 Nov. 1929. See also University of the Witwatersrand, Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 843/RJ, Cp 5.6.3.
38 BTI Report No. 125 (Pretoria, 1931), p. 28; Conradie, 'Port Elizabeth as Industriesentrum', p. 481.
Location. Part of the reason was that the tenants initially consisted of the 'poorest of the poor', rather than the aspirant middle class who might have been better able to afford the higher rents. Many tenants had been removed from the tin kitchens which adjoined the cheapest grade of huts in the old location. In light of the obvious inability of such tenants to pay the rentals, McNamee was instructed by the NAC in July 1927 to endeavour to let the new cottages to the 'better type' of inhabitant of the location. Yet, three months later the situation was no better. McNamee reported that although those in the brick-blocks comprised only 111 out of a total of 3 137 rentpayers, they alone were responsible for nearly half the amount of rent outstanding for the month of October. This was the case even though special attention had been given to collecting rents in this grade, and despite the fact that more prosecutions had been instituted for non-payment of rents than in all the other grades put together.

During the years that followed, Newtown residents made numerous representations to the authorities for financial relief. Proposals in these petitions included: (i) exempt lodgers from municipal levies; (ii) equalise rents in old and new portions of the location; (iii) decrease the cost of services provided; (iv) equalise the cost of services in both portions of the location; (v) reduce the costs of administration; (vi) reduce interest on loan obtained for housing scheme; (vii) extend the period in which the PECC repay capital loan; (viii) suspend capital repayment in the short term; (ix) reduce rents with losses to be carried by the General Rate Fund. These proposals will not be discussed at any length because they were all rejected by the NAC despite Newtown residents receiving the backing, at different times, of the Location Superintendent, Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee. For its part, the NAC was more concerned with reducing the deficit on the NRA. McNamee thus came under intense pressure from the NAC to reduce outstanding rentals and tried the following measures:

(i) prosecution of rent defaulters;
(ii) institution of weekly rather than monthly payment of rents;
(iii) repatriation of those unable to pay rents to the reserves.

Reference has already been made to certain of these measures in connection with the administration of New Brighton. Here we will confine ourselves to discussing their financial implications.

40 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276, Minutes of NAC, 29 July 1927.
The administration’s campaign to prosecute and evict rent defaulters from New Brighton had mixed success. In the majority of cases, Newtown residents simply could not afford rents when living at or below the bread line. Moreover, there was the secondary consideration that by prosecuting rent defaulters who fell into this category, the authorities treated them as criminals as a fine with the option of a jail sentence was likely to be imposed. This effectively meant that rent defaulters were being penalised twice for a single offence. The likelihood of recovering both fines and rent arrears from such persons was remote because they were likely to abscond once the administration’s intention to prosecute was known. And with little likelihood of being able to trace absconders, especially if they had left Port Elizabeth altogether, it meant that these amounts of outstanding rentals had to be written off as irrecoverable. Only in cases where offenders had the means to pay rents and willfully chose do not to do so, was legal action likely to have the desired consequences. Otherwise, to evict rent defaulters from Newtown was self-defeating. Having provided the accommodation, it made no economic sense to have the houses standing empty.

A ruling made in 1929 by the Cape Town Appeal Court with regard to the right of local authorities to prosecute defaulters for the non-payment of rentals had ramifications for the PECC’s administration of New Brighton. Regulations under Section 23(3)q of Act 21 of 1923 which imposed penalties for failure to pay rent framed by the Cape Town Municipality in respect of Ndabeni Location were deemed to be ultra vires. The Supreme Court quashed the conviction of a rent defaulter on the grounds that whites were not jailed upon conviction for failure to pay rent. The ruling rejected the notion that a person unable to pay rent should be treated as a criminal and implied that the local authority would be obliged to rely on civil action to recover rents from defaulters. Although New Brighton was not yet under the Urban Areas Act, it was then being considered and, in any event, similar provisions existed for New Brighton in terms of the Native Reserve Location Act. Not surprisingly, the PECC’s right to prosecute residents of New Brighton for non-payment of rents was soon to be challenged in the courts. Amidst a fair amount of publicity and what was construed to be ‘agitation’ by the administration, plaintiffs also challenged the right of the PECC to charge the increased rentals and lodgers fees without proclaiming the amended regulations in the Government Gazette.

Eventually, the Superintendent was authorised to make an example of tenants with the worst records as far as defaulting on rentals was concerned by prosecuting and then evicting them amidst as much publicity as possible.⁴³

In spite of the successful prosecution of two test cases of New Brighton tenants who had failed to pay rents in 1931,⁴⁴ the Superintendent impressed upon the NAC that taking legal action against rent defaulters was seldom worth the trouble as only a small amount of arrears was invariably recovered. He also bemoaned the removal of the periodical court from New Brighton as it had been useful in dealing with rent arrears cases. Consequently, it was resolved that the Superintendent be authorised to exercise his discretion in dealing with offenders. In addition, it was decided to make representation to the Minister of Native Affairs about the possibility of re-establishing the periodical court in New Brighton.⁴⁵ The City Council took the view that judicial fines accruing from offences committed in New Brighton should provide a source of income for the NRA and not be paid into public revenue. The court was re-opened in September 1931, over four years after having been abolished [see previous Chapter].⁴⁶

In late 1931 the PECC decided to make rentals payable on a weekly rather than a monthly basis in the belief that this would facilitate the collection of rents. Their thinking on the matter was implicitly racist for it presupposed that the proportion of wages which should be put aside for rents was wasted on beer, liquor and other non-necessities.⁴⁷ In fact, the disposable income of the average New Brighton resident was negligible. Advisory Board members pointed out that weekly rentals would interfere with the operation of stokvels and other such mutual aid associations in the community.⁴⁸ The weekly collection of rents resulted in additional clerical work and its failure to reduce the non-payment of rents did not justify the continuation of the system.

McNamee also investigated the possibility of having unemployed and destitute New Brighton.

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⁴³ CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/5, Minutes of sub-committee appointed to investigate reduction of outstanding rentals, 7 Oct. 1931.
⁴⁵ CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1279, Minutes of NAC, 6 Feb. 1931.
⁴⁷ CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1490, Minutes of the PECC, 4 Nov. 1931.
⁴⁸ CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of the NAC’s interview with NBAB deputation, 7 Dec. 1931.
residents, who could not afford to pay rentals, repatriated to the 'native territories'. He claimed that he did not wish to summarily eject the jobless, widowers and others who had fallen on hard times, but that those with family in the reserves would have a better chance of subsisting. A request to obtain assistance in the form of rail warrants for the repatriation of such people to the reserves was, however, turned down by the NAD.\(^{49}\)

McNamee had interpreted his brief from the NAC as meaning that evictions on a large scale were to be avoided but that steps against a few offenders at a time should serve as an example to the many. In a bid to pre-empt accusations of arbitrariness in selecting people for eviction, McNamee disclosed that his method of dealing with rent defaulters followed certain guidelines: tenants in arrears were first warned to pay rents owing by headmen; this was followed by a printed notice which threatened criminal proceedings; thereafter, a summons was issued and the matter was dealt with by the Magistrate who determined a schedule for repayment of rent arrears; if the Magistrate's order was not complied with, then ejection was ordered. McNamee claimed that ejection was used as a last resort and that if tenants endeavoured to pay arrears then they were afforded every opportunity to continue in occupation of their dwelling.\(^{50}\)

One of the reasons why McNamee favoured the application of the Urban Areas Act to New Brighton was that it simplified the method of dealing with rent defaulters, as it enabled the authorities to short circuit the procedure for evicting residents for non-payment of rents.\(^{51}\) With the promulgation of new regulations in 1933, he introduced a harsher regime in order to ensure that all tenants capable of paying rentals should do so. Regulation 23 permitted eviction orders to be served on tenants who failed to pay rentals a month after their due date. If such a person failed to comply with the order, they faced prosecution and the imposition of a penalty. Three years after the regulations had come into force, the administration's new course of action against rent defaulters showed 'impressive' results. McNamee reported that he had taken the following measures between 1 April 1933 and 30 March 1936:

- (a) Orders issued to tenants to leave New Brighton 3389
- (b) Tenants who left after receiving order 97
- (c) Prosecuted in court for failing to obey order 487
- (d) Prosecuted for non-payment of rent 241
- (e) Ejected from New Brighton 119


Given a population of 7,430 in mid-1935, the above figures suggest that more than half the principal occupants were served with evictions orders during these three years - although only a small percentage were actually evicted.

McNamee became increasingly uncomfortable with his part in turning people out of their houses and the Location, and tired of the NAC's constant harping on the amount of outstanding rentals. He claimed to have done all in his power to minimise arrears but seemed unable to satisfy the NAC unless outstanding rentals were virtually nil. In his chagrin, he expostulated against the 'budget-watchers':

The recovery of all monies accruing I have interpreted to be a feature of almost paramount importance in your policy - monies are to be collected at all costs, short of, say, turning a sick or dying person into the street.52

It obviously went against the grain that his self image as a fatherly figure who had the best interests of Location residents at heart should be compromised by his having to act peremptorily against rent defaulters.

Throughout this period, the PECC remained committed to a self-sufficient NRA. But shortfalls from the new housing scheme contributed to the growing deficit on the NRA:

### TABLE 5.4

**NATIVE REVENUE ACCOUNT 1928-1936**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Surplus</th>
<th>Deficit</th>
<th>Cumulative deficit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td></td>
<td>774</td>
<td>774</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>2,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td></td>
<td>523</td>
<td>2,893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td></td>
<td>285</td>
<td>3,178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>313</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>5,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td></td>
<td>699</td>
<td>5,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,185</td>
<td>7,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>482</td>
<td></td>
<td>7,406</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With the exception of 1929, the largest deficits were recorded between 1933 and 1935 after the economy was recovering from the Depression. By the latter year, the cumulative deficit

52 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/10, Report of Supt. NBL, 1 April 1936.
on the NRA was over £7,000. It is noteworthy that the smallest deficits were recorded during the depths of the Depression when unemployment for New Brighton residents was at its height.\(^5\) On the other hand, rent receipts showed a fairly steady increase during the twelve months from June 1932 to May 1933. The average amount received was £896 per month, whereas during the following twelve months it increased to £1,200 per month - a difference of £304.\(^6\) Moreover, between the beginning of June 1933 until the end of February 1936, the amount of rent collected exceeded expenditure.\(^7\) A partial explanation for this anomalous situation would seem to be that provision for bad debts for irrecoverable rents was not written off.

The overall trend was that the deficit had steadily accumulated since 1928 when the PECC commenced charging economic rents for houses in Newtown. Yet, it insisted on this policy for it was not prepared to subsidise New Brighton rents from the General Rate Fund if this meant that ratepayers were to bear the burden. The City Treasurer considered it 'unthinkable' that ratepayers of the city should be called upon to meet the deficit in the NRA for as long as it possessed 'realisable assets'. This was a reference to the Location land valued at approximately £12,000 (an amount in excess of the current deficit) still on the books of the NRA.\(^8\) In response to a query as to how it proposed to rectify the deficit on its NRA in 1933,\(^9\) the NAC had informed the NAD that:

(a) the committee would not adopt the principle of charging to the general revenue of the city any deficit on the NRA;
(b) the deficit on the NRA was being carried forward free of interest and that included in the location grant was a large area of land which might be sold as industrial sites at any time on the account of location funds.\(^10\)

Although prepared to reduce the rents of certain municipal houses occupied by poor Whites when it was found that tenants were unable to pay, the PECC would not do the same for New Brighton residents. By way of explanation for this discrimination, the NAC held that it had been unable to reduce rents because the Government had refused to reduce the 5% interest rate on economic loans; notwithstanding the fact that it was now offering money to municipalities at 2% interest with which to build sub-economic housing schemes for Africans.\(^11\)

55 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/10, Report of Supt. NBL, 1 April 1936.
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/7, Report of the City Treasurer to NAC, 24 Oct. 1933.
57 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, SNA to TC, PE, 26 Sept. and Minutes of NAC, 29 September 1933.
58 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1630, Minutes of the NAC, 1 Dec. 1933.
Whilst the PECC's situation was not unlike that of its counterpart in Cape Town (where the municipality had taken transfer of Ndabeni from the central state), the latter's General Rate Fund subsidised the NRA. In fact, Cape Town was one of a number of centres - others included East London and Kimberley - where ratepayers bore part of the burden of financing the locations. However, the PECC was not inclined to follow the lead of these municipalities. Instead, it had steadfastly refused to balance the NRA from the General Rate Fund. Having acquired assets of land and buildings from the Union Government when taking transfer of New Brighton, this - as opposed to, say, beerhall profits - became a means to subsidise the city's cheap labour supply. Even when the NRA deficit increased steadily because of unemployment, ineffective measures for recovering rentals, and the fixing of Newtown rents at a rate higher than the average tenant could afford, the PECC still reckoned on being able to dispose of the remaining Location lands at some future date and thereby write off the debts incurred on behalf of the NRA.

The Port Elizabeth Municipality's Subsidisation of the Native Administration Fund, c.1937-1953

The announcement by the Government that as from 1 April 1934 sub-economic housing loans would be made available to local authorities under the Slums Act had been welcomed by PE's Medical Officer of Health (MOH). He expressed the view that if such provisions could be extended to the African population, it could provide a means of abolishing the slum areas in the city and creating a 'native' village. A joint meeting of the NAC and Health & Markets Committee felt that advantage should be taken of the Government's offer to loan money at a rate of 2% (as against the market rate of 3.75% with the Government and local authority sharing the loss equally) and that the Central Housing Board (CHB) should be approached to ascertain whether sub-economic loans could be extended for African housing schemes. The Board considered the scheme eligible for financial assistance out of loan funds for sub-economic housing and approved the PECC's preliminary proposal in principle. Having been given the go ahead, the PECC then baulked at implementing the plan for it would have entailed ratepayers subsidising the housing of the African population. Accordingly, it toyed briefly with the idea of a 'Native Village' where tenants would be granted long lease as a

60 See CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Correspondence from the Town Clerks of Cape Town, Kimberley and East London to TC, PE dated 7, 3 and 15 January 1934, respectively, confirms that this was the case.


62 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/8, Sec. for Public Health to TC, PE, 18 June 1934.
cheaper alternative. It then approached the CHB to waive the Council’s share of the loss that they were meant to bear on the sub-economic loan, but this was refused. However, when the Slums Act was amended so that local authorities would be required to bear only half the amount of loss carried by the central state, the PECC adjusted its own policy in respect of the provision of African housing.

This policy shift was occasioned partly by the government’s insistence that the deficit on the NRA would have to be met annually from the Council’s general account before funds for the McNamee scheme would be granted. First, £500 was provided in the 1937 Estimates towards reducing the accumulated NRA deficit. Secondly, the NAC recommended that the General Rate Fund carry the loss necessary to utilise the sub-economic loan for African housing. Subsequently, in January 1937, the PECC adopted a resolution to the effect that "in future the general rate revenue account bear any deficit arising from the operation of the NRA" provided it was caused by housing. This resolution marked a departure from the PECC’s previous policy of having a self-financing NRA. The newly-named Native Administration Fund was to be run on an entirely different basis.

In a statement to the Wage Board in late 1939, Cllr Mrs E.M. Holland noted that the PECC was subsidising poor wages by providing sub-economic housing for unskilled workers. In advocating a 5s. per day minimum wage, she expressed the view that this would help shift the burden from the PECC to "those employers who should rightfully bear it". Calculations by the MOH submitted to the Wage Board were cited as evidence that living costs for a New Brighton family of four amounted to £5.2.2 for food, plus £1.10.2 for rent, railfares, poll tax and other sundries, giving a total of £6.12.4. These figures made no provision for clothing, recreation and other necessities. Thus even an across the board minimum wage of 5s. per day (the equivalent of about £6 per month) plus a cost of living allowance (cola) for unskilled workers advocated by the PECC, was insufficient for the average African family to make ends meet. Yet, the PECC welcomed Wage Board investigations not so much for the improvement

66 University of the Witwatersrand, Margaret Ballinger Papers, A410 C2.3.9.1, Statement by Mrs E.M. Holland on behalf of PECC re Wage Board Investigation, 24 Nov. 1939.
they might bring to the wage levels of unskilled workers, but rather as a first step in resolving the question of who should bear the costs of reproduction of the working class.

In December 1939 the Wage Board fixed a minimum wage of £1.10.0 per week or £6.10.0 per month for 27 commercial and distributive trades. A few months later, the PECC again passed a resolution which recommended that all wage determinations for a single class of labour should be the same throughout the Union. A bloc of councillors representing employers rejected Mrs Holland's call for a 5s. per day minimum wage. Instead, they accepted the argument that it was counter-productive to set a higher wage in Port Elizabeth than other centres because it would cause an influx of unskilled work seekers to the city. They held that a national minimum wage (rather than influx controls) would ensure an equal distribution of labour. Only two female councillors dissented and one, Mrs Holland, commented sarcastically that "it was wonderful to see the Council standing manfully for the employer".

A very different standpoint was adopted by the SNA during a visit to Port Elizabeth in November 1941 in his capacity as Chairman of the Smit Committee. He was lavish in his praise of the generosity of the PECC in subsidising the sub-economic housing scheme of McNamee Village from general rates. He commended the Council's 'liberal' and 'far-sighted' policy for not being bound by the [in]capacity of the African population to pay for their own housing. But in its Report, the Smit Committee recognised that practice of making sub-economic loans available to municipalities as an incentive to underwrite housing schemes had been largely unsuccessful. Only 41 local authorities had undertaken such schemes, although there were 267 proclaimed locations. This reluctance on the part of municipalities was attributed to the widely held perception that these would still incur excessive losses which would increase NRA deficits or necessitate the subsidisation of township costs. The Smit Committee recommended that contributions from the general revenue accounts of municipalities be utilised to make up deficits on NRAs and that local authorities be compelled to provide housing schemes. However the massive urbanisation during the War put paid to

69 Ballinger Papers, A410, C2.3.9.1, Letter from E.M. Holland to M. Ballinger, 29 March 1940.
70 Umatali wa Bantu, 8 Nov. 1941 in University of the Witwatersrand, SAIRR Papers, AD 843/B 9.5.
virtually all future sub-economic schemes for Africans.

Meanwhile, new tensions arose in New Brighton as a result of rent disparities. Rents in the new sub-economic scheme were fixed at 16s. and 14s. per month for three-and two-roomed houses, respectively, and 6s. per month for single rooms accommodating 4 single men; with an extra surcharge of 1s.6d. for the supply of electricity. McNamee wished to afford long-standing residents of New Brighton, especially those who had been paying premium rents in the brick-buildings, the first option on the new sub-economic houses where provisional rents were as much as 10s. less than those in Newtown. But it was pointed out that former Korsten residents who had been relocated would be dissatisfied at having to pay the higher Newtown rents. In order to try avert discontent, the PECC made known its intention of ultimately bringing rentals of economic houses in line with the sub-economic dwellings. This was achieved progressively over a five-year period as the comparative rents for 1938 and 1943 show:

**TABLE 5.5**

*NEW BRIGHTON RENTALS 1938 AND 1943*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1938</th>
<th>1943</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) Newtown</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Cottages (3 rooms)</td>
<td>30 0</td>
<td>16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>&quot; (2 ” )</td>
<td>20 0</td>
<td>16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Houses (2 rooms)</td>
<td>20 0</td>
<td>16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>&quot; (2 ” w/kitchens)</td>
<td>21 6</td>
<td>16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>&quot; (3 ” )</td>
<td>22 6</td>
<td>16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>&quot; (3 ” w/kitchens)</td>
<td>24 0</td>
<td>16 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) McNamee Village</td>
<td></td>
<td>16 0</td>
<td>16 0*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Semi-detached (3 rooms)</td>
<td>14 0</td>
<td>14 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>4 Rooms</td>
<td>28 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Rents were fixed at 20s. for similar houses built in 1943-4.*

72 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Report of the City Treasurer, 6 Jan. 1944 re Native Sub-Economic Housing Scheme (McNamee Village), citing SNA to Sec. CHB, 24 Nov. 1936.

73 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282, Minutes of the NBAB, 10 Feb. and 17 March 1938.

74 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1283, Memo of TC for NAC, 11 Dec. 1939.
The above Table does not include rents in the Red Location, nor the SMQ (for either the old location and Newtown) for neither were changed during this period.

In November 1943, a motion to increase rents in New Brighton was motivated by the argument that the PECC was experiencing a loss of about 3% or £37 000 per annum which was far in excess of the 1.25% envisaged in terms of the scheme. In terms of the provisions for the grant of loans for sub-economic housing, the Government and local authorities were to share losses in the ratio of 2:1. The Government reckoned that it would lose 2.5% on market rates by advancing loans at the rate of 0.75% interest per annum to local authorities. The local authorities, in turn, were required to lose 1.25% per annum. What happened in practice, however, was that local authorities often incurred greater losses. Opponents of the motion disputed these figures and the fact that any loss should be limited to 1.25%. Others held that any loss was easily compensated for in other ways, which was presumably an allusion to the degree of social control facilitated by having the majority of Africans resident in New Brighton. The motion was defeated by the narrowest of margins but the issue engendered much public debate and controversy.\(^{75}\)

A review of the sub-economic scheme by the City Treasurer in January 1944 showed that the original estimates had been far too conservative. The estimate for 2 500 houses and 500 single rooms had been £550 100, whilst the expenditure as at 30 November 1943 in respect of 3 406 houses amounted to £756 930. The largest component of the figure of £236 888, by which the expenditure had exceeded the estimate, was a sum of £179 670 for dwellings. (The cost of the provision of services approximated the original estimate far more closely). In the case of many contracts, the final cost per house exceeded the tendered price by more than 50%. Costs of below £150 per house in 1939, had increased to more than £200 in 1942 because of rises in the costs of materials and labour during the War. Thus the increase in expenditure on houses was not only due to the increased number erected but the per capita cost thereof. The original estimate had been fixed at about £183, whereas the actual cost had amounted to nearly £223 - a difference of £40 per structure. According to the City Treasurer, the situation had been exacerbated by, *inter alia*, the increase in the costs of administration and health services for which no provision had been made in rents. In addition, the NRA had incurred a progressively larger loss on account of the reduction of rents in Newtown to 16s. so as to bring them in line with the rents in McNamee Village. The City Treasurer was adamant that only a general rent

\(^{75}\) The Star, 11 Nov. 1943 and The Guardian, 18 Nov. 1943.
increase would salvage the situation.\textsuperscript{76}

By 1944, the PECC’s sub-economic housing schemes had come to a standstill after having built 5,486 dwellings of which 3,500 were for Africans. The Council declared itself no longer able financially to undertake further schemes under existing conditions nor was it willing to commit itself to new ones on the terms proposed by the Government, to be co-ordinated through the agency of the soon to be established National Housing and Planning Commission. The PECC’s main objection was that the proposals could not guarantee that the loss to be borne by local authorities would not exceed 1.25% of the loan debt in the erection of sub-economic houses. This, more than anything else, rankled with certain Councillors who regarded the failure of the previous scheme to underwrite losses as tantamount to a betrayal of trust by the Government.\textsuperscript{77} Thus the PECC’s rejection of the Government’s new housing proposals was coupled to a growing dissatisfaction with the losses sustained on the sub-economic housing schemes.

\textbf{TABLE 5.6}

\textit{LOSSES INCURRED ON SUB-ECONOMIC HOUSING, 1939-1945}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expenditure</th>
<th>Revenue</th>
<th>Loss</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>33,995</td>
<td>29,960</td>
<td>4,035</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>47,985</td>
<td>38,210</td>
<td>9,775</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>57,442</td>
<td>43,700</td>
<td>13,742</td>
<td>23.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>68,635</td>
<td>49,301</td>
<td>19,334</td>
<td>28.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>81,222</td>
<td>51,561</td>
<td>29,661</td>
<td>36.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>80,894</td>
<td>54,917</td>
<td>25,977</td>
<td>32.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945*</td>
<td>91,334</td>
<td>57,246</td>
<td>34,088</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Estimated

The cumulative deficit for the period totalled £136,532 and the contribution required from general rates was steadily increasing. The City Treasurer reckoned that when the sub-economic housing programme was completed and the PECC was meeting the total interest and redemption charges, the contribution required from general rates to meet the deficit was

\textsuperscript{76} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Report of the City Treasurer re Native Sub-Economic Housing Scheme (McNamee Village), 6 Jan. 1944; 3/PEZ 4/2/1/1/122, Report of City & Water Engineer to Housing & Slum Elimination Committee, 15 Feb. 1944.

\textsuperscript{77} EPH 30 and 31 March 1944, 6 April 1944.
anticipated to be at least £43 000 per annum. This was estimated to be the equivalent to a rate of about ½d. in the £ on the 1944 valuation of site and buildings in Port Elizabeth. Overall, the loss on the scheme was expected to be approximately 2.5% of the loans advanced for sub-economic housing purposes, or effectively double that laid down by the Government. But even if these estimates are accepted, ratepayers were making a relatively small contribution to subsidising the housing of Port Elizabeth’s poorest classes.

In June 1944, the NAC considered the feasibility of reducing the losses on the sub-economic scheme by increasing rentals in New Brighton. It initially considered increases to the lowest categories of accommodation in the Red Location might be preferable to the highest category of rentals in McNamee Village and Newtown. The Location Superintendent argued that discrimination against the very poor - even where their incomes were supplemented from the (illicit) sale of beer - could hardly be justified when their living conditions were appalling. The NAC finally resolved to increase rents on all houses in McNamee Village by 4s. per month and to fix the rent of the newly-erected dwellings at £1 per month. If the NAC regarded tenants of the sub-economic houses better able to afford rent increases, they were sadly mistaken. A survey conducted the previous year of the incomes of 73% of householders in McNamee Village revealed that by far the majority (2 023 out of 2 724) earned less than £6 per month. Of the total, the incomes of 325 households were supplemented by the earnings of children residing with them, and 182 householders were totally dependent on the earnings of children. A further 154 householders were unemployed with no visible income. If an income of £6 per month was to be regarded as barely adequate to subsist, then rents of £1 would entail increased privation for these residents. It was regarded by the PE Joint Council to be inappropriate that the ‘underfed and underpaid’ Africans should be singled out to help meet the deficit on the PE Municipality’s budget.

The rent increases were presented to the Advisory Board as a fait accompli. The Superintendent felt constrained to justify a general increase on the grounds that tariffs had been based on 1937 estimates of the cost of buildings which had increased enormously, as had the

78 CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, City Treasurer’s Report for the Year ended 31 Dec. 1944 and Memo to NAD, 27 Sept. 1946.
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Report of Supt. NBL, 7 July 1944.
81 CeA, NTS 6371 197/313, Sec. PE Joint Council to Minister of Native Affairs, 22 Nov. 1944; The South African Outlook, 1 March 1945, p. 63 (Comments by Cllr E.M. Holland).
cost of maintenance and services. Moreover, he noted that since the rentals had been fixed, wages paid to unskilled workers had been increased. He presented the Board with the scenario that if additional revenue from rent increases was not forthcoming there was every possibility that the PECC would refuse to build any more houses and that many Africans would continue to live under slum conditions.\(^2\) When called upon to approve the new regulations necessary to implement the rent increases, members of the Board expressed their dissatisfaction with not having been consulted on the matter. It was unanimously felt that rents of £1 were beyond the capacity of New Brighton residents and that, if introduced, would give rise to malnutrition with an accompanying increase in the incidence of tuberculosis.\(^3\) Notwithstanding opposition, the PECC went ahead with its plans to apply for the rent increases.\(^4\)

The proposed rent increases did not eventuate until 1947 because of community resistance [see Chapter 8]. When further rent increases were mooted, residents made known their intention of refusing to pay these and threatened boycott action.\(^5\) The PECC chose to ignore the likelihood of opposition and approved an average increase of 1s. per week on houses in McNamee Village although there were to be no increases to rents in the other parts of New Brighton [see Table 5.7]. In late 1951 the PECC proposed further rent increases in McNamee Village in order to reduce losses on sub-economic housing. It was also proposed that those unable to afford the new rents would be moved to cheaper houses in the lower rent group. Cllr G. Schafer, who was Chairman of the NAB, argued that in real terms the proposed 10% increases amounted to between 60% and 80% and could not be afforded by the majority of residents. He also contended that any attempts to rehouse McNamee residents in other portions of the location would have negative socio-political consequences, which would be more harmful than "any alleged losses on Native housing schemes".\(^6\) The NAC decided to recommend that the Council postpone the rent increases until such time as new Wage Board determinations for African workers had been made. The NAC's report argued that

"if the residents of New Brighton were to be able to meet the proposed increase in rent, wages should be adjusted to meet the increases."\(^7\)

The majority of Councillors, however, took the view that a rent increase should not be contingent on wage increases as the PE Municipality had recently turned down a request for an increase by its own African employers.\(^8\)

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82 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 27 July 1944.
83 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Dec. 1944.
84 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Dec. 1944.
85 UCT Manuscripts, M. Ballinger Papers, A410 B2.5.40, A.P. Mati, Sec. NB Vigilance Committee to Ballinger, 22 April 1946.
86 EPH 6 Oct. 1951.
87 Evening Post 21 Nov. and EPH 22 Nov. 1951.
88 EPH 23 Nov. ("City Council Over Native Wages") and Evening Post 23 Nov. 1951 ("Increase of rents only on merits").
The Council also rejected an increase in general rates on the grounds that it was unfair to expect ratepayers to subsidise the residents of New Brighton. The proposed increase of ½d. would have raised the rate to 6d. in the £. Yet it was contended that New Brighton residents were already paying higher tariffs for the provision of water than ratepayers in the city, and that overall they were paying the equivalent of a rate of 8d. in the £. Nor was the PECC prepared to make comparable rent increases on the sub-economic housing schemes erected for Whites and Coloureds who were arguably better able to pay such increases. As it was, existing rents in McNamee were reckoned to be higher than for comparable houses for Coloured residents of Schauder Township. In response to what he declared to be 'gross distortions' of the position, Schauder himself noted that rents had not been increased in the older portion of New Brighton since 1927. He also pointed to the discrepancies between rents paid by McNamee residents and those in the recently constructed austerity housing (Boastville) and the emergency wooden housing scheme (Kwaford):

TABLE 5.7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of dwelling</th>
<th>1945</th>
<th>1947</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(a) McNamee Village</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-roomed</td>
<td>3/3 &amp; 4/7</td>
<td>4/2</td>
<td>6/6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-roomed</td>
<td>3/8</td>
<td>4/8</td>
<td>8/9*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-roomed</td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>7/4</td>
<td>12/6*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*Proposed new rates.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(b) Boastville</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4/2 &amp; 4/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(c) Kwaford</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6/-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(d) Elundini</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7/11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8/9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-roomed</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12/6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

89 EPH 28 Nov. 1951 (Letter from M.M. Desai).
90 See correspondence in EPH 1 Oct. 1951 (from Dick Mjele, NB), 16 Oct. 1951 (from 'Parent', NB) and 22 Oct. 1951 (H. Williams, Schauder Township).
91 CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, TC to SNA, 3 Oct. 1951.
Schauder suggested that the opposition to the rent increases was stage managed by McNamee residents who represented a 'privileged group' intent on protecting their position to the detriment of others. These included residents of the new housing schemes who paid higher rents for poorer amenities and residents of slums outside New Brighton who might not be afforded the opportunity to acquire better housing if the non-payment of rents forced the PECC to halt housing and slum clearance projects. Although the social geography and stratification of New Brighton contributed to the creation of sectional group interests, there was considerable solidarity in the community against rent increases.

A statement issued by the ANC in 1951 called upon the authorities to "erase the misconception that the African is entirely dependent upon their philanthropic charity". It pointed out that Africans bore the brunt of indirect taxation in the form of cheap labour. Cheap labour benefitted Port Elizabeth's employers, both the authorities themselves and industrialists. Yet sub-economic housing was made available to poorly paid workers by the authorities and not employers. From the perspective of the local authority, it was argued that "sub-economic housing... is the adjustment we apply to inadequate wages". The author of this statement went on to suggest that a housing tax should be imposed on businesses if the authorities were to continue to provide sub-economic houses and, accordingly, subsidise poor wages. The state appeared to concur with such a proposal as levies were imposed on white employers of African labour. The Native Services Levy Act (64 of 1952) established the principle that employers had a responsibility towards meeting the costs of providing certain services to the townships. For the first time, the business sector which derived direct economic benefits from cheap African labour was called upon to contribute towards the costs of its reproduction.

Conclusion

Much of the (direct) cost of the reproduction of Port Elizabeth's African workforce was carried by the central state for the first two decades after the establishment of New Brighton. After the Municipality assumed responsibility for New Brighton, it sought to maintain a self-balancing NRA. Neither the PECC nor ratepayers were to bear the costs of reproduction. Having acquired substantial assets as part of the transfer, the PECC was able to supplement

92 EPH 6 Dec. 1951.
94 EPH 10 Dec. 1951 ('Native Housing Fallacy').
95 Bekker and Humphries, From Control to Confusion, p. 122.
NRA income by means of the occasional hiring or sale of location land not specifically earmarked for residential purposes. Some revenue was derived from the irregular payment of court fines into the NRA. But the absence of a municipal beerhall, which provided the major source of revenue in many centres, meant that the Location was financed primarily through the renting of municipally-owned dwellings. Ultimately, the quest for self-sufficiency was undermined by the deficit which accrued to the NRA on account of the Newtown housing scheme.

In 1937 the PECC decided that its sub-economic housing scheme would be partly subsidised from the general rate fund. McNamee Village came to be hailed as an example of how suitable and cost-effective accommodation for Africans could be provided with the judicious use of sub-economic loans. The initial enthusiasm for the project was, however, dampened by escalating costs and the consequent losses sustained by the NAF. It was felt that the central government had reneged on its undertaking to restrict these losses and had passed the greater burden of financing homes and essential services for Africans to the local authority and hence (indirectly to) ratepayers. For many municipalities, beer profits remained of crucial importance in meeting deficits on the NRA. For Port Elizabeth, however, this was never an option for reasons which we shall explore in the following Chapter.

The PECC sought, instead, to extract additional revenue from New Brighton residents by imposing a succession of rent increases on New Brighton from the mid-1940s. The cumulative deficit on the NAF caused the PECC to reconsider its subsidisation of sub-economic rents and make the African population liable for the costs of its own reproduction. Not that the PECC’s purported ‘liberalism’ extended to the financing of New Brighton... Indeed, Robinson has argued that the PECC was actually frugal and tight-fisted with respect to its management of the NRA. Although not altruistic, at least the PECC did not stoop to the fraudulent practices of the borough of Durban. 

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CHAPTER 6

PERMITTING PATRONAGE AND POLICING PRIVILEGES:
DOMESTIC BEER BREWING IN NEW BRIGHTON, c. 1903–1945

Much of the literature on sorghum or 'kaffir' beer in South African townships has been concerned with the efforts of the state to control its production and consumption, and resistance thereto. The beerhall is said to represent a distinct loss of autonomy on the part of urban Africans in shaping their own communities. On the other hand, the shebeen has come to symbolise a site where state control of drinking habits and other leisure activities was weak. It was here that a vibrant popular culture acquired a subaltern status. Thus, when home brewing is discussed, it is invariably in the context of efforts by the authorities to clamp down on illicit practices. As far as I am aware, there is not a single case study of a township where domestic brewing was officially sanctioned.

The 1923 Urban Areas Act upheld the principle that prohibition should be the rule in African townships, although it also made provision for municipal or domestic brewing - but not a combination of these. Between 1923 and 1937, some 45 municipalities adopted domestic brewing as opposed to 8 which adopted monopolies. The 1937 Native Law Amendment Act overturned prohibition in favour of the principle that African had a right to beer, either by means of municipalisation, or domestic brewing or through the agency of licensed premises. The first option remained exclusive but the latter two could be practised parri passu. In instances where municipalities failed to establish monopolies or license individuals to sell beer, they could not prohibit domestic brewing. But the extent of support by local authorities and

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1 Most of the chapters in the recently published J. Crush and C. Ambler (eds.), Liquor and Labour in Southern Africa (Pietermaritzburg, 1992) are written in this vein.
4 Report of the Native Affairs Department for 1937, U.G. 48 - '37, p. 35; S. Bekker and R. Humphries, From Control to Confusion (Pietermaritzburg, 1985), p. 120.
the police for beerhalls under a municipal monopoly was probably inversely proportional to the preference of urban Africans for domestic brewing. Many chose to introduce municipal monopolies despite opposition from the communities themselves because it presented an obvious means of balancing NRAs.

Although Port Elizabeth periodically considered the introduction of beerhalls, it was one of the few major centres to continue allowing domestic brewing throughout our period. This chapter is concerned with why, how and under what circumstances domestic brewing was permitted in New Brighton. First, it will examine the attempts by the location administration to fashion a system which catered for the conflicting interests of different sections of the New Brighton community, as well as accommodate the views of outside pressure groups. Secondly, it will outline the PECC’S efforts to legalise home brewing by way of a permit system. And, finally, the chapter will address the functioning and abuse of the system of home brewing, the latter largely by way of statistical evidence derived from police records. This will enable us to assess the validity of the constantly repeated assertion that New Brighton was 'a law-abiding community' as justification for the practice of domestic brewing. Moreover, it will also provide scope for a comparative evaluation of the merits of domestic brewing and beerhalls under municipal control.

The Establishment and Operation of Dualism in New Brighton, 1903-1923
New Brighton’s unique combination of domestic brewing and prohibition originated during the time that the Location was administered by the Cape Colonial Government. Section 14 of the Native Reserve Location Act stipulated that no licence to sell liquor was to be issued to residents. Section 16 stated that it was an offence to bring intoxicating liquor into the location or be in possession thereof without a permit, which would only be issued for medicinal (and possibly ritualistic) purposes. Section 17 set out penalties for the contravention of these clauses. The definition of intoxicating liquor in Section 1 of the Act included 'kaffir' beer and

89-91.

thus expressly forbade trade in or possession thereof. But Section 16 of the Act provided the loophole for the introduction of domestic brewing. It was suggested that residents be issued permits to brew a limited quantity of 'kaffir' beer for their own consumption as it was regarded part of the staple African diet. Domestic brewing was permitted on account of 'administrative relaxation', a euphemism for a customary practice which was, strictly speaking, illegal.

Part of the rationale for allowing domestic brewing (not unlike that for beerhalls) was that it would serve to combat the illicit trade in and consumption of 'European' liquor in New Brighton. Despite exerting a disproportionate influence on the location administration through the Native Advisory Board, the proponents of prohibition could not withstand the demands for traditional beverages. The authorities were of the opinion that as long as the demand for traditional beer existed, it was preferable to have brewing under supervision. They reckoned that prohibition was unworkable and counter-productive, as those New Brighton residents long accustomed to drinking 'kaffir' beer would then frequent shebeens outside the Location. Domestic brewing was obviously favoured by a good number of women who saw the financial incentives. A system of dualism could accommodate the interests of prohibitionists and brewers in a single locality. This exemplified the contradictory impulses of alcohol regulation: on the one hand, the desire to suppress African consumption altogether and, on the other, the effort to restrict consumption so that it conformed to and reinforced the objectives of social and economic domination.

Spatially, New Brighton's system of dualism was demarcated by 'wet' and 'dry' areas. The 'wet' areas comprised 12 blocks of houses in the Red Location wherein residents were allowed to brew 4 gallons of beer per week. There were 9 blocks in the 'dry' area. Subsequently, the 'wet' area was sub-divided into three sections of 4 blocks and permits were issued to each section in turn so that those who were eligible could obtain permits every third week. Permits were issued only to registered occupants of houses whose rent payments were up to date and not to lodgers. They were issued by the Location Superintendent on Monday mornings and expired on midnight the following Saturday so that brewing was effectively forbidden on Sundays. Under this rotational system, permit holders were allowed to be in possession of a maximum of eight gallons of beer per day. This quantity was considered adequate for three

7 CAD, Native Affairs (NA), 734 348, ARM to SNA, 7 Aug. 1908 and Minutes of the NBAB, 24 Oct. 1908.
households and was supposed to afford brewers the opportunity to reciprocate the hospitality of those with whom they had drunk beer during the two weeks when themselves not entitled to a permit. Although beer could not legally be sold, it would have been extremely difficult to prevent this. Migrants, many of whom were lodgers or later became tenants of the SMQ, could not obtain permits and congregated in the 'wet' areas for their social drinking. This had the effect of reducing the surveillance necessary to control revelry and anti-social behaviour, but it did not eliminate illicit brewing nor the trade in beer and liquor altogether. The term 'domestic' brewing was clearly a misnomer for the quantities allowed were beyond the consumption requirements of the average household. If anything, homes in the 'wet' area of New Brighton became part-time shebeens.

The PF City Council's struggle to legalise dualism in New Brighton, 1923-1936
An illegal system of home brewing had existed for a number of years when the PECC assumed control of New Brighton in 1923. The PECC was made aware of this state of affairs by the Union Government and advised to regularise the position as soon as possible by applying the Urban Areas Act. There was considerable debate as to what course the PECC should follow with regard to framing beer brewing regulations in terms of this legislation. It was faced with three possible options: (1) total prohibition; (2) domestic brewing subject to conditions prescribed by regulations; (3) the vesting in the municipality of the exclusive rights to manufacture, supply and sell 'kaffir' beer within its area.

The new Location Superintendent, W.G. Bellairs, had definite views on traditional sorghum beer. He reckoned that the nutritional value of the beer in its pure state and when taken in moderation was widely recognised. He held that domestic brewing and consumption was "a custom and privilege which ... no Government has interfered with except in so far as to control, regulate and keep within proper limits". The denial of this privilege would not only cause 'grave discontent', but "also defeat its own object by leading to a large increase in the consumption of brandy and other spiritous liquors and their introduction into the location in ever increasing quantities, leading inevitably to the physical, mental and moral deterioration and degradation of the inhabitants". He also cited the example of many 'better class or educated natives' who chose to live in the 'dry' areas and forego beer privileges as a sign of

9 Eastern Province Herald, 6 June 1919 (letter from 'Straightforward'); Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS), 2443 4/291, Superintendent of Natives to Magt., PE, 16 June 1919; Report of the Native Affairs Department for the years 1913 to 1918, UG 7 - 1919, p. 18.
significant social change amongst urbanised Africans. Thus he advocated the continuation of the existing system of domestic brewing with the proviso that conditions for the grant of permits should be made more stringent if the need arose.\(^{10}\) I have cited Bellairs's views at some length because they are representative of a viewpoint which was common amongst those with first-hand experience of rural African society. This was that 'kaffir' beer was part of the African diet and should not be prohibited but strictly regulated.\(^{11}\) Bellairs's experience in the Transkei probably accounts for his echoing the views of officials of the NAD who favoured domestic brewing of the traditional beverage of African peoples.

Bellairs's views would undoubtedly have found support amongst many of New Brighton's residents. The Location Committee, for instance, argued that to implement prohibition after so many years of domestic brewing would be counter-productive. If not permitted to drink 'kaffir' beer which had been allowed to ferment properly, people would take to various concoctions which could be prepared surreptitiously and more quickly.\(^{12}\) The Advisory Board, too, expressed itself in favour of the continuation of the existing system of domestic brewing subject to regulation and control.\(^{13}\) Although some Board members were themselves teetotallers on account of moral or religious convictions, they did not consider it wise to impose their principles on the majority of New Brighton residents.

On the other hand, representations for prohibition were made by a number of pressure groups. In March 1924, a group of over 200 Christians from mission churches, as well as the Order of Ethiopia, passed the following resolution:

That this meeting of members of the Churches in New Brighton regard the Kaffir Beer traffic in the Location as a danger to our young people and beg the Municipality to prohibit the manufacture and sale of Kaffir Beer.\(^{14}\)

Similar petitions were submitted to the PECC by white ministers.\(^{15}\) And the PECC also

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\(^{10}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, Report on the Manufacture of Kaffir Beer, New Brighton Location, which accompanied a letter from the Location Superintendent to the Town Clerk, PE, 26 May 1924.


\(^{12}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/556, Secretary Location Committee to Superintendent of Natives, 12 Oct. 1925.

\(^{13}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, Minutes of NBAB, 28 April 1924.

\(^{14}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, Resolution dated 30 March 1924 signed by Henry Newell.

\(^{15}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/725, Petitions from the Clergy of the Anglican Church, PE, 7 April 1924 signed by J. Cowan, and from Ministers Fraternal of the Congregational, Baptist, Wesleyan, Dutch Reformed and Presbyterian Churches, 21 April 1924 signed by J.M. Robert.
received a deputation from the Federal Woman's Christian Temperance Union led by Sister Dora Nginza [see Appendix C for biographical details] which probably represented the wives of the 'respectable' classes. The temperance lobby constituted a formidable pressure group at the time but its influence appears to have waned from the mid-1920s as the state and local authorities came to favour controlled beer brewing.

The publication of comments about conditions in New Brighton made by Superintendent Bellairs and two clergymen to the Port Elizabeth Rotary Club in August 1925 and the subsequent controversy that this sparked, had a significant bearing on the PECC's decision to consider a municipal monopoly. One of the clergymen reportedly stated that "he could not understand why the possession of Kaffir beer should be regarded as a serious offence outside of New Brighton but not an offence inside the Location". A sub-committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club - which included some prominent Councillors and the Chief Sanitary Inspector - released a report which confirmed previous claims that "Kaffir beer [was] brewed in excessive quantities under little or no supervision". The extent to which the incumbent Location Superintendent could be blamed for the situation was a moot point. He had inherited the system from his predecessor and obviously only continued well-established practices.

In the face of mounting pressure, Bellairs had to be seen to asserting a greater degree of control over brewing. Accordingly, he issued a warning to beer brewers that if they continued to abuse their privilege, the practice would be discontinued entirely. In addition, an African police corporal was engaged for the express purpose of exercising more effective control of the manufacture and consumption of beer in the location. However, these measures and proposals for improvements were not sufficient to defuse the crisis, and Bellairs became the Council's scapegoat for its bad press and was dismissed from his position as Superintendent. Clearly, the Council should have shouldered as much responsibility as its employee for what was perceived to be the administration's inability to control a socially destructive practice by certain interested parties.

16 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/724, Minutes of PECC, 3 Dec. 1924.
18 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Report of the Sub-Committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club to investigate the conditions of Native Life in and about the City, 3 Dec. 1925.
The publication of the abovementioned Rotary report added to the public clamour for a municipal monopoly in New Brighton. It was suggested that:

the Municipality undertake the sole manufacture and control and distribution of Kaffir Beer, and that any profit therefrom shall be allocated and employed solely for the benefit of the Native population.21

The city's Medical Officer of Health (MOH) criticised the issue of brewing permits on a rotational basis because drinkers simply congregated in one portion of the location which "lends itself to all manner of evils".22 A leading Councillor also objected to the congestion of drinkers in the 'wet areas' and expressed preference for a brewery erected by private enterprise but under municipal supervision.23 The obvious appeal of the system for the local authorities lay in the fact that the Africans themselves rather than white ratepayers or employers would bear the cost of their reproduction. In addition to income derived from rents, fines and other fees, the profits from beer sales would be paid into the NRA and be used to pay salaries of administrators and provide facilities in the location.

Whilst the Urban Areas Act had incorporated many features of the 'Durban system',24 the framers of the Act had recognised that beerhalls were more suited to a 'floating' population (such as Durban with its togt labourers) than a stable one where family units comprised a significant section (such as Port Elizabeth). The municipalisation of beer brewing had only been experimented with in Natal, and in the Cape where conditions were very different there were not a single precedent for Port Elizabeth to follow. By contrast, the practice of domestic brewing was well established in New Brighton and any attempt to remove it was likely to meet with resistance.

Nonetheless, the PECC's Native Affairs Sub-Committee showed itself in favour of municipalisation. At a meeting in December 1925, concern was expressed about the trend towards abuse of the permit system. Figures tabled at the meeting indicated that the number of convictions for illegal brewing had increased from 29 in 1921 to 135 in 1924, which meant

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21 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Report of the Sub-Committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club to investigate the conditions of Native Life in and about the City, 3 Dec. 1925.
22 PE Municipality, Mayor's Minute 1925, Report of the MOH, p. 56.
23 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Undated report of Cllr H.J. Millard on New Brighton submitted to the NAC with that of the sub-committee appointed by the PE Rotary Club to investigate conditions of Native Life in the City, 3 Dec. 1925.
that the per capita conviction rate had increased from 5.5 to 16.5 per 1000.25 Opinion was also swayed by the financial incentives of municipalisation. Another set of figures was tabled showing Durban’s beerhall profits which suggested that a municipal monopoly in New Brighton could defray the costs of administering the location quite considerably. On the basis of these considerations, the Sub-Committee recommended that a brewery should be established under the aegis of municipality.26 The Council affirmed the principle that the manufacture and sale of 'kaffir' beer at New Brighton should be undertaken by the Municipality and, accordingly, a definite proposal should be formulated.27 But the Council did not have the power to introduce a municipal beer monopoly whilst New Brighton was still administered under the Native Reserve Location Act; this could only be conferred in terms of the Urban Areas Act.

In the interim, the PECC took steps to impose stricter controls on beer brewing. In June 1926, the Assistant Resident Magistrate (ARM) tried four New Brighton residents for contravention of beer brewing regulations in the periodical court. He came to the conclusion that "there were such exceptional circumstances in these cases that the accused should only be nominally fined and that their privileges should be retained". The Location Superintendent protested on the grounds that the PECC had discretion to issue or not renew permits and contended that such a ruling was not within the Magistrate’s province. He pointed out that in one case the accused had a previous conviction for a similar offence. Allegations that the Superintendent had torn up a letter setting forth the ARM’s ruling in the case in front of some Africans and thereby undermined his authority were refuted but caused further recriminations. Ultimately, the NAC lodged an appeal against the sentence and resolved that the decision not to renew permits be adhered to.28

Bellairs’s successor as Location Superintendent, J.P. McNamee, was expected to continue the PECC’s tough approach to illegal beer brewing. He was instructed to take immediate steps to remedy the abuse of the permit system upon assuming office. He sought to close a loophole in the system which effectively allowed a permit holder to be in possession of more than 8 gallons per day. A new condition was attached to the issue of permits which stipulated that the

25 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Magt to Town Clerk, PE, 9 Oct. 1925.
26 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of Native Affairs Sub-Committee, 3 Dec. 1925.
28 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Messrs Krogscheepers & Strydom to TC, PE, 22 June 1926 and Minutes of NAC, 30 June 1926.
holder could not be in possession of beer in any of its stages of manufacture, as well as beer ready for consumption, at the same time. McNamee also undertook to exercise a close personal supervision over the blocks where beer was being brewed.\textsuperscript{29} He earned the nickname \textit{uGilifatyi} on account his habit of personally emptying containers when quantities of beer in excess of the regulation amount were found.

When the NAC discussed the relative merits of the regulations pertaining to beer brewing under existing conditions and the Urban Areas Act, it was pointed out that only the latter made specific provision for the legalisation of domestic brewing. In other words, whereas the PECC treated beer brewing as a 'privilege' which could be entirely revoked consequent upon abuse of the permit system, in terms of the Urban Areas Act it would be regarded as a right which could only be denied individuals for contravening the regulations.\textsuperscript{30} In reporting on the position, McNamee, like his predecessor, made it known that he favoured the legalisation of the system of domestic brewing under the Urban Areas Act rather than a municipal monopoly in New Brighton. Amongst other things, the Act made provision for those "not in possession of any honest means of livelihood" - meaning persons living from the proceeds of the sale of beer - to be ejected from the location. He was of the opinion that this and other measures would enable adequate control to be exercised over domestic beer brewing.\textsuperscript{31} The NAC instructed its Chairman and the Location Superintendent to report back on the issue.

The report by Cllr T.C. White and McNamee expressed the opinion that it was "not opportune for the Municipality to create a monopoly in brewing Kaffir Beer". It recommended, instead, the continuation of the existing system of domestic brewing provided that the conditions governing the issue of permits were strictly enforced. An additional suggestion was for the erection of eating houses in various parts of the city where African workers would be able to obtain lunch-time meals and beer with a low-level of alcohol under strictly regulated conditions.\textsuperscript{32} The NAC, however, chose to reject this recommendation and resolved, instead, that a building be erected in New Brighton for the brewing and supplying of Kaffir Beer at an estimated cost of £5 000.\textsuperscript{33} The Council adopted the NAC's recommendation, although

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{29} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1276 and 1/1556, Reports of the Location Superintendent, 19 Sept. and 19 Oct. 1926; Minutes of the Finance Committee, 24 Sept. and 22 Oct. 1926.
\item \textsuperscript{30} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/666, Minutes of NAC, 2 March 1927.
\item \textsuperscript{31} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Memo of the Location Superintendent, 4 April 1927.
\item \textsuperscript{32} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Report of T.C. White and J.P. McNamee re Kaffir Beer to NAC, 30 April 1927.
\item \textsuperscript{33} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of the NAC, 6 May 1927.
\end{itemize}
four dissenting Councillors insisted on having their protests recorded.\textsuperscript{34}

The PECC's approach to the municipalisation of beer brewing was cautious, informed as it was by the knowledge that there might be resistance to the introduction of beerhalls in New Brighton. Although it included a sum of £4 000 for a beerhall against the loan schedule in its estimates for 1928,\textsuperscript{35} the PECC appears to have been especially wary that the capital outlay involved in such a project might not be recouped. Therefore it entertained the idea of granting a concession to a local brewery to manufacture beer under licence from the Council which would supply and sell it in the location.\textsuperscript{36} But the response of the SNA to this proposal was to the effect that the NRA should "benefit by the brewing and sale of the beer, and did not contemplate independent contractors making an intermediate profit". Therefore, it was considered unlikely that the Minister of Native Affairs would approve the operation of a commercial brewery licensed by the local authority.\textsuperscript{37} Although privatisation (to use an anachronistic term) was ruled out, the Council was still intent on securing a municipal beer monopoly.

The most obvious obstacle to the introduction of a monopoly was the illegality of the existing system of domestic brewing. Section 20 (2) of the Urban Areas Act stated that

\begin{quote}
Where brewing is, at the commencement of this Act, permitted by law [emphasis added], domestic brewing shall after the commencement of this Act be permitted.
\end{quote}

Because brewing was not actually permitted under the Native Reserve Location Act, the existing system could not have been automatically legalised as provided for by Section 20 (2) simply by transferring from the operation of the one Act to the other. The alternative, as stipulated in Section 20 (3) of the Act, was for the PECC to consult the Advisory Board, pass a resolution and then obtain the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs who would proclaim the introduction of a municipal monopoly (as if domestic brewing had never existed). But before it was prepared to commit itself to municipalisation, the PECC sought an assurances from the Minister of Native Affairs that any objections of the NAB would not be allowed to stand in the way, even if this meant having to amend the Urban Areas Act.\textsuperscript{38} The PECC also asked the Native Commissioner and District Commandant of the SAP to intercede with the

\textsuperscript{34} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of Council, 18 May 1927.
\textsuperscript{35} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of NBAB, 18 June 1928.
\textsuperscript{36} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Town Clerk, PE to SNA, 20 June 1927.
\textsuperscript{37} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, SNA to Town Clerk, PE, 20 July 1927.
\textsuperscript{38} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/3, Magt. and NC, PE to TC, PE, 17 July 1929.
Government on its behalf. 39 In fact, it should not have been unduly concerned because there was little likelihood of the Minister of Native Affairs refusing a municipal application for the establishment of a beerhall. 40 The PECC only succeeded in further delaying the application of the Urban Areas Act which was a prerequisite for the approval of a municipal beer monopoly.

From 1927, the SAP had assumed responsibility from the headmen for enforcing compliance with the terms of the beer brewing permits issued by the Location Superintendent. Complaints about the conduct of police in the course of their searches for illegal brewing activities and caches of beer soon surfaced. They had apparently shown no concern for the alleged offender's right to privacy and dignity, and had subjected them to offensive language and rough treatment. Arrests had been made in instances where residents had been found in possession of both beer ready for consumption and beer in course of preparation. The latter category included both isidudu (beer in its porridge stage) and unstrained beer. This was a contravention of the conditions under which new permits had been issued, which stipulated that: "No fresh brew shall be made until the previous brew has been consumed", even though beer could not normally be brewed in one day. 41 At a subsequent meeting when the matter was discussed, the Superintendent stated that no person could be prosecuted for being in possession of unfermented liquor, and that no single instance had been brought to his notice of a permit holder being unable to brew daily the prescribed allowance owing to this condition. However, he did agree to delete the word isidudu from permits issued in future. The NAB resolved that the issue and conditions under which permits were granted should be left to the discretion of the Superintendent. As far as police conduct was concerned, the Superintendent attributed their behaviour to 'over-zealouness'. The matter was not pursued further because it was pointed out that the PECC had no control over the SAP which was under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Justice. 42

In his Annual Report for 1928, McNamee commented on what he considered certain
unsatisfactory aspects of the system of domestic brewing in New Brighton:

One undesirable effect has been to attract to New Brighton numbers of women who now occupy, solely for the purpose of brewing and selling beer, houses which were originally intended to accommodate bona fide native employees of the City. Other women, who upon loss of a husband, either by death or desertion, would in the ordinary course of events return to their homes in the territories, now remain on and subsist by selling beer to the detriment of themselves and their children.\(^{43}\) As long as these women remained the principal householders and ensured that their rentals were up to date, they were entitled to brewing permits. It was invariably women who were found in possession of quantities of beer in excess of their quotas and faced charges for contravening the conditions of their permits. There were also claims that many of the single women not only earned an income from the sale of beer but other practices such as prostitution. Certain community leaders believed that the evils associated with home brewing - but not the practice itself - could be eliminated by issuing permits only to those households over which a man was head.\(^{44}\) But this was hardly a viable option in a society where an increasing number of women were breadwinners and patriarchy was visibly under threat [see Chapter 7].

The denial of brewing permits and, thereby, a means of subsistence, was utilised as a means of co-opting women brewers. In 1929, a certain Annie Mjekula led a deputation which met with the PECC and registered its protest at the denial of permits to a large group of women. Little more than three years later, she was commended by the Superintendent for keeping her side of a bargain in ensuring that privileges were not abused over the holiday season by way of excessive drinking or disorderly conduct. Mjekula had presided over a committee which had played a crucial role in safeguarding existing beer privileges.\(^{45}\) Patronage was a subtle ploy to get brewers to police themselves or face the prospect of having their privileges summarily revoked.

In July 1929, the NAC supported the Superintendent’s suggestion that new tenants of houses in the ‘wet’ areas be denied beer brewing privileges as a way of gradually reducing the number of permits issued.\(^{46}\) Permits would also be permanently withheld from those convicted of brewing on Sundays and those convicted of being in possession of intoxicating liquor other

\(^{44}\) University of Cape Town, BC 630 K. 26, Evidence of A.F. Pendla to the Native Economic Commission, 26 & 27 March 1931, pp. 6009, 6034.
\(^{46}\) CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1277, Minutes of NAC, 18 July 1929.
than 'kaffir' beer manufactured from malted corn. In addition, it was decided to rigorously enforce the stipulation that those brewers convicted of having more than the regulation 8 gallons in their possession be denied further permits. The administration had made known it's intent in this regard at a public meeting some two years previously, and McNamee felt that brewers had ample warning to get their houses in order. 47 By steadily reducing the number of those entitled to permits, it was reckoned that there would be less resistance when the time eventually came to establish a municipal monopoly. The campaign, however, came to nought when the PECC did an about face on the monopoly issue.

The Durban riots caused the NAC to re-evaluate its position with respect to the establishment of a monopoly for the manufacture and supply of beer. When the NAC discussed the issue once again in October 1929, the perceptions of Councillors were undoubtedly influenced by the experience of Durban and the fear of a similar outcome if beerhalls were imposed on the local African population. The collective and virtually unanimous change of mind was evident in the new brief given to the Location Superintendent. He was instructed to report on the issue of permits to allow beer brewing if and when the Location was subject to the provisions of the Urban Areas Act Act. 48 In a carefully worded report, McNamee outlined the pros and cons of domestic brewing and the monopoly system. He expressed the view that conditions in the Cape were different to those pertaining in Natal, and he noted the financial failure of beerhalls in certain centres where beerhalls not been well patronised. He implied that it was possible that Port Elizabeth’s African population would boycott beerhalls. 49

In spite of the reversal of the NAC’s position with regard to the municipal monopoly, the Superintendent continued the policy of withholding permits from those convicted of contravening the regulations or those recently allocated houses in the 'wet' area. By early 1930 there were 704 principal occupiers of whom 557 were issued with brewing permits on a regular basis; 103 had forfeited the privilege through abuses; 14 new occupiers were not liable for permits; and 30 did not avail themselves of the privilege. 50 A deputation to the Advisory Board took issue with the principle of denying beer brewing privileges to certain householders in the 'wet' areas, and noted that those residents convicted of brewing without a permit were not only obliged to pay a fine or go to gaol, but thereafter they were not allowed to brew at

48 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of NAC, 18 Oct. 1929.
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Report of Location Supt. to NAC, 10 April 1930.
all. In this way, "they were being twice punished for a single offence". Having decided to revert to domestic brewing, the NAC decided to adopt a more flexible approach with regard to the issue of permits. It NAC adopted a motion that permits be re-issued to those convicted of having less than 4 gallons in excess of that allowed and that all new occupiers of the 'wet' area be allowed to apply for permits. This meant that certain past offenders would be given another chance to brew beer subject to specific conditions. The Superintendent was granted discretion to withhold the privilege of brewing from one or more beer blocks for any period up to six months in the event of any disorderly conduct or riotous behaviour occurring in the location. McNamee expressed reluctance to accept discretionary power to issue permits to those who had been convicted and had their permits cancelled, because his decisions might be seen to "savour of favouritism". But his objections were overcome by the expediency of being able to dispense patronage.

Meanwhile, the NAC approved draft regulations framed under the Urban Areas Act which provided for the continuance of the existing system of domestic brewing. These regulations included the provision that the brewing of kaffir beer for domestic consumption was permitted subject to the conditions stipulated in a permit to be issued by the Location Superintendent. The permit specified the localities where beer might be brewed, the quantity, and the period for which the permit was valid. No objections to these draft regulations were forthcoming from the NAB, but the NAD had expressed last-minute reservations. It was decided to withhold the beer regulations rather than delay the promulgation of all the regulations any further. These were promulgated in August 1933, five months after New Brighton came under the provisions of the Urban Areas Act. But their implementation was delayed still further as another notice had to be issued in order to proclaim their retrospective inception from 1 April 1934.

These regulations did not satisfy the SAP's requirements for controlling illicit brewing. They

51 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1497, Minutes of NBAB, 6 March 1930.
52 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of NAC, 14 March 1930.
55 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of NAC, 8 Sept. 1932.
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of the NBAB, 12 July 1931.
57 Government Gazette, Provincial Administration Notice No. 314, 4 Aug. 1933.
58 Government Gazette, Notice No. 366, 23 March 1934.
had favoured the application of the Urban Areas Act to New Brighton because it allowed searches for illegal beer or liquor to be conducted without a warrant.\textsuperscript{59} The PECC was, however, wary of conferring powers on the SAP for it exercised no control whatsoever over the police. Their solicitors advised against granting the SAP power of entry into any dwelling in the location for any purpose as their powers in that regard were circumscribed by Statutory Police Regulations. It was also suggested that no regulations governing the search for illicit beer be made for there was no provision therefore in the principal Act.\textsuperscript{60} The PECC disregarded this advice and decided, instead, to obtain the approval of the Minister of Native Affairs for regulations according the police power to search for beer without a warrant in the entire Port Elizabeth urban area.\textsuperscript{61} These regulations, which were duly promulgated, empowered the Location Superintendent, any member of the SAP or officer duly authorised by the local authority to search premises where it was suspected that 'kaffir' beer was being made, kept, supplied or sold in contravention of the Urban Areas Act or regulations framed thereunder.\textsuperscript{62}

There was an immediate public protest in New Brighton on 9 October against this measure. A well attended meeting passed a resolution which condemned the PECC's decision to enact the regulation. It was stated that the regulation was unnecessary as "the law-abiding ... residents of New Brighton have authority, unlike other places, to brew kaffir beer by permit".\textsuperscript{63} When McNamee requested the NAC's advice as to how he should try defuse the opposition of location residents to the regulations, the rather lame retort was made that as they "were law-abiding the committee did not anticipate that there would be any cause of complaint".\textsuperscript{64} The response of the SNA on the matter was equally platitudinous, stating that New Brighton residents "need have no fear that they will be put to any inconvenience or annoyance by the operation of the regulations".\textsuperscript{65}

No sooner had the new beer brewing regulations come into force, than they were deemed to be inadequate to regularise the system of domestic brewing practised in New Brighton. One

\textsuperscript{59} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/666, District Commandant, SAP to TC, PE, 13 Jan. 1930.
\textsuperscript{60} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/4, TC, PE to McWilliams & Elliott, 31 March and reply, 1 April 1930.
\textsuperscript{61} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of PECC, 28 Sept. 1933.
\textsuperscript{62} Government Gazette, Notice No. 1456 of 20 Oct. 1933.
\textsuperscript{63} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Loct. Supt. to TC, PE 26 Oct. 1933.
\textsuperscript{64} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Minutes of NAC, 10 Nov. 1933.
\textsuperscript{65} CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, SNA to Chief Native Commissioner, King Williamstown, 15 Nov. 1933.
Saraham Gojo was charged with contravening the regulations in that she was found in possession of 'kaffir' beer on a Sunday - her permit having expired the previous day. In his review of the case and upon closer examination of the regulations in conjunction with the relevant sections of the Act, the Assistant Native Commissioner raised substantive objections as to the validity of the regulations. These were that Section 23(3)(k) of the Act did not permit the local authority to make regulations restricting days on which beer may be brewed or possessed, nor the areas in which beer may be brewed or possessed, and neither did it give the Minister power to sanction regulations restricting days and areas, and moreover that before any regulations so made and sanctioned could be held to be valid, Section 20(3) would require amendment. In other words, the restrictions on domestic brewing stipulated on the permits issued by location administration were *ultra vires* and until such time as these were regularised, residents (under 21 years) could not be prevented from having beer. Although the defending attorney had not challenged the validity of the Notice nor the regulations framed under section 23(3)(k) of the Act, the Supreme Court ruled that the conviction and sentence should be set aside.

The Government's Law Advisers concurred with the views of the Assistant Native Commissioner. Accordingly, the SNA recommended that another set of regulations which complied with the provisions of the legislation be proclaimed as soon as possible. The PBCC enquired whether it was not possible to give effect to the principle of 'local option' in New Brighton whereby residents might be free to choose to live in an area where beer brewing was allowed or not indefinitely. The SNA, however, rejected the proposal as it would result in total prohibition being permanently and indefinitely imposed on certain location residents residing in a specified area or ward.

Moreover, he was of the opinion that it would conflict with Section 20(3) read with Section 23(3)(k) of the Urban Areas Act in that

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67 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, Supreme Court, Eastern Districts, Rex v. Gojo, 26 April 1934.

68 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, SNA to Sec. for Justice, 18 May 1934; Sec. for Justice to SNA, 4 June 1934; Actg. SNA to Sec. for Justice, 8 June 1934; Sec. for Justice to SNA, 16 June 1934; CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, SNA to TC, PE, 20 June 1934.

69 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, Notes of Interview between Council and Government Representatives re the Domestic Brewing of Kaffir Beer at New Brighton Location, 3 July and TC, PE to SNA, 5 July 1934.
the Minister may only declare that domestic brewing shall be permitted in a location or native village and cannot in a notice thereunder impose restrictions as to localities within which, or the persons by whom, beer may be brewed, used or possessed in pursuance of the general facility granted.\textsuperscript{70}

This reply effectively ruled out the continuation of the system of dualism which had been practised in New Brighton for many years. The PECC was now faced with a major dilemma as far as its policy was concerned: should it scrap dualism and allow home brewing anywhere in the location or should it seek an amendment to the law so that continuance of the system would be possible?

In arguing the case for the retention of New Brighton’s existing system of domestic brewing, the Location Superintendent stated:

The present system has given every satisfaction not only to the majority of the Native inhabitants, but to the local authority and the administration. For years past there has been little disorderliness, riotous behaviour or crimes of violence. Drunkenness in native urban locations is reported to be on the increase... [but] has definitely decreased at New Brighton.\textsuperscript{71}

In support of his contention, McNamee cited figures to show that prosecutions for the illicit possession of liquor had decreased from 7.4 per 1000 in 1928 to 0.75 per 1000 in 1933. Similarly, the conviction rate for drunkenness had dropped from 7.98 per 1000 to 2.98 per 1000 during the same period. Although McNamee did not cite any comparative figures to lend further weight to his argument, those for Durban-Pinetown for the same period were on average three to four times higher.\textsuperscript{72} Notwithstanding the ruling that regulations with respect to the brewing of beer had to apply to the location as a whole and not to any particular portion, the NAC remained convinced that the existing system should be continued. It appointed a sub-committee to investigate the possibility of having it regularised rather than scrapped.\textsuperscript{73}

Although an amendment to the Urban Areas Act was one way of restricting beer brewing to specific areas in a location, the NAD would not seriously entertain such a proposal.\textsuperscript{74} An internal memorandum of the NAD called New Brighton’s dualism ‘invidious’. It was clearly

\textsuperscript{70} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1556, SNA to TC, PE, 17 July 1934.
\textsuperscript{71} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Report of Loc. Supt. to NAC, 27 July 1934.
\textsuperscript{72} Stakesby Lewis, \textit{Kaffir Beer Halls: The Failure of "An Experiment"} (Johannesburg, 1941), pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{73} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 10 Aug. 1934.
\textsuperscript{74} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, SNA to TC, PE, 20 Oct. and Loc. Supt. to TC, PE, 7 Nov. 1934.
not convinced of the merits of the system and pointed to the contradiction whereby

the basic idea of restriction is to prevent abuse and to apply total prohibition to an area in which the persons inhabiting it are least likely to abuse a privilege is somewhat illogical. To deprive such a person of the total right to have kaffir beer on his premises for his use while his neighbour across the street may have liquor for possible abuse is open to objection.75

The NAC, for its part, was becoming increasingly frustrated and embittered by what it regarded as shoddy treatment by the NAD. Members maintained that New Brighton would not have come under the Urban Areas Act without the assurance that existing beer brewing practices would be safeguarded. It was felt that because the regulations had been submitted to the NAD for approval and the Council had made clear its wish to continue with its system of domestic brewing, it was owed some sort of explanation as to why regulations were only now declared *ultra vires.*76

In the meantime, the New Brighton administration carried on issuing beer brewing permits as if they were still valid. For the local authority there existed the danger that prosecutions for contravention of the regulations would not be upheld in court and so were quietly suspended. The fear was expressed that "if the Natives get to hear about the legal difficulty the location will fall into chaos".77 The District Commandant of the SAP, too, sounded a number of warnings that the 'excellent control' formerly exercised by the Location Superintendent over beer brewing and related activities was fast being undermined.78 Under the circumstances, the NAC considered it imperative to have some legally enforcable regulations governing beer brewing in place as soon as possible. Accordingly, it approved a proposal of the NAD that beer brewing permits would be issued at the discretion of the Location Superintendent subject to any resident having being denied a permit indefinitely having the right to appeal to the Magistrate. Quantities and times when brewing was allowed could be specified, and the permits would only be valid in those (undefined) areas of the location where expressly permitted.79

The Advisory Board recommended that provision in the new draft regulations be made for the

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75 CeA, NTS 5240 197/313, Internal memo of NAD (n.d.).
76 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of the NAC, 9 Nov. 1934 and Memo by TC for NAC re 'Brewing of Kaffir Beer', 9 Jan. 1935.
77 CeA, NTS 5420 197/313, Notes of interview between the Minister of Native Affairs and J.S. Young, MPC, PE, 30 Jan. 1935.
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 15 March 1935.
restriction of domestic brewing in accordance with the boundaries of existing 'wet' areas. This would exclude the granting of beer brewing rights by the Magistrate to residents of 'dry' areas. Notwithstanding this recommendation, the PECC approved the regulations without alteration. However, the NAD suggested amendments and the new regulations were finally promulgated in January 1936. As a result of the delay, no regulations governing beer brewing in New Brighton existed for over 12 months - and this for the second time in the space of three years. Concerns that Port Elizabeth would experience a 'calamity' and "lawlessness would get the upper hand" proved unfounded. New Brighton appeared to live up to it's reputation as a law-abiding community for there is no evidence that illegal brewing and criminal activities increased markedly during either of these periods.

During 1936 beer brewing privileges were extended to a portion of the new brick blocks commonly known as 'Newtown'. This decision followed representations made to the Location Superintendent by a deputation of about 100 women. The matter was referred to the Advisory Board which, in turn, recommended that a survey be taken amongst residents of the brick blocks to ascertain their wishes. The result was that approximately two-thirds of the residents indicated a desire to have beer brewing in the area. Although there was opposition from one Board member to permitting beer brewing in areas where churchgoers resided, the majority felt that in the light of the survey they could not justifiably force their personal principles on the majority. This represented an about face on the part of the Board which had emphatically rejected the extension of domestic brewing the previous year. They were probably influenced by court opinions as to the illegality of withholding brewing privileges from this area and the potential for the issue becoming a source of grievance if not addressed satisfactorily. In any event, the Board recommended that one-third of the brick blocks be set aside for brewing on the same conditions as pertained in the Red Location. This arrangement was subsequently approved by the NAC, but its implementation was delayed pending the appointment of additional headmen to provide surveillance in the area. This was as far as the extension of beer brewing privileges went.

80 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NBAB, 28 March 1935.
81 Government Gazette, Provincial Notice No. 6, 9 Jan. 1936.
83 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Report of Loc. Supt. to NAC, 19 Feb. 1936; Minutes of NBAB, 2 March, 2 April and 28 May 1936; Minutes of NAC, 1 May 1936.
From voluntary prohibition to the legalisation of dualism, 1937-1945

The Native Laws Amendment Bill had included clauses suggested by the PECC which would have legalised New Brighton’s system of domestic brewing, but these were omitted by the Select Committee from the final version of the Act. Thus there was no provision for dividing a location into two areas, one in which brewing would be permitted and the other prohibited. Moreover, the SNA confirmed McNamee’s opinion that the deletion of Section 23(3)(k) of the principal Act under which New Brighton’s most recent regulations had been proclaimed meant that they would be rendered null and void. These would have to be substituted by regulations made by the Minister of Native Affairs - and not the local authority - in terms of the amended Act.

With little prospect of the continuation of the system of domestic brewing practised in New Brighton, the PECC sought to appraise residents of the situation and demonstrate that they had the interests of the community at heart. The Chairman of the NAC, H. Relton, explained the implications of the Native Laws Amendment Act at a meeting in November. The following resolution was carried:

That this meeting of New Brighton residents resolves to request the City Council of Port Elizabeth to urge the Government not to disturb the present beer system which has been in existence at New Brighton for nearly thirty years, and which has proved a wonderful success. If New Brighton has the reputation of being one of the most law-abiding locations in the land, then it is due to the system of controlling the consumption of Kaffir beer. The wet and dry area system has proved satisfactory to all concerned and has made it possible for the officials and Police to maintain law and order without difficulty.

Meanwhile, the PECC made urgent representations to the NAD for an amendment to the Urban Areas Act. A deputation was granted an interview with the SNA and the Inspector of Urban Locations. But this proved to be of no avail because these officials maintained that there was no means of giving legal sanction to a system of 'wet' and 'dry' areas in terms of existing legislation. The set of regulations promulgated by the Minister and applicable to all

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84 See Sections 23 and 24(d) of the draft Native Laws Amendment Bill in Government Gazette, Notice No. 2401, 31 Dec. 1936.
86 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Loc. Supt. to TC, PE, 9 Nov. 1937 and SNA to TC, PE, 24 Nov. 1937.
88 CeA, NTS 5240 197/313, TC, PE to SNA, 2 Dec. 1937 and reply, 3 Dec. 1937.
urban areas did not provide explicitly for the dualism of the New Brighton system, but (in the opinion of the SNA) would, by 'administrative adaptation', be allowed to continue. These regulations came into operation on 1 January 1938.

The 'administrative adaptation' meant that New Brighton residents would have to agree to comply voluntarily with certain requirements if the existing system of beer brewing was to continue. Under the circumstances, the PECC could not afford to alienate location residents unnecessarily. Thus the timing of the announcement by the SAP of a new 'hardline' policy with regard to liquor raids in locations was regarded as extremely unfortunate by the NAC. A SAP minute setting out guidelines for the information of local authorities cited a paragraph from the recently published Report of the Vereeniging Location Riots Commission in support of the statement that:

the Police Force reserves to itself the right to raid any location at any time on being satisfied that it is in the interests of law and order that such a raid should take place. In such cases raiding will naturally take place regardless of any other considerations.

In actual fact, this statement disregarded the Commission’s recommendations that responsibility for control of illegal brewing should rest in the first place with the municipal authorities, and that the SAP should only provide assistance upon request. It also ignored the fact that these recommendations were made in respect of a location where a municipal monopoly - and not domestic brewing - was practised. If applied to New Brighton, such an approach was thought to have been likely to cause 'agitation' amongst beer brewers. Accordingly, the NAC resolved to inform the local District Commandant that there was no necessity for police raids prior to the forthcoming holiday season.

Superintendent McNamee called another public meeting in New Brighton in January 1938 to explain the provisions of the new regulations with respect to the supply and possession of beer. A motion that unrestricted brewing, as provided for under the Native Laws Amendment Act, should be allowed was moved but apparently had no support. The overwhelming majority voted to adhere voluntarily to the old system of domestic brewing which confined the practice

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91 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minute SAP 15/40/37 Commissioner, SAP to Deputy Commissioner, SAP, Tvl, 23 Nov. 1937 attached to Dist. Cmdt., SAP, PE to Mayor, PE, 29 Nov. 1937.
to certain 'wet' areas. The co-operation of residents at this juncture was, however, no guarantee that it would be forthcoming indefinitely. McNamee was well aware that with the imminent removal of Korsten residents to New Brighton, there was every chance that they would not be prepared to forego their rights to brew beer. They were to him an 'unknown quantity' from an area where illicit brewing and liquor trade was reputedly widespread despite its being outlawed. He had no wish to leave the resolution of this matter to chance.

Accordingly, the PECC sought to mobilise opinion in order to secure an amendment to the Native Laws Amendment Act which would legalise the system of dualism in New Brighton. Local MPs and the Native Representatives were petitioned to make representations to this end. But the PECC's hopes of achieving the necessary amendments to the Native Laws Amendment Act were dashed by the early parliamentary recess called because of the forthcoming general election.

As had been expected, petitions for the extension of beer brewing privileges to former 'dry' areas were soon received. Despite the resolution a few months previously by residents to adhere to the conditions governing domestic brewing, 27 registered occupiers of a single block sought to advance their claims to brew beer. The Advisory Board, which wished to preserve the existing system intact, resolved that the Superintendent should endeavour to arrange for transfers of the petitioners to the 'wet' areas. This was, however, neither a practicable nor a long-term solution to the problem.

In August 1938 the repeal of existing regulations governing powers of search for illicit possession or brewing of 'kaffir' beer made further inroads into the functioning of the New Brighton 'system'. The amended regulations withdrew the powers of search from the headman who had exercised close supervision of beer brewing since its inception. The advantage of

95 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 11 Jan. 1938. Copies of the memo are also located in the SAIRR Papers at the University of the Witwatersrand, AD 843/B 87.3.2 and the Molteno Papers at UCT, BC 579 B25.5 attached to a letter from the TC, PE, 7 March 1938.
97 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NBAB, 30 June 1938.
having headmen conduct on the spot raids in instances where they came across illegal brewing during the course of their normal rounds, would now be offset by having to call in authorised officials or policemen for the purpose. Such unnecessary delay would cause the element of surprise to be lost and afford the parties time to secrete or destroy surplus beer. Accordingly, the PECC made representations to the NAD to modify the position so as to reinvest African constables and headmen with the powers of search formerly invested in them. The NAD was not prepared to make an exception even though it conceded that abuse of powers of search by headmen had not occurred in Port Elizabeth.\(^9\) This was a debatable assertion, but it appears that complaints made with regard to the *modus operandi* of the police in conducting searches for beer in New Brighton were even more numerous than had previously been the case.\(^{10}\)

The commencement of the construction of McNamee Village and relocation of people from Korsten brought home to the PECC the necessity of finding a solution to the unsatisfactory state of affairs with regard to the beer question. With little likelihood of the Native Laws Amendment Act being amended during the 1939 session of parliament either, the NAC once again entertained the idea of introducing a municipal monopoly.\(^{11}\) The Advisory Board, too, was opposed to the extension of home brewing privileges to McNamee Village but was equally strongly opposed to any form of municipal control of beer brewing. Yet, it recognised that the new inhabitants of the location could not be denied the right to beer and that it was impracticable to transfer them to the old location. Under the circumstances, it recommended that the system of licensed houses for the manufacture and sale of 'kaffir' beer be put into operation in McNamee Village.\(^{12}\)

The Advisory Board’s recommendation was turned down by the NAC,\(^{13}\) and so the debate about the merits of introducing a municipal monopoly was enjoined. The MOH, Dr Duncan Ferguson, came out in favour of this option. He made recourse to the standard argument that the income derived from municipal sales could be used for the advantage of the community as a whole. He reckoned that sorghum beer manufactured under controlled conditions and

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99 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 13 Sept. and TC, PE to NC, PE, 23 Sept. 1938.
100 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of the NAC, 15 Nov. 1938.
101 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of NAC, 6 Dec. 1938; Actg. SNA to TC, PE 13 Jan. 1939.
102 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of the NBAB 16 Feb. and 27 April 1939.
consumed in moderate quantities was preferable to unhygienic domestic brewing which provided scope for the addition of 'harmful adulterants'. He recommended that the Council should come to a decision in this matter at an early date because "the vested interests of the domestic brewer are becoming more and more powerful". However, Ferguson's argument was undermined by information that in both Grahamstown and East London the beerhalls operated at a loss and caused a drain on their NRAs. The NAC instructed the Superintendent to visit Durban and Pietermaritzburg to investigate municipal brewing, as well as Bloemfontein where the NAC had recently recommended that domestic brewing be replaced by a system of licensed houses.

McNamee's visit to beerhalls in Natal served to reinforce his previously expressed opposition to municipal brewing. His report showed clearly that he did not favour any of the choices available to the PECC. These were:

(a) abolish domestic brewing in the old location and institute municipal brewing for the whole of the urban area;

(b) permit domestic brewing in the new village;

(c) establish licensed houses in the new village and continue with domestic brewing in the old location.

He noted that when beer brewing was made illegal, the manufacture of dangerous concoctions became more rather than less likely. As beer from malted 'kaffir' corn took a few days to mature and would have to be secreted away in order to avoid detection, the obvious alternative was to provide additives which gave the brew instant 'kick.' Thus shebeens which were still frequented, became more likely to sell such concoctions which, if anything, was likely to increase the incidence of drunkenness in areas where monopolies existed. McNamee also contended that beerhalls were far more suited to towns like Durban with its large 'floating' population than to Port Elizabeth where about 80% of the population was living under conditions of family life. He commented that the PECC would encounter resistance from virtually the entire African community to the introduction of municipal brewing.

As far as the second option was concerned, McNamee noted that proper supervision would necessitate the employment of an increased staff of headmen. Another implication was that domestic brewing would mean that the appearance of the newly-erected dwellings would be...
rapidly spoiled by the practice of beer brewing and its paraphernalia of smoke-blackened paraffin tins. Licensed houses would be an experiment because it had not previously been adopted by any local authority. (In the case of Bloemfontein, that City Council had decided to continue with its system of domestic brewing). Disadvantages were that only a limited number of individuals who were granted licenses would be able to profit and that the 'evils' attendant on beerhalls would not be dissimilar to those of licensed houses. McNamee, in the final analysis, still favoured the continuation of domestic brewing if confined to the old location. Despite the urgency of the situation, the NAC was not prepared to commit itself unequivocally to any of the options placed before it. Having reaffirmed its opposition to the introduction of the licensed house system, it now referred the matter back to the Advisory Board. The problem was no nearer to resolution as it dragged on into the third year since the passage of the Native Laws Amendment Act.

Public meetings were held on successive Sundays in March 1940 in order to ascertain the views of residents as regards beer brewing. At the first of these meetings, residents of both the old and new portions of the location expressed their "opposition to the introduction of municipal brewing in no uncertain terms". At the second, the residents of McNamee Village unanimously agreed to refrain from applying for beer brewing permits to which they were entitled in order to obviate the possibility of municipal brewing being introduced. This compromise was welcomed by Advisory Board members as a 'generous gesture' on the part of these residents. By voluntarily foregoing their right to brew beer, it could be argued that prohibition did not obtain in McNamee Village and that, therefore, the location administration was complying with the regulations proclaimed under the relevant legislation. On the other hand, the withholding of such permits would not hold up to the scrutiny of the courts so that, in the last resort, the successful operation of the arrangement would be dependent on the cooperation of residents.

In 1939 residents of the brick blocks requested further extension of beer brewing privileges to their area despite the agreement of the previous year. A survey revealed that 107 out of a total of 183 occupiers wished to brew beer. McNamee considered that if this request was agreed to, it would be the thin edge of the wedge as far as brewing in the new village was

concerned. If this caused the new residents to reconsider their decision of the previous year and also request brewing privileges, the current system would break down. In that event, both he and the Council would probably regard a municipal beerhall as preferable. This threat was enough to convince the Advisory Board of the merits of maintaining the status quo. Unfortunately, I have not been able to ascertain whether or not a public meeting of brick block residents endorsed the Board’s view.

The appointment of the Native Affairs Commission to enquire into the working of the provisions of the Urban Areas Act relating to the use and supply of 'Kaffir' Beer in July 1941 proffered hope that the Government might reconsider the possibility of approving the operation of dualism in townships. The Commission’s terms of reference made no specific mention of Port Elizabeth’s situation, yet these were sufficiently wide in scope to investigate this question. When giving evidence before the Commission, McNamee made a pitch for the local authority to be allowed to choose whatever system or combination thereof most suited the needs of the local African population. He was apparently informed by a member of the Commission which visited New Brighton to observe the operation of the 'wet' areas first hand, that this experience had made them reconsider the objections to domestic brewing cited by numerous local authorities and location superintendents.

In its report, the Commission was less enthusiastic about New Brighton’s system of 'wet' and 'dry' areas. The working arrangement was described as an exceptional example of goodwill and voluntary limitation of location privileges. But even this ideal system when carefully examined was found not to be flawless. In every dwelling inspected there were to be seen vessels for measuring the consumers’ requirements, which told their own tale of surreptitious sale. That even this concession to the mercenary manufacturer was liable to abuse was evident from the fact that the location superintendent had been constrained to warn this class from time to time of the possibility of withdrawal of the system in favour of the exclusive municipal supply. It is this overhanging threat which contributes materially to the successful control of these areas.

108 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1557, Minutes of the NBAB, 20 March and of NAC, 8 April 1941.
109 Government Gazette, Notice No. 94, 4 July 1941.
Beer brewing was not regarded as a right but a privilege, to be earned or forfeited depending on whether community interests were placed above those of individuals or not. Whilst this system was said to offer a method of 'voluntary control' with brewers policing themselves (para. 126), in the final analysis, it depended on threats and not trust. But more promising for New Brighton was the Commission’s recommendation for the flexibility to accord "local authorities… discretion to adopt any system or combination of systems of manufacture and supply of kaffir beer" (para. 82). But until the necessary legislation was enacted, there could be no guarantee of the continuation of New Brighton’s system as prohibition would still have to be adhered to on a voluntary basis.

By all accounts, the illicit liquor trade and brewing of concoctions in McNamee Village by ex-residents of Korsten was widespread. Neither the imposition of the maximum fines for those convicted of these offences,113 nor the increased vigilance of the headmen and SAP seemed to have the desired effect of curtailing such activities.114 It was not uncommon for as much as 200 gallons of concoctions such as qiilka (honey beer) to be found in a single week. But larger volumes probably escaped detection. It was common practice to conceal the receptacles containing concoctions in the bushes surrounding the dwellings. When the headmen became wise to this, the brewers took to secreting these concoctions in well camouflaged holes in adjacent common ground. Prosecutions were also difficult because of the need to prove ownership of the receptacles found. More often than not, these and the contents were simply destroyed.115 The police constantly blamed the headmen for not performing their duties, whilst the location administration urged the appointment of additional SAP personnel. Furthermore, the police steadfastly maintained that the only means to suppress illicit liquor dealing and brewing in New Brighton was a municipal monopoly.116

This proposal was tabled at an Advisory Board meeting in July 1944. The NAC’s ploy was to exert pressure on the Board to "take some steps to influence the people against illicit brewing". The Board reaffirmed its preference for domestic rather than municipal brewing. It duly agreed to convene a meeting to point out the possible consequences of illicit brewing; that is, not simply the punishment of individual offenders but the possibility that the entire

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community would be deprived of beer brewing privileges on account of the conduct of a few. The Superintendent promised that the administration would facilitate as far as possible the transfer of non-drinking residents of the old location to McNamee Village in cases where beer drinkers applied to move. And the Board also recommended the extension of the 'wet' area in the old portion of the location. This was not acceded to by the NAC which seemed to take the view that more effective control was possible of beer brewing by restricting the 'wet' area.\textsuperscript{117}

The PECC finally obtained the means to legalise its system of restricted domestic brewing by permit in New Brighton in 1945. Amendments to the Urban Areas Act (36 of 1944) introduced a provision whereby a dual system - domestic brewing and prohibition - was permitted. The urban local authority was able to stipulate that domestic brewing should not apply within any specified location or native village under its control.\textsuperscript{118} After thirty or so years, New Brighton's system of dualism could operate legally for the first time.

There were still differences of opinion within the PECC with regard to the relative merits of domestic brewing and a municipal monopoly. In evidence given to the Kaffir Beer Profits Enquiry which visited Port Elizabeth in late 1945, the City Treasurer attributed Port Elizabeth and Cape Town's rates, which were apparently the highest in the country, to the lack of revenue from beer profits which, in other centres, was spent on subsidising rentals and other administration costs.\textsuperscript{119} The MOH advocated beerhalls as a means of providing additional public amenities for New Brighton residents. Cllr Mrs Holland, Chairperson of the NAC, considered it 'iniquitous' that municipalities should profit from beerhalls even if additional amenities were provided as a result. Cllr Schauder, who was Chairman of the PECC's Housing Committee and a member of the National Housing and Planning Committee, was an equally staunch advocate of domestic brewing. The new Location Superintendent, C.T. Boast, utilised memoranda and arguments employed by his predecessor in support of the practice of domestic brewing in New Brighton. He and the two Councillors were convinced that residents would boycott beerhalls if they were introduced to New Brighton.\textsuperscript{120} Another argument against municipal beerhalls was that "the negligible incidence of crime in New Brighton was attributed

\textsuperscript{117} IAD, 25/117 No. 2, Minutes of NBAB, 27 July and Minutes of NAC, 3 Aug. 1944.
\textsuperscript{118} Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 70, 19 January 1945.
\textsuperscript{119} IAD, 25/117 No. 2, City Treasurer to TC, PE, 27 Oct. and Minutes of NAC, 29 Oct. 1945.
\textsuperscript{120} University of the Witwatersrand, SAIRR Papers, AD 843/B 87.2.2, Evidence given to Kaffir Beer Inquiry, PE, 3 & 5 Nov. 1945.
in part to the fact that there was no organised sale of kaffir beer". \[121\] In the end, the PECC stuck with domestic brewing alongside prohibition, rather than opting for a municipal monopoly.

**Conclusion**

In spite of the obvious advantages of beerhalls, the PECC never saw its way clear to introducing them. Having first agreed to a municipal monopoly in 1925, and confirmed its decision two years later, the PECC reversed this decision after the Durban beerhall riots of 1929. There was also the experience of others towns in the Cape like Grahamstown and East London where beerhalls had been poorly patronised. During the 1930s and 1940s, the local authority presumed that the introduction of beerhalls in New Brighton would more than likely be met with stiff opposition. It was argued that in the event of beerhalls being boycotted, this would add to rather than relieve the financial burden of the NRA which was the main concern of the so-called 'budget watchdogs'. And with the paternalistic 'liberal' lobby also advocating home brewing, the PECC adopted a cautious approach to implementing a municipal monopoly. Thus beerhalls were not introduced in Port Elizabeth at a time when they were becoming commonplace throughout the Union.

The peculiarities of the system of dualism in New Brighton made it no easy matter to legitimate in practice. Domestic brewing was permitted in about two-thirds of the original Location but reduced proportionately as New Brighton was extended. It was allowed in about one-third of 'Newtown', but not in the SMQ nor in McNamee Village. The 'wet' areas eventually comprised about one-sixth of the entire location. Throughout the period 1923 to 1945, the PECC made constant recourse to the argument that New Brighton was 'a law-abiding community' to justify domestic brewing. The administration appears to have come to believe its own propaganda. By permitting this practice, as well as providing sub-economic housing, it was contributing materially to the residents quality of life. This suited the residents themselves, especially the brewers with vested interests in the continuation of the system. But as criminality, and especially juvenile delinquency, increased after the Second World War, the utility of domestic brewing came to be questioned. The connection between crime and home brewing will be explored further in subsequent chapters.

\[121\] *Imvo Zabantsundu*, 17 Nov. 1945.
CHAPTER 7
SOCIAL RELATIONS AND CULTURAL PRACTICES
IN THE NEW BRIGHTON COMMUNITY, c. 1903-1953

Bozzoli has noted that workers are not the only inhabitants of South Africa's townships. Citing Couzens, she added that "classes are squashed together not simply physically, but economically, socially, culturally, ideologically and politically, in their common experiences of segregated township life". Social historians have usually identified the emergence of three distinct classes in early twentieth century urban African society: a petty (or aspirant) bourgeoisie, a working class and a lumpenproletariat. The African underclasses appropriated the symbols of the dominant (white) and traditional cultures in varying degrees. Those workers who were firmly and securely incorporated into the urban workforce identified with and at least partially accepted Western cultural models, whereas the more vulnerable sectors - the under- and unemployed - identified with cultural practices of the countryside. Therefore the social and cultural fragmentation of the underclasses militated against the emergence of a homogeneous working-class culture. Indeed, given the fragmented and ambiguous nature of class formation, it is not at all appropriate to speak of class cultures.

Many pioneering studies of working-class cultural practices in urban African society equated these with the 'popular' - that is, something 'of the people' which stands in opposition to ruling-class cultural and political hegemony. The concept 'popular' covered a range of class dynamics and cultural practices in the mediation of social relationships. According to Gramsci, the hegemonic power of the dominant classes defined the parameters in which oppositional and subordinate cultural forces operate. The fact that these parameters are always contested, creates the central dynamic whereby common people forged lived experiences. Culture was thus a sphere of contestation between the discourse of the dominant and the common sense of subordinate cultures. For Gramsci, then, this ideological struggle was an important facet of

resistance and part of the larger struggle for cultural and political hegemony. Thus our conceptualisation of culture should be rooted in, but not reduced to, a complex social experience that includes political struggle.

In the attempt to reconstruct everyday life of urban Africans, the community has been viewed as the basic unit of social analysis. But communities must not be regarded as synonymous with residential entities such as locations or townships which are the product of administrative decisions rather than joint action of residents themselves. The existence of a community capable of acting with common purpose cannot be simply assumed in instances where people have been economically, socially or culturally deprived. The prerequisites of physical proximity and common experience are not sufficient in themselves to forge a 'sense of community'. Bozzoli has suggested that there is sufficient evidence from case studies to conclude that "communities do at certain points in history become manifest social entities, with important effects on class and ideological responses". In her view, the community should be regarded as a concrete reality which may in certain circumstances enhance rather than contradict the class consciousness of its members. Communities can be partly 'imagined' in Benedict Anderson's sense, for they are always to some degree imaginary constructions of self. But identity is never exclusively individual. Rooted in the common experience of a group of people, it is a collective phenomenon. The existence of communities is founded on the social interaction among its members, which helps define social boundaries and produce a collective identity.

It is obviously necessary to establish at the outset whether we can speak of a New Brighton community. This should not be construed to imply a quest for a homogeneous society. On the contrary, factors such as class, gender, age, kinship and ethnicity, as well as the degree of urbanisation all contributed to cleavages. Therefore it will be necessary to construct a profile

7 Thornton & Ramphela, 'Quest for community', p. 38.
of the community which is sensitive to social divisions. We will examine how social conditions influenced the lives and lifestyles of New Brighton’s subordinate classes - both the working class and lumpenproletariat. Then we will study the elite culture of the middle class with particular reference to the function of education. And finally, we will analyse the role of the churches - particularly of the indigenous type - as institutions which articulated different forms of consciousness. We will attempt to establish the connection between these forms of consciousness which might have co-existed and interacted at any given time. New Brighton residents had multiple identities: they could be workers, husbands or wives, parents, neighbours or members of any number of church, civic, political or sports organisations. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to present a composite picture of changing social relations and cultural practices in New Brighton during our fifty year period.

A Profile of the New Brighton Community

Communities are dynamic and fluid, even when they are apparently most stable. New Brighton was a particularly transient society. Apart from the usual coming and going of people, two successive generations of Africans were forcibly relocated there. These removals created a deep sense of violation and insecurity which disrupted the existing fabric of society. Such resettlement is invariably accompanied by an increase in anti-social behaviour and a decline in morality. The PE City Council, on the other hand, propagated the view that its slum clearance programme would promote social upliftment. It was argued that there was a direct correlation between improved living conditions in New Brighton - when compared with Korsten - and the apparent low crime rate. The provision of 'better class' housing was said to instil within residents some pride in their upkeep and a wish to maintain certain quality of life; although the incentive was obviously reduced because the homes remained municipal property.

When the sub-economic housing scheme for Africans was first mooted, the Superintendent suggested that:

Persons removed from slum properties should not be grouped together in one place; rather they should be intermixed with New Brighton residents ... The danger of the newcomers looking upon themselves and being looked upon by others as a separate community with possible future faction quarrels will be avoided.  

This statement implied that 'outsiders' would become 'insiders' and not develop separate identities if they lived cheek by jowl with respectable residents of long-standing. In June 1938 it was reported (rather prematurely) that "in 99% of cases the ex-slum dwellers have responded

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morally, physically and socially to their greatly improved living conditions" [in McNamee Village].¹ It was envisaged that "a greater sense of responsibility and a healthy public spirit" could be fostered amongst the newcomers.⁹ But social cohesion could not be forged overnight, nor from outside. Community formation was partly a product of demographic factors.

Although a social and political construct, 'race' has consistently been conflated or confused with cultural and other non-physical characteristics in popular usage. The practice of residential segregation which had a lengthy history in Port Elizabeth prior to the creation of New Brighton, reinforced the significance of race as a form of identity. Although created solely for Africans, New Brighton always had small White and Coloured minorities. There were repeated calls by Advisory Board members for the removal of Coloureds from New Brighton. And when sub-economic housing was built for Coloureds at Schauderville in the late 1930s, immediate action was demanded on this issue. Conflict between the two communities was accentuated when after the removals of Africans from Korsten, expropriated sites were granted to Coloureds. Thus the existence of social divisions and the effects of residential segregation impinged on the collective identity of the New Brighton community.

Port Elizabeth's African population was said to originate principally from the districts of King Williamstown, Middledrift and Peddie in the Ciskei, as well as the Transkei. By far the majority of residents were Xhosa-speakers. A municipal census conducted in 1931 revealed a high degree of ethnic and linguistic homogeneity in New Brighton. The ethnic/racial breakdown of the population was as follows: Xhosa 59.8%, Fingo 28%, Basuto 4.6%, Coloured 6% and Others 1.6%.¹¹ As was the case in Langa, the commemoration of 'Fingo Emancipation' Day and Ntsikana Memorial Celebrations 1940s was a source of tension between Fingoes and Xhosas.¹² Such cultural practices which promoted rival identities contributed to cleavages in the New Brighton community.

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9 EPH 11 June 1938.
Anthropological writings on Xhosa-speaking communities in East London’s townships regard the ‘red/school’ dichotomy as more significant than Xhosa/Fingo social divisions. The *Xhosa in Town* trilogy defined social relations primarily according to cultural criteria, regarding 'school' and 'red' people (*amaqaba*) as readily identifiable cultural types within these communities. The former aspired to eventual assimilation into a common society through a process of acculturation, whereas the latter participated in urban society only as far as it was necessary to sustain the subsistence rural economy and traditional culture. Although involved in labour migration, the 'reds' reject incorporation into the wider political economy. Mayer refers to the 'red' worldview as an ideology of resistance. Their apparent 'conservatism' is explained as an ideological expression of their rejection of white domination. It has to be said that cultural traditions constitute an adaptable resource for coping with changed circumstances. They can be reinterpreted, developed, or even 'invented' in order to accommodate modified social practices or serve as political resources. It is probable that the urbanites referred to all newcomers to the township as 'red'; that this was essentially a distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' rather than between binary opposites or ideal cultural types.

The Red Location became synonymous with so-called 'red' or 'blanket' people although the composition of its population was actually little different from the greater Port Elizabeth area in the 1900s. It was estimated that 'single' men comprised over half of the town's African population, but that the percentage in New Brighton was lower. We have seen in Chapter 3 that from the 1910s far more accommodation was set aside for families than 'single' men although a SMQ was built in the late 1920s. In 1938 New Brighton's adult population included 1411 'single' men and 30 'single' women out of a total of 7714 persons. This meant that less than 19% of the population comprised 'single' persons. Nor did this proportion increase in the

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14 A. Spiegel & E. Boozaier, 'Promoting tradition: Images of the South African past' in *SA Keywords*, pp. 40-57.

15 CAD, NA 734 f348, Chief Inspector of Public Works to Labour Dept., CT, 2 Sept. 1903 citing figures given by Civil Commissioner.
following thirteen years. In 1951 the number of adult males exceeded females by 2 656 which suggests that 'single' men or migrants made up about 7% of the total population [see Table 7.1 below]. The Old Location became the temporary 'home' to a disproportionate number of migrants and the 'wet' areas were avoided by the 'respectable' classes and churchgoers. Accordingly, this neighbourhood had quite a different character to the other parts of New Brighton. Social geography thus served to accentuate certain cleavages in the community.

As we have seen, New Brighton's population fluctuated considerably during the 1900s but assumed a much more permanent character during the following decade. A fairly reliable index of the degree of permanency can be gauged from statistics relating to gender. The ratio of male to female residents in New Brighton in 1904 was approximately 3:2 which was only marginally higher than that for Port Elizabeth and its peri-urban areas. By 1911 females comprised about 44% of the New Brighton population, which was on a par with the metropolitan area as a whole. Observations made during the 1910s suggest that the proportion of females and hence, the number of permanent residents increased. The Tuberculosis Commission, for instance, remarked that New Brighton's population comprised as much as five sixths of westernised or what it termed 'dressed Natives'. The trend was confirmed by the increase in the proportion of married persons and women with families by the end of the decade. In 1935 it was estimated that 60,3% of the population was fully urbanised and 29,3% semi-urbanised, with a meagre 10,4% being classified as 'rural natives'. New Brighton became a relatively stable community in which the family was the basic social unit - a situation which was to change from the late 1940s.

In Chapter 3 we noted that New Brighton's female population exceeded the number of males briefly during the Depression. This rather irregular occurrence can probably be attributed to the return of a significant number of male migrants to the reserves. Although women were often the first to be marginalised off the land when the reserves deteriorated, Table 3.4 showed that female numbers remained steady whereas male numbers declined appreciably in the period 1928-1933. But after the Depression there was a recovery in the total population of New Brighton, and the sexual ratio returned to more typical proportions. In 1945 the

17 U.G. 7 - 1919, pp. 18-19.
estimated population of 26 000 comprised 7 500 men, 7 200 women and 11 300 children, which meant that 49% of the adult population was female. By 1951 over 46% of New Brighton’s population above the age of five were females. And girls under the age of 18 outnumbered boys by 674. The population of 36 760 in 1951 was made up as follows:

**TABLE 7.1**

**NEW BRIGHTON'S POPULATION 1951**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Kwafor</th>
<th>Boastville</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adult males</td>
<td>4 213</td>
<td>4 824</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult females</td>
<td>2 613</td>
<td>3 578</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boys under 18</td>
<td>830</td>
<td>2 540</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls under 18</td>
<td>854</td>
<td>3 150</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Children under 5</td>
<td>1 471</td>
<td>4 650</td>
<td>873</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>9 981</strong></td>
<td><strong>21 355</strong></td>
<td><strong>3 050</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A survey of age distribution reveals that children comprised a fairly constant proportion of the New Brighton population throughout our period. In 1924 it was estimated that 41% of the Location’s population were children under 16 years. By 1945 this percentage had edged up to 43%. The above Table shows that the percentage of the population under the age of 18 years was about 43% in 1951. Not surprisingly, the proportion of children and juveniles in the Old Location was noticeably smaller than the other sections of New Brighton.

The above profile of the New Brighton community is rather impressionistic. It confirms the existence of cleavages along the lines of class, culture or degree of urbanisation, ethnicity, language, age and sex. But the social stratification has to be balanced against what New Brighton residents had in common. A common language and origins were important ingredients in community formation. On the other hand, urban Africans follow the associative rather than the cohesive principle of social organisation. The network character of social relationships is evident in ties of kinship, membership of churches and other voluntary associations. The abovementioned demographic factors contributed to the definition of socio-cultural boundaries.

20 PE Municipality, Mayor’s Minute for 1924, Report of the MOH, p. 28.
Social Conditions and a Culture of Survival in New Brighton

The most obvious feature of urban African living was widespread poverty, especially in times of economic hardship, and the consequent struggle to survive. Like their counterparts on the Witwatersrand and elsewhere, residents of New Brighton developed a number of strategies to help cope with their poverty. Various means were found to distribute the meagre resources through the community, assisting those whose need was greatest at any particular time. Whilst migrants could still rely on home-boy networks or *amakhaya*, by far the majority of New Brighton’s residents created their own social support networks in the city. Associations such as burial societies and *stokvels* were created. The former ensured that members and their families had decent burials, whilst the latter allowed members to take turns to use the monthly contributions of the club to purchase items such as clothing and furniture which their own earnings would not have permitted. The ‘culture of survival’ was essentially defensive, for it taught people to make do without challenging the system. Moreover, the strong sense of community engendered by the tradition of sharing and self-help could be - and was - exploited by employers who had an excuse for not having to pay a living wage.  

The failure of employers to pay a living wage also provided justification for urban Africans resorting to small scale illegal informal sector activities to make ends meet. Supplementary income was derived from keeping unauthorised lodgers, ‘piece jobs’, petty theft, trading in stolen goods, running shebeens and gambling dens, and prostitution. The moral condemnation of the community was generally reserved for the more serious instances of acquisitive crime such as burglary and robbery and the use of violence [see Chapter 8 for further discussion of criminality]. As self-help - of the legal and illegal type - was woefully inadequate, a few social welfare groups which operated in New Brighton provided some relief for the destitute. These groups were sponsored mainly by white philanthropic institutions such as the Native Welfare Society (later the PE Joint Council), Rotary and various churches. A certain Valentine Magniac ran a soup kitchen in the Location for a good number of years. In 1941 the PECC established the Adcock Home for the aged and infirm as part of the sub-economic housing scheme in McNamee Village. However, many New Brighton residents escaped the social welfare ‘safety net’.


On the Reef townships people escaped the hardships and frustrations of life in the distractions of drink and dance in shebeens during the inter-war years. The most vital feature of this working-class culture was the popular musical style known as marabi. There appears to have been nothing similar in New Brighton. This could be partly attributed to the fact that the use of private homes for entertainment was virtually out of the question. A regulation stipulated that no social gatherings were allowed (except in public halls, schools or churches, and then only with prior permission) after 10pm on weekdays, 11pm on Saturdays and not at all on Sundays. The consumption of beer for men was essentially a social act, "the affirmation or strengthening of ties with kith, friends or neighbours". For many women, however, this cultural practice offered first and foremost a means of subsistence.

The combination of the cumulative neglect of New Brighton by the authorities and the poverty of the majority of its residents created appalling living conditions. Consequently, standards of health were low, disease and illness rife, infant mortality rates high. The breakdown of the family was coupled with high rates of illegitimacy, and crime and violence became a way of life for many on the fringes of society. We will not be able to examine these trends comprehensively for our entire period but only for critical and limited periods as our data is not complete.

We will commence with an examination of mortality rates in New Brighton for select years.


25 Mayer, Townsmen or Tribesmen, p. 118.
TABLE 7.2

DEATHS IN NEW BRIGHTON FOR SELECT YEARS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Ave. Annual Population</th>
<th>Total Deaths</th>
<th>Mortality Rate per 1000</th>
<th>Infant* Mortality Deaths</th>
<th>Mortality Rate per 1000 Births</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>2 332</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20,6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>3 119</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>43,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>4 773</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>24,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>4 398</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>56,8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>8 270</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>44,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>7 147</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>40,3</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>319,08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>6 707</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>26,2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>210,33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>12 034</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>24,2</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>267,81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>29 633</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>23,5</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>213,24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>40 725</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>22,1</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>315,04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Under the age of 1 year

The prevalence of Tuberculosis (TB), dysentery and enteric fever was ascribed to defective sanitation, and these diseases were virtually endemic throughout our period. Whilst there is no clearly established correlation between overcrowding and the incidence of TB and other respiratory ailments, poor living conditions were likely to make people more prone to contracting such diseases. Packard has noted the susceptibility of newly westernised Africans to TB and shown that the average mortality rate in New Brighton between 1904 and 1912 was 5,9 per 1 000 people. The overall mortality rate for all causes of death for the same period was 25,6 per 1 000. Measures such as the fumigation and limewashing the interior of buildings, the construction of extra latrines, the introduction of a dual pail system for stercus removal, and sanitary removals on Sundays did little to prevent the outbreak of diseases such as typhoid and gastro-enteritis caused by the squalor of New Brighton. Residents were also susceptible to contagious diseases and the influenza epidemic exacted a heavy toll. In the space of a single month in late 1918 at least 312 deaths occurred in New Brighton.

26 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), NTS 2443 8/291, Report of Medical Officer of the Location to the MOH, 15 May 1916.
29 CeA, NTS 2443 8/291, Sec. PWD to SNA, 14 Sept. 1916.
The above figures show that mortality rates were particularly high amongst infants. In fact, two to three out of ten children died before the age of one year virtually every year. This state of affairs was caused by a lack of suitable nutrition and inadequate post-natal care, and possibly 'backstreet' abortions. However, I have found no evidence to suggest - as Mager and Minkley have done in the case of East London - that infanticide was a common practice. But it is probably safe to assume that unwanted pregnancies had become commonplace in New Brighton.

More than one out of every two children were invariably illegitimate throughout our period. This pattern is discernible in the following statistical sample:

**TABLE 7.3**

*Births in New Brighton for Select Years*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Rate per 1 000</th>
<th>Illegitimate Births</th>
<th>Rate percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>8 270</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>39,05</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>63,7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>7 147</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>48,13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>6 707</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>40,45</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>56,5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>12 034</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>32,99</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>54,3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>29 633</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>30,07</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>30,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>40 725</td>
<td>1 057</td>
<td>25,95</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>57,1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be said that the rate of illegitimacy in 1945 was out of keeping with the general trend which was in excess of 50%. Many of the children classified as 'illegitimate' were probably the products of customary unions which were not recognised for record purposes. But, equally, many children were the products of transitory sexual liaisons between 'unmarried mothers' or

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30 Calculation based on figures gleaned from various issues of *EPH*, 8 Oct. to 6 Nov. 1918.

31 A. Mager and G. Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind: The East London Riots of 1952' in P. Bonner, *et al* (eds.), *Apartheid's Genesis* (Johannesburg, 1993), p. 238. Their assertion appears to rest on a single case reported in the local press, although others might arguably have never been discovered or prosecuted. The marginally higher mortality rate of girls over boys can be attributed to numerous other factors and do not prove infanticide.
and their lovers. Rites of passage such as the extraction of penalties by young men for 'defiling' virgins and even the payment of lobola (bridewealth) came to be increasingly discarded in urban African society.

High illegitimacy rates usually - but not inevitably - accompany a breakdown in family life. Many New Brighton children grew up in homes where neither the extended nor nuclear family was the norm. In such circumstances, women usually bore sole responsibility for children for they were the constant in the household or family unit. Their earning power as beer brewers, prostitutes, washerwomen, and so on, conferred on them a degree of autonomy. Bonner's historical research on the East Rand has lead him to concur with the anthropologist Longmore that urban women were "schooled in self-reliance and self-sufficiency". On the other hand, the need of a 'husband' to secure a house or some measure of protection meant that women were dependent on men in some ways. But, for the most part, there was invariably a reconstruction of the domestic economy and a shift towards matrifocality. In the absence of a permanent male household head or a father figure, sons developed antagonism towards patriarchal authority figures - such as headmen - outside the family. It was, more often than not, these boys who received their education on the streets and became juvenile delinquents or tsotsis.

The local authority regarded recreation as having the potential to keep young African males off the streets. It was believed that if their energies could be diverted into sporting activities, this would reduce the likelihood of juvenile delinquency and counter the emergence of gangs and organised criminal activities. The PECC had made provision for the following facilities by 1941:

- 5 tennis courts;
- 6 playing fields suitable for football and cricket;
- 1 children's playing field equipped with swings and slide;
- 2 playing fields allocated to wayfarers or girl guides.


CeA, NTS 4506 585/313, Evidence of J.P. McNamee to Smit Committee, PE, 30 Oct. 1941.
These facilities were by no means adequate for the recreational and sporting needs of the New Brighton population. In 1944 the Administration appointed its first sports organiser and social worker, A.Z. Lamani, who had trained at the Jan Hofmeyr School of Social Work which was run by the American Board Missionary, the Rev Ray Phillips. In 1947 a regular contributor to *Imvo Zabantsundu* commented on the neglect of social life for New Brighton's younger generation. The erection of the 800-seater Rio Bioscope shortly thereafter served to provide some entertainment. The screening of numerous westerns, however, created something of a cult amongst the youth and the Bioscope became a popular venue for gang members to hang out. Various writers have noted how *tsotsi* gangs appropriated the names and styles of cowboys learned from the watching of films. The choice of the name Apaches by a well known New Brighton gang was presumably a means of identifying with the 'underdogs' and subverting Hollywood-style heroism.

It has been argued in much of the anthropological and sociological literature that anomie is connected with the diminution of social control by parents and concomitant decline of behavioural norms in urban society. The growth of deviancy was evidenced by the increasing incidence of criminal activity, a penchant for lawlessness and violence, and the withdrawal from society through the abuse of dagga and drink. The lumpen element or so-called 'dangerous classes' consisted of the idle, unemployed and dissolute. Urban youths without the necessary education or skills to find operative or semi-skilled work, often chose not to seek employment which required hard manual labour. They joined gangs voluntarily or were coerced in to doing so, engaged in criminal activities and became the perpetrators of indiscriminate violence on their fellow residents. Such youth gangs created a *tsotsi* subculture which inverted the values and reappropriated the symbols of the dominant culture. They literally and figuratively carved out their own identities by adopting subversive lifestyles. The anomie situation in New Brighton will be examined further when we look at the background to the 1952 riots in Chapter 9.

38 *Imvo* 22 Nov. 1947 p. 4 ('New Brighton Lacks Social Improvements').
39 *Evening Post* 29 Nov. 1952 ('Facts behind growing gangsterism in towns').
40 Cobley, 'We All Die Together', pp. 54-62, 66, 72-74.
Education and an Elite Culture in New Brighton

Even the upper strata of the African community which consisted of petty traders, craftsmen and others of independent means, eked out an existence in New Brighton. The competition of a group of Jewish traders considerably reduced chances for successful entrepreneurial ventures in the Location. In fact, opportunities for self-employment and capital accumulation were few and far between. Education offered some prospects of upward social mobility for it provided the means for a limited number of Africans to escape from the ranks of labourers into the salariat. Ministers, teachers, interpreters, clerks and other professionals who constituted an aspirant middle class or petty bourgeoisie, received relatively small stipends or salaries without regular increments. Although many of these white collar workers experienced declining living standards, they still enjoyed considerable social status on account of the value attached to education. As Bradford has remarked, education was "a central ideological symbol around which the middle classes coalesced, and through which they differentiated themselves from the masses". The educated elite sought to emulate the cultural practices of the dominant whites, including their leisure time activities. This response was shaped by several decades of exposure to and absorption of a Western mission education.

Functional literacy amongst Africans in the Eastern Cape was probably slighter higher than the national average. The proportion of those who were literate increased from an estimated 6,8% of the adult population in 1911 to about 9,7% in 1921 and 12,4% in 1931. Port Elizabeth had its fair share of graduates from Lovedale, Healdtown and other mission colleges or educational institutions in the Eastern Cape, but had no tertiary institutions of its own. Local Africans would have had to go to Fort Hare in order to attain a university education. For most of our period, there was no secondary school in New Brighton either. The only secondary school which admitted African students was Paterson High School situated in Mount Road. A number of scholarships to attend Paterson were awarded every year to African pupils who attained the highest marks in Standard 5 in any of New Brighton's primary schools. Although originally built for Africans, it increasingly assumed the character of a 'coloured' school as racially segregated education was enforced. The Advisory Board's request that a

43 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Memo of TC, PE re 'Paterson High School Scholarships', 7 July 1936.
secondary school be established in the Location was ignored for many years." Meanwhile, many New Brighton youths who might have been in the classroom roamed the streets and contributed to the problem of juvenile delinquency.

The first schools established in New Brighton were mission schools. They were run by the Anglican, Presbyterian and Wesleyan denominations who utilised church buildings as classrooms. In 1905 the Ethiopian Order was granted permission and government aid to establish a private school along the same lines as the mission churches. In the years that followed, the Advisory Board frequently debated the merits of enforcing compulsory school attendance in the Location and bringing the schools under the jurisdiction of the School Board. A proposal that regulations be made to increase rents with the extra funds being used to pay the School Board as not all parents would be willing or able to pay fees if schooling was made compulsory, was turned down. It was thus mainly the children of the occupational elite who attended school in New Brighton and only a minority went on to Paterson High or secondary schools elsewhere.

In 1923 the schools run by the various churches were amalgamated and became known as the United Primary School. They were not under one roof and still operated in various church buildings. These buildings remained the property of the respective denominations who did not receive rent from either the Education Department or School Committee which comprised the resident Ministers. In addition, the public hall was also used for school purposes. Although under the jurisdiction of the Education Department which paid teachers salaries, the School Committee had a say in the management of the School. Later the United Primary School was divided into Upper and Lower Primary Schools, each with its own School Committee.

By 1936 there was a shortage of school accommodation in New Brighton. It was estimated that 330 children of school-going age were not attending school. A report compiled by the Location Superintendent and submitted to the government stressed not only that the accommodation was

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44 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1282, Minutes of the NBAB, 4 Feb. 1937.
46 CeA, 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 18 Feb. 1913; Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 23 Aug. 1915.
48 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1275, Rev J. Cowan to the Mayor, PE, 3 Feb. 1926.
inadequate, but in many ways unsuitable for educational purposes. The NAD was unable to provide any assistance in order to ameliorate the position owing to a lack of funds. Nor did the CPA make grants in respect of the erection of school buildings, it only paid rent grants subject to certain conditions. School accommodation in 1937 was as follows:

**TABLE 7.4**

*SCHOOL ACCOMMODATION IN NEW BRIGHTON 1937*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Floor Space</th>
<th>No. of Pupils</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Higher United School</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Presbyterian Church</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Scotland</td>
<td>1 050</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Church</td>
<td>2 061</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lower United School</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Ethiopia Church</td>
<td>1 680</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican Church</td>
<td>925</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglican School Room</td>
<td>905</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregational Church</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Public Hall</td>
<td>1 421</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9 364</td>
<td>987</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existing shortage of school accommodation in New Brighton was exacerbated by a further influx of children of school-going age from Korsten once the removals were affected. There were five denominational junior schools for Africans in Korsten which together accommodated over 1 860 pupils, as well as the Edward Street Native School (Methodist) in the city centre which had a roll of about 60 pupils. It was planned to erect six lower primary schools, two higher primary schools and one secondary school at a total estimated cost of £38 800 to meet the educational requirements for New Brighton during the following ten years. There was considerable debate as to whether the provision of school accommodation for these pupils was the responsibility of the Government, the CPA or the PE Municipality. Initially, the PECC was prepared to construct school buildings subject to the expenditure being approved out of sub-economic housing funds and to the educational grant being issued by the CPA in respect of

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49 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Report of the Supt. NBL, 1 April 1936.
50 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/10, Memo re 'School Accommodation - New Brighton Village' by TC, PE for NAC, 4 June 1936.
of the maintenance of buildings. However, the Central Housing Board ruled that it was not
permissable for sub-economic housing funds to be utilised for this purpose. Instead, the NAD
in conjunction with the CPA sought Parliament's approval for a loan of £20 000 to the PE
District School Board for the construction of schools in New Brighton. The School Board
subsequently requested transfer of the nine sites earmarked for schools in New Brighton. The PECC, however, resolved that only four of the nine sites be transferred to the School
Board as this was in keeping with the immediate educational requirements.

Soon after this it was announced that the control of African Education would be transferred
from the Cape's Department of Education to the Native Affairs Department. In the
circumstances, the NAD refused to sanction further loans to the CPA for the erection of school
buildings for Africans in urban areas. Both the PE School Board and the PECC protested that
this was likely to cause further delay in the provision of schools in New Brighton. The
PECC agreed to transfer or lease in perpetuity school sites to the NAD, to erect school
buildings thereon and provide water and sanitary services at normal location tariff rates. But
this proposal was found to be in conflict with the Urban Areas Act and the NAD reversed its
previous recommendation that the sites be leased to the School Board as the control of African
education remained in the hands of the Cape Education Department. Accordingly, the NAD
made a grant to the CPA for the erection of school buildings in New Brighton during the 1939
financial year.

By the time the Korsten removals got under way, no provision had been made for educational
facilities in McNamee Village. The Bantu African Teachers Union demanded to know what

53 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Minutes of the H&SEC, 1 Dec.; Minutes of Sub-Committee
Appointed to go into the Question of School and Church Sites - Korsten and New
54 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, SNA to TC, PE, 11 June 1938; Sec. for Public Education to
TC, PE, 20 Jan. 1939; Memo re 'Native Schools' for H&SEC, 28 Jan. 1939.
55 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Minutes of Joint Meeting of H&SEC and NAC, 30 Jan. 1939.
56 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Sec. Public Education to Sec. School Board, PE, 18 Feb.; Sec.
PE School Board to TC, PE, 22 Feb.; TC, PE to SNA and Sec. for Public Education,
28 Feb. 1939.
57 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Minutes of Joint Meeting of H&SEC and NAC with
representatives of the NAD, Chief Inspector Native Education and Circuit Inspector,
PE, 20 March; Report re 'Native Schools at Port Elizabeth' by C.W. Slarke, Inspector
of Urban Locations, 21 March 1939; Minutes of the NAC, 2 May and of the PECC,
17 May 1939.
58 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, SNA to TC, PE, 30 May 1939; TC, PE to SNA, 6 June and
reply, 12 June 1939.
steps had been taken in order to "suppress hooliganism amongst the children who now roam the streets... having been robbed of education".\textsuperscript{59} The PECC resolved to grant the School Board the use of a group of eight new three-roomed houses and four two-roomed houses at reduced rentals to provide temporary school accommodation in McNamee Village.\textsuperscript{60} Certain Advisory Board members took exception to their exclusion from a Committee of only three ministers appointed to govern the temporary schools. These Board members expressed fears that any recurrence of denominationalism in the schools would be detrimental to educational standards. They did not wish to have a situation arise again where church affiliation and not qualifications was the prerequisite for teaching appointments. Rev G.B. Molefe [see below], a member of the Board and the School Committee, took the strongest exception to these remarks. So, too, did McNamee who attended committee meetings and gave the assurance that in appointing the twelve new teachers the question of their church denomination was never considered.\textsuperscript{61}

Despite the Government stipulation that no new denominational school in New Brighton would qualify for aid, the St Francis Xavier (Roman Catholic) Native School was erected in 1938 or 1939.\textsuperscript{62} In 1940 the Church of Christ was granted permission by the PECC to utilise its church building as a school for the children of members. Permission was subject to the approval of the PE School Board and to renewal every twelve months.\textsuperscript{63} By 1944 the school had three teachers (only one of whom was certified) and 256 pupils. Teachers' salaries and the general running of the school was funded by monies raised by functions and from the church's various business ventures.\textsuperscript{64} Neither school received government aid even though the authorities had failed to erect adequate facilities to cater for the educational requirements of New Brighton's pupils.

Five schools under the jurisdiction of the School Board and catering for about 2500 pupils were completed in McNamee Village in 1941. These consisted of one junior secondary school, two higher primary and two lower primary schools. [see Figure 3.3] A secondary school was

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{59} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Sec. Bantu African Teachers Union to TC, PE, 5 June 1939.
  \item \textsuperscript{60} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628, Minutes of the PECC, 28 Feb. 1940.
  \item \textsuperscript{61} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/14, Minutes of the NBAB, 11 April 1940.
  \item \textsuperscript{62} University of the Witwatersrand, A 410 V.M.L. Ballinger Papers, B2.5.47 SNA to Ballinger, 13 Sept. 1947.
  \item \textsuperscript{63} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628 Minutes of the PECC, 14 March 1940, 12 March 1941 and 11 March 1942.
  \item \textsuperscript{64} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1629, Memo accompanying application for Government recognition by Church of Christ, 27 Nov. 1944.
\end{itemize}
established largely as a result of the initiative of Rev Molefe, who was a qualified teacher. He commenced with seven Std 7 pupils in the New Brighton Presbyterian Church in 1942 and did most of the teaching himself. The following year, he registered these pupils for Junior Certificate and enrolled a further seventy in Std 7. With the backing of the local Inspector of Schools, Molefe managed to persuade the Cape Education Department to secure premises for a secondary school in New Brighton. The pupils took occupation of the classrooms in 1944. Molefe resigned from the ministry and became the principal of the Newell Junior Secondary School [see Illustration 7.1]. By 1948 the School was full and it was decided to convert Cowan Higher Primary School into another secondary school. This was done by sending over 300 pupils and four staff members from Newell to Cowan. In the same year, Newell was upgraded to a High School and it had its first matriculants in 1950.65

The local educated elite were readers of the African press but the New Brighton community never had its own newspaper. There were a number of publishing ventures aimed at producing a newspaper for a local African readership during the period under consideration but these were all short-lived. I have found reference to the African Defender brought out by one J.B. Nyambolo in the late 1920s which appears to have run to only a few issues. That political maverick, S.M. Bennett Newana, who had acted as editor of the ICU's newspaper The Black Man in the early 1920s, resided in New Brighton for many years. During the late 1930s he published African Continent which appeared intermittently for a few years. The trade union organiser, A.Z. Tshiwula, edited Ndavela for railway workers in 1948. Probably the most widely read newspaper in New Brighton was Imvo Zabantsundu which Switzer has described as "essentially a community newspaper focusing on non-partisan news of general interest to the mission-educated community in the Eastern Cape".66 Regular coverage was provided in Imvo of New Brighton affairs by freelance reporters such as Tshiwula, Jimmy Pemba, W.W. Mabija and G. Soya Mama. In addition, W.W. Jabavu of the well-known family which ran Imvo worked as a full-time journalist in New Brighton during the 1930s and 1940s. Jabavu established a news agency for several African newspapers and reported regularly for Imvo and


Illustration 7.1 Rev George Molefe with a group of senior students at Newell High School (SA Panorama).

Illustration 7.2 'Bishop' James Limba of the Church of Christ. (Church of Christ).
New Brighton’s so-called 'school' people saw themselves as a progressive or non-tribal group and was regarded by others as 'black Englishmen'. They were bound together by numerous economic and cultural ties, and their voluntary associations comprised the institutionalised matrix of a distinct social class. A small public library housed in the T.C. White Hall was sponsored by the PE Joint Council. Reading and social clubs, debating societies, temperance organisations, itimiti (tea-meetings), and so on filled their social calendar. They also attended lectures, talks and educational films or slide shows which were often held in the public hall or church buildings. On such occasions most programmes had musical accompaniment which was provided by church choirs and bands. It would appear that New Brighton’s middle class was too small and weak to support full-time professional bands. But then neither was jazz, jive or tula 'n divile (the Xhosa equivalent of marabi) the preserve of any particular class. Music which is often said to be a universal language, also serves to bridge class barriers. Musical performance and other leisure-time activities sometimes brought together mission-school and proletarian participants, and new cultural patterns and social institutions were developed within the framework of communal recreation. As such, recreation provided a meeting ground of working class commonalty and middle class elitism and could contribute to community formation.

Owing to the restraints of space and a lack of information, this discussion of middle class culture has to be curtailed. But it is appropriate that we now consider the role of the churches - both mission and independent - in New Brighton society.

Cultural or Class Institutions? The Churches in New Brighton

Structural functionalist explanations of the appeal of churches in urban African society have concentrated on their beliefs and practices with an emphasis on cultural adaptation. They have focused on the role of churches in synthesising western and traditional cultural practices and largely ignored the social formation in which they arise and exist. An equally reductionist materialist position holds that religious belief and practices of churches are simply the

ideological expressions of particular classes. Thus it has been held that members of the mission churches were from the middle class, whilst the independent churches were 'working-class churches'. \(^6^9\) People's experience as members of a class may and often do assume a religious form, therefore we must examine nature of the relationship between the class position of particular groups and their cultural expression. I have attempted a fairly extensive analysis along these lines with respect to the Church of Christ elsewhere, \(^7^0\) and here I will extend the analysis to other churches in New Brighton.

Previous chapters provide something of the context for relating the growth of the churches - both mission and independent - which formed an integral part of the culture of the New Brighton community.

The closure of Port Elizabeth's old locations caused considerable dislocation not only to the social fabric of these communities, but to specific church congregations. This can be illustrated with reference to the Anglican Church which had established St Stephen's Mission Church on Richmond Hill close to the centre of town in 1869. Many members of St Stephen's moved to New Brighton and worshipped in a dwelling until a new church building was erected after the grant of title in 1907. A wood and iron structure served the New Brighton congregation until the Red Location site was exchanged for one in McNamee Village. The erection of a more permanent brick building was completed in 1941. Meanwhile another church, also known as St Stephen's, was built in Mount Road in 1927 and continued to provide a place of worship for African Anglicans still resident in the city or Korsten. At least the first four or five priests-in-charge of St Stephens were Whites and they were not permitted to reside in New Brighton. Although there were assistant African priests prior to 1944, Rev D.N. Mbopa was the first African priest-in-charge. \(^7^1\) Anglicans comprised the second largest congregation - behind the Methodists - in New Brighton for most of our period.

For the reasons mentioned in Chapter 3, the semi-independent Ethiopian Order had been

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\(^7^0\) See my "In the World but Not of It": 'Bishop' Limba and the Church of Christ in New Brighton, c. 1929-1949', *Kronos*, 19 (1992), pp. 102-134.

\(^7^1\) Pamphlet to Commemorate the 50th Anniversary of St Stephen's Mission, New Brighton (Port Elizabeth, 1991) compiled by G.S. Mama, M. Joka, F. Magxaki and E. Makubalo.
granted a site with title in New Brighton by the Cape Colonial Government. The Order was affiliated to the Church of the Province of South Africa and under the ultimate control of the Anglican Archbishop. Tuckey holds that the membership of the Order was largely confined to Xhosa-speakers of the amaXunukwebe people from the Middledrift area. She maintains that in the urban centres it served mainly work seekers and migrant labourers, providing them with a 'home and a social centre' in the alien environment of the city. The Order drew members from the lower classes who had a smattering of education rather than from the educated elite. The original wood and iron church building was burnt down in 1929 and it was the first congregation to erect a brick church building in New Brighton. Its membership never approached that of the mother church, but it had a sizeable congregation.

Of the 'Ethiopian' churches, both the Presbyterian Church of Africa and the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church were granted sites - but not title - in New Brighton by the Cape Colonial Government. The grant of these sites was made possible by the fact that both these churches had been accorded Government recognition. From 1915 the Government agreed to consider applications from independent churches for sites on their merits. But this was still subject to the condition that

the applicant body had, by the length of its existence, the magnitude and stability of its work and the suitability of its constitution, shown itself fit to be entrusted with the occupation of land for mission purposes. The conditions for Government recognition of independent churches were more clearly defined by the Report of the Native Churches Commission of 1925. These included the stipulations that: the church should have been in existence for ten years and have at least six congregations; the church should have a constitution, schools, buildings and other signs of growth; ministers should not be licensed unless they had passed Std 6 and had 2 to 3 years training; and the church should have an "accepted ethical standard". Under the circumstances, New Brighton remained very much a stronghold of the Methodist, Anglican and other Protestant missions during the period in which it was administered by the central state.

The PECC (incorrectly) assumed that churches had only the right of occupation to sites in New Brighten.
Brighton. In cases where there were no buildings but churches could substantiate their right of occupation, these were approved. Thus in 1927 the PECC permitted the Presbyterian Church of Africa to occupy a site on the same terms as those previously approved by the Colonial Government. On the other hand, it refused to recognise the application by the Bantu Presbyterian Church of South Africa for a site when its representative could not substantiate the verbal claim that a site had previously been granted by the central government. When the Bantu Presbyterian Church renewed its application for a New Brighton site seven years later, it was permitted to occupy the vacant Roman Catholic Church site. The PECC agreed to the same conditions as those set by the Colonial Government, except that the Church was given only twelve months in which to erect a church building. [See Appendix B for tabulation of church grants].

In 1934 the PECC decided to frame new conditions for the grant of church sites in New Brighton. Apart from the clause that churches would have twelve months to build, it was stipulated that:

(a) churches would have no claim to title to the land which remained the property of the Council;
(b) churches would have no right to lease or sub-let the site;
(c) permission to use site would be cancelled if it ceased to be used for church purposes;
(d) one month notice of evacuation need be given by Council which was obliged to pay compensation for buildings and other materials only if the church was not provided with an alternative site.

The amended conditions were taken as being applicable to existing and new leases. But there were no qualifications which had to be met prior to making the application. Although the Government recognition was cited as a prerequisite, in practice the disposition and discretion of Superintendent McNamee was important for his recommendations were able to influence Council decisions.

In return for its site leased to the Bantu Presbyterian Church, the Roman Catholic Church was allocated a new site by the PECC in 1935. The Catholics who had been meeting in private

76 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Rev C.D. Kwatsha to TC, PE, 11 March and Minutes of the PECC, 20 April 1927.
77 EPH 8 March 1927, p. 10.
78 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Reports of Supt. NBL, 31 Jan. and 14 March 1934; Minutes of NAC 23 Feb. and 16 March 1934; TC, PE to C.G. Mgiza of Presbyterian Church of SA, 10 April 1934.
79 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Solicitor Mc Williams & Elliott to TC, PE, 12 April 1934.
dwellings, then proceeded to construct the St Francis Xavier Church. In the same year, the
Council approved the grant of sites to the Bantu Church of Christ and the Bantu Methodist
Church of South Africa. Both these indigenous churches were then utilising public facilities
for services and sought to erect their own church buildings. They claimed to have memberships
of 280 and 86, respectively. The application by the founder of the Church of Christ, the
self-styled 'Bishop' James Limba, was favourably received because he and his followers were
regarded by McNamee as the most law-abiding people in New Brighton. The Superintendent
expressed the following opinion about the moderating influence of Limba:

... the members of his flock, in regard to sobriety, orderliness, personal cleanliness and
general good behaviour, are outstanding. The Reverend Limba himself is a man of
exceptionally good character, anxious at all times to avoid giving offence to the
authorities or contravening the law in any way, and these qualities he has apparently
been successful in instilling in the minds of his followers.

In other words, the authorities viewed Limba as a useful agent of social control.

The Church of Christ, situated on the edge of the still-to-be-erected McNamee Village, was
consecrated in a well-attended ceremony in August 1937. The brickbuilding with corrugated
iron roof could seat nearly one thousand people. In spite of having no guarantee of tenure to
the site which was leased from the PE Municipality, the Church committed an enormous sum
(variously estimated at between £4 125 and £5 750) to the undertaking. Permission was also
granted by the PECC for the erection of a parsonage on the same site on condition that the
Church paid a monthly tariff for the provision of municipal services. The manse which was
known as the 'Bishop's Palace' was completed in 1938 at a cost of £1 355. It was a large,
expensively furnished, modern house which was equipped with electricity. Both the church
building and manse were imposing structures by the Location’s standards. They conferred
recognition on the Church of Christ.

The growth of the independent churches in New Brighton during the 1930s would appear to
have exceeded that of the mission churches. Although figures were not updated regularly, the

80 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Minutes of the PECC, 25 September 1935.
81 CAD: 3/PEZ 1/1280 and 1/3/2/15/7, Report of the Supt. NBL to NAC, 16 Feb. 1933.
82 CeA, NTS 1473 674/214, Testimonial by J.P. McNamee, 27 Nov. 1940 (Annexure E) in support of Petition by Limba for Recognition of the Bantu Church of Christ, PE, 19 Feb. 1941.
83 G.S. Budaza, 'The Native Separatist Church Movement' (M.A. Thesis, UNISA, 1948),
p. 12.
84 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1665, Minutes of the NAC, 6 August 1937.
85 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Divisional Council to TC, PE, 4 Jan. 1939.
size of the congregations of various denominations in 1938 was as follows:\textsuperscript{86}

\textbf{TABLE 7.5}

\textit{NEW BRIGHTON CHURCH MEMBERSHIP, 1938}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Denomination</th>
<th>Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methodist Church of South Africa</td>
<td>1178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church (of Scotland)</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order of Ethiopia</td>
<td>217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Africa</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregational Union of South Africa (Basuto)</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist Church of South Africa (Coloured)</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congregational Union of South Africa</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African Methodist Episcopal Church</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic Church</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantu Presbyterian Church of South Africa</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bantu Methodist Church of South Africa</td>
<td>530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of Christ</td>
<td>815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>4617</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both the Church of Christ and the Bantu Methodist Church showed phenomenal growth since they had applied for sites three years earlier. The Church of Christ had by far the largest membership of the independent churches in New Brighton. The above figures include only those churches which had been granted sites and had erected church buildings thereon, and not the Seventh Day Adventists, the Ethiopian Catholic Church and Old Apostolic Church which had been refused sites by the Council. It is therefore likely that any number of small (especially independent) denominations which may have used private premises for services went unrecorded.

Known church members comprised 4617 out of a population of 7715 (including children) in 1938.\textsuperscript{87} Thus, nearly 60\% of New Brighton’s population claimed church affiliations. With its relatively permanent population, many of New Brighton's residents were second or third generation Christians whose parents had belonged to mission churches. Although it is likely

\textsuperscript{86} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628, Report of Supt. NBL, 22 Oct. 1938. The same figures were given for all but the last four churches in 1934. See CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 14 March 1934.

\textsuperscript{87} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/12, Report of the Location Superintendent, 22 February 1938.
that some of these 'school people' would have joined the 'Ethiopian' churches, it is unlikely that many would have joined the Church of Christ or other indigenous churches. In fact, Mqotsi and Mkele state that many converts to the Church of Christ had not previously been attached to any Christian denomination.\textsuperscript{88} The Church of Christ definitely targeted the new arrivals amongst the migrants because Limba is known to have preached regularly on Sunday afternoons in the vicinity of the SMQ in the Red Location.\textsuperscript{89} It would appear that Limba attracted a considerable number of followers from amongst the newly proletarianised segment of New Brighton's burgeoning population in the 1930s.

McNamee suggested that it would be advisable to place some check on the number of sites allocated for church purposes in McNamee Village. This reflected the Superintendent's concern that if churches continued to mushroom at present rates this would pose difficulties for his administration. He recommended that in future applicants should have:

(a) at least ten existing churches;
(b) a training school for clergy;
(c) recognised ministers and duly appointed marriage officers.\textsuperscript{90}

Essentially, this meant compliance with the requirements that the Government laid down for recognition. While not appearing at all stringent, only seven indigenous churches had been accorded recognition by the Government by this time.\textsuperscript{91} The Superintendent's recommendations were adopted by the PECC, along with an amendment to the regulations that the period in which church buildings were to be erected be extended from twelve months to two years.\textsuperscript{92}

The PECC's assumption that all church sites in New Brighton previously allocated by the central government were granted subject to the right of occupation only was questioned by the Baptist Church in 1940. It claimed title to a site in the Red Location upon which the Municipality had erected buildings, and an investigation into the matter revealed that a number of church sites had been irregularly exchanged or transferred. When the Baptists refused to accept an offer of site in McNamee Village subject to the new conditions for church sites, the

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\textsuperscript{90} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1627, Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 10 Sept. 1938.

\textsuperscript{91} R. Phillips, \textit{The Bantu in the City} (Johannesburg, 1938), p. 254 fn 11.

Council held that it had forfeited its right to the site by virtue of the fact that it had not been used for the purposes of the grant for over thirty years. However, the original grant stated that under such circumstances the land would revert to the Government which indicated that it was not willing to take possession of sites not utilised for church purposes and transfer them to the PE Municipality. Consequently, the Council resolved that:

the Council adopt the policy that wherever possible sites in close proximity to those held by Deed of Grant be granted - in freehold - to church authorities owning land in the old New Brighton Location area (but which have not been utilised for the purpose set out in the Deed of Grant or,

alternatively, in the event of land not being available in the immediate vicinity of the area presently owned in the old village, land be offered on a leasehold tenure in the new village on the same conditions as will apply to allocations to churches which have already been granted facilities of this nature.

It was clearly not the intention of the PECC that land should be given to the church authorities in McNamie Village on a freehold basis in future, but only in exceptional cases such as the above.

The Anglican, Baptist, Presbyterian and Methodist Churches negotiated sites in McNamie Village with a 25-year renewable lease in exchange for ones in the old part of the Location. These denominations expressed considerable misgivings about having to surrender freehold sites held by title in perpetuity in exchange for the lease of a site for a limited period. Apart from that of the Church of Christ which has already been mentioned, sites were also granted to the Bantu Methodist Church of Africa, Bantu Mission Field of Seventh Day Adventists, Independent Congregational Church of South Africa, and the African Methodist Episcopal Church. In spite of the stipulated conditions, the grant of church sites by the PECC in New Brighton was a rather arbitrary process. The PECC would appear to have granted sites in cases where the applicant churches had connections with established white churches quite readily.

A case in point was the grant of a site to the Assemblies of God in 1945. The formation of the church in New Brighton followed Nicholas Bhengu’s 'Back to God Crusade'. Amidst

93 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628, TC, PE to Prov. Secretary, 14 May and reply 8 Aug. 1940; Minutes of the NAC, 10 Sept. 1940 and 25 Jan. 1941; Messrs McWilliams & Elliott to TC, PE, 25 Sept. 1940.
94 City of Port Elizabeth, Mayor’s Minute for the Year ended 31 August 1941, pp. 37-39.
95 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1628, Supt. NBL to TC, PE, 18 Jan. 1940.
reports that Bhengu was able to get tsotsis and hardened criminals to lay down their weapons and that "crime came to a virtual standstill" during the Campaign, the man later dubbed the 'Black Billy Graham', was welcomed by the authorities. Although claiming initially to be non-denominational in character, many of those converted during the Crusade did not return to their own churches but formed a body which affiliated to the white Assemblies of God which had been established in Port Elizabeth. Bhengu's church though remained semi-independent and East London was to become the home of his mother church. Yet, the growth of the Assemblies of God outstripped virtually all existing churches in New Brighton.

Although Bhengu claimed to have been a mere vehicle for God's healing powers, he was known as umpilisi ('Divine healer') in Xhosa and derived considerable authority from his charisma. By contrast, Limba's authority rested on that accorded an African chief and he was called uTata ('Father') by his flock. The organisational structure of the Church of Christ closely resembled traditional Xhosa society with church membership replacing kinship. Accordingly, the relationship between Limba and his congregation is said to have reflected that between a patriarch and members of his extended family. Limba did not forbid customs such as circumcision, lobola and polygyny for which he could find biblical justification. Instead, he incorporated them within the practices of the Church in amended form. In other words, he regulated these practices in the same way as a chief exercised control over customs which formed part of his public authority. And because Limba recreated the pattern of a hierarchical system under his own authoritarian leadership, he could be rightly termed the 'chief' of the Church of Christ in accordance with Sundkler's typology. Epstein has cautioned against comparing leaders of urban-based AICs with traditional chiefs. He suggested that it was 'a profound methodological error for [it implies] the assessment of urban conditions against a model of the traditional tribal system'. But there appears to be ample evidence that Limba modelled the organisation of his church on traditional society, making innovative structural changes in order to reinforce his moral and spiritual authority.

The Church of Christ also reproduced and redefined existing social hierarchies and gender relations of a patriarchal society. Whilst it may be that male dominance in both traditional African society and the Zionist churches is something of a myth, there was no sign of the informal power of women in the Church of Christ. Unlike the Zionist churches where women outnumber men, are the focus of healing activities, and control much of the resources through the manyano; there are not only proportionately many more males in the Church but they are dominant in most spheres of church activity. The fine line between the subservient and supportive roles of women is evident in their influence on decision-making. They are not, for instance, allowed to take part in discussions in church. Should a married woman wish to raise a point, her husband had to serve as her spokesman and introduce the matter as if it was his own idea. Males thus exercised a great degree of social control over women in the congregation. This subservience was based on a combination of social relationships in the patrilineal family and biblical (especially Pauline) teachings. Like the Assemblies of God, the Church of Christ justified the secondary status of females on the basis of the scriptures.  

Dubb’s depiction of the insularity of members of the Assemblies of God from the wider community has ready application to the Church of Christ. He holds that the importance of in-group solidarity is twofold. In the first place it had the effect of maintaining the vitality of the church, and of ensuring that the changed lifestyle of converts would be sustained. Secondly, the Church provided its members with an alternative to the alienated existence of an urban location. It defined clearly what was good and evil and created a web of social relations within which the individual felt secure. The strictures on customary male recreational or leisure time activities (like drinking and smoking) promoted family life and attendance of church services, bible studies and prayer meetings. The lives of members became centred on church activities. Contact with outsiders was limited to a minimum and social interaction was mainly with fellow members of the congregation. Such solidarity was shared by members of both churches through the creation of separate identities. This was especially so with respect to the appearance of Church of Christ members which set them apart from outsiders. Like Limba himself, male members did not shave their beards and wore suits as a badge of respectability.  

102 Mqotsi & Mkele, 'iBandla lika Krestu', pp. 109-11; Pauw, Christianity and Xhosa Tradition, p. 308.  
103 Dubb, Community of the Saved, especially pp. 137-158.  
104 Dubb, Community of the Saved, p. 152.  
105 Budaza, 'The Native Separatist Church Movement', p. 17.
pattern of residential clustering of members, deacons in the Church of Christ were able to keep a close watch on the activities of members residing in their area. The intense interaction between members and between them and church officials had the effect of making it extremely difficult for individuals to break the rules of the church without being quickly and easily discovered. As a result of their way of life which differed from those of the people around them, members of the Church of Christ formed a close-knit and exclusive community in New Brighton.

In the view of Buijtenhuis, religious movements (like Zionist churches) are not the expression of particular classes but of those who experience the destruction of traditional socio-cultural norms. Following Baechler, he employs the concept of 'counter-society' to explain the response of religious groups who renounce all power aspirations in a hostile social environment and instead retreat (in terms of organisation but particularly of beliefs, moral codes, ritual) to 'a place to feel at home' - a phrase he borrows from Welbourn and Ogot. But this is not 'retreatism' pure and simple. In my view indigenous churches provided something more than escape from the harsh realities of political domination, economic deprivation, rapid social change and cultural anomie in the townships. Withdrawal was not merely a defensive act nor are such churches necessarily politically passive institutions. In fact, the creation of alternative and autonomous structures effectively constituted rival power bases. In certain instances, these churches sought to empower members and the body corporate through economic self-sufficiency. Members of these churches did not explicitly reject the dominant values of society but attempted to construct a new identity and form of consciousness. Thus any reference to, say, the Church of Christ as an 'alternative community' or 'counter-society' requires some qualification.

Conclusion

Social cleavages were, to some extent, offset by the shared experience of poverty and oppression. A growing awareness by all groups of a community identity was in the first instance due to the 'spatial ordering of society' by the dominant classes. All classes of Africans lived side by side and were readily identified by their race. Social gradations and class differences tended to diminish in a situation where all were subjected to an identifiable (white) external oppressor. In the face of such common experience a group identity could coalesce and become the basis for a collective response. The struggle against political and cultural hegemony by New Brighton residents often assumed an inward and defensive form. Survival was the first priority. Yet, the struggle was also manifest in community and national politics.

Struggles of urban African communities have been primarily concerned with subsistence issues such as the cost of food, housing and transport. Mobilisation in such struggles has tended to be sporadic and difficult to sustain because of the vagaries of labour and political organisations. In the absence of a vibrant political society, vigilance and civic associations became key agents in mobilisation. Even statutory institutions such as advisory boards have played a significant role in community struggles. Although advisory boards were to all intents and purposes powerless, progressive organisations were prepared to use these 'institutions of the oppressor' to further their aims until as late as the 1950s. Moreover, in many instances advisory boards had a symbiotic relationship with the more representative community-based institutions. This chapter will show that despite its questionable legitimacy and ambiguous role in community affairs, the Native Advisory Board (NAB) contributed in some measure to the formation of a dynamic political tradition in New Brighton.

Advisory boards have often been portrayed as 'collaborationist' bodies and those serving on the boards summarily dismissed as 'stooges' or 'sell-outs'. Bloch and Wilkinson, for instance, state quite unequivocally that they were dominated by the 'most reactionary elements' of the African petty bourgeoisie, and "generally became the vehicles for the often narrow grievances and aspirations of a disconnected petty bourgeoisie". But other writers have noted the inherently contradictory role of advisory boards in community politics. Kuper observed that participation in state-created bodies (like advisory boards) did not necessarily imply subordination and that such structures could provide opportunities for organising the people and undermining the structure of domination. Stadler's appraisal also reflects this ambivalence. He states at one point that the limited forms of African representation in local bodies [such as advisory boards]... seldom generated any substantial political support in urban African communities. Yet, at another point, he reckons that advisory boards "provided a locus for African political activity, and some significant community leaders used them as a power

A more recent work by Cobley has gone some way towards providing a more nuanced and diachronic treatment of the petty bourgeoisie and of their role in community politics. The apparent contradictions can be partly explained by the structurally ambiguous position of the African petty bourgeoisie and the changing nature of the advisory boards.

Despite the burgeoning literature on the African middle class, the significance of the role of advisory boards in community politics has still to be thoroughly assessed. For what we lack are in-depth case studies of advisory boards which cover extended periods. As far as Port Elizabeth is concerned, a study has been made of the operation of the board's successor - community councils - in the townships during the 1970s. It also provides, by way of stressing the continuity between these bodies, a resume of NAB meetings between the 1920s and 1940s devoid of historical contextualisation. This study evaluated the behaviour of individual Board members with significant personal followings. These 'notables' built up systems of patronage based on a network of clients linked by a web of social relations resting on kinship and ethnic ties, business interests and membership of political, church and sports organisations. This approach provides a point of departure for our examination of the functioning of the NAB against the background of the changing structural position of the petty bourgeoisie discussed.

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in the previous chapter. A discussion of the political culture and the formation of cliques in New Brighton during the 1920s and 1930s will follow.

The chief concern of the final section of this chapter is to explain the radicalisation of community politics and concomitant politicisation of the NAB, which culminated in its resignation in 1952. Here, again, we will refer to Cobley’s work. His notion of a 'great awakening' of advisory boards which he ascribes to their widening role in terms of the 1936 Natives' Representative Act (NRA) is problematical. The conversion of boards into electoral colleges for urban areas under the Act may have galvanised politics in the northern provinces; but not in the Cape where Africans still participated - albeit in attenuated form - in wider (white) electoral politics. Secondly, Cobley associates this 'great awakening' of the boards with the participation of political organisations. But as he himself shows and others before him have done, members of the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) stood for advisory boards before the passage of the NRA. Moreover, Cobley fails to distinguish between those with known political affiliations contesting elections in their private capacities and those who stood for an organisation per se. After the collapse of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union (ICU) and with the African National Congress (ANC) moribund by the early 1930s, former officials of both these organisations elected to advisory boards were only accountable to local constituencies - or, in the case of nominees, to the local authority. That participation by the ANC and the CPSA in advisory boards during the 1940s and 1950s became more widespread, was because these organisations determined to capture any forum capable of drawing in diverse groups in local communities into their ranks. It will be shown that the NAB in New Brighton was no exception.

The Origins and Functioning of the New Brighton Advisory Board c. 1908-1923

It is a fairly common assumption that Native Advisory Boards were first established in terms of the Urban Areas Act of 1923. In fact, the first advisory boards predate this legislation by some fourteen years and forerunners of the Boards had been established in Port Elizabeth's


9 Stadler, The political economy of modern SA, pp. 106, 112.
locations even earlier. In 1890 the Town Council had sanctioned the formation of a location committee to confer with "on matters relating to the orderly conduct of the locations". Six years later, the Council and the African community entered into an agreement which envisaged an arrangement akin to the advisory board system. Provision for the establishment of Advisory Boards were included in the Cape's amended Native Reserve Location Act of 1905. But when regulations drawn up in terms of this legislation were discussed with New Brighton residents, no real interest therein was expressed. Yet, before these regulations were promulgated, the Assistant Magistrates of Ndabeni and New Brighton consulted informally constituted boards on matters of interest to residents. Advisory Boards were formed in both Locations in late 1908 and commenced functioning the following year.

Advisory Board regulations proclaimed under the amended Native Reserve Location Act stipulated the procedures for the election and nomination of candidates, voting, the holding of meetings, and so on. Only four of the six Board members would be elected by residents. In the event of there being more than four nominations for these positions, the Magistrate would be obliged to call a public meeting at which candidates would be elected by a show of hands - this was later changed to a ballot. From 1910 two members would be appointed by the Governor-General acting upon the advice of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) which, in turn, followed the recommendation of the Magistrate. Meetings were to be held on a monthly basis provided they were quorate. They were to be chaired by the Magistrate who was ex-officio an additional member of the Board with a deliberative as well as a casting vote. In New Brighton, the Superintendent soon took over the Magistrate's functions, including the selection of nominees to serve on the NAB.

State officials nominated Advisory Board members so in the event of residents electing members whose policy was "reactionary [sic] and embarassing to the Officers of the Location",

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12 CAD, NA 734 f348, SNA to ARM, NBL, 19 Dec. 1906.
13 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, SNA to PM, CC, 4 July 1908.
14 Cape of Good Hope Government Gazette, Proclamation No. 297 of 31 July 1908.
15 CAD, NA 734 f348, Minutes of the NBAB, 3 June 1909.
the interests of the Government could be safeguarded. In addition, nominated members could "maintain a balance of power amongst the various tribes in the Location and ... ensure as far as possible their due representation". The latter consideration suggests that the strategy of divide and rule was advocated by the authorities in urban locations. In the case of New Brighton, this was to be used to exploit cleavages between the Fingoes and other Xhosa-speakers, residents of different areas in the Location, and between those entitled to vote for NAB members and those not. These strategies will be discussed below.

It was the stated intention of the Secretary for Native Affairs (SNA) that Advisory Boards would be "thoroughly representative of all classes of the community". To this end, it was regarded as inappropriate to grant lease and title holders the sole right to elect Board members. Neither title nor long lease was granted in the Reserve Locations, but the right to vote and to stand as a NAB candidate was restricted to principal occupants whose rents were fully paid up. Thus lodgers were effectively precluded from participating in the elections even though they paid a fee to the Administration. Subsequent recommendations for the establishment of advisory committees representing all native residents in urban locations, were not to be realised.

The Report of the Native Affairs Department for 1911 conceded that there was "no local government [for urban Africans] in the true sense [but that the advisory boards] serve a most useful purpose as a connecting link between the Government and the residents of these locations". In New Brighton, opinions as to the efficacy of the NAB were divided. Nominated members believed that it served a useful purpose, but one elected member rather more cynically regarded his function as "nursing the Location for the Government". In his opinion NAB members were little more than Government functionaries and, as such, might as well be paid an honorarium for their services. The SNA's response to the request shows scant regard for the fact that certain members were well aware of the NAB's questionable legitimacy and sceptical of the degree of independence they exercised:

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16 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, ARM, Uitvlugt to SNA, 26 Feb. 1908.
17 CeA, NTS 156 1703/f348, SNA to Surveyor-General, 31 March 1908.
18 Transvaal Province, Local Government (Stallard) Commission Report (Pretoria, 1921), pp. 52 and 95, Appendix VII.
20 See, for example, statements by Rev Mcanyangwa recorded in CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, Minutes of the NBAB, 30 Jan. and 28 April 1914.
21 CAD, NA 156 6224/f348, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Sept. 1911.
Were Government to sanction the grant of any pecuniary indulgence for their services it is quite possible that the confidence of the community in the Board as a whole might be weakened, and the Board itself not be as independent and untrammeled in its discussions and decisions.\textsuperscript{22}

Yet, a Report of the Native Affairs Department issued in 1919 noted that the NAB had "assisted greatly in arousing interest and ensuring contentment in the administration".\textsuperscript{23}

The NAB functioned relatively smoothly until it was engulfed by populist protest politics during Port Elizabeth's post-war crisis. As I have shown elsewhere,\textsuperscript{24} the post-war years were characterised by the mobilisation of black workers under the banner of the PEICWU. During this time, the labour movement dealt directly with employers and the PECC, which served to highlight the NAB's irrelevance in addressing anything but minor complaints. With the heightened tensions in the aftermath of the shootings of October 1920,\textsuperscript{25} the Location Superintendent, no longer regarded the NAB as an unqualified success. He noted that it was an excellent institution for both individually and as a Board [it] acts as a brake on the hot headed and is a means of bringing to light any grievances which residents might have.

On the other hand, he complained that "there is ... a section of the residents which regards the Board with suspicion and criticises it unmercifully".\textsuperscript{26} This was hardly surprising because there were no elections for three successive years after 1918 and the NAB had simply been re-appointed en bloc by the Superintendent.\textsuperscript{27} Members' own frustration and disenchantment with the NAB was reflected by the frequent failure to hold meetings during 1920 and 1921 due to an inability to raise a quorum. In short, the composition of the NAB was fixed and its functioning had become a sham.

Under these circumstances, the establishment of a Vigilance Committee to look after "the best

\textsuperscript{22} CAD, NTS 156 6224/f348, Actg. SNA to RM, PE, 22 Nov. 1911.
\textsuperscript{23} Report of the Native Affairs Department for the Years 1913 to 1918, U.G. 7-1919, p. 17.
\textsuperscript{27} CeA, NTS 2443 3/291, Supt. NBL to Magt., PE, 17 Feb. 1922 and SNA to Magt., PE, 2 March 1922.
interests of the native community" was hardly surprising. Its executive officers included a current (and a future) NAB member, and were moderates without ties to the by then divided PEICWU. The Vigilance Committee thus provided an alternative - but not officially sanctioned - forum for New Brighton residents to air their grievances.

It also became customary for residents to elect a Chairman of Public Meetings (or Location Chairman) annually. In the event of anyone wishing to convene such a meeting, an application had to be motivated to the Location Chairman for the use of the public hall. Should he consider that a useful purpose would be served thereby, the application and agenda of the proposed meeting was referred to the Superintendent. When permission was granted for public meetings, these afforded residents an opportunity to discuss matters without the presence of officials. It remained the Location Chairman's responsibility to convene and chair the meetings, and to see to it that proceedings were conducted in an orderly manner. Moreover, he had to report the outcome of the meeting to the Superintendent. Failing this, the Location Chairman stood to forfeit his position and residents the 'privilege' of holding further public meetings. Regulations made no provision for the position of Location Chairman, but Grattan and his successors reckoned that it provided training for responsible leadership. When the SNA questioned whether the procedure for holding public meetings did not "derogate from the authority of the Superintendent", Grattan argued that he remained the 'final authority' in Location matters. Consideration was given periodically to legalising the position of the Location Chairman by way of additional regulations, but the closest it came to this was when the procedure for calling public meetings was placed on record in 1922.

Social Control and Clique Politics in New Brighton c.1923-1942:

The functioning of advisory boards was not prescribed by the Urban Areas Act which was enabling legislation. The Act stipulated only that the local authority could not make or withdraw regulations for a particular Location without prior consultation with the NAB. However, the NAD's 'model' regulations served as a guide for local authorities. Urban

28 EPH 2 July 1921.
29 CeA, NTS 2443 4/291, SNA to RM, PE, 15 April and Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 27 April 1922.
Africans who qualified to vote for members of the Board or serve thereon, were supposed to learn the duties and responsibilities of (limited) citizenship. 32 In deference to Stallardism, the boards were not accorded statutory powers as this might have implied future citizenship rights for urban Africans.

As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Superintendent liaised between the NAB and the Council. He submitted a monthly report along with the NAB minutes to the Native Affairs Committee. Copies of the NAC’s minutes were, in turn, attached to the agenda circulated to City Councillors. The Superintendent reported back to the NAB on the recommendations of the NAC and the resolutions of the Council. He was also responsible for the selection of the PECC’s nominees to the NAB, who numbered half of the Board members for most of the period under discussion. 33 Such nominees were in the invidious position of having to reconcile the contradictory expectations of the community and the Council. They owed allegiance to the Council and were not free to determine their own priorities.

After the hiatus of the early 1920s, the NAB performed its functions more successfully than its counterparts in other centres where the local authorities were seldom able to make boards fully functional. In 1927 McNamee reported that there was, amongst his fellow Location Managers and Superintendent, a general impression that

when comprised of the right type of natives, [Advisory Boards] were helpful to the authorities. In several instances difficulties were overcome through the agencies of such Boards. 34

To McNamee himself, the 'right type of native' meant those willing to co-operate with the authorities so that the NAB became a help rather than a hindrance to social control in the Location. Most of these came from the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie. With the necessary skills and acumen, some became major political brokers in New Brighton during this period.

The Superintendent’s position as Chairman of the Advisory Board augmented his personal influence in New Brighton enormously. McNamee claimed to have the necessary qualities to

33 In terms of the regulations under the Urban Areas Act the Board consisted of 3 elected and 3 nominated members. In 1940 it was enlarged to 8 members of whom half were nominated, and in 1949 further enlarged to 12 members of whom 8 were elected.
act as an impartial overseer of the Board’s activities. The NAC evidently concurred, for it ignored the recommendations of at least two Government Commissions that the Location Superintendent should not hold this office. And when members proposed that a City Councillor act as Chairman of the NAB, it circumspectly suggested that this should not be construed as a personal attack on the incumbent, but rather that an important principle was at stake. In their view, a Councillor was not an employee of the PECC like the Superintendent and his independence would safeguard the status of the Advisory Board as trustees of the Location residents. The only concession made by the NAC was that it would meet regularly with the Board in the absence of the Location Superintendent, to enable it express grievances without fear of recrimination. It was not until 1948 that the NAC agreed to amend the regulations so as to permit a member of the NAC to act as Chairman of the NAB.

As the primary interlocutor with the PECC, McNamee was able to establish extensive patron-client networks. The operation of these networks worked through McNamee’s lackeys on the NAB, especially long-serving nominated members. The dispensing of patronage was used to co-opt individuals with standing in the community. McNamee maintained good relationships in an official capacity with influential figures such as A.F. Pendla, James Limba, P.J. Nikiwe and Rev G.B. Molefe. These individuals - for whom profiles are provided below - were generally acknowledged to have been "respected by their own people [as they] had rendered very valuable service to the community". McNamee rewarded loyalty with special privileges, including preferential access to accommodation and the grant of licenses to trade or become proprietors of eating houses. The price exacted for this was collusion in effecting social control. Not all NAB members were prepared to comply and those individuals who declined to become party to the system of patronage or simply fell foul of the Location Superintendent were marginalised. Thus the Superintendent’s attempts to co-opt residents cut two ways.

35 Cape Archives Depot (CAD), Port Elizabeth Town Clerk’s Files, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Memo of Supt. NBL re Native Economic Commission Report, 5 Aug. 1932.
37 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 23 March 1944.
38 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of meeting between the NAC and NBAB, 13 Oct. 1944.
39 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NAC, 2 Feb. 1944; Eastern Province Herald (EPH) 3 Mar. 1944.
As we have seen, the allocation of houses in New Brighton by McNamee often occasioned charges of 'favouritism' on his part. Although the responsibility of the Location Superintendent, the NAB could make recommendations in this regard. In 1928 it revoked a previous resolution to the effect that no unattached women should be allocated houses. It was resolved that applications of widows and women with children, who had been deserted by their husbands, should receive sympathetic consideration, provided such persons were earning an honest living. This the Superintendent was prepared to do, but reserved the right to use his own discretion in all cases. On another occasion, the Superintendent quashed a resolution of the NAB that all occupiers of double (i.e. two semi-detached two-roomed) houses in the old portion of the Location, excepting school teachers and ministers of religion, be given notice to quit one half of each such dwelling. The proposed exemption of certain classes of residents from this resolution was in keeping with an earlier decision of the Board that the 'more advanced type of Native' should be encouraged to take up residence in New Brighton and that special consideration should be given to finding houses for such persons. This standpoint was contested on occasion, but the majority of Board members - who were from this class themselves - felt justified in preserving their privileges.

Perhaps the leading community figure of his generation was Andrew Frank Pendla. He was elected to the NAB in 1925, 1928 and 1930, and served as a nominated member from 1935 until his death in 1944. He enjoyed the confidence of McNamee who regarded him as "the most capable board member - nominated or elected - that I have ever worked with". As a senior clerk and interpreter to the attorney, J.H. Spilkin, he was in a position to provide legal advice to the many residents who sought it; or, failing that, could refer people to his employer. Together with his position on the NAB, this enabled Pendla to establish individualised patron-client relations. As a tshawe (petty chief), Pendla derived much of his standing from lineage-type authority based on ties of kinship which still held sway in New Brighton. He suggested to the Holloway Commission that urban representatives of the chiefs sit on a separate body from the NAB and meet regularly with the local authority. His own

40 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1279, Minutes of NBAB, 23 April 1931.
41 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1277, Minutes of the NBAB, 11 Oct. 1928.
42 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1497, Minutes of the NBAB, 7 Feb. 1929.
43 See, for example, CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1497, Minutes of the NBAB, 16 May 1929.
45 University of Cape Town Manuscripts Collection, BC 630, K. 26, Evidence to the Native Economic Commission, Port Elizabeth, 26 & 27 March 1931, 6006-26, 6030-42.
Illustration 8.2 New Brighton Advisory Board 1944 (Church of Christ).

Illustration 8.1 Andrew Frank Pendla (Private: Mrs B. Matsolo).
ethnic support base was, however, augmented by a personal following. Although something of an opportunist whose political career ended with his being axed as President of the Cape African Congress in 1942, Pendla was repeatedly elected to key positions on civic bodies by New Brighton residents.

In a somewhat different category, but also very influential in New Brighton’s affairs was ‘Bishop’ James Limba, head of the Church of Christ. Limba was elected to the NAB for three consecutive years from 1931 to 1933 and then, again, in 1936. After standing down for a year, he became a nominated member for ten consecutive years between 1938 and 1947 until he declined further nomination following a constitutional dispute in the Church which amounted to a challenge to his leadership. During his years on the NAB, Limba availed himself of the opportunity to secure trading licenses for a number of commercial ventures and these were well patronised by his followers who kept him in fine style. Limba’s was the only application for a site in New Brighton by indigenous churches to have been approved during McNamee’s term of office. The Location Superintendent reckoned Limba and his followers to be amongst the most law-abiding residents of New Brighton and, obviously, useful allies in affecting social control.

The only woman who wielded comparable influence in New Brighton was Sister Dora Nginza (nee Jacobs), the well-known District Nurse and matriarchal figure. She earned the praise name Aa! Nobantu!! (Mother of the People) not only on account of all the children she brought into the world but also due to the respect in which she was held. This was augmented by her marriage to Henry Nginza, a tshawe of the amaRarabe royal family. Following the death in

46 University of the Witwatersrand, Church of the Province Archives, A.B. Xuma Papers, Letters from Xuma to Pendla of 31 December 1941 (ABX. 411231a), Pendla to Xuma, 15 January 1942 (ABX. 420115a), Nikiwe to Xuma, 5 March 1942 (ABX. 420305), Xuma to Pendla, 16 Sept. 1942 (ABX. 420916c), Xuma to Nikiwe, 18 Sept. 1942 (ABX. 420918c) and Nikiwe to Xuma, 22 Sept. 1942 (ABX. 420922b); Walshe, The Rise of African Nationalism in South Africa, 390-1.


1943 of her husband, a former headman in the Location [see Chapter 4], Nginza served as the urban representative of Paramount Chief Archie Velile Sandle of the Ciskei. Her support for the 1951 Bantu Authorities Act alienated her from 'progressive' organisations such as the ANC. But her influence was confined largely to the more traditional and conservative segments of the community despite her involvement in civic, church, cultural activities, and occasional non-party political matters. She was held in esteem not only by McNamee, but a succession of medical officers of health. However, as an employee of the Location administration, Nginza was precluded from serving on the NAB.

Educators, clergymen and other members of the 'respectable classes' often served as nominated members of the NAB. Prince John Nikiwe was a school principal until his retirement in 1944 and a Methodist lay preacher. He served as an elected member of the NAB between 1922 and 1928 and thereafter as a nominated member for an almost unbroken period of 35 years. He served on the executive committees of the PE District Native Welfare Society (later the PE Joint Council). Nikiwe was also on the executive of both the local and provincial branches of the Cape African Congress at various times between the 1920s and the early 1940s.

When Rev G.B. Molefe took charge of the New Brighton Presbyterian mission church in 1939, he was immediately convinced by McNamee to accept nomination to the NAB. He was to serve without interruption for almost thirty years. A graduate of the South African Native College (Fort Hare), he boasted an M.A. from Columbia University, New York. He later resigned from the ministry to become principal of the first secondary school in New Brighton. The presence of nominees like Nikiwe and Molefe on the NAB went a long way

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51 PE Municipality, Town Clerk’s Files; Newspaper House Library File; Interviews with G. Soya Mama, New Brighton, 10 August 1989 and J. Graham Young, Port Elizabeth, 23 August 1988.
towards ensuring that it would co-operate with the Location Superintendent and the local authority. In their dealings with white officials, they typified the servility of the 'old guard' leaders who became uneasy with the increasingly strident demands of the younger generation in the 1940s. Both Nikiwe and Molefe were undoubtedly co-opted by McNamee.

The administration's divide and rule strategy occasionally fuelled tension between Xhosas and Fingoes. There were persistent claims that McNamee preferred to nominate Fingoes to the Advisory Board. In an item published in *Imvo Zabantsundu* in 1930, it was alleged that such tactics were being employed to sow seeds of division in the community. It was held that members of the NAB had secured election through chicanery and by virtue of their support by a vote of 'pals' in a very low poll. Threatened with a case of libel, the newspaper publishers decided to retract the contents of the article. Whatever the truth of the matter, the existence of cliques was a feature of Advisory Board politics.

During the 1930s, NAB meetings assumed a far more confrontational edge and personal antipathies overshadowed much of the proceedings. Meetings often saw heated exchanges between McNamee and certain elected members. The Superintendent resorted to the technique of using the rules of meeting procedure to maintain control of the proceedings. On occasion speakers were warned to adhere strictly to procedures which had not been observed for a number of years. On other occasions, he silenced outspoken members by ruling their criticisms and motions 'out of order.' In 1935, for instance, McNamee ruled out of order a motion for more Xhosa members on the Board. By March 1939 there was so much ill feeling amongst Board members, as well as between certain members and the chairman, that a meeting was adjourned until such time as there was a 'change of atmosphere'.

The election of the disaffected former Headman Ntsonga [see Chapter 4] to the NAB in 1935 had brought the simmering tensions to the fore. McNamee contended that Ntsonga was a "malicious and vindictive individual" who had caused trouble ever since his election to the NAB and that he was in league with two other Board members in attempting to disrupt the

54 *Imvo Zabantsundu* 16 Oct. 1930 ("Ezase New Brighton").
55 *Imvo* 11 Nov. 1930.
56 de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition', pp. 103, 120-1.
57 de Jongh, 'Interaction and Transition', pp. 103, 122.
administration of New Brighton. These were Wilson Jabavu and A.Z. Tshiwula.

The journalist and photographer, Jabavu, had been nominated as member of the NAB in 1932 but had subsequently fallen out with McNamee over the Superintendent’s part in dismissing Ntsonga. For his part, McNamee took exception to the manner in which Board proceedings were being reported in the press. Jabavu won election to the NAB in the years 1937-42 and 1945, during which time NAB meetings were punctuated with tensions on account of the mutual recriminations between these antagonists. Tshiwula was elected to the NAB on three occasions (1935, 1939 and 1949), served as Margaret Ballinger’s election agent in Port Elizabeth when she became the Native Representative for the Cape Eastern Circle, and was himself nominated as a candidate for the NRC in 1942. He also became an organiser for the Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU) in the 1940s in which capacity he had a rather chequered career. The origins of Tshiwula’s dispute with McNamee lay in the Superintendent’s attempt to disqualify him from the 1938 NAB elections by branding him an ‘agitator’ on account of his record of criticising the administration for malpractice.

The chief cause of Tshiwula’s complaints concerned the partiality shown by McNamee in the allocation of houses in New Brighton. Given sole discretion in the matter, the Location Superintendent failed to process applications for houses strictly on a first-come-first-serve basis. Exceptions were invariably made in ‘deserving cases’ such as ministers, teachers and other members of the ‘respectable classes’ whose standing in the community made it imperative for them to have the best accommodation available. But an even more blatant form of patronage was the practice of giving preference to prospective applicants for houses who were prepared to pay off rent arrears owing by previous tenants. This rather unscrupulous practice was condoned by the NAC which pressurised McNamee to reduce the levels of outstanding rentals in the Location. The way in which beer brewing permits were allocated also fuelled the acrimonious wrangle between the Superintendent and a clique whom he believed was intent on confronting him at every turn.

58 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 12 July 1935.
60 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Tshiwula to Chief Magt., 15 Nov. 1937.
61 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/9, Supt. NBL to RM, PE, 12 July 1935.
In 1938 Tshiwula published letters in the press wherein he alleged that the administration had compelled would-be tenants to pay rent owing by previous defaulters who had absconded from the location. He also claimed to have been a victim of extortion himself. He refused to produce evidence of his claims before the NAB on the grounds that he had submitted the matter for legal opinion and it was *sub judice*. McNamee repudiated the allegations and maintained that in cases where such payments had been made, this was done so voluntarily. Tshiwula renewed his allegations of corruption against the administration before the Smit enquiry which visited Port Elizabeth in 1941. On this occasion he submitted sworn statements to the commissioners to substantiate his claims. McNamee denied the allegations but promised that the affidavits would be investigated. He noted that previous enquiries had found nothing to substantiate irregularities on the part of headmen who were responsible for collecting rent arrears. But the dismissal of a number of headmen following disclosures of bribery and corruption which had not been made public knowledge, suggests that any claims to a clean administration had a hollow ring to them. McNamee obviously resented the fact that the commissioners should have seriously considered what he construed as efforts by Tshiwula’s clique to impugn him and the administration.

The inconsistency of the Superintendent’s actions also opened the door to charges of favouritism. In some instances, he allowed individuals or special interests groups to make direct representation to him and, if he saw fit, placed such matters before the NAC. In other instances, McNamee insisted that they follow the correct procedures, which meant consultation with the NAB as the proper body to make representation with the authorities. In 1928, when an unofficial body which styled itself the ‘New Township Committee’ came into being and (in McNamee’s words) endeavoured to “usurp the functions of the properly constituted Advisory Board by dealing with matters of general interest” (i.e. the equalisation of rents), he rejected it as being ‘self-appointed’. But on another occasion five years later, McNamee granted an interview to a deputation of women about the issue of beer brewing permits. In defence of his actions to the NAB, McNamee explained that he was always prepared to listen to the complaints or troubles of any section of the public or any individual, male or female. He

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62 Intermediate Archives Depot (IAD), Port Elizabeth, PE Town Clerk’s Files, 25/104 No.3, Minutes of the NBAB, 28 Feb. 1939.
63 Central Archives, Pretoria (CeA), Native Affairs (NTS), 4506 585/313, Evidence of A.Z. Tshiwula, Port Elizabeth, 29 Oct. 1941.
64 CeA, NTS 4506 585/313, Evidence of J.P. McNamee to Smit Enquiry, Port Elizabeth, 30 October 1941.
added that "on no single occasion had any attempt been made... to usurp the functions of the Board". 66 McNamee implied that the all-male NAB was being chauvinistic or discriminating against women. But even though women had no forums for airing their particular grievances, the NAB was being more consistent than the Superintendent by insisting that it should provide the sole channel of communication with the local authority. When another deputation representing 'Newtown' residents was given an audience by the NAB in 1932, their spokesmen argued that any section of the community should have the right to make direct representations to the NAC and PECC. The NAB unanimously rejected this demand on the grounds that affording residents direct access to the local authority without the intercession of the NAB would provide an opening for 'agitators'; and that the NAB would suffer a loss of prestige, be rendered irrelevant and then might as well be abolished. 67

The principle that all matters of public interest were the concern of the NAB became difficult to uphold when that body itself was representative of only a small section of the New Brighton community. In the first place, the Superintendent's nominees who owed allegiance to the Council were not answerable to the community at all. Candidates with the right connections and politics, rather than a concern to make the Board broadly representative of the community, were criteria for nomination. Secondly, Board members were sometimes over representative of certain areas in the Location. The high levels of rent arrears in 'Newtown' during the Depression years implied that the occupiers of these buildings were practically disenfranchised. In order to compensate for this, the Superintendent was instructed to nominate representatives from this area to the NAB. 68 The proposal that a ward system, whereby all sections of the Location would be accorded equal representation, be introduced was to be made on a number of occasions by the NAB but only adopted by the NAC eventually in 1950. 69 Thirdly, Board members were elected by registered tenants whose rents were not in arrears. This effectively excluded most women, lodgers and grown-up children living with their parents. It is difficult to ascertain precisely how many residents were entitled to vote, but the figures given for some elections suggest that those who participated comprised a very small percentage of residents. Thus, for one reason or another, the Board could never claim to be properly representative of the New Brighton community.

66 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of the NBAB, 11 Aug. 1933.
67 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/7, Minutes of the NBAB, 1 Dec. 1932.
68 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1498, Minutes of the NAC, 17 Feb. and 19 May 1933.
Public meetings remained crucial for the airing of community grievances and, accordingly, the position of Location Chairman carried much responsibility. When Pendla, the incumbent in 1932, refused to permit the holding of a meeting he deemed not to be a matter for public interference, his decision had serious ramifications for the standing of the NAB. The aggrieved persons subsequently appealed to the Mayor and sought legal advice on the matter, but were not allowed to go over the heads of the NAB. Although Board members queried the wisdom of Pendla's decision, they did not question his right to make such a ruling. After a public meeting in 1933 ended in a fracas, the NAB recommended that the time had come for either the Superintendent or Board members to assume responsibility for convening and chairing future public meetings. Regulations to this effect were drafted but not promulgated. The position of Location Chairman was reviewed again in 1935, but this time the NAB was not prepared to approve a motion that the Superintendent be appointed to officiate at public meetings. By the time that the NAB voted to abolish the position of Location Chairman, the practice of the Chairman of the Vigilance Committee presiding over public meetings had obtained official sanction.

The Vigilance Committee (or Civic Association as it later became) was more representative of the New Brighton community than the NAB for members were elected by all residents in public meetings. More often than not, the two bodies had an overlapping membership. Pendla, Tshiwula and Jabavu were frequently elected as Chairmen of the Vigilance Committee. Thus to depict vigilance committees as rivals of the advisory boards is too simplistic. The American Board missionary, Ray Phillips, who reckoned that vigilance associations were apt to be more radical than advisory boards and lacked reliable leaders with integrity, whereas the latter had the support of level-headed, responsible type of detribalised Africans, inaccurately sees them as representing opposing blocs. In the case of New Brighton, the relationship was more complementary for they sometimes co-operated on issues. When the Vigilance Committee petitioned the PECC on behalf of residents, the NAC always referred it to the NAB which was regarded as the proper channel for such representations. In some instances, the NAB supported the Vigilance Committee, whilst at other times the latter was forced to bypass the NAB and seek direct access to the NAC or even the full Council - which was seldom possible.

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70 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/15/5, Minutes of the NBAB, 21 April and 6 June 1932.
71 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1280, Minutes of the NBAB, 2 March 1933.
72 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Minutes of the NBAB, 17 May 1934.
73 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1281, Minutes of the NBAB, 19 July 1934; De Jongh, 'Interaction and Transformation', p. 120.
The foregoing analysis suggests that it would be more accurate to speak of competing cliques than opposing moderate and radicals blocs in New Brighton. These cliques did correspond to some extent to cleavages between nominated and elected Advisory Board members. But neither the cliques nor the patron-client networks established by Board members during the 1920s and 1930s survived the radicalisation of New Brighton politics in the following decade.

The Politicisation of the New Brighton Advisory Board in the 1940s

Because many local authorities either failed to establish advisory boards or ignored them where they existed, the Native Laws Amendment Act (36 of 1944) compelled these authorities to set up boards whose functions were to consider and report upon any regulations which the urban local authority proposed to make or adopt, and take the initiative in recommending regulations. And Section 19(5) of the Urban Areas Consolidated Act (25 of 1945) obliged local authorities to submit estimates of the NRA to advisory boards before adopting them. But these stipulations still only served as broad guidelines governing the constitution and functioning of advisory boards by local authorities. It was incumbent upon the local authorities to define the modalities for constituting advisory boards within the broad parameter set by the 1923 Urban Areas Act and its subsequent amendments.

Further reforms to the advisory board system envisaged during the 1940s were rejected as being contrary to the precepts of 'Stallardism'. For instance, the suggestion that local authorities implement a system of direct municipal representation for urban Africans was ignored. Davenport holds that after the 1946 miners' strike and the adjournment sine die of the Natives Representative Council in the same year, the Government contemplated democratising the advisory board system so as to make it more representative without making it more powerful. A scheme for reconstituting the advisory boards drawn up by the

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Johannesburg Joint Council, probably influenced the thinking of the then Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit. Evidence in Smit's private papers reveal a far-reaching proposal for the conferment of self-government upon urban Africans by linking all local advisory boards to an Advisory Boards Congress and granting them representation in the NRC which would exercise executive and administrative authority in respect of African locations and townships. The Native Laws (Fagan) Commission also recommended the upgrading of advisory boards into urban councils or some other form of self-government. However, nearly all the municipalities that submitted evidence to the Commission expressed opposition to extending decision-making powers to advisory boards, and the new Nationalist Government was not compelled to jettison established practices.

The reform of the Advisory Board system was proposed against the background of the radicalisation of urban African politics. Many of the features of this 'new radicalism' described by Cobley were common to New Brighton and other communities throughout the country. The rising cost of food, housing and transport; as well as inadequate services and amenities caused overcrowding, increasing crime and violence. Subtle variations in class position within the community afforded scant protection against the ravages of socio-economic distress. Certain members of the petty bourgeoisie continued to co-operate with the authorities and put their faith in institutions like the advisory board, but others had moved by the mid-1940s towards a new readiness to support, though not necessarily to lead, direct action. Yet, the often ambivalent attitude of some advisory board members demonstrated that this radicalisation remained patchy and partial. In these circumstances, the petty bourgeoisie, found themselves challenged by a new generation of populist radical leaders who sought to capture the advisory board as a means of establishing a platform in community politics and exerting pressure on local authorities.

79 University of the Witwatersrand, Ballinger Papers, A410 F1.3.3, Memo entitled 'Draft Scheme for Reconstituting the Advisory Boards', 5 Jan. 1944.
83 Cobley, Class and Consciousness, pp. 205-214.
In late 1943 the CNETU nominated four officials - Isaac Mfuku, Phineas Sandia, B. Ncapayi, and A.O. Malakane - as its candidates for the forthcoming NAB elections. The CNETU secretary, Councillor Mohammed Desai, who was a member of the CPSA and the Indian Congress, became their campaign manager. Their programme included demands for ownership of location houses after an unbroken occupation for a certain period, the erection of further houses on a leasehold basis, as well as better sports and recreation facilities. Also on their agenda was a demand for the abolition of the NAB and for New Brighton to become a separate ward within the PEM and residents to be given "the same rights and privileges as those in other townships in the city". Demands for direct municipal representation for New Brighton residents was not without precedent, but it assumed a new urgency as the PECC had deprived many Africans of the municipal franchise through the loss of property rights in Korsten.

At a well attended election meeting on 15 November 1943, the trade union candidates were reportedly accorded a unanimous vote of confidence by those in attendance. Desai, with his usual rhetorical flourish, warned the people not to heed "the filthy anti-Communist and anti-Christ propaganda", which he apparently believed to be the work of local capitalists aiming to discredit the CNETU candidates. The actual opponents were the sitting members of the NAB who contested the election on a single ticket and had unsuccessfully objected to Desai's 'interference' in the election. All but one of the CNETU candidates (who was disqualified) were returned by a large majority. Sandia claimed that the outcome of this election clearly indicates the growing class consciousness of the Port Elizabeth workers.... The election was fought on a clear programme and working-class principles. I may add that this election is a moral victory for the working-class organisation, the Communist Party....

It is unlikely that the CNETU canvassed residents on shopfloor issues and was undoubtedly premature to speak of shared worker consciousness. Nor is it exactly clear what part the CPSA played in the victory, but there was considerable overlapping of membership and a working alliance between the two organisations. However, it was the first occasion on which the

84 Desai won re-election in the 1944 Council elections and served until 1947. For details of his rather chequered career as a union organiser, see Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class', pp. 81, 84, 85-89.
85 The Guardian, 11 Nov. 1943, ('Advisory Board Candidates').
86 The Guardian, 7 Oct. 1943, ('Advisory Board Elections').
87 The Guardian, 18 Nov. 1943, ('T.U. Candidates Election Drive').
88 IAD, 25/104 No. 3, Minutes of the NBAB, 4 Nov. 1943.
89 The Guardian, 2 December 1943, p. 1 ('Sweeping T.U. Success').
CNETU's capacity to mobilise residents was put to the test. It is difficult to assess their level of popular support in an election where figures of voters are not available. But if the number of voters registered in New Brighton for Native Representative elections is anything to go by, the poll was large and the trade unionists won convincingly.

Early in 1944, Desai caused a rumpus in a City Council meeting when he claimed that prominent Councillors were responsible for disseminating 'anti-worker propaganda and sabotage' in New Brighton. He predicted that if the Council continued colluding with employers against workers, there was every likelihood that violence and bloodshed such as had occurred recently at Marabarastad would follow. The Councillors responded with counter charges that communist 'agitators' were responsible for any disaffection. McNamee categorically denied Desai's charges but added that NAB members had "expressed concern at the possible introduction of communism into New Brighton". The NAB declared Desai's assertion to be totally unfounded. And an editorial in the *Eastern Province Herald* denounced the "extravagant but empty promises held out to the Native residents by an active band of agitators working under the aegis of the Communist Party". Spokesmen for the CNETU denied that their candidates for the NAB elections had been controlled or financed by the CPSA or that previous elections had been apolitical.

The fears that the authorities harboured about the ramifications of the politicisation of the NAB soon appeared to to have been justified. The NAB lent its support to the 1944 anti-pass campaign even though Port Elizabeth's African population was not subject to any form of influx control. But the endorsement was only given after taking precautions to ensure that the NAB was not seen to be associated with communism. When communications from the PE District branch of the CPSA called upon the NAB to identify with Africans elsewhere and lend its support to the anti-pass campaign, it hesitated before doing so. The majority of Board members wished to ignore the request, but Sandla who had himself been elected on the CNETU/CPSA ticket argued that it was the issue rather than the source of the communication which mattered. Only when the NAB had received similar requests for support from various

92 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 15 Feb. 1944.
93 *EPH* 15 Feb. 1944, Editorial.
94 *The Guardian*, 2 Mar. 1944, ('African Unions Attacked at PE').
95 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 20 Apr. 1944.
other organisations, were they prepared to give their unqualified support to the anti-pass movement.\textsuperscript{96} The nominated members of the Board - consisting of Pendla, Limba, Nikiwe and Molefe - were clearly struggling to come to terms with the changes in the tempo and character of both community and national politics.

The Advisory Board and Community Struggles: Resistance to the 1945 Rent Increase

The PECC's decision to implement rent increases in New Brighton in 1945 without consulting the NAB highlighted its dilemma with regard to the question of participation in and identification with community struggles. At a mass meeting on 14 January 1945 held under the auspices of the ANC, residents passed a resolution deploring the PECC's decision to increase rents and called, instead, for the reduction thereof by 6d. in all sub-economic townships in Port Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{97} A call for a demonstration to protest against the rent increases was supported by all political and labour organisations. The NAB could not afford to be seen to be acting against the community's wishes, but it was equally wary of ruling out further consultation with the PECC on the matter. In the ensuing debate about the best course of action to be taken by Board members, Rev Molefe stated:

\ldots the demonstration was the voice of the people, not of the Board. This movement was not started by the Board, although that particular body sympathised with the people in making this form of protest\ldots The masses therefore should carry on and this Board should await the City Council's reply.

It would appear that Molefe thought that the Board should take a backseat rather than try hijack this expression of the popular will. Jabavu expressed the opinion that the NAB should participate in the demonstration as representatives of the people. But Molefe's motion that members of the NAB should participate in their private capacities as a protest against the increase of rents was carried.\textsuperscript{98} The attitudes of Board members towards the demonstration reflected an ambivalent perception of their standing \textit{vis-a-vis} the community. Nominated members would appear to have seen themselves merely as a channel for representing legitimate grievances to the authorities, whilst elected members saw themselves as being at the forefront of popular protest. This suggests that their identification with the community in subsistence struggles infused the Board with greater legitimacy.

On 27 January, a public demonstration organised by the ANC and CNETU was staged against

\textsuperscript{96} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/18, Minutes of the NBAB, 27 Apr. 1944.
\textsuperscript{97} CeA, NTS 6371 197/313, P.M. Sandia, Sec. ANC, Cape Midlands Region to MNA, 15 Jan. 1945; M.M. Desia, Sec. CNETU to MNA, 16 Jan. 1945.
\textsuperscript{98} CAD, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Minutes of the NBAB, 25 Jan. 1945.
the rent increases. A large crowd marched from New Brighton to the Feathermarket Hall, from where it was diverted to the Donkin Reserve, and a resolution was passed which condemned the proposed rent increases as "a retrogressive step and a black blot on the liberality of Port Elizabeth". Aside from questioning the way in which the supposed loss on McNamee Village was calculated, it argued that this could be remedied by wage rather than rent increases. An editorial in the *EP Herald* dubbed the demonstration a 'misconceived occasion' used by 'agitators' to further political ends. It argued that the average African worker had received increased wages in recent years and was much better off than when he "lived in Korsten and paid extortionate rent for noisome hovels and worse". The march was also denounced by Cllr Adolf Schauder who sounded a refrain that was to be heard often:

the cause of Native progress had been set back ten years by the procession... and caused resentment amongst many friends of the Native people who have worked for years to make Port Elizabeth a model of liberalism in the Union.

Having insisted on the rent increases himself, Schauder felt compelled to defend them with the argument that New Brighton would still have the cheapest rates in the country relative to the amenities provided.

Under threat of a rent boycott, the proposed rents increased were postponed. However, the PECC resolved that the tenants of houses under council schemes would, as from 1 September 1945, pay rents on a weekly instead of a monthly basis. As had been the case when a similar abortive experiment had been made in the early 1930s, it was held that this would facilitate the payment of rents by workers who were paid on a weekly basis. A deputation submitted a memorandum to the Mayor on behalf of New Brighton residents. It was argued that the percentage of Africans who were paid monthly should not be underestimated; that in cases where families had more than one income that money was set aside and pooled in order to pay rents at the end of the month; that it was customary for family budgets to be done on a monthly basis; and that weekly rentals actually were a subterfuge for increasing rents. The introduction of the principle of weekly rent payments had two added implications: it would disqualify certain Africans from the municipal franchise and eligibility to vote at NAB

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99 CeA, NTS 6371 197/313, ANC and CNETU Resolution attached to letter from P.M. Sandia to MNA, 2 Feb. 1945; *EPH* 29 Jan. 1945 ('March Thro’ the City’); *The Guardian* 1 Feb. 1945 ('March from McNamee').

100 *EPH* 29 Jan. 1945 (Editorial).

101 *EPH* 30 Jan. 1945 ('Native March Leaders to be Prosecuted'); *The South African Outlook*, 1 March 1945, p. 36.

102 Intermediate Archives Depot, Port Elizabeth (IAD), PE Town Clerk's Files, 25/169 No. 4, Minutes of NAC, 15 May and PECC, 23 May 1945.
elections; as well as increasing rents on account of the four extra weekly payments per annum.\footnote{CA, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Notes of Interview between Deputation and Mayor re Payment of Rentals Weekly at New Brighton, 30 July 1945 and attached memorandum.}

Once again, the measure was introduced without prior consultation with residents or their representatives. The NAC's unwillingness to accede to the NAB's request for an interview caused a souring of relations between the two bodies. Even nominated Board members expressed strong objections to the fact that the Council had ignored the NAB when it had not been prepared to rubber stamp its decisions. The usually circumspect Rev Molefe complained that there was no co-operation and if the NAB was to serve as an effective link between the people and the Council, it would have to be appraised of Council's intentions before the latter passed final and binding resolutions. Jabavu remarked that the Council was showing a dictatorial attitude and making high-handed decisions.\footnote{IAD, 25/104 No. 3, Minutes of the NBAB, 29 May and 23 July 1945; Minutes of the NAC, 3 and 31 July 1945.} The PECC's intransigence added to the problems of the moderate Board members who were already hard pressed to justify making further representations to the local authority knowing that the outcome was a foregone conclusion.

With little prospect of the PECC backing down on weekly rentals, labour and political organisations requested the intervention of outside parties. The Executive Committee of the SAR&H Non-European Staff Association approached the local System Manager to put its case to the PECC,\footnote{UCT Manuscripts, Margeret Ballinger Papers, A410 B2.8.20, A.Z. Tshiwula to System Manager, SAR&H, PE, 9 Aug. 1945.} and the ANC urged the Minister of Native Affairs to veto the proposal.\footnote{CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, Telegram from H.V. Mabaso, Sec. Cape African Congress, NB to SNA, 24 Aug. 1945.} A resolution passed at a mass meeting of New Brighton residents held on 26 August criticised the PECC's lack of consultation on the matter and reiterated many of the aforementioned deputation's objections.\footnote{CA, 3/PEZ 1/3/2/15/19, Report of Supt. NBL, 27 Aug. 1945.} This was followed by mass meetings held under the auspices of the newly-formed Committee for the Restoration of the Franchise which condemned the change from monthly to weekly rentals as "an attempt by the Council to increase rents and to deprive the Africans in New Brighton of their civic vote."\footnote{CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, M.M. Desai, Sec. Committee for Restoration of the Franchise to SNA, 7 Sept. 1945.}
The implementation of the system of weekly rentals could not be enforced until both the Minister of Native Affairs and the Provincial Administrator had approved amendments to existing regulations which stipulated tariff structures. Upon being advised by the SNA against taking 'precipitate action' and upbraided for not having referred the proposal to introduce weekly rentals to the NAB, the PECC passed a resolution that rentals would be calculated in such a way that the aggregate of weekly payments would be no more than that payable on a monthly basis.\(^9\) When a meeting between the NAC and NAB was finally held, Board members remarked that arrear rentals under the monthly system had been negligible and that weekly payments were likely to cause hardships. The Chairman assured the Board that it had not been the intention of introducing weekly rentals to deprive anyone of the franchise, but that financial considerations alone had played a part in the decision. The NAC, however, declined to depart from its previous decision and suspend weekly payments.\(^10\) I have found no evidence to show that a threatened general strike in protest against the PECC’s arbitrary handling of the rent issue ever occurred, but the episode illustrates the NAB’s increasing involvement in community politics.

The radicalisation of community politics, 1946-1953 and the Advisory Board’s Crisis of Legitimacy

CNETU candidates were elected *en bloc* in the elections for the NAB in the 1946 and 1947. In the 1946 election they defeated candidates of the Civic Association.\(^11\) But the following year the CPSA nominated its own candidates, and the sitting CNETU Board members refused to share the platform with them.\(^12\) There appears to have been no other candidates, so the communists did not exactly split the left-wing vote. Yet some prominent members of CNETU actively supported the Communist candidates, thereby straining relations between the two organisations. But if the working class alliance in New Brighton appeared to be in disarray, a resurgent ANC was set to become a major contender in future NAB elections.

The New Brighton ANC branch had gone from bad to worse in the early 1940s under the leadership of the ‘old guard’. At the beginning of the decade, Molefe had reported to ANC

\(^{109}\) CeA, NTS 6369 197/313, SNA to TC, PE, 29 Aug. and reply 30 Aug. 1945; Minutes of PECC, 30 Aug. 1945.


\(^{111}\) *The Guardian*, 6 Dec. 1945 (‘Progressives Score Victory’).

\(^{112}\) *The Guardian*, 14 Nov. 1946 (‘Advisory Board Elections at PE’).
President-General, Dr A.B. Xuma, that Congress was "absolutely dead except in name".¹¹³ When Pendla and other executive members of the Cape African Congress were suspended in 1942, the provincial headquarters were moved to Cradock under Rev James Calata. Nikiwe and Molefe continued to serve on the executive of the local branch of the ANC but were slowly alienated by the uncompromising militancy of the Youth League (CYL) at the local and national level, and the ousting of Xuma as President-General. Molefe finally resigned from the ANC because of his unwillingness to endorse the principles of the Programme of Action. Instead, he endeavoured to promote racial reconciliation through the offices of the SA Institute of Race Relations and the Moral Re-Armament movement. They also both served on the executive of the PE Joint Council, with Molefe acting as President during the latter years of the War. It has been suggested that the collapse of the PE Joint Council immediately after the War "seems to have been tied up in part with the radicalization of local politics in New Brighton" and the waning influence of long-standing Advisory Board members.¹¹⁴ Both Nikiwe and Molefe continued to serve as nominated members of the NAB, except that the former declined nomination for three consecutive years from 1947. By the end of the decade they had been completely marginalised.

Instead of the appearance of new petty bourgeois leaders, the ANC 'old guard' was supplanted by trade unionists with working class backgrounds.¹¹⁵ An exception was, A.P. Mati, a former trading partner of Pendla who turned his talents to union organisation. He retained a position on the ANC executive committee and, along with Raymond Mhlaba, won election to the NAB in the early 1950s on an ANC/CPSA ticket.¹¹⁶ Mhlaba himself had progressed from being an organiser of the Laundry Workers Union to become secretary of the local branch of the CPSA and ANC chairman in 1947.¹¹⁷ The activist, Gladstone Tshume, who was also a

¹¹³ University of the Witwatersrand, A.B. Xuma Papers, ABX. 410617a, Molefe to Xuma, 14 Aug. 1940 and 17 June 1941.
member of the CPSA, the CNETU and the ANC, unsuccessfully contested the 1948 NAB elections. Lodge observes that "by 1950 politics was in the hands of working-class leaders to a degree which clearly distinguished Port Elizabeth from any other centre." Under its new leadership, local ANC branches were not only rejuvenated but became more attuned to national political currents.

In 1947 the ANC Working Committee had forwarded a resolution proposed by the Africanists which recommended to the annual conference that all elections under the Native Representative Act, including advisory boards, be contested on a boycott ticket. However, the moderates led by Xuma with the support of the communists, repudiated this strategy in favour of one with a greater degree of flexibility. The whole question was reviewed at the 1949 national conference when the Programme of Action was on the agenda. A memorandum argued that the boycotting of 'dummy' institutions should remain a strategy and not be elevated to a principle. It argued that:

... It is essential to realise that mere membership or participation in the political, social, cultural and other institutions established by the oppressor does not necessarily imply collaboration with the oppressor. Collaboration must depend on the nature and function of the institution and also the activities of members within the institution. It is possible under certain conditions to use the institutions of the oppressor as an auxiliary force for the downfall of the ruling class.

Nonetheless, the newly-elected President-General of the ANC, Dr J.S. Moroka, pledged the organisation to a policy of non-collaboration with the Government and the boycott of advisory boards, the NRC and indirect parliamentary representation. But local ANC branches were still not completely bound by this decision or chose to ignore it.

In the case of New Brighton, Mhlaba and a number of ANC colleagues had won seats on the NAB in the 1949 elections. It would appear from Mbeki's account that this was in line with a strategy of supporting the election of the branch chairman to the NAB with a mandate to raise general grievances at its meetings and provide regular report backs at open-air meetings.

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118 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 51. For biographical information on Tshume, see Gerhart & Karis, From Protest to Challenge v.4, p. 159 and Cherry, 'The Making of a Working Class', pp. 84, 102, 124, 191, 215.
119 Lodge, Black Politics, p. 55.
120 The Guardian, 21 Nov. 1947 ('ANC Decision on Boycott').
121 Lodge, Black Politics, pp. 29, 78; Posel, Making of Apartheid, p. 37.
122 Cited in Bloch, 'Using the Institutions of the Oppressor', p. 49.
as to the progress made.\(^{125}\) Within a few months, Mhlaba gave expression to popular disillusion when he stated that "the people are beginning to realise that the Advisory Board is useless because the Council is not prepared to act on the recommendations of the Board".\(^{126}\) But despite this frustration and the 1949 ANC Conference resolution, Mhlaba stood for and won re-election to the NAB the following two years. It was not until 1951 that he resigned from the NBAB. Mhlaba's letter of resignation cited, amongst other things, the fact that the NAB had no executive powers and that its recommendations were ignored and disregarded by the local authority as reasons for its powerlessness. He noted that "as long as Africans had no real legislative powers, their struggle would be an ex[tra]-parliamentary one".\(^{127}\) Participation in the affairs of the NAB had shown at first hand that there was nothing to be gained thereby. Mhlaba acknowledged having been influenced by the debate which the Programme of Action had precipitated about participation in 'dummy institutions'. He claimed to have been given no directive by the national executive of the ANC to resign, and his decision followed that of the local branch to boycott government institutions.\(^{128}\) This position may have reflected the increasing influence of the CYL, of which Mhlaba was a member, on the decisions of the New Brighton ANC branch.\(^{129}\) However, none of his colleagues in the ANC followed his lead in resigning from the NAB.

Meanwhile, in 1951 the ANC opposed further rent increases in New Brighton. The organisation distributed circulars calling upon residents not to pay the increases and held a number of mass meetings to register protest against the PECC's 'unreasonable' and 'unrealistic' decision. At one such meeting, it was unanimously resolved to mandate the ANC to make all representations and submissions on behalf of residents and to use all means to defeat the Council's decision.\(^{130}\) On another occasion, a group of a few hundred women marched on the administration offices to demand an interview with the Mayor, J.C.K. ('Boet') Erasmus, with regard to the rent increases.\(^{131}\) The Mayor subsequently paid a visit to New Brighton where he was met by a large group of women who protested against the proposed

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126 IAD, 25/104 No. 3, Minutes of the NBAB, 28 July 1949.
127 IAD, 25/104 No. 4, Mhlaba to Sec, NBAB, 24 May 1951.
128 Interview with Mhlaba, Kwaford, 11-12 January 1990.
131 *EPH* 24 Oct. 1951.
rent increases.\textsuperscript{132} Somewhat inconsistently, the PECC determined that Cllr Schauder should not accept an ANC invitation to address a public meeting on the rent issue and declared that it would recognise representations made only by the NAB.\textsuperscript{133} As had been the case in both 1945 and 1947, the NAB came out unequivocally against the proposed increases, as well as the way in which the PECC was attempting to foist them on residents without consultation. Despite charges that both the NAB and ANC served narrow interest groups, there appears to have been considerable solidarity on the rent issue amongst New Brighton residents.

During the crisis precipitated by the New Brighton riots of 18 October 1952 [described in the next Chapter], neither the PECC nor the Ministers of Justice and Native Affairs, who made fleeting visits to Port Elizabeth, deigned to meet the NAB. Consequently, all eight elected members as well as one nominated member, tendered their resignations from the NAB. They expressed their indignation and dissatisfaction with the failure of both the PECC and Government to consult them and added that

\begin{quote}
It is ... our considered opinion that it would be dangerously treacherous to continue to serve on a segregatory institution in which the African people throughout the Union have ceased to repose any confidence...[and] ... that served as the last vestige of collaboration with Authorities that be.\textsuperscript{134}
\end{quote}

The resignation of the majority of NAB members stemmed from the realisation of its powerlessness to tackle the problems confronting the local community in light of the denial of representation in the body politic.

Nikiwe and Molefe were two of the nominated NAB members who did not resign. With a number of other moderate community leaders, they made their own representations to the PECC. They argued that the dismissed workers had faced two alternatives: either the loss of work or the loss of life and limb; and precisely because they had been intimidated, they should be reinstated. They stated that such an act would reduce the tension between the ANC on the one hand, and the PECC and commerce and industry, on the other. But despite the plea that such an act "would restore the spirit of goodwill that has existed for the last thirty years",\textsuperscript{135} their faith in the PECC proved to be misplaced.

\textsuperscript{132} EPH 3 Nov. 1951.
\textsuperscript{133} Evening Post 26 Oct. 1951.
\textsuperscript{134} IAD, 25/104 No. 4, Minutes of the NBAB, 28 Oct. 1952; EPH 30 Oct. and Advance, 6 Nov. 1952.
\textsuperscript{135} IAD, 25/169 No. 7, Minutes of Council-in-Committee, 13 Nov. 1952.
New Brighton residents consequently decided to boycott the forthcoming NAB elections and resolved that "in the future [the African National] Congress is going to be the only mouthpiece of the people". A Field Officer employed by the SAIRR considered it "quite conceivable that this decision [would] be carried out in view of the solidarity of the people". In the event, his prognostication proved incorrect for the NAB was reconstituted and it proved difficult for the ANC to sustain the momentum of the Defiance Campaign and membership levels after the riots. Although the NAB weathered the crisis and continued to function, it did so without the slightest vestige of popular legitimacy.

Conclusion

Although the NAB had constantly to face the question of its credibility in the New Brighton community, its greatest crises coincided with upheavals in the wider body politic. The low levels of participation during the disturbances of the early 1920s foreshadowed the deeper crisis of 1952. Between these flashpoints there was a gradual increase in the political temperature. Although the 1930s proved to be relatively quiescent with the authorities able to co-opt the most influential community figures, the subsequent politicisation of the advisory board turned it into a potential ally of civic, political and labour organisations. The challenge posed to the local authority by the board was obviously limited in that it had no real power to act. Yet, as Posel has pointed out, protests by advisory boards underlined the breadth and intensity of African dissent. The very bodies created by the state for the purposes of co-opting support from moderate Africans were joining the throngs of the disaffected.

The paradox of advisory board politics was thus twofold: these statutory bodies were being used to subvert local authorities at precisely the time when their legitimacy was increasingly being called into question, and the political training acquired by Board members contributed in some measure to making New Brighton a stronghold of the increasingly radicalised ANC. This issue will be explored further with reference to the 1952 Defiance Campaign and the New Brighton riots in the next chapter.

137  Posel, Making of Apartheid, p. 38.
CHAPTER 9
CRIMINALITY AND A SUBCULTURE OF VIOLENCE:
THE CAUSES, COURSE AND CONSEQUENCES OF
THE 1952 NEW BRIGHTON RIOTS

The New Brighton riots occurred whilst the Defiance Campaign was running its course in Port Elizabeth. One argument about the causes of the riots lays stress on understanding the political climate in which they occurred. It was held that the acts of defiance had unleashed pent up forces which the ANC was unable to control; that the ANC's mobilisation of township residents was accompanied by a lack of discipline in the organisation's ranks. Another view is that an increase of serious crime in New Brighton created a climate conducive to the breakdown of law and order and so contributed to the violence of that day; that the criminal element did not cause the riots but took advantage of the situation. The killing of whites by Africans were motivated by revenge rather than political gain. Both these viewpoints will be considered as we attempt to unravel the relationship between the Defiance Campaign and the outbreak of violence on 18 October 1952.

The first section of this Chapter will subject the perception that New Brighton was a law-abiding community and that crime was scarcely a problem to closer scrutiny. It is my argument that a major contributory factor to the riots was the growth of a subculture of violence amongst the marginalised sections of the New Brighton community, especially the youth. The increasingly youthful character of New Brighton's population and inadequate provision for education combined to push a growing number of juveniles onto the streets. They rejected the norms and values of society, as well as any notion of communal solidarity. A profile of those implicated in the riots will show that many had probably already been drawn into subliminal or criminal activities. At the risk of overstatement, it will be suggested that New Brighton's youth was little different from most other townships where tsotism had become a major social problem by the 1940s.

Some recent historical work on gangs and tsotism in urban African society has been informed by subcultural theory.¹ This paradigm is concerned to explain why and how marginal groups

appropriate the products of capitalist society and create their own subversive lifestyles. In the case of youth subcultures, the assumed primacy of age as a social relation is replaced by analyses of the intersection of age and gender with class, without giving specific weighting to any one set of social relations. This is more nuanced than the notion of 'youth culture' which suggests a non-existent homogeneity amongst youth. Notwithstanding the assertion to be found in much of the literature on the so-called 'lost generation' of the country's black youth, I do not regard youth to be primarily a political construct. It is a social category which can be fashioned for political purposes but has broader application.

The second section of this chapter will seek to understand whether there was any connection between the Defiance Campaign and the riots. My account of the course of the campaign is necessarily selective and partial. The next section on the public reaction to the riots will enable us to examine the causes thereof. This will be followed by an evaluation of the consequences of both the Defiance Campaign and the New Brighton riots for Port Elizabeth's history.

The Increase of Crime and Subculture of Violence in New Brighton

The perception that New Brighton was a law-abiding community persisted until the riots of 1952. Margeret Ballinger claimed that "Port Elizabeth has the most law-abiding community in its New Brighton township of any community in the country". The absence of pass laws in Port Elizabeth, regarded as a contributory factor in the criminalisation of Africans in other centres, undoubtedly meant that fewer New Brighton residents were forced to spend spells behind bars. Similarly, it was believed that provision for domestic beer brewing meant that residents of New Brighton need not break the law in order to observe their traditional social drinking habits. Yet, a considerable number would have been sent to jail for contravention of Location regulations, especially for brewing excessive quantities of beer, as well as the failure to pay rents or poll-tax.

During the 1920s, there was incidents in New Brighton of tsotsi-type activities and 'faction
On one such occasion in 1922, there was purportedly a fight between 'red' and 'school' youths. Yet overall crime rates were still relatively low, as the figures for a limited period show.

**TABLE 9.1**

*New Brighton Crime Statistics, 1928-1934*

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<th>Prosecutions for</th>
<th>1928</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
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<tr>
<td>Possession of liquor</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<td>Possession of dagga</td>
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<td>20</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>30</td>
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<tr>
<td>Riotous behaviour</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>35</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resisting Arrest</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Assault (common)</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>48</td>
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<td>Assault to harm</td>
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<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rape</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other major crimes</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>364</strong></td>
<td><strong>273</strong></td>
<td><strong>197</strong></td>
<td><strong>228</strong></td>
<td><strong>161</strong></td>
<td><strong>140</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| POPULATION                | 7,394 | 7,147 | 7,327 | 7,033 | 6,557 | 6,707 |

Prosecutions for all crimes were always less than 50 per 1,000 persons during the entire five-year period, and were as low as 21 per 1,000 in 1933. There was not a single prosecution for murder in this period. Although a good percentage of crimes possibly went unreported, it is safe to say that crime statistics in New Brighton were relatively low.

When the Korsten removals were under way in 1939, the Superintendent warned that some criminals with particularly bad records were amongst those moved to New Brighton. McNamee's prognosis that crime levels in the Location would rise were to be borne out. From

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6 *Imvo* 16 May 1922.
the 1940s complaints about *tsotsis* became fairly frequent in Advisory Board meetings and concerns were expressed by the NAC about the increasing levels of violence. Following a stabbing incident in 1943, the Location Superintendent maintained that a large number of boys over the age of 18 years who refused to work were the chief problem:

They are the principal seducers of young Native girls. They corrupt the morals of school girls and boys, and are often the leaders of gangs of young hooligans.9

The Superintendent proposed to enforce a regulation that stipulated that the adult sons of registered occupiers of houses be obliged to take out lodger permits. This was viewed as a preventative measure to combat crime. By making them pay for their accommodation, it was reckoned that these 'wont-works' might be pressurised to secure employment. It would appear that gang members were unemployed youths who filled up their time with criminal activities, as well as schoolgoers who welcomed the diversions that organised crime offered them during their leisure hours. It should be emphasised though that this was never a large group, although its ranks swelled from the late 1940s.

Such gangs operated mostly under cover of darkness and made much of the Location unsafe by night. Street lights in the Red Location which had fused during the Second World War were not repaired for many years.10 It would appear to be no coincidence that it was during the War years when a blackout was being enforced that the number of reports of violent crimes increased measurably. And statistics demonstrate an even greater increase in violence in the post-War period. Prosecutions for assault, for instance, increased from 222 in 1945 to 596 in 1949, or 7.49 to 16.6 per 1 000. The rate of assaults wavered for a few years thereafter but in 1953 numbered 840 or 18.4 per 1 000. Every year from 1949, without fail, the Superintendent remarked on the rise in juvenile delinquency in the Location.11 Although I

9 CAD, 3/PEZ 1/1896, Minutes of NBAB, 10 May and Report of Supt. NBL to NAC, 20 May 1943 (The quote is from the latter).
10 *Imvo* 29 May 1948, p. 1 ('Housing Shortage at P.E.').
11 Mayor's Minutes for 1949, 1950 and 1952. See Reports of the Manager of Native Affairs, for these respective years.
have been unable to ascertain the incidence of other serious crimes in New Brighton during this period, there are indications that the Location was far from being the exceptionally law-abiding community that its staunchest apologists claimed.

Residents requested that more meaningful measures be taken to combat hooliganism in New Brighton. At a public meeting in 1944 fears were expressed that the leniency of sentences imposed on perpetrators of serious crimes such as assault, homicide and murder did not serve as a deterrent. The Advisory Board was to request the permission of the Magistrate for the community to:

(a) form committees in the various wards of the Location;
(b) create a civilian guard, members of which should be vested with powers of special constables.\(^\text{12}\)

When these proposals came to nothing and recourse to the law appeared to be to no avail in stamping out hooliganism, older Location residents resorted to vigilantism. In an incident in September 1947, one person was shot dead and five others injured when a group of senior residents clashed with abakwetha (manhood initiates) who had apparently molested and thrown stones at some washerwomen returning home.\(^\text{13}\) At the subsequent trial of 49 persons on charges of public violence, the Chairman of the Vigilance Committee testified that a decision had been taken that parents should punish their own children for unruly behaviour. The incident had been the culmination of a series of fights between the older inhabitants and groups of youths who had been terrorising the Location. On this occasion, the intervention of the police had caused an escalation of the conflict.\(^\text{14}\) On other occasions, the police were roundly criticised for being conspicuously absent when they were most needed. Not all New Brighton residents agreed that vigilante action was the best way to deal with the twin problems of delinquency and criminality. But it seems clear that a breakdown in traditional authority was accompanied by an increasing disregard for what was seen as the white man's law by many New Brighton youths. The law lost its social sanction and certain types of crime came to be regarded as morally neutral.

\(^{13}\) EPH 2 Oct. 1947 ("Disturbance at New Brighton").
\(^{14}\) EPH 24 Oct. 1947 ("NB Disturbance").
Although there were a number of white officials and traders with families resident in New Brighton until the 1950s, the criminal elements invariably targeted other Africans, especially the elderly, who were more vulnerable to attack. A well known resident of the Red Location, Jimmy Pemba, recounted having been attacked and robbed twice. He held that 'decent' Africans (such as policemen on night duty, ministers, teachers, nurses, etc.) who qualified should be permitted to own guns for self-protection against gun or knife-wielding criminals and thugs. But only Whites were entitled to firearms. A white trader who assumed control of the family business (a butcher and general dealer) in New Brighton in 1939 recounted that at the time the Location was 'peaceful'. He and his wife could walk the streets without any reason to fear being attacked or molested. He decided to move to town in 1945 and purchase property in a white suburb, partly on account of his increasing concern for the safety of his family. Thereafter, he commuted by motor car into New Brighton on a daily basis and also took to carrying a firearm as a precaution. He never had cause to use it and was one of the few white traders to remain in New Brighton after the 1952 riots.

The nature of much of the criminal activity described above reveals significant generational cleavages in New Brighton. But the locus of much of the delinquent and criminal activities is equally significant. The aforementioned stone throwing incident, for example, occurred in the vicinity of the SMQ in the Red Location. In this, the oldest part of New Brighton, rooms and even floor space was rented out to lodgers. Not only was there acute overcrowding, but people slept between dwellings in the open air. It was also the only part of the Location where beer drinking was allowed. Despite the Administration's efforts to exert strict control of brewing, there was no way to put a stop to the operation of shebeens nor to prostitution. There are no figures which allow us to make a comparison of statistics for drunkenness and criminal activities in the various parts of New Brighton. But the Red Location, with its deplorable and overcrowded living conditions, was no better than the slums which the PECC had sought to eliminate in Korsten. Amidst this widespread immiseration, the Red Location appears to have become a haven for the criminal and delinquent elements amongst New Brighton's youth.

These tsotsis were maladjusted juveniles, brought up for the most part by unmarried mothers who often eked out an existence through beer brewing or prostitution. The grinding poverty led to schooling in lives of petty crime as the lack of facilities made their chances of education

16 Interview with Joseph Henen, Mount Croix, PE, 27 April 1993.
and employment slim. Many graduated to gangs where they found outlets for their frustrations in smoking dagga or violence such as rape, murder and other serious crimes. As with East London, the criminal element was inclined to align itself with township radicals and militants. They not only directed their anger against Whites and moderate Africans in the Location, but resorted to violence and intimidation against the ANC leadership in an effort to steer the organisation in the course of its choosing.

The Defiance Campaign in Port Elizabeth

Public meetings were held all over the country on 6 April 1952 to unveil the defiance campaign. In Port Elizabeth, a large crowd endorsed the plan for groups of volunteers to court arrest by deliberately defying certain discriminatory and unjust laws. A special provincial conference of the ANC convened at New Brighton on 12 April agreed to push ahead with the campaign. The following day, a large crowd attended a public meeting in New Brighton chaired by Raymond Mhlaba, of the local ANC branch. Not only were the decisions of conference unanimously endorsed, but a large number of volunteers were enrolled for the defiance campaign.

On 31 May the national executives of the ANC and SAIC met in Port Elizabeth to confirm the 26 June, the second anniversary of the National Day of Protest, as the date for the launch of the defiance campaign. This decision was announced by the ANC President-General, Dr J.S. Moroka, at a mass meeting of nearly 3,000 held in New Brighton the following day. Attendance at the township meeting had been restricted to Africans because the PECC had invoked a seldom used regulation prohibiting other race groups from entering the township. Moroka led the people in taking a pledge to fight for freedom even if it brought suffering and death. The solemnity of the occasion was heightened by prayers which gave the meeting the appearance of a church meeting and not a political rally. The PE African Ministers' Association, an affiliate of the Interdenominational Ministers' Association, declared its support for the campaign. The support of the churches was, indeed, a remarkable feature of the campaign in Port Elizabeth.

17 Mager and Minkley, 'Reaping the Whirlwind', p. 231.
18 The Guardian 24 April 1952 ('Cape Africans Ready for Campaign').
20 Kuper, Passive Resistance, p. 147.
On 25 June women spent the day and night in prayer in preparation for the launch of the campaign the following day. It became a feature of the campaign that women met for prayers prior to their menfolk going into action, a practice in keeping with African custom. This is not to suggest that women played only a supportive role. On the contrary, a sample group of resisters in the Eastern Cape suggests that women made up as much as 42% of participants and that the ANC Womens' League was actively involved in the campaign in numerous ways. Christian teachings arguably played an important role as a source of restraint in the conduct of volunteers for the defiance campaign. In Port Elizabeth, as elsewhere, neither people with criminal records nor the unemployed were accepted as volunteers. They were respected members of the community and were taught to adhere to a code of discipline in non-violent protest action. Dr J.L.Z. Njongwe, acting President of the Cape ANC (in the absence of Z.K. Matthews) and chief organiser of the campaign in the Eastern Cape also appealed to the public not to participate spontaneously or independently because the campaign should be carried out by organised and trained volunteers who would defy unjust laws and submit to arrest willingly. The volunteers complied 'religiously' with the instructions of the ANC leadership to conduct themselves in an exemplary fashion and public co-operation proved to be equally forthcoming.

Early on the morning of 26 June, Mhlaba led a batch of 30 volunteers through the 'Europeans Only' entrance of the New Brighton railway station. They were duly arrested, refused bail and remanded in custody. Further defiers followed the example of the first group. During the first week of July, four groups totalling 85 resisters defied apartheid regulations and joined their comrades in the new North End jail which was reportedly almost full. Mhlaba was sentenced to 2 months hard labour or a fine of £10, with half the sentence suspended for 6 months. The remainder of the first group were sentenced to £6 or 30 days with half the sentence suspended. Fines were not paid and all the volunteers served their jail sentences.

The trial of a group of 19 volunteers who had requested to be served at counters marked

21 Benson, *Struggle for a Birthright*, p. 146.
22 Carter, ‘Defiance Campaign’, pp. 78 and 89 #17.
23 Carter, "The Defiance Campaign", p. 83.
24 *EPH* 15 July 1952.
26 *Clarion* 10 July 1952, pp. 1 and 8.
'Europeans Only' at the North End Post Office on 5 July had a rather different and unexpected outcome. It turned out that they had simply defied practices which they and the police thought had the force of law. Because there was nothing in the postal regulations which made segregation legally enforcable, they were tried in terms of the Post Office Act of 1911 which made it an offence to obstruct the course of Post Office business. As they had simply stood in queues to buy postage stamps, they were deemed to have committed no offence and acquitted. Similar charges against another 54 defiers were consequently withdrawn.28

There was a steady increase in the number of defiers arrested in Port Elizabeth as the campaign got into its stride. The first month saw 389 arrests, the second 666, and the third 738.29 Despite juveniles (under 21 years of age) being sentenced to corporal punishment and warnings by a local Magistrate that future offenders would receive heavier sentences, the number of volunteers showed no sign of abating. The first all-woman batch of 32 defiers, led by 'Nompie', pregnant wife of Dr Njongwe, were the first to receive the heavier sentences. They were sentenced to 40 days imprisonment with the option of a £8 fine, half suspended for six months, for using the 'Europeans Only' entrance of New Brighton railway station.30

Civil disobedience was combined with strike action in Port Elizabeth. Six strikes involving 850 workers took place in a period of three weeks.31 Volunteers returning to work after having served their prison sentences would be refused re-employment. Workers, encouraged by certain ANC activits, would then target such employers with strike action. They sought (in the words of Fine and Davis) "to turn the [defiance] campaign into a springboard for trade union and community organisation".32 Dr Njongwe criticised those who wished to drag "side issues ... into the defiance of unjust laws campaign".33 This possibly suggests that Njongwe did not wish to allow local issues to distract from the objectives of a national campaign. These differences of strategy was one reason for the emergence of divisions within the ranks of the local ANC.

29 Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 97, Appendix III.
30 The Clarion 31 July 1952 ('Mass Support for Defiance Campaign').
32 Fine and Davis, Beyond Apartheid, p. 125.
Carter provides a further clue as to the nature of these divisions when he mentions that three [unnamed] former members of the CPSA who held office in the ANC were involved in an ideological dispute with Njongwe. The three were probably Mhlaba, Gladstone Tshume and Caleb Mayekiso [see Appendix C for biographical information]. Njongwe's right hand man was Robert Matji, the then ANC Provincial Secretary and the only full-time officer in the local ANC. The credit given Njongwe and Matji for making Port Elizabeth a strong centre of the Defiance Campaign by some observers, has since been downplayed. Lodge also sees the conflict between Njongwe and the left-wing leadership in Port Elizabeth in ideological terms, as "illustrative of the limitations of mainstream Congress radicalism". This is, presumably, a reference to Njongwe's Youth League credentials. The local CYL had a very different character to its counterpart in the Transvaal where Njongwe had cut his political teeth. The latter had a reputation for being anti-communist. By contrast, the presence of communists in the former caused it to be known as the 'Red' Youth League. Yet, Lodge holds that the communist influence was not necessarily divisive. He appears to have accepted at face value a statement by Z.K. Matthews that communist influence in the Eastern Cape during the Defiance Campaign was insignificant. But Matthews, who was in the United States at the time, was kept informed of developments through the correspondence of his son, Joseph. The younger Matthews was himself national secretary of the CYL and would appear to have worked closely with Njongwe and Matji in organising the Defiance Campaign in the Eastern Cape.

34 Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 83.
35 I was informed that Robert Matji was believed to have left town and feigned illness to avoid having to lead the first group of New Brighton volunteers. Interview with George Pemba, Swartkops Valley, 31 July 1992. But my information suggests that he led the group of volunteers who attempted to defy apartheid at the North End Post Office [see above]. Thereafter, it is likely that he deliberately avoided arrest because he was a key organiser of the defiance campaign.
37 Lodge, Black politics, p. 61.
38 T. Orie, 'Port Elizabeth in the 1940s-1950s: the Tripartite Alliance?', Paper presented to the Conference on 'Port Elizabeth's Place in South African History and Historiography', Vista University, Port Elizabeth, 1992, p. 9
40 Cory Library, MIC 407 Karis-Carter Microfilm (CAMP), Reel 12A, 2: XM 65: 47/3-20, Correspondence from Joe to Z.K. Matthews, 29 July 1952 to 7 January 1953.
In order to blunt the defiance campaign, the state resorted to charging the ANC leadership with offences such as treason and sedition. Fifteen prominent figures in the Eastern Cape were charged in September under the Suppression of Communism Act, or alternatively with incitement to public violence in terms of the Riotous Assemblies Act. Of the 11 arraigned in Port Elizabeth, only Raymond Mhlaba and Gladstone Tshume had previously been members of the CPSA. Amongst the non-communists charged were Dr Njongwe, Robert Matji, Joe Matthews and Adam Mati; Dr V.K. Moodaley, Senior Vice-President of the Cape Indian Congress (PE); and the only woman, Florence Matomela. But charges under the Riotous Assemblies Act against these ANC leaders were dropped by the Magistrate who stated that he was not aware of a single instance of violence having marred the passive resistance campaign in the city. 41 The action of the state against the local ANC leadership did little to dampen the enthusiasm of Port Elizabeth’s African community for the defiance campaign.

Figures cited by Joe Matthews suggest that membership of the ANC in Port Elizabeth swelled enormously during the Defiance Campaign. He reckons that the membership of the New Brighton branch alone increased from 2 700 to 13 000 within the space of less than a month. It was not the only local branch which provided volunteer groups and showed significant growth during the Campaign. By early September, ANC membership in Korsten and Dassieskraal stood at 5 000 and 3 000, respectively. 42 But membership in itself is no guarantor of the success of the campaign. More likely than not, numbers were swelled by new recruits who paid one-off subscriptions than those who regularly paid monthly dues. It was the volunteers who comprised the core membership of the ANC, and many of them sacrificed their jobs and much else by serving prison sentences for defying the law. Yet much of the campaign’s success rested on the visible support of the masses and their identification with the goals of the Defiance Campaign.

By the middle of October the number of arrests in Port Elizabeth was approaching the 2 000 mark and exceeded the total for all the major centres outside the Eastern Cape. 43 All accounts

41 People’s World, 2, 9 and 16 Oct. 1952.
of the defiance campaign have noted its success in the city, but only as part of a regional phenomenon.44 But the particular dynamics of politics in Port Elizabeth set it apart from other centres in the Eastern Cape, which must be explored. Lodge has pinpointed factors which made Port Elizabeth an easier environment for African political organisation than other centres. These include: the relatively relaxed administrative framework, especially the absence of influx control measures; the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the workforce; the existence of a large concentration of African industrial workers and the strength of trade unionism; the leadership roles played by trade unionists and communists in the local ANC. He also identified reasons for high levels of dissatisfaction amongst Port Elizabeth's African population in 1952. These included: the fragility of the freedoms allowed by the paternalistic PE Municipality; the widespread and desperate poverty, especially of recent arrivals from the city's rural hinterland where conditions were fast deteriorating; under- and unemployment with few Africans finding employment in industry; and inadequate housing.45

With much of the above I have no argument. But it is necessary to qualify certain of Lodge's observations. For one thing, his characterisation of the local state in Port Elizabeth is not altogether accurate. Following Robinson, we have questioned the pedigree of Port Elizabeth's 'liberalism'. Here it needs to be stressed that influx control and labour registration measures were not, in the first instance, aimed at curtailing political activities. Other statutes such as the Criminal Law Amendment Act and the Suppression of Communism Act existed for that purpose. Besides, there were other ways to control political activities in New Brighton. A regulation gave the Manager of Native Affairs the right to prohibit non-residents from entering, and thereby attending political meetings and rallies. This regulation had, on occasion, been used to forbid those deemed by the authorities to be 'agitators' from engaging in political activities in the township.

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44 R. Fine (with D. Davis), Beyond Apartheid: Labour and Liberation in South Africa (Johannesburg, 1990), pp. 118-126.
The inference of a line of continuity between the nineteenth century wars of dispossession and the mass action of the 1950s - and which is to be found in much of the literature - is problematical. A tradition is not simply something handed down from one generation to the next. It is reappropriated by each generation and vested with new meanings by different communities. Political consciousness is shaped more by personal and collective experience than the politics of memory. As Carter has remarked

The extent and continuity of politicisation from these [i.e. ANC, ICU, Vigilance Associations] and other sources should not be unduly stressed any more than the importance of these antecedents in acting as a catalyst to resistance in the Eastern Cape in 1952.47

Triumphalist and telelogical models of resistance have little explanatory value because they suggest non-existent continuities of resistance. It is necessary to go beyond asking whether Port Elizabeth’s militancy was exceptional and assuming that the response of other regions to the defiance campaign was normative.

Hirson concedes that the close relationship between trade unions and the ANC was a crucial factor in the comparative success of the Defiance Campaign in Port Elizabeth - but not in other centres in the Eastern Cape.48 There is a need to reassess the relationship between working-class and national or community-based struggles. Even though working-class activists held office in the local ANC and the CPSA and undoubtedly played crucial roles as individuals in these organisations, organic working class leadership cannot be given all the credit for the interaction with trade unions. It is my opinion that Orie has overstated the strength of the alliance between CNETU, the ANC and the CPSA.49 Communist and non-communist trade unionists had fallen out with one another over, amongst other things, the contesting of Advisory Board elections. In fact, the groundwork laid by the trade unions in the 1940s referred to by Lodge, appears to have been largely undone by the end of the decade. Cherry has confirmed that the membership of the CNETU and its affiliates in Port Elizabeth was

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47 Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 77.
48 Hirson, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 97.
49 Orie, 'The Tripartite Alliance', passim.
exaggerated and, more importantly, has questioned its organisational ability. Desai's corruption stood revealed and CNETU had effectively collapsed by 1947.\textsuperscript{50} Carter argues (correctly in my view) that the unions gained more from the ANC during 1952 through increased membership than the latter benefitted from trade union assistance in mobilising support for the campaign.\textsuperscript{51}

We have seen in the previous Chapter that a rejuvenated ANC leadership in Port Elizabeth helped prepare the ground for the Defiance Campaign. A new generation of working class leaders eclipsed the 'old guard' leadership of the ANC in New Brighton in the late 1940s. Moderate community leaders - some of whom served as nominated members of the Advisory Board - had been increasingly marginalised. On the other hand, the experience gained by candidates who contested Advisory Board elections on party tickets or those who participated in the vigilance/civic association, provided some political training. The mobilisation of the community during the nationwide 1944 anti-pass campaign served as something of a 'dress rehearsal' for the Defiance Campaign. Even community struggles such as the 1949 bus boycott, and the 1945 and 1951 rent boycotts helped consolidate an ANC power base in New Brighton. The ANC leadership was able to rely on its record of co-operation with existing trade union and community organisations to bolster participation in the national campaign of protest against discriminatory and unjust laws.

The defiance campaign suffered (in the words of Roux) its 'first major setback' with the New Brighton riots.\textsuperscript{52} The well-disciplined passive resistance of the volunteers was overtaken by the fury of mob action. ANC leaders firmly declared their intention of continuing the campaign in a peaceful, disciplined and non-violent manner. To have done otherwise would have amounted to a tacit admission of complicity in the riots. It was stated that there would no deviation from the doctrine of passive resistance, although fears were expressed that further violence might erupt.\textsuperscript{53} In fact, the dominant current in the ANC leadership responded to the violence of the masses and the police by withdrawing from both mass struggles and from further acts of defiance which might trigger violence.\textsuperscript{54} The local campaign was virtually


\textsuperscript{51} Carter, 'The Defiance Campaign', p. 89 #19.

\textsuperscript{52} Roux, \textit{Time Longer than Rope}, p. 391.

\textsuperscript{53} Roux, \textit{Time Longer than Rope}, pp. 390-1.

\textsuperscript{54} Fine & Davis, \textit{Beyond Apartheid}, p. 122.
paralysed as a result. In the month following 18 October, only 93 individuals were arrested for acts of defiance in Port Elizabeth.\textsuperscript{55} Although both Njongwe and Matthews spoke of extending the campaign to the rural areas,\textsuperscript{56} this proved to be nothing more than rhetoric. If the success of the defiance campaign in Port Elizabeth was undermined by the outbreak of violence, further occurrences in Kimberley and East London on 8 and 9 November, respectively, delivered the coup de grace.

The Course and Nature of the 1952 New Brighton Riots

Leo Kuper's \textit{Passive Resistance in South Africa} provides the most extensive account of the New Brighton riots.\textsuperscript{57} The standard accounts of black politics have made little more than passing reference to them.\textsuperscript{58} More specialised works on Port Elizabeth's history have added little additional information, but they have contributed to our historical perspective on the riots.\textsuperscript{59} An attempt will be made to reconstruct the events of 18 October 1952 from the above secondary accounts, newspaper reports, official and unofficial documentation, memoirs and oral testimony in a little more detail than has hitherto been the case.\textsuperscript{60} However, the available

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Evening Post} 3 and 7 Nov. 1952; Carter, 'Defiance Campaign', p. 97, Appendix III.
\item Hirson, 'The Defiance Campaign', pp. 97-8.
\item Apart from secondary sources previously mentioned, this account of the riots is based on the following contemporary documents: a confidential report (R.R. 182/52) of a Field Officer, W.B. Ngakane, for the SAIRR re 'Port Elizabeth Riot and Events that Followed', 24 Nov. 1952 which comprised an addendum to a Report by the Director on Visits to Port Elizabeth, East London and Kimberley in connection with the Riots (R.R. 9/53) located in the University of the Witwatersrand's A.D. Rheinallt Jones Papers, AD 843/RJ, Aa 12.20.2 and two memoranda from SAP District Headquarters, PE to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, dated 19 Nov. 1952 and 8 Jan. 1953 respectively, both entitled 'Naturelle Onluste: New Brighton: 18/10/52' supplied by the SAP Museum Archives. This has been supplemented by various newspaper reports; a two-part investigative journalistic article by Matthew Nkoana published in \textit{Golden City Post}, 29 July and 5 Aug. 1956; the unpublished Memoirs of Paddy McNamee (jnr.), pp. 42-43; and oral testimony from a number of interviews. I have failed to trace the Evidence at the Preparatory Examination of William Gova and 126 Others, Magistrate's Court, Port Elizabeth and the Judgment in Regina v. William Gova and 10 Others cited by Kuper, \textit{Passive Resistance}, pp. 133-5. Unfortunately, the records of proceedings of
\end{itemize}
evidence is by no means exhaustive and contains certain discrepancies and, accordingly, this account must be regarded as preliminary.

At about half past three on the afternoon of Saturday 18 October, a railway worker notified the police that a tin of paint had been stolen from his office at North End station by two Africans who boarded the bombella train. A waiting railway constable tried to apprehend the suspects upon their arrival at the New Brighton station. They resisted arrest, a scuffle ensued, and other passengers who had witnessed the incident went to their assistance. The constable used his revolver on his assailants, firing twenty-one shots, killing one and wounding two in the process. (He was later commended by a Judge for his courage and devotion to duty in the face of the serious danger posed by hostile Africans to life and property). 61

Meanwhile, a considerable crowd had converged on the New Brighton station. It consisted not merely of passengers who had disembarked from the train, but a large contingent of young people from the nearby Red Location who had heard the shots and ensuing commotion. One source suggests this might have been on account of an ANC Youth League meeting scheduled to be held at Emlatheni on the afternoon of 18 October but which was cancelled at the last minute because of the funeral of a headman. 62 I have not been able to verify this but it is clear that prominent figures in the local CYL happened to be out of town as they were involved in canvassing support for the Defiance Campaign. 63 But Joe Matthews's remark that "the Youth League fellows failed utterly to pacify the mob", 64 suggests some attempt at intervention by the CYL.

Buildings at the railway station and an incoming train were peppered with stones and other missiles by the crowd [see Illustration 9.1]. At least two sources testify that several whites at the station were spared. 65 Nor were the homes of whites in the vicinity of the station attacked. But when police reinforcements arrived on the scene, they were greeted by a hail of stones.

stones and petrol bombs. An order to fire was given and in the face of the salvo the crowd departed the scene, taking its dead and injured with it.

In headlong flight, the mob vented its anger upon the first white person which it encountered nearly a kilometre from the station. With cries of "Afrika" (popularised by the Defiance Campaign), the mob attacked and killed W.M. Laas, who had given two fellow workers a lift home. The unfortunate victim was stabbed repeatedly and his vehicle destroyed [see Illustration 9.2]. Nearby, the trader Abraham Isaacson was forced to take refuge in his store when the crowd began to pelt it with stones. The police, who had been alerted to this incident, arrived upon the scene. They fired on the crowd and again several more persons were wounded before the crowd dispersed.

The discovery of the mutilated body of a white victim resulted in further SAP reinforcements being rushed to the New Brighton police station and patrols being sent into the township. Apart from isolated incidents of stone throwing, an eerie calm prevailed. With the onset of darkness, the police retired from the township partly because they did not feel safe and partly because they believed law and order had been restored.66 Unfortunately, the lull was to be followed by further blood-letting.

At about 8 p.m., the screening of the film 'the Gun-Fighters' was about to commence at the Rio Bioscope, when a number of youths entered the building and ordered everyone out. The African patrons beat a hasty exit, but a group of five whites found themselves trapped in the bioscope's projection room when the building was set alight [see Illustrations 9.3 and 9.4]. The group consisted of the bioscope manager, Rudolph Brandt, and his wife, Edith; a technician, Gerald Leppan, and his fifteen year-old assistant, Karl Bernhardt; as well as Lappan's thirteen year-old son, Brian. They had chosen to ignore an earlier warning that their lives were in danger. When they attempted to leave via the fire escape, they were set upon and stabbed. The three adult males were killed and their bodies mutilated. Brian Leppan incurred only minor wounds as he managed to escape to the nearby house of a headman, from where he was smuggled out of the Location to safety by a clergyman.67 Mrs Brandt was assaulted and raped, and only saved from certain death by the timely arrival of the police. The police

66 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 2.
67 The two men, E. Mlanlandle and Rev S.Z. Hlaula, priest-in-charge of St Stephen's Anglican Mission, were later rewarded for their bravery by the PECC. See Golden City Post, 29 July 1956, p. 10.
Illustration 9.3 Rio Bioscope and Brandt's burnt-out car.
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria).

Illustration 9.4 Burnt-out Rio Bioscope.
(SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria).
were greeted with a hail of stones and retaliated by firing on the crowd.

Sporadic attacks on private and public property in New Brighton continued throughout the night. Marcow's General Dealer's Store was set alight and totally burnt out [see Illustration 9.5]. The section of the Administration Building which housed the Post Office, was also partially destroyed by fire [see Illustration 9.6]. Another target of attack were milk depots, and at least four were razed to the ground. Fire engines and ambulances entering the township had to have police escorts. Much of the township was plunged into darkness but a strong police presence finally brought an end to further incidents.

During the course of the night, the police in the city had been strengthened by the arrival of reinforcements from the district. New Brighton was cordoned off by well-armed policemen who controlled exit and entry into the township. More armed policemen patrolled the outskirts of the white suburbs. For some, who were old enough to remember, it probably evoked images of a 'black peril' scare of some magnitude which had gripped the city in the wake of the 1920 shootings. On that occasion, an angry crowd in New Brighton had apparently sought to avenge the deaths of their own people and threatened the life of the then Superintendent. Despite the fears expressed by white officials and traders then resident in the Location, there had been little looting and damage to property. Although circumstances were vastly different between 1920 and 1952, the tension and panic of black and white Port Elizabeth residents was just as real.

The consequent breakdown in trust between Whites and Africans in New Brighton itself as a result of the riots was almost complete. This was so because of the gruesome nature of the killing of whites, who were regarded as being well disposed towards Africans. Most traders and officials would not have concurred with the SAIRR Report which averred that "there was no open hostility to ... Europeans". Isaacson and two other traders who had been in New Brighton for at least a generation left the township immediately. Some traders cut their losses and sold to African buyers, but a few continued with their businesses until their leases

69 SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 5.
Illustration 9.5 Remains of Marcow's General Dealer's Store. (SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria).

Illustration 9.6 Burnt-out Post Office. (SAP Museum Archives, Pretoria).
White officials, too, were not prepared to run the risk of remaining in New Brighton and vacated their houses.

The cost of the New Brighton riots can be measured in material, as well as psychological terms. A police estimate gives a figure of £23 772 as the total for damage to buildings and vehicles. Apart from the damage to public and private property in New Brighton, eleven lives were lost. Apart from the four Whites named above, there were seven Africans killed in the riots. The injured or wounded consisted of two Whites and 24 Africans. The identities of the African victims and of the 127 persons charged with offences ranging from murder and rape, to public violence and arson may also provide some clues as to the the causes of the riots, and to this we now turn.

Reactions to and causes of the New Brighton riots

This section will attempt to evaluate the immediate and underlying causes of the New Brighton riots. Our starting point will be with the analysis of the press coverage, which was largely concerned with apportioning blame for the riots. As the Government refused to appoint a commission of enquiry to investigate the riots, unsubstantiated reports and ex parte statements on the riots abounded. Had an inquiry been instituted, the affair would have been sub judice and editors might have refrained from publishing these. Instead, the debate was conducted in the press and gave rise to much speculation as to the causes of the riots.

The police and official versions of the riots were given prominence in the national press. It was held that the railway policemen responsible for discharging the first shots at his assailants had acted in self-defence. The police reinforcements who had arrived on the scene had fired on the crowd in order to protect government property. A police statement emanating from Preteria had alleged that the attack on the New Brighton railway station was planned. It claimed (without foundation) that the two suspects whom the police had attempted to arrest for the theft of paint had escaped and made a report to a meeting in the location, after which 3 000 Africans attacked the station. But in a secret memorandum, the District Commandant of the SAP in Port Elizabeth admitted that they had found no evidence that the unrest had been

72 Interview with Joseph Henen, Mount Croix, PE, 17 April 1993.
73 Memo from SAP District Headquarters, PE to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, 19 Nov. 1952, pp. 8-9.
planned beforehand.75

Press reports of the New Brighton riots expressed outrage at the indiscriminate attacks on innocent Whites. They dwelt on the latent and powerful anti-white sentiments of the rioters and the racial character of the mob violence. The rampaging mobs, according to The Star, attacked Whites and destroyed their property "because they were White, and not for any offence they had given".76 And the Pretoria News reckoned that the incident was "the first major riot of Natives based on no more than a murderous impulse to kill the White man".77 Even local ANC leaders, in disassociating themselves from the acts of the rioters, issued a statement which condemned the "unfortunate, reckless, ill-considered return to jungle law".78 By equating these acts with 'barbarism' and 'savagery', they only served to reinforce racial stereotypes of Africans. To Whites, Africans became the 'enemy' - the 'Other' or the 'them' of common parlance. Such images came to be etched indelibly on the collective memory of the white public.

Coverage of the riots gave little consideration to the fact that several Africans had been killed before the mob turned on whites or symbols of white authority. Dr Njongwe pointed out that the "the statements .. made by the police differed considerably from the story of the start of the riot which was generally accepted in New Brighton". This version suggested that it was a spontaneous reaction to "seeing one of their number shot dead by a railway policeman for resisting arrest". Thus, the immediate cause of the riots was the unwarranted shooting of the suspected thief or an assailant by the railway policemen, and the readiness of police reinforcements intent on dispersing the crowd outside the station to shoot rather than first try other methods. Njongwe added that although the unofficial version was not necessarily correct in every respect, the obvious way to ascertain what had sparked the riots was to institute an inquiry.79

Although the Government refused to appoint a commission of enquiry to investigate the riots, at least three ministers arrived at prima facie conclusions with regard to the causes of the riots. The Minister of Justice, C.R. Swart, asserted categorically that:

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75 Memo from SAP District Headquarters, PE, to Adjunct-Commissioner, Grahamstown, 19 Nov. 1952, pp. 4, 9.
79 Evening Post, 22 Oct. 1952 ('NB Riot/ANC Leader Wants Inquiry').
We are satisfied that what happened at New Brighton is one of the direct results of the defiance campaign and the dangerous game being played by a number of leaders of the African National Congress and the South African Indian Congress.  

And the Minister of Native Affairs, Dr H.F. Verwoerd, was equally quick to connect the riots with the defiance campaign. But he added a twist to the argument, and stated that the riots were an indirect result of Port Elizabeth's liberal treatment of its African population. Verwoerd contended that the riots were the result of the failure to implement measures such as influx control, registration of service contracts and curfew regulations. He claimed that the riots held a 'double lesson' for the PECC because the defiance movement had been launched from and the first violence of the campaign had occurred in its 'model village'. In short, Verwoerd held that it was the reluctance of the PECC to apply urban apartheid fully that had caused the riots.

From another perspective, apartheid could be regarded as a cause of the riots. Margaret Ballinger argued that any explanation for the riots should be sought in the extension of controls by the Nationalist Government and not their absence. She remarked that "[t]he Natives of Port Elizabeth had more to lose in the way of personal liberty than those of other cities". The local ANC leadership also pointed out "the danger of the doctrine of apartheid, which made differences between individuals immediately assume a racial character". And Robinson has pointed, more specifically, to railway apartheid as having precipitated the riots. She writes that the riot... was the direct result of the generally aggressive and unpleasant behaviour of railway officials who had given the residents of New Brighton cause for complaint over several decades.

Because of its proximity and symbolic importance, the New Brighton railway station was chosen as the site for the first act of defiance in Port Elizabeth. It would seem to be more than coincidence that it was the site of the outbreak of violence nearly four months later.

Another variant of this argument laid the responsibility for the riots squarely on the shoulders of the police for their use of excessive force. In a strongly worded statement, the working committee of the ANC indicted the Nationalist Government for using the police to prop up the

80 EPH 22 Oct. 1952 ('Swart Warns Rioters of Stern Action').
81 EPH 21 Oct. 1952 ('Verwoerd Blames PE for Native Riots'); The Star, 23 Oct. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth Warned by Minister').
83 EPH 20 Oct. 1952 ('We Had No Part in It, says African Congress').
superstructure of white domination, rather than preserve law and order. The police were blamed for provoking the riots:

It was the policy of using the police to terrorise Non-Europeans that had brought about an explosive and dangerous situation.85

This statement resembles Lodge's explanation which is predisposed towards precipitating factors. In his view, the riots (in Port Elizabeth and East London) "arose essentially out of the increasingly tense relationship between black and police which the [defiance] campaign had generated".86

In spite of the ANC denial of instigation or involvement in the riots, it was maintained that the heightened politicisation of New Brighton's people was a contributory factor. Both the Afrikaans and English press - supporters of the NP and the opposition UP, respectively - suggested that ANC leaders could not escape responsibility for the riots, as they were themselves aware that violent consequences could flow from the organised resistance of the Defiance Campaign. The Pretoria News, for instance, stated that the ANC leadership may be sincere in their wish to wage a purely non-violent campaign but they have no means of ensuring that the mass of Natives roused to unified resistance will follow their passive lead.87

Another editorial likened the Africans subjected to the propaganda of the Defiance Campaign to a child with a lethal weapon who was liable to kill itself or others if not properly directed. With their sense of grievance sharpened by such propaganda, "their reaction, at moments of stress, was unpredictable and not necessarily pacific".88 Thus many political commentators in the English press echoed the Government view that the climate created by the campaign contributed to the 'unrest'. In so doing, they helped the Government to mobilise public opinion against passive resistance. Indeed, most Whites did not draw a distinction between the riots and the campaign.89 They would have given little credence to Kuper's conclusion that "there was no evidence to connect the resistance movement with the disturbances nor was violence at any time advocated by the resisters as a means of struggle".90

86 Lodge, Black politics, p. 45.
87 Pretoria News, 20 Oct. ('Towards a State of Siege?').
88 Natal Witness, 21 Oct. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth Disturbances').
90 Kuper, Passive Resistance, p. 133.
Certain commentators argued that passive resistance had contributed to the defiance of legally constituted authority and promoted a breakdown of law and order. It was reckoned that anti-social or criminal elements took advantage of the situation to give vent to their destructive proclivities. Contemporaneous investigative journalism and oral traditions both suggest that the rioters were mainly delinquents and tsotsis. The ages of those shot and killed by police during the riots were between 21 and 43. As with East London, an overwhelming proportion of those tried for offences ranging from public violence to murder stemming from the riots were juveniles between the ages of 13 and 21 years. Of the 127 accused, there were 20 females. The oldest was 41 and the youngest 12 years. The average age of the group was less than twenty years. Unfortunately, I do not have at my disposal information relating to schooling, employment, previous convictions, family structure, accommodation, area of residence, and leisure time activities of the persons charged which might have enabled the construction of a more complete profile of the rioters.

Although the 'African urban youth problem' was by no means unique to New Brighton, it was not something for which the PECC could escape responsibility altogether. Thus the PECC felt constrained, especially in the light of the Government's criticisms of its policies, to show that the riots were not a result of neglect or omission on its part. In its concern to deflect attention from the inadequate housing and poor living conditions in New Brighton, it latched on to any suggestion that responsibility for the riots could be attributed to agents provocateurs. A report by the director of the SAIRR observed that white witnesses in Port Elizabeth had testified that 'strangers' had entered the township prior to the riots. The implication was that 'outside agitators' rather than 'our own Natives' were responsible for instigating the riots. Similarly, a document tabled at the meeting of the Cape Province Municipal Association claimed to have 'definite proof' that the riots had been instigated by 'agitators'. This information was never made public knowledge and dismissed as 'mere propaganda' by A.Z. Lamani, the New Brighton Village Chairman, and hotly denied even by conservative spokespersons such as Sister Dora Nginza and Rev G.B. Molefe. As with all such claims of 'agitation' in the

94 Calculation based on 'List of Accused Persons' in CAD, PE Magistrate's Records, 1/PEZ 1/2/2/3/18, Criminal Record Book, A Court, 4 Nov. 1952.  
96 EPH 30 Oct. 1952 ('More Riots Planned for E. Cape Says Official').  
event of unrest, the PECC sought to draw attention away from itself and point the finger elsewhere.

It has been shown that the riots were explained as a result of: racial animosity; the spontaneous outburst of pent-up anger; a climate of contempt for the law and increased politicisation caused by the defiance campaign; the work of outside agitators or a criminal element; deliberate police provocation; the result of apartheid, especially on the railways; and even Port Elizabeth's 'liberal' policies towards Africans. This summary, however, cannot do justice to the complex relationship between the immediate and underlying causes of the riots.

The Consequences of the New Brighton Riots

The Ministers of Justice and Native Affairs both paid brief visits to Port Elizabeth shortly after the New Brighton riots. The former held discussions with the police and the mayor, and inspected the scene of the events. The latter did not deem it necessary to meet the PECC and, instead, instructed the Acting Native Commissioner to convey an ultimatum to the effect that if the Council did not impose the required control measures, the Government would introduce legislation to force it to toe the line. The Pretoria News commented that "the riots have almost been welcomed by the Cabinet as a means of ending an experiment which showed signs of proving the Nationalist Party policy of strict control wrong". It pointed out that a number of other major centres such as Durban and Johannesburg had recently experienced disturbances despite the existence of full control regulations. By contrast, Port Elizabeth had "an enviable record of freedom from crime and racial strife". But the Nationalist Government had no qualms about using the tragic occurrence to further its political and ideological aims. They seized upon the New Brighton riots as an opportunity to 'turn the screws' on the PECC in order to force it to impose stricter controls on political activity and conform with its policy for urban Africans.

The embattled 'liberal' lobby sought to resist pressure from the central state to comply with Verwoerd's ultimatum, and a spokesman for the group predicted a 'long, uphill struggle' for Verwoerd. Schauder, defended the PECC's policies with the argument that:

Proof of the success of our policy is that we have had only one night's disturbance in thirty years of racial peace and progress. This is a good record which cannot be equalled by any other large centre where restrictive policies are in operation and where

99 Rand Daily Mail, 24 Oct. 1952 ('P.E. Prepares for Battle on Native Township Issue').
disturbances are so frequent that they are no longer regarded as news. Nonetheless, New Brighton's image as a 'model' township with a law-abiding community was dealt a severe blow by the riots. Schauder himself conceded that the PECC's "progressive policy... has been undermined in one night".\textsuperscript{100} Despite a previous warning that the riots might jeopardise the provision of further municipal housing, the PECC decided to re-direct funds set aside for a housing scheme for whites into Elundini Native Township, an extension of New Brighton. It claimed this was "an act of faith in the African community of Port Elizabeth"; a magnanimous gesture under the circumstances. But, in order to counter expected adverse reactions from white ratepayers, the PECC warned that it would be forced to reconsider its decision to go ahead with housing construction at Elundini if there was a repetition of the disturbances in New Brighton.\textsuperscript{101}

But veiled warnings to the African population were not all the PECC issued. The publication of the transcript of an interview by the \textit{Evening Post} with Dr Njongwe - who happened to be out on bail awaiting trial under the Suppression of Communism Act - provoked a hostile reaction from the PECC. It requested newspaper editors to exercise discretion in publishing reports relating to the riots. This amounted to an effort to impose censorship on the press to which the \textit{Evening Post} editor, took strong exception. He argued that it was his duty to inform the public about the thinking of African leaders with respect to the riots in order to afford white South Africans an opportunity to acquaint themselves therewith.\textsuperscript{102}

Representatives of New Brighton community and political organisations expressed concern that the riots continued to influence the thinking of the authorities. A joint statement issued by A.Z. Lamani, in his capacity as chairman of New Brighton Village Committee, and on behalf of the ANC, CYL, African Ministers' Council, Advisory Board and Vigilance Committee, condemned the "indiscriminate, wanton and careless" shooting by SA and Railway Police and called for the appointment of an impartial commission of enquiry. And it was argued that the

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{The Star}, 21 Oct. 1952.
authorities "seem bent on perpetuating hostilities" by the heavily armed police patrols which engaged in an "extravagant display of firearms". Equally disturbing, was the frantic rush by white civilians to buy weapons. Such actions did nothing to restore peace and create goodwill between the people of Port Elizabeth.¹⁰³

In protest at the continued strong police presence at New Brighton railway station and armed guards on trains and buses, the ANC launched a boycott of SAR&H transport which Dr Njongwe vowed would continue until the armed guards were withdrawn.¹⁰⁴ New Brighton residents had to either walk all the way to work or a few miles to the outskirts of the city, where they could board a municipal bus which would transport them to work. The boycott was lifted when the railway authorities negotiated the removal of the armed guards with ANC leaders.¹⁰⁵ Although a 'potentially explosive' situation was averted, the subsequent actions of both the local and central authorities perpetuated rather than eased the tension.

On the evening of 28 October the PECC held a special meeting in order to formulate its response to the crisis precipitated by the New Brighton riots. A motion that the Minister of Native Affairs be requested to conduct a judicial inquiry into the cause of the riots was defeated. However, it was resolved to apply for permission to impose a curfew on Africans in the city between the hours of 9 pm and 5 am. New Brighton residents would not be affected by the curfew, but non-residents would not be allowed into the Location without a permit. In addition, the Council requested the Minister of Justice to enforce the Riotous Assemblies Act for three months and thereby effectively prohibit open air meetings. The voting on these issues was not unanimous and suggests that erstwhile liberals on the PECC were folding under pressure from the demands of the central state and white ratepayers. A fair amount of behind the scenes lobbying resulted in Schauder and the former trade unionist, Mrs Katie Gelvan, voting with the majority. Only three councillors, Mrs E.M. Holland and Messrs A. Dubb and G. Schafer, opposed the imposition of the restrictions.¹⁰⁶ The communist mouthpiece, Advance, commented that this "represented a craven capitulation of Port Elizabeth liberalism

¹⁰⁴ EPH 25 Oct. 1952 ('PE Expects Week-End of Tension').
¹⁰⁵ EPH 29 Oct. 1952 ('Bus Service to NB Normal Again: Boycott Ends'); Cape Times, 7 Nov. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth Test').
to the Nationalists".\footnote{107}

Whilst the PECC was deliberating, a mass meeting at New Brighton heard ANC Secretary-General, Walter Sisulu, declare that the "Council would be betraying the trust reposed in it for many years" by the city's African population if it introduced restrictive measures. This was to no avail. In response to the PECC decision, a meeting of the ANC Eastern Cape Regional Committee was convened and attended by 60 delegates from 15 branches said to represent over 30,000 members. It was resolved to pursue strike action unless the PECC rescinded its decision to impose a curfew and ban political meetings.\footnote{108} The call for strike action was endorsed at meetings held in various venues on Sunday 2 November. A statement issued by the ANC condemned the PECC for "having allowed itself to be led on the road to fascism by suppressing African organisations, trade unions and the ANC". It was stated that the strike would continue until "God Almighty had changed the hearts of the City Councillors" and the ANC's demands had been met.\footnote{109}

The response of the Mayor, C.F. McArthur, to the ANC call for strike action was equivocal. Announcing that the Council would not be intimidated by the strike threat, he added that the success of the ANC activities largely implied intimidation by 'so-called leaders' of 'law-abiding Africans'. He reckoned that the city had been targeted because

The council's liberal attitude in the past has apparently been taken by certain Africans as a sign of weakness. Therefore, the impact of the resistance organisation was aimed at Port Elizabeth because it was anticipated we would yield to demands.\footnote{110}

Yet, McArthur privately approached the ANC leaders to call of the strike, which they refused. Further behind the scenes negotiations resulted in the ANC leadership agreeing to moderate its demands: to limit the strike to one day in return for which the PECC promised to restrict the operation of the curfew to three months and the ban on meetings to one month.\footnote{111} The compromise appears to have been initiated by the Mayor who met the executive committee of the ANC.\footnote{112} Njongwe agreed to it without consulting the rank and file ANC membership.

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107 \textit{Advance}, 13 Nov. 1952 ("Port Elizabeth City Under Siege").
109 \textit{Advance}, 6 Nov. 1952 ("P.E. Africans Call General Strike").
110 \textit{Evening Post} 6 Nov. 1952 ("We will not be intimidated").
111 \textit{Cape Argus}, 8 Nov. 1952: \textit{Advance}, 13 Nov. 1952 ("Port Elizabeth City Under Siege").
112 Benson, \textit{Struggle for a Birthright}, pp. 151 and 155 states that ANC President-General, Moroka, had ordered that the indefinite strike be modified to a one-day stayaway. The Director of the SAIRR also discussed the issue with an unnamed Congress leader [Moroka or Njongwe?] and implied that a SAIRR representative might have played an
Advance hinted at some disquiet amongst ANC members with its remark that "there was a strong feeling in the location that the strike should have continued indefinitely as planned".113

The one-day stayaway was scheduled for Monday 10 November, two days after the curfew and ban on political meetings took effect. During the course of the weekend, Port Elizabeth was in a state of virtual siege. The police force was further augmented and citizens took extraordinary precautions to arm themselves in the event of violence. The hysteria of white residents was fuelled by news of riots in East London on the Sunday when two Whites, including a nun, were gruesomely killed. The day of the stayaway, however, passed without serious incident. The majority of the African workforce, according to Advance, "stayed quietly at home and spent the day in fasting and prayer".114 It was estimated that over 90% of Port Elizabeth’s black workforce responded to the ANC’s call. Many Coloured workers, particularly in the canning industry, participated in the strike. Most Indian shop owners heeded the SAIC call to close for the day. The wholly successful action underscored the level of support for the ANC and its allies, although there were the usual claims that this was due to intimidation. It also brought home to employers the vulnerability of the Port Elizabeth economy to strike action.

The PEM itself refused to observe the spirit of the agreement negotiated by the Mayor with the ANC. When workers returned to their places of employment, they were victimised. The police were called in to drive them off PEM premises and Coloured scab labour was rounded up from neighbouring districts. An order went out to all heads of municipal departments that workers who had absented themselves from work should only be re-engaged if they were indispensable, and then only as new employers.115 In other words, all participants in the stayaway stood to lose service benefits such as wage increments and cumulative leave. The PEM suspended between 600 to 800 general workers, as well as a further 500 trainees on the Elundini housing scheme. The Railways, Post Office and other state employers replaced African with Coloured unskilled labour which served to heighten tension between the

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113 Advance, 13 Nov. 1952 ('Port Elizabeth City Under Siege'). See also SAIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 8.
115 IAD, 25/169 No. 7, PE Municipality, Suggested Circular to all Non-European Employees (undated); Cape Times, 11 Nov. 1952.
communities. Certain private companies also adopted a hardline attitude and dismissed workers who had heeded the stayaway call. It was estimated that a total of approximately 4,000 workers were dismissed. But scab labour proved unworkable and employers eventually had to reinstate most of the dismissed workers.

The assurances by certain individuals who (according to the local authority) comprised "the moderate and level-headed residents of New Brighton... of sufficient standing to have opposed the ANC openly", that the strike call would not be heeded proved to be ill-founded. There attempt at misrepresentation in order to curry favour with the authorities had miscarried. Yet, a deputation to the Mayor which included Rev G.B. Molefe, Rev S.Z. Hlala, P.J. Nikiwe and other nominated Advisory Board members was well received. The Consultative Mayor's Committee was set up and further discussions, which centred around grievances underlying the riots which the PECC considered it within its powers to address, followed. Council acknowledged certain shortcomings in its administration of the township and agreed to:

1. approach the Government to abolish segregation at the New Brighton railway station;
2. make representation to SAR&H for the erection of suitable bus shelters;
3. undertake to increase its African labour force and approach SAR&H to do the same;
4. replace electric street lighting destroyed in the riots;
5. co-operate with the School Board and the Technical College Council to establish facilities for technical education at New Brighton;
6. consider the appointment of a welfare officer at New Brighton;
7. commence work immediately on the improvement of quarters for single men.

Neither the Committee nor this seven-point programme had the backing of New Brighton's political or civic organisations. As a critical report put it, the PECC "preferred to pay heed to the advice of men who were out of touch with the situation".

The PECC became party to the Government's attempts to discredit the ANC with the 'taint' of communism by intervening in township politics. It was decided to disseminate anti-ANC propaganda to "counteract the blackmail of the agitators". A leaflet entitled "Twenty-Five Years of Bantu Progress in the Union's Friendly City" was distributed in New Brighton. In

117 Cape Times, 12 Nov. 1952; Rand Daily Mail, 12 Nov. 1952.
119 Evening Post 18 Nov. 1952 ('Council-Africans Meeting').
120 SAIIRR Report RR 182/52, para. 10.
it, the CYL was blamed for the recent spate of lawlessness, arson, murder and violence in the township. The CYL was even said to be in the employ of an unknown foreign power, an obvious attempt to associate it with Soviet communism.\textsuperscript{121} Threats had been made on the life of Rev Molefe as he was regarded as a 'sell-out' by radical elements within the ANC.\textsuperscript{122} The claim that members of the CYL were communists was not ridiculous as Mhlaba and other 'named' communists were members of the CYL. But the PECC's involvement in 'dirty tricks' made it a willing partner to state repression.

The New Brighton riots remained in the public eye because the trial dragged on in to the new year. The ANC engaged legal counsel on behalf of the accused, and the defence team was led by Sam Kahn.\textsuperscript{123} Of the 108 persons eventually tried, five were found guilty of murder, of whom one was sentenced to death. Others were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of varying length after being found guilty on charges such as arson and public violence.

During the period in which the local ANC leadership had been restricted under the Suppression of Communism Act,\textsuperscript{124} a radical element in league with the criminal underclass threatened to subvert the organisation. The functioning of the New Brighton branch was hamstringed by the emergence of volatile dissidents in its ranks. The leadership was accused of 'cowardice' for having abandoned the defiance campaign after the riots. ANC meetings were apparently broken up by organised gangs (which included tsotsi elements) and leaders were subjected to assaults. Mhlaba has recounted that he was lucky to escape but that Gladstone Tshume, Caleb Mayekiso and others were victims of attacks.\textsuperscript{125} The ANC executive issued leaflets in which it condemned these 'cowardly attacks' as the work of government agents provocateurs. One newspaper report citing a non-ANC source, attributed the dissension in the organisation's ranks to the purchase of white trader's stores in New Brighton by ANC officials from other centres,\textsuperscript{126} which appears very unlikely. The ANC went public about its internal troubles in a bid to disassociate itself from the activities of the dissidents. Eventually, the organisation

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\textsuperscript{121} IAD, 25/169 No. 7, Mrs Eily Murray, LAO to the Mayor, PE, 11 Nov. 1952 and undated leaflet in Xhosa with English translation; \textit{Advance}, 4 Dec. 1952 ('P.E. Council Blames Foreign Agitators for Riots').
\textsuperscript{122} Interview of Rev G.B. Molefe by David and Celene Hunter, 2 April 1980, pp. 9-10 (Transcript in my possession).
\textsuperscript{123} Interview with Attorney Isadore Noach, PE, 3 Aug. 1993.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{Advance} 13 Nov. 1952, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{125} Interview with Raymond Mhlaba, Fordville, PE, 11-12 Jan. 1990.
\textsuperscript{126} \textit{EPH} 9 July 1953 ('ANC Probe Breakaway Movement in PE').
\end{flushleft}
expelled six members for breach of discipline and violation of policy.\textsuperscript{127}

Meanwhile, the case against Njongwe and his co-accused reached the Supreme Court and the presiding Judge ruled that change need not be imposed by communistic doctrine to be construed as falling within the purview of the Suppression of Communism Act.\textsuperscript{128} The accused were each sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, suspended for three years. Shortly hereafter, most of the ANC leadership in Port Elizabeth was banned by the Government. At the same time, the passage of the Criminal Law Amendment and Public Safety Acts gave the Government further wide-ranging powers to curb civil disobedience. Despite these circumstances, the Port Elizabeth township was probably the only place where the M-plan was implemented. This provided for the continuation of the ANC structures 'under conditions of illegality' through the creation of a cell system.\textsuperscript{129} With the leadership having been forced to 'go to ground', the ANC had to rely on grassroots organisation.

Conclusion

The dividing line between lawlessness and protest was a thin one. It is my argument that the increase in crime in New Brighton from the 1940s was partly the result of the growth of a tsotsi element and a subculture of violence. The victims of the system became the villains. The rioters attacked symbols of white authority (i.e. policemen) and others associated with the system of white domination. The ANC was compelled to disassociate itself from this violence but still could not dispel white perceptions of complicity therein. After the suspension of the defiance campaign and the clampdown on the local ANC leadership, the latter became targets of violence by dissidents. But the alliance between the radicals and criminal element was short-lived. Perhaps the real success of the ANC was that it weathered the crisis caused by the 18 October riots and subsequent dissension in its ranks. New Brighton remained an ANC stronghold and the organisation sustained popular support beyond this period.

The riots in New Brighton and elsewhere provided a pretext for the central state (with the compliance of local authorities) to clamp down on extra-parliamentary opposition. The outbreak of violence played a decisive role in the suspension of the defiance campaign. As

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{128} Prentice-Hall Law Reports, K. 61, pp. 171-3; South Africa Law Reports, p. 848, Regina vs Njongwe and others.
\bibitem{129} Fine and Davis, Beyond Apartheid, pp. 125-6.
\end{thebibliography}
Kuper has remarked:

Quite apart from their effect on the resisters, the riots provided the opportunity for the Government to take over the initiative and to assume far-reaching powers with some measure of justification. 130

Whilst the government introduced a battery of repressive laws to combat civil disobedience, the PECC applied the provisions of existing laws to suppress political activity in the township. It also made moves specifically to undermine the ANC in New Brighton. Early in 1953, the PECC introduced influx controls and labour registration for the first time. Robinson has argued that "the new legislation was not imposed entirely under central government duress". 131 The almost indecent haste with which the PECC contrived to implement politically repressive and labour control measures suggest that it had shifted perceptibly to the right in its dealings with the African population. This reflected, amongst other things, a realignment of social forces in the city due to demographic changes and the hardening of racial attitudes amongst the city's white ratepayers. Port Elizabeth could no longer claim to be a 'progressive' city.

CHAPTER 10

CONCLUSION

For many years, the PECC had pursued 'progressive' policies towards its African population: rejecting influx controls and labour registration, embarking upon a large-scale slum elimination programme and relocating those removed to sub-economic housing in New Brighton. This Port Elizabeth 'model' became increasingly difficult to sustain as a result of the massive post-war urbanisation, radicalisation of township politics and polarisation amongst the white population. Certain councillors, articulating the fears of a pro-Nationalist Afrikaans-speaking constituency, demanded conformity to central state policies towards urban Africans. They argued that influx control and registration had the potential for reducing the need to provide housing by expelling those Africans deemed surplus to the city's labour requirements. This would appease white ratepayers who were unwilling to accept any financial burden in this regard. Other councillors, more attuned to the interests of local capital, were ambivalent. This was partly the result of the fear that the ANC, which had shown its capacity to mobilise the local African population during the defiance campaign and to stage a successful stayaway involving the majority of black workers, was capable of organising concerted resistance to the imposition of passes. Those councillors representing the local 'liberal' ideology were forced on the defensive and eventually capitulated in the aftermath of the New Brighton riots. These events marked the end of an era; a watershed in the history of Port Elizabeth.

The Port Elizabeth 'model' comprised rather more than an absence of influx control and labour registration. The reluctance to regulate labour supplies went hand in hand with the 'location strategy', used to regiment the daily life of New Brighton residents. Aside from the spatial organisation, close personal supervision by the Superintendent and surveillance by the administrative staff identified by Robinson,¹ I have elaborated upon other features of the New Brighton's administrative system. Prominent residents who served on the Advisory Board were co-opted through the dispensing of patronage by way of trading and hawking licences, etc. granted by the Superintendent. Permission to brew beer in the 'wet' areas was also regarded as a privilege which was granted largely at the discretion of the Superintendent. Even the allocation of houses was dependent upon favouritism and having the right connections. In short, a system of clientelism in combination with the 'location strategy' enabled strict social

control to be exercised in New Brighton.

In some respects, the administration and running of New Brighton differed little from other townships. The financing of the Location, as with Ndabeni, was given a headstart as a result of the transfer of capital assets - in the form of land and buildings - to its NRA. In New Brighton there were no beerhalls to provide an additional source of revenue to supplement income from rents - which was never sufficient to balance the NRA. The system of dualism, whereby domestic brewing and prohibition existed in different sections of New Brighton, was difficult to enforce because it was not legalised until 1945. Rather than make explicit comparisons between New Brighton and other townships, I have identified distinctive features in the administration of New Brighton.

Many of these features were developed during the period in which New Brighton was administered by the central state and influenced the formulation of a national policy of urban segregation. As many as eight features of the Cape’s Native Reserve Location Act were included in some form in the Urban Areas Act. Swanson has asserted that the Cape legislation "laid the ideological and institutional foundations of urban segregation". Furthermore, it could be argued that the 'Cape system' was far more important than other centres in providing the basis for a uniform national policy because of the continuities in the personnel between the Cape's and the Union's NAD. These officials would undoubtedly have been swayed by their own experience of supervising Ndabeni and New Brighton. As Robinson has remarked, the administration of the Cape's 'model' locations played an important role in both the systematisation of 'urban native management' and its incorporation into the central state apparatus.

However, national policy also drew on the experience of other local authorities. A strong case has been made for Durban as a source of many of the controls which were built into the administrative nexus of the segregated/apartheid city. Allowance was made in the Act for a

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municipal beer monopoly modelled on the so-called 'Durban system' which appeared to
ensure a self-financing administration. Indeed, all of the major urban centres can probably
stake a claim to having influenced the content of the Urban Areas Act.

Ironically, Ndabeni and New Brighton were amongst the last major locations to come under
the provisions of the Urban Areas Act and thus to adopt the model (sic) which they had been
so instrumental in developing. The reason for this would appear to be tied to the extent to
which Cape Town and Port Elizabeth sought to preserve the autonomy of the local state. For
about twenty years, neither had direct administrative or financial responsibility for its African
population. But the Union Government divested itself of these functions and the two
municipalities assumed control of these locations in 1923. The PECC treated the African
population administratively as part of the city, although New Brighton was spatially separate.
This practice continued after New Brighton came under the Urban Areas Act. When the Bantu
Affairs Administration Board Act came into force in 1973, the central government, without
consulting either the PECC or African population, excised all townships from the municipal
area in which they were situated and removed them from the jurisdiction of the local authority.
Responsibility for the administration of New Brighton and Port Elizabeth's other townships
was turned over to the East Cape Administration Board. The Act also created Administration
Boards wholly answerable to the Bantu Affairs Department (successor to the NAD) which
usurped the rights, functions and powers of local authorities in respect of urban African
administration. In so doing, this Act eliminated the duality of control which had characterised
urban African administration since 1910, and that of New Brighton since its creation. In fact,
the control of New Brighton had come full circle: from the central to the local state, and then
back to the former.

New Brighton never constituted Port Elizabeth's entire African community during our period.
At times, the number of Africans in Korsten outnumbered their fellows in New Brighton. And
there were always small numbers of Africans resident - many illegally - in the city itself.

Although the focus of this thesis has been New Brighton, related developments in Korsten, in particular, have not been neglected. Korsten routinely provided an alternative place of abode for those Africans intent on avoiding New Brighton. The invocation of the discourse of public health which had resulted in the closure of the old locations and the growth of Korsten in the 1900s, was used to justify the removals of Africans from Korsten to New Brighton in the late 1930s. Korsten was partially cleared of Africans, but two decades later the position had returned to its former state when it had been described as a 'notorious slum'. In the late 1950s the PECC embarked on a further slum clearance programme in Korsten and Dassieskraal. Although municipal housing schemes for Whites and Coloureds were erected, much of the prime estate cleared of Africans and released for development is still unoccupied to this day. Once a bustling non-racial township where Africans could obtain freehold title, Korsten is today an ill-defined and underutilised combination of residential, industrial and commercial land usages. A comprehensive history of Korsten still waits to be written, and would complement this study of New Brighton.

New Brighton was regularly feted as a 'model' location. This was particularly so after the erection of McNamee Village. It was actually one of a number of townships in the country to be termed a 'model'. Others included Lamont Village near Durban, Langa Township near Cape Town, and Waaihoek near Bloemfontein. Indeed, the number of 'model' locations suggests that local authorities used their own arbitrary criteria for making such a claim. Their motives were certainly not altruistic but neither were they entirely self-serving. This public display of paternalism afforded local authorities the opportunity to be seen to be committed to the well-being of their African populations. The moving force behind Port Elizabeth's sub-economic scheme, Schauder, once remarked that:

Port Elizabeth prided itself on its fair and honourable treatment of Natives and on being the first town in the Union to undertake a genuine slum elimination scheme.  

A visitor to Port Elizabeth in 1953 was informed by Schauder, that the city was "one of the best places for an African to live in, as South African towns went". He was also informed that New Brighton, which was "the finest township in the Union", had made "an ideal shop window of African urban life" for the 1946 Royal visit. Schauder was the city's greatest

10 EPH 20 May 1948 ('Shanties at Korsten').
ambassador and publicist. He gave guided tours of New Brighton and Korsten to many VIPs who visited the city. This afforded him an opportunity to showcase the Council’s efforts to provide social upliftment for the city’s slum dwellers.

Since the 1950s, New Brighton has been dwarfed by subsequent housing developments, site-and-service schemes and squatter settlements which have sprawled out on Port Elizabeth’s northern outskirts. Nowadays, a visitor could hardly fail to be struck by the old and dilapidated homes standing side by side with new modern ones. The variegated appearance of housing in the township reflects the neglect and parsimony of the authorities, as well as a lack of pride in homes not owned by the occupants. Much of the existing stock has been allowed to fall into a state of disrepair. The original ninety-odd-year-old structures in the Red Location have never been upgraded and are amongst the most unsightly places in Port Elizabeth’s townships [see Illustration 3.2]. The makeshift dwellings have been repaired, where possible, primarily with sheets of corrugated iron so as to make them barely habitable. Except in those few cases where residents have made renovations, dwellings in other parts of New Brighton have remained largely unchanged. Kwaford, seen during a visit to Port Elizabeth in 1953, was reckoned by John Gunther to be the "most startling slum" in Africa.12 It has since been upgraded and the houses made from timber crates have been replaced by fairly modern homes suitable for the upwardly mobile. But unemployment rates are conservatively said to be in excess of 50% amongst the African populace. The overwhelming impression of Port Elizabeth’s townships is of poverty and squalor.

The communities which feature in the works of geographers who to date have sketched residential development in Port Elizabeth’s black areas,13 remain relatively undifferentiated. There has been a tendency to portray the black population as hapless victims of an all powerful state - both local and central. In keeping with the premises of social history, this study has attempted to 'flesh out' the New Brighton community; to reduce the anonymity of individuals within the community. Aside from some relevant biographical detail provided in the text at appropriate points, Appendix C has more extensive notes on the lives of nearly all those who feature prominently in the body of the thesis. In this way, it is hoped that people can emerge as characters and not merely statistics in New Brighton’s history. At the same time, it has been

my intention to provide the community with a collective social identity. This has been weakened, to some extent, by my incomplete picture of cultural, sports and leisure-time activities in Chapter 7. There is scope for further research of these activities in the Xhosa-medium newspapers like *Imvo Zabantsundu* and other sources. My research in this area has, of necessity, been partial because of a reliance on translators.

Other themes raised in the course of this thesis also require further elaboration. These include relationships between the predominantly Xhosa-speaking African population of New Brighton and other minority groups. Despite the location being established with the express purpose of housing Africans, a small number of Coloureds and Whites resided therein. Available records do not shed much light on the lives or identities of the former. They were not assimilated or fully accepted because there were frequent demands for their removal to Coloured housing schemes, especially when accommodation was at a premium. There were also tensions between the African and Coloured communities in the city during the Korsten removals in the 1930s. On the other hand, their solidarity as exploited workers and oppressed peoples did find expression in the field of labour relations at various times. Examples of this include strikes called by the PEICWU in 1920, the CNETU in the late 1940s, and the ANC in 1952. Generally, though, it was far easier to organise a single community than to mobilise across racial and spatial divides.

There is far more information available on the white than the Coloured inhabitants of New Brighton. I have provided some information about the officials, especially the Location Superintendents, because of their crucial administrative roles. As the 'men on the spot' they comprised the 'frontline' of white rule. I have only made passing mention of the white traders in the New Brighton. These people, mainly Jews of east European origin and first generation immigrants to the country, had to learn both English and Xhosa. They constituted a community in their own right and sought unsuccessfully to establish a synagogue in the Location. Many raised families in New Brighton and passed on their stores to their children. All the white children were obliged to commute to town daily aboard the *bombella* train in order to receive their schooling. There was some social interaction between Whites and Africans, especially on the sports field, but otherwise they appear to have led separate existences. However, those Whites who grew up in New Brighton seem to have a residual memory of good relationships.
with African residents being destroyed by apartheid. Perhaps this thesis, in dealing largely with the pre-1948 period, might serve to question romanticised and selective perceptions of a bygone era.

Port Elizabeth is not a microcosm of South African society and it has charted its own contours on the historical landscape. This study of the first fifty years in the history of New Brighton has sought to further our knowledge and understanding of the total history of Port Elizabeth. Given the existing lacunae in the field, much remains to be done before a comprehensive picture of the city’s past can be constructed. But there are indicators that progress is being made. These include the increasing number of scholars researching aspects of the city’s history; the publication of theses by Kirk, Robinson and Cherry in the foreseeable future; and the holding of the first ever conference devoted to Port Elizabeth’s history in 1992. The number of bibliographical entries in this thesis is itself evidence of the growing corpus of literature on the city’s history. Perhaps Port Elizabeth’s place in South African history and historiography is now assured?

This thesis has sought to make a modest contribution to South African historiography, and especially to the field of urban history. Its value lies firstly in the exploration of new terrain. As a history of New Brighton, it joins numerous other works which have recovered the history of urban African communities. Although part of the oppressed and exploited South African underclasses, each community is unique and each study provides valuable insights into the range of human experience. This thesis has, I believe, also confirmed the conceptual and methodological contribution that social history can make to South African historiography. In the face of the postmodernist challenge which has pronounced the collapse of the 'meta-narrative' and decried totalizing systems of meaning, it is worth re-emphasising that narrative functions to locate subjects in a historical context and give meaning. The narrative constructed in this thesis is more than select fragments of the past, if less than History (with a capital 'H'). Like John Clarke, I believe we have arrived at 'the end of History' via a particular theoretical route. There has, however, been no end to history.

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APPENDIX A

Note on Sources

Given the relative paucity of secondary literature on Port Elizabeth’s history, primary materials constitute the major source for this study. For the period during which New Brighton was administered by central government (1902-23), the files of the Native Affairs Departments of the Cape and Union Governments proved to be most useful. The records of the Port Elizabeth Town Clerk relating to the administration of New Brighton prior to circa 1945 are housed in the Cape Archives and of more recent vintage in the Intermediate Archives Depot, Port Elizabeth. These proved to be the most invaluable and extensive for my purposes. Yet, these records of both the local authority and the central state undoubtedly reflect the views of the ruling classes.

I have found that Port Elizabeth’s daily newspapers provided limited coverage of the affairs of New Brighton. The Eastern Province Herald, which was published throughout the period under consideration, provided extensive coverage to town/city council meetings, and even published the minutes of council sub-committees until the 1920s. The only reporting of local affairs by New Brighton residents was for newspapers with a primarily African readership such as Imvo Zabantsundu and Umteteli wa Bantu. Regular coverage of New Brighton’s affairs in the local press only commenced with the publication from 1948 of a new daily in Port Elizabeth, The Evening Post. Otherwise, it was the left-wing press (eg. International, The Guardian and its successors) which provided occasional coverage of matters related to Port Elizabeth’s African population.

I have conducted over twenty interviews including some with current and former residents. Whilst this sample cannot be said to be representative of the community, the oral testimony has provided numerous insights into the character of individuals - both officials and prominent community figures. But it would be naive to believe that the voices of the people will speak for themselves any more than the documents tell the truth. And because by far the greater amount of information has been gleaned from official sources, it is to be expected that the voice of the community, and especially the illiterate underclasses, will struggle to be heard. In the final analysis, this thesis reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of the available source materials refracted through the prism of my perspective.
## APPENDIX B

### CHURCH SITES IN NEW BRIGHTON

#### RED LOCATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOT NO</th>
<th>ORIGINAL GRANTEE/ LESSEE*</th>
<th>OCCUPIED BY (Date)</th>
<th>COMMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10/A</td>
<td>Baptist Church</td>
<td>Municipal buildings (erected 1927-8)</td>
<td>Exchanged for site in McNamee Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14/A</td>
<td>Roman Catholic Church</td>
<td>Bantu Presbyterian Church (1934)</td>
<td>Exchanged for Lot 35/B with occupation rights only</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21/A</td>
<td>Congregational Union of SA</td>
<td>Edward Memorial Congregational Church</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22/A</td>
<td>Bishop of Grahamstown on behalf of the Order of Ethiopia</td>
<td>Order of Ethiopia</td>
<td>Original church burnt down 1929. Replaced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/A</td>
<td>Basuto Independent Church Congregational Union of SA</td>
<td>Basuto Congregational Church</td>
<td>Became known as Bantu Independent Church</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/A</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Church of SA</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27/A</td>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>Presbyterian Church of Africa (1927)</td>
<td>Site never occupied by Salvation Army.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28/A</td>
<td>United Free Church of Scotland</td>
<td>Presbyterian Church of SA</td>
<td>Exchanged for Site in McNamee Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/A</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Church of SA</td>
<td>Vacant</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/A</td>
<td>Church of the Province of SA</td>
<td>St Stephen’s Mission Church</td>
<td>Exchanged for Site in McNamee Village</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>American Methodist Episcopal Church*</td>
<td>AME Church</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35/B</td>
<td>Roman Catholic Church*</td>
<td>St Francis Xavier Mission Church</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>52</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Church of SA*</td>
<td>Wesleyan Methodist Church (Coloured)</td>
<td>Coloured Mission dismantled in 1941. Subsequently occupied by the Bantu Methodist Church</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX C

Biographical Notes

GQAMLANA, Rev Jarvis Wallace.
Born 1882.
Teacher at missions school at Fort Beaufort.
Divinity student at Lovedale.
Ordained and inducted at the Presbyterian New Brighton mission in July 1916.
Wife died in influenza epidemic in 1918.
Delegate of the PE branch of the Cape Native Congress which evidence to the Godley Committee in February 1920.
Nominated member of the New Brighton Advisory Board between 1917 and 1932.
Member of the PE Joint Council.
Died unexpectedly on 2 July 1932 at the age of 50.


JABAVU, Wilson Weir ("Mtshetshi")
Born ?
Son of D.D.T. Jabavu and brother to John Tengo and Davidson.
Moved from Korsten to New Brighton in 1929.
Nominated to the Native Advisory Board in 1932 in place of the deceased Rev. Jarvis Gqamlana.
Served as nominated of NAB between 1933 and 1935.
Elected to NAB between 1937-42 and in 1945.
A freelance journalist and photographer who contributed items to Imvo Zabantsundu and Umteteli wa Bantu.
Died 1949?

{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk’s Files; Communications from G. Soya Mama.}

LIMBA, James Ngcanjini
Born Ngqele, Middledrift district c. 1883.
Primary education at Kabah Location, Uitenhage.
Employed on railways at Kendrew Station until 1917.
Moved to Ndabeni, Cape Town where he worked as a packer until 1928.
Left Methodist Church in which he had been a lay preacher.
Joined Charles Sigxabayi’s Church of Christ (Ibanda lika-Krestu).
Sigxabayi deposed as ‘Bishop’ in 1925? and returned to Transkei.
Limba undertook preaching tour of Eastern Cape in 1928.
Took charge of church congregation in Korsten.
Moved to New Brighton where he built up large following.
PECC granted site to Church of Christ in 1935.
Church building and manse completed by 1937.
School established on premises in 1940.
Elected to NAB from 1931 to 1933, and 1936. Served as nominated member between 1938 and 1947.
Established trading store, butchery and farming operations in the Alexandria district and Summerville, Sundays River area.
Church of Christ's constitutional dispute regarding Limba's successor and ownership of church property went to litigation at Grahamstown Supreme Court in 1948.
Died 1963.

{Source: See references in my, 'Bishop Limba and the Church of Christ in New Brighton, c.1929-1949', Kronos, 19 (1992), pp. 102-134.}

MATI, P.P.
Proprietor of the Three Star Trading Co., McNamee Village, 1941-?
Elected Village Chairman 1946.
Member of the NAB 1950-2.
Chairman of the PE ANC in the 1940s.
Secretary of the ANC 1950-1.
Secretary of the local branch of the SAR&H Workers' Union.
Organiser of the Laundry Workers' Union and the African Commercial & Distributive Workers' Union.

{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; Luckardt & Wall, Organize or Starve!, p. 78; Cherry, 'The Making of an African Working Class', pp. 78, 215; Advance 5 Oct. 1953, p. 3; Karis & Carter Microfilm.}

MATJI, Robert Mokxotho
Born c.1923, Pretoria.
Factory worker in Port Elizabeth (1947).
Bookkeeper in a general store in New Brighton.
Provincial Secretary of the Cape ANC 1952-4.
Defiance Campaign organiser. Arrested under Suppression of Communism Act in Sept. 1952.
Sentenced to 9 months suspended for 3 years.
Banned in 1954 in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act for 2 years and forced to resign from the ANC and CYL.
Escaped arrest for treason and fled to Basutoland in 1956.
Joined Mokhela's Basutoland National Council, and later Marematlou Freedom Party.
Still resident in Lesotho.

{Sources: Karis & Carter, Political Profiles, v.4, pp. 77-8; Benson, African Patriots and The Struggle for a Birthright; Karis & Carter Microfilm.}

MAYEKISO, Caleb J.
Born 1913 at Idutywa, Transkei.
Textile worker in Port Elizabeth.
President of the local branch of the African Textile Workers' Union.
Joined the ANC in 1942.
Organiser of the PE bus boycott 1949 and strike of 26 June 1950.
Arrested during 1952 Defiance Campaign. Served 14 days imprisonment.

Sources: Karis & Carter, Political Profiles, v.4, p. 82; Benson, African Patriots, pp. 168-9; H. Joseph, If This Be Treason, pp. 176-7; Karis Carter Microfilm 2:XM 70:96/1; Sechaba (Aug. 1969), pp. 16-17.

McNAMEE, JAMES PERCIVAL
Born 25 Jan. 1881, Ireland.
Resident in Victoria East.
Appointed Inspector of Grahamstown's locations in Apr. 1917.
Assumed duties as Superintendent of Natives, New Brighton, in Sept. 1926.
Eldest son drowned at New Brighton beach in Feb. 1927.
Appointed as Justice of the Peace in 1932.
Known as "uGilifatyi" to New Brighton residents.
Sub-economic housing scheme and extension of New Brighton built 1938-43 named "McNameeville" in his honour.
Resigned as Location Superintendent with effect from 1 July 1945 but retained in a temporary capacity for two extra months.


MHLABA, Raymond Mpakamisi
Born Fort Beaufort, 1920.
Completed J.C. at Healdtown in 1941.
Moved to Sidwell, PE.
Married Joyce Meke in 1943, by whom he had 8 children (who died in 1960).
Lodged in New Brighton until granted house in 1949.
Employed at Nanucci Dry Cleaners in 1942.
Recruited to the Laundry Workers' Union and became active in CNETU.
Sacked by Nanucci after 1948 strike.
Joined the SACP in 1943 and served as district secretary for Port Elizabeth, 1946-50.
Joined the ANC in 1944 and served as PE branch chairman, 1947-53.
Secretary of Vigilance Committee in 1949.
Served as ANC representative on NAB, 1949-51. Resigned.
Played a leadership role in the 1949 PE bus boycott.
As volunteer-in-chief for Port Elizabeth during the Defiance Campaign, he led the first group of volunteers through the 'Europeans Only' entrance of the New Brighton railway station on 26 June, 1952.
Arrested and sentenced to 30 days hard labour.
Sacked by employers, a firm of concrete manufacturers.
Joined firm of solicitors where he was employed until 1961.
Banned in terms of the Suppression of Communism Act in June 1953.
Elected to the Cape executive committee of the ANC in 1954.
A defendant in the treason trial (1956-61).
Detained during 1960 state of emergency.
Joined Umkonto we Sizwe in Dec. 1961 and became a member of the high command.
Detained after the Rivonia swoop in July 1963 and sentenced to life imprisonment.
Confined to Robben Island until transferred to Pollsmoor Prison in 1982.
Married common-law wife, Dideka Heliso, at a ceremony in Pollsmoor.
Released in 1989.


MOLEFE, Mbanga James George Benjamin ("G.B.").
Born at Mbulwana, near Ladysmith, Natal on 15 Sept. 1901.
After death of parents he was raised by his grandmother.
His uncle, Josiah Mguni, put him through school at Newcastle.
Obtained a teachers' certificate at St Chad's Training College, Ladysmith.
Appointed principal at Esididini Primary School near Dannhauser in Natal in 1920.
Transferred to Gordon Memorial Higher Primary School in Helpmekaar District, Natal in 1923.
Whilst teaching at Helpmekaar, he acted as an interpreter to Presbyterian minister, Rev. J.M. Matheson, during his visits to outlying churches.
Enrolled at Lovedale Training School for training in the ministry for the Bantu Presbyterian Church in 1925.
Completed his matric and theology diploma in three years.
Principal of Fort Hare College, Dr. Alexander Kerr, convinced Molefe to study for a B.A. degree which he obtained in 1932.
Travelling secretary of the Student Christian Movement in 1930.
Married Jane Mbelle, daughter of the Supreme Court interpreter and linguist, Isaiah Budlwana Mbelle in 1934.
Had three children, Thabiso, Tsepo and Boyce.
Ordained in the Bantu Presbyterian Church in June 1932 and was appointed to Newcastle.
Apart from his ministerial duties, he established and served as the first principal of the Fairleigh Secondary School.
In 1938 he was offered a scholarship to attend the Union Theological Seminary, associated with Columbia University in New York.
Gained accreditation for his B.A. and wrote a thesis and exams for a M.A. degree which was awarded in May 1939.
During his return trip to South Africa, he attended the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland and World Youth Conference in Amsterdam.
On his return home in September 1939, he accepted an appointment with the Bantu Presbyterian Church in New Brighton.
In 1940 he opened a night school for adults.
In Jan. 1942 he commenced a school for Std 6 and 7 pupils in his church for those unable to attend Paterson High School in Korsten.
He became the first principal of the newly-erected Newell Secondary School in 1944 and remained its head until his retirement in June 1959.
In 1953 he was elected as the first black moderator of the Bantu Presbyterian Church (now the Reformed Presbyterian Church of Southern Africa).
He returned to the ministry in 1959 as minister of St Barnabas Presbyterian Church in Kwazakele.
He retired from active ministry in 1974.
He served as a nominated member on the Native Advisory Board (later PE Joint Advisory Board) in the years 1940-58, 1961/2-1968/9, ??-1977.
Executive member of the Locations Advisory Board of South Africa, 1947.
President of the PE Joint Council (1943).
Served as chairman of the PE regional committee of the SAIRR in 1952-3.
As a member of the Moral Re-Armament Movement, he undertook tours of Europe, Asia and America in 1953, 1955 and 1959-60.
Patron of the Eastern Province Bantu Rugby Union.
Appointed as a commissioner of oaths in Port Elizabeth in 1957.
Received the Freedom of Port Elizabeth's African Townships in 1973.
Awarded an honorary doctorate in theology by University of Fort Hare in 1978.


NGINZA, Dora
Born Dora Jacobs, on the farm "Baviaanspoort" in the Cradock district, 17 Oct. 1891.
Trained as a nurse at Victoria Hospital, Lovedale, May 1915 to July 1919.
Appointed as first nurse at New Brighton on 1 Nov. 1919.
Subsequently appointed Sister-in-Charge of New Brighton Clinic and District Nurse.
Married Chief Henry Mnyaka Nginza in Feb. 1923.
Chief "Mthunzi" Nginza installed as representative of Paramount Chief Velile Sandile of the amaRarabe in the Port Elizabeth urban area.
Husband died in 1943 and Sister Dora served as acting representative of the amaRarabe.
Installed as Paramount Chief Archie Velile Sandile's permanent representative in a ceremony in Oct. 1945.
Led a deputation to the House of Parliament to interview the then Minister of Native Affairs, for an improvement of the position and status of the Paramount Chief of the amaRarabe and the allotment of land for the tribe in 1948.
Member of the Edward Memorial Congregational Church.
President of the Midland District of the Congregational African Women's Association.
In charge of the Congregational United Girls' Auxiliary movement for many years.
Awarded for public service by the New York Council of African Affairs.
New Brighton residents who gave her the praise name Aa! Nobantu!! ('Mother of the people').
Retired on pension from the position of Sister-in-charge of the New Brighton Clinic on 31 Dec. 1954.
Retired as amaRarabe representative in 1963.
Accompanied a Port Elizabeth delegation, which included Schauder and Molefe, to a meeting of the Moral Rearmament Movement at Caux, Switzerland in 1955.

Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk's Files; EP Newspaper Library: Dora Nginza file;
NIKIWE, Prince John.

Born Feb. 1884.

Educated at Healdtown.

Taught at Somerset East and Kimberley.

Arrived in PE in 1915 to be principal of Wesleyan Methodist Mission Church which became the Upper United Higher Primary School.

Appointed Principal of Edward Street (Richmond Hill Methodist) Coloured Higher Primary School in 1925.

Founder member of the Cape African Teachers’ Association.

Retired in 1944 at the age of 60.

Married Lily Ntsiko, also a teacher and civic leader in her own right.

Served as circuit steward and lay preacher in the Methodist Church.

Eating house proprietor which catered for SMQ (1930).


Retired from the Advisory Board in August 1963.

Attended numerous Location Advisory Boards Congresses and was elected Vice President in 1933 - a position he held for a number of years.

He represented the Cape Native Congress in giving evidence to the Godley Committee on Pass Laws in Port Elizabeth in 1920.

Secretary to the Cape African Congress in 1942 and possibly implicated in financial irregularities when Pendla was dismissed by ANC President, A.B. Xuma, in 1942.

Member of the PE Joint Council.


Prince Nikiwe Township in Kwazakele named after him in 1969.

{Sources: PE Municipality, Town Clerk’s Files; Evidence of Godley Committe, PE, February 1920; Interview with J. Graham Young, PE, 23 Aug. 1989; E P Newspaper Library: P.J. Nikiwe File; Communications from G. Soya Mama.}

NJONGWE, Dr James Lowell Zwelinzima

Born 12 Jan. 1919 in Qumbu, Transkei

Completed B. Sc. degree at Fort Hare and M.D. at the University of the Witwatersrand in 1945.


Elected treasurer of the New Brighton ANC branch in 1948.

Member of the CYL.

Elected to ANC nationa executive committee in Dec. 1949.

Acted as President of Cape Congress in the absence of Z.K. Matthews, 1952-3.

Arrested in Sept. 1952 under Suppression of Communism Act. Sentenced to 9 months imprisonment, suspended for 3 years.

Negotiated limitation of Nov. 1952 strike in Port Elizabeth to one day with Mayor in return for re-instatement of dismissed workers.

Elected President of Cape Congress in June 1954.
Banned under Suppression of Communism Act in Dec. 1954 and forced to resign from ANC.
Departed from Port Elizabeth in poor health and dire financial straits in 1955.
Co-conspirator but not accused in Treason Trial.
Retired from active politics in 1956?
Banned for many years until the final one expired in Dec. 1973.
Re-established medical practice in Matatiele, Transkei.
Died ??


NTSHINGA, James Hamilton Edward 'Tikini'
Born c.1895, Grahamstown.
Obtained primary education in Port Elizabeth.
Employed as Clerk Interpreter at the Knight Central Mine, Germiston in 1910.
Became Organising Secretary of the Bantu Young Peoples' Association in Germiston.
Volunteered to join the British Red Cross Forces and served overseas during World War One.
Returned to Port Elizabeth after the War and worked for 13 years as a sampler for the wool buyers, Messrs A.C. Forder & Co.
Became interpreter clerk for PE attorney.
Elected to the New Brighton Advisory Board, 1938-9.
Appointed Headman in the New Brighton Native Administration in 1939.
Resigned as member of NAB.
Appointed Chief Headman in 1953.
Appointed Bantu Inspector in 1955 when the post of Chief Headman was scrapped.
Retired as Senior Assistant in the Bantu Administration Department in June 1970.
Founder member and President of the PE Blind and Crippled League Movement, 1935-41.
Manager of the Adcock Homes for elderly run by the Bantu Benevolent Society in conjunction with the PE Charity Organisation.
Member of New Brighton Vigilance Committee (1936).
Founder and managing director of the Mexican Vocal Company and the Midnight Rounders.
Earned the title of "PE's leading entertainer".

[Sources: The African Horizon, Dec. 1941, p. 20].

PENDLA, Andrew Frank.
Born ? in the Eastern Cape.
Descendent of a sub-chief of the amaNgqika?
Educated at St Matthew's College, Keiskammahoek.
Employed for some years as an interpreter in the Magistrate's Court, Middelburg before being transferred to Graaff-Reinet.
Employed as a postal official at New Brighton until his dismissal after five years service in 1920 on account of alleged embezzlement.
Appointed interpreter by the PE Municipality in June 1923.
Employed as clerk/interpreter by Attorneys Scheepers and Spilkin.
Engaged in various business ventures at different times: hawking, eating house proprietor (1929), and a trading store (1940).
Elected as a member of the New Brighton Advisory Board in 1925, 1928 and 1930. Served
as a nominated member from 1935 to 1944.
Secretary of the Location Committee in 1925, Chairman of the New Brighton Vigilance Association in 1931-2 and Secretary of the Port Elizabeth and District Vigilance Association in 1931.
Unsuccessful candidate of the Cape African Congress for the PE North seat of the Provincial Council in 1929 or 1930.
Auditor to the Cape Native Voters’ Convention (1930).
Executive member of the PE Native Welfare Society which later became the PE Joint Council. President of the Cape African Congress in the early 1940s. Suspended by Xuma in Sept. 1942 for opposing the ANC line on the Native Representatives elections and offering open support to National Party candidates. Pendla and Cape African Congress executive ousted by Rev. James Calata in elections in Nov. 1942.
Thrice married: (1) Lilia Dwanya, by whom he had five children before being divorced; (2) Beatrice Makombi, who died in labour with their first child; (3) Joyce Vuzo, by whom he had one daughter.

SCHAUDER, Adolf.
Born Austria, 16 December 1920.
Emigrated to Port Elizabeth in 1899.
Served as medical orderly at the Prince Alfred Infirmary, Grahamstown and with the British forces during the South African War.
Returned to Port Elizabeth after demobilisation and established a wholesale business in partnership with J.M. Patlansky.
Later set up his own business and branched out into industrial chemical production.
Married Frieda Shear in 1906 and had six children.
Outlived his wife who died in 1953 and children, Gerald, Leon, Ray and Anne.
Two surviving sons, Hyman and Ralph, ran the family business until very recently.
Elected to Port Elizabeth City Council in 1923.
Served continuously for 43 years until his retirement in 1966.
Served as deputy-mayor (1938-40) and mayor (1940-42).
Elected Chairman of the Housing Committee in 1935 and served for many years during which time he was the 'moving force' in the completion of the Schauderville and McNamee Village sub-economic housing schemes for Coloureds and Africans, respectively.
Known as the 'Father of Housing' in Port Elizabeth.
Member of the National Housing and Planning Commission, 1948-64.
Founder member of the New Brighton Night School for Adult Education (1938) and of the Bantu Benevolent and Welfare Society (1948).
Given praise name Sonceba ('He who strives for mercy') by the New Brighton community.
Founder and first President of Midland Areas Development Association.
Long-serving member of the PE Harbour Board and PE and District School Board.
Representative of the PECC on the Executive of the Cape Municipal Association.
Elected as Life Vice-President of the Cape Province Municipal Association, 1962.
Member of Council of Rhodes University, 1946-66.
Honorary Degree of Doctor of Social Science conferred by Rhodes University, 1967.
Addressed Moral Re-Armament Congress at Caux, Switzerland in 1955.
Member of the SAIRR.
Actively involved in the civic and religious affairs of Port Elizabeth's Jewish community, as well as social and philanthropic work.
President of PE Orthodox Hebrew Congregation; Founder and President of PE Hebrew School; President and Hon. Life-President of PE Jewish Benevolent Society; Vice-President SA Jewish Board of Deputies, etc.
Awarded Freedom of the City of Port Elizabeth, 1957.
Died 4 March 1968.

{Sources: PE Municipality Town Clerk's Files; H. Schauder, 'Adolf Schauder' in C.J. Beyers (ed-in-chief), Dictionary of South African Biography, V.5 (Pretoria, 1987), pp. 680-1; Interview with Mr Hyman Schauder, Port Elizabeth, 8 March 1992; E. Bernstein, "Give Me the Strength to Help People": Adolph Schauder and his work for South Africa [sic], Jewish Affairs, 20, 12 (Dec. 1965), pp. 11-15; Times Media Newspaper House File of clippings on A. Schauder; Cory Library, Rhodes University, MS 14 348, Citation for conferral of Honorary Degree of Doctor of Social Science, 1967.}

TSHIWULA, Alfred Zacharia.
Born in East London, 1890.
Educated at St Matthew’s College.
Taught school for a short time.
Became a special contributor and correspondent for The Daily Dispatch (East London).
Elected General Secretary of the Cape Native Congress, 1919.
Organised Congress branches in the Cape Province and Transkeian Territories.
Became a commercial traveller representing several Cape Town firms in furniture, instruments and jewellery.
Employed as clerk (?) by Attorney Archibald Marock, 1937.
Elected to the New Brighton Advisory Board in 1935 and 1939.
Appointed election agent for Margaret Ballinger, Native Representative for the Cape (Eastern) district in Parliament during the 1937 campaign.
Nominated by PE District for election to NRC in 1942.
Formed the African General Workers Union in 1939 and became its Organising Secretary.
Organiser for CNETU in the 1940s.
Secretary of the PE branch of the SA Railway & Harbour Workers' Union in 1943 which subsequently became known as the SAR&H Non-European Staff Association. Published the newspaper Ndavela ('I have appeared') on behalf of the Union.
Dismissed as official of the Staff Association in 1947 after signing a promissory note or IOU without necessary authorisation.
Managed Masizakhe Co-operative, a trading store, on behalf of its directors Neil Boss, Adolf Schauder and ? Anderson from 1943. Dismissed after being accused of bad management and financial irregularities.
Established estate agency in 1954.
Set up a dry cleaning business in 1957.
Died 1958.

TSHUME, Gladstone Xala
Born c.1912.
Joined CPSA in Grahamstown in the late 1930s.
Employed by pharmacy in Port Elizabeth.
Elected chairman of CPSA in PE.
Assisted in founding of Food & Canning Workers’ Union.
Became secretary of the Dockworkers (i.e. stevedores) Maritime Union.
Organised PE dock workers strike in 1946.
Secretary of African Textile Workers’ Industrial Union.
Volunteer during 1952 Defiance Campaign in PE.
Banned for 2 years under the Suppression of Communism Act in Oct. 1953.
Forced to resign from ANC, African Textile Workers’ Union, etc.
Defendant in Treason Trial (1956-61).
Lay preacher in Methodist Church in New Brighton where his brother, Ben, was a minister.
Died from a stroke on 6 Sept. 1957.

### Members of the New Brighton Advisory Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>Nominated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>George Nxokwana</td>
<td>Stephen Tarf Mliva</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lewis Mtubi</td>
<td>Thomas Mnikina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joseph Ngqolobe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Peter Siko</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>George Ngxokwana</td>
<td>John Yokwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Mnikina</td>
<td>Walter Nobatana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ben Njokweni</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rev Stephen Mdliva</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>George Ngxokwana</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanyangwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Walter Nobatana</td>
<td>John Yokwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Mtimka</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Isaac Mlamla</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Thomas Mnikina</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanyangwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Ngxokwana</td>
<td>John Yokwe</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Mtimka</td>
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<td>Isaac Mlamla</td>
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<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>Isaac Mlamla</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanyangwa</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Charles Mtimka</td>
<td>J Yokwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>George Ngxokwana</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Thomas Mnikina</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>J Rula</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanayangwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Stokwe</td>
<td>J Yokwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P Nguna</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z Teya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>J Rula</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanyangwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N Stokwe</td>
<td>J Yokwe (resigned -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P Nguna</td>
<td>replaced by Peter Funde)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z Teya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>N Stokwe</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanyangwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>P Nguna</td>
<td>P Funde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>J Ngqolobe</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Z Teya</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
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<td>Minister</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>J Ngqolobe, Z Teya, P Nguna, N Stokwe</td>
<td>Rev H W Mcanyangwa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>Zenzile Teya, Nicholas Stokwe, Peter Nguna, Alfred Mlotana</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>P Nguna, Z Teya, A Mlotana, M Dubula</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>J Mayekiso, P Nguna, N Stokwe, M Dubula</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>P Nguna, N Stokwe, J Mayekiso, M Dubula</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>Mathew Dibula, P J Nikiwe, John Frolick, Mongameli Mquqo</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Matthew John Dubula, Saba Njokweni, Prince John Nikiwe, Mongameli Mquqo</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>Matthew John Dubula, Saba Njokweni, Prince John Nikiwe, Andrew Frank Pendla</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Members</td>
<td>Bishop</td>
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<td>------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
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<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>Prince John Nikiwe, James Mamela Dippa, Matthew John Dubula, Robert Daza Nkontso</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana, Peter Funde</td>
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<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>Horatio M'belle, G Magqaza, E C Mkumatela, Felton Mokwena</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana, Prince John Nikiwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>A Njoli, James Mamela Dippa, Andrew Frank Pendla, Felton Mokwena</td>
<td>Rev J W Gqamlana, Prince John Nikiwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Manuel Zibonda, Rev James Limba, Robert Qalinge</td>
<td>P J Nikiwe, W W Jabavu, Thomas Zini</td>
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</table>
1935
W J Frolick
E Ntsonga
A Z Tshiwula

1936
Robert Qalinge
Rev James Limba
Manuel Zibonda

1937
Wilson Jabavu
Robert Qalinge
Manuel Zibonda

1938
Robert Qalinge
Wilson Jabavu
James Ntshinga

1939
J Ntshinga (resigned)
W W Jabavu
A Z Tshiwula

1940
G Dubula
W W Jabavu
N Nguna
T Zokufa

1941
W W Jabavu
Ndyebo Nguna
Tamplin M Zokufa
Robert M Tutshana

1942
W W Jabavu
N Nguna
T M Zokufa
R M Tutshana

1943
A Ntshinga
T N Ranuga
P P Mati
P J B Kwaza

1944
I M Mfuku
Phineas M Sandla
A O Malakane
A Ntshinga

A F Pendla
Rev J Jolobe
A F Pendla
Rev J Jolobe
A F Pendla
Rev James Limba
A F Pendla
Rev J Limba
A F Pendla
Rev J Limba
A F Pendla
Rev J Limba
A F Pendla
Rev J Limba
A F Pendla
Rev J Limba
A F Pendla (succeeded by Rev D N Mbopa)
A F Pendla
Rev J Limba
1945
I M Mfuku
P M Sandla
W W Jabavu
A O Malakane

1946
I M Mfuku
P M Sandla
W W Mabija
A Nkaphuka

1947
W W Mabija
P J M Sandla
I M Mfuku
M Nkosinkulu

1948
C M Singapi
A Ntshinga
W W Mabija
D Mtiya

1949
A Ntshinga
W Ximiya
P J B Kwaza
D L Mtiya
W W Jabavu
T J Tladi
A Z Tshiwula
R Mhlaba

1950
A B Ntshinga
Raymond Mhlaba
W Mgijima
Rev A Tsekeletsa
P P Mati
M Bookholana
W M Norongo
Wilson Ximiya

1951
R Mhlaba (resigned)
P P Mati
A A Tsekeletsa
W F Ximiya
S Sigetye
H Ntshinda
J Nozewu
P Serapelo

1952

P P Mati
W F Ximiya
A A Tsekelitsa
J Tsikila
W F Tuta
W M Stemele
S Sigetye
H Mabamba

W Ntshekisa
Rev G B Molefe
J B Marwanqa
P J Nikiwe
APPENDIX E

Mayors of Port Elizabeth, 1902/3-1952/3

- Prior to 1913 the election of the Mayor took place in December each year.
- From 1913 the Mayoral election was held in September and the term of office ran until the following August.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Mayor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902/3</td>
<td>J.C. Kemsley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1903/4</td>
<td>J.C. Kemsley</td>
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<tr>
<td>1904/5</td>
<td>J.C. Kemsley</td>
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<tr>
<td>1905/6</td>
<td>A. Fettes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1906/7</td>
<td>A. Fettes</td>
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<td>1907/8</td>
<td>A. Fettes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1908/9</td>
<td>C.H. Mackay</td>
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<tr>
<td>1909/10</td>
<td>C.H. Mackay</td>
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<tr>
<td>1910/11</td>
<td>G.S. Whitehead</td>
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<td>G.S. Whitehead</td>
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<tr>
<td>1912/13</td>
<td>A.W. Guthrie</td>
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<td>1913/14</td>
<td>A.W. Guthrie</td>
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<td>1914/15</td>
<td>A.W. Guthrie</td>
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<td>1915/16</td>
<td>A.W. Guthrie</td>
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<td>1916/17</td>
<td>J.C. Kemsley</td>
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<td>1918/19</td>
<td>J.C. Kemsley/H. Forbes</td>
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<tr>
<td>1919/20</td>
<td>J.S. Young</td>
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<td>1920/21</td>
<td>W.F. Savage</td>
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<td>1921/22</td>
<td>A.P.J. Wares</td>
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<td>1922/23</td>
<td>A.P.J. Wares</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923/24</td>
<td>A. Linton</td>
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<td>1924/25</td>
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<tr>
<td>1925/26</td>
<td>J.S. Young</td>
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<td>1926/27</td>
<td>J.S. Young</td>
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<td>A.H. Brookes</td>
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<td>A.H. Brookes</td>
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<td>1929/30</td>
<td>J. Scott</td>
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<td>1930/31</td>
<td>J. Scott</td>
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<td>1931/32</td>
<td>H.J. Millard</td>
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<td>1932/33</td>
<td>W.F. Caulfield</td>
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<td>1933/34</td>
<td>W.F. Caulfield</td>
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<td>1934/35</td>
<td>T.C. White</td>
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<td>1935/36</td>
<td>T.C. White</td>
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<td>1936/37</td>
<td>W.C. Adcock</td>
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<td>1937/38</td>
<td>W.C. Adcock</td>
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<td>1938/39</td>
<td>J. McLean</td>
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<td>J. McLean</td>
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<td>A. Schauder</td>
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<td>1941/42</td>
<td>A. Schauder</td>
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<td>1942/43</td>
<td>A.C.T. Bloe</td>
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<td>1943/44</td>
<td>A.C.T. Bloe</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944/45</td>
<td>J.J. Glendinning</td>
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<tr>
<td>1945/46</td>
<td>J.J. Glendinning</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946/47</td>
<td>J.S. Neave</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947/48</td>
<td>J.S. Neave</td>
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<tr>
<td>1948/49</td>
<td>J.S. Young</td>
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<td>1949/50</td>
<td>J.S. Young</td>
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<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>J.C.K. Erasmus</td>
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<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>J.C.K. Erasmus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>C.F. MacArthur</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX F

The Native Affairs Committee

- Established 3.12.1925 as a sub-committee of the Finance, Works & General Purposes Committee
- Upgraded as of 16.11.1926 as a fully-fledged committee
- Consisted of 7 Councillors from which it elected a chairperson on an annual basis
- Term of office lasted from September to August

Chairpersons of the Native Affairs Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Chairperson</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1926/7</td>
<td>T.C. White</td>
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<tr>
<td>1927/8</td>
<td>T.C. White</td>
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<tr>
<td>1928/9</td>
<td>H.J. Rogaly</td>
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<td>H.J. Rogaly</td>
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<tr>
<td>1931/2</td>
<td>M.J. Killeen (T.C. White, Acting Chairman, Feb.-Aug.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932/3</td>
<td>H. Relton</td>
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<td>1933/4</td>
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<td>1934/5</td>
<td>H. Relton</td>
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<tr>
<td>1935/6</td>
<td>T.G. Makepeace</td>
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<tr>
<td>1936/7</td>
<td>H. Relton</td>
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IV. INTERVIEWS

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   Dr P.J. Jabkovitz, Rondebosch, 1 Jan. 1990.
   Mr G. Soya Mama, Thembalethu, 10 Aug. 1989.
   Mrs B. Matsolo, Hillside Location, Graaff-Reinet, 1 May 1992.
   Mr Raymond Mhlaba, Fordville, Port Elizabeth, 11 & 12 Jan. 1990.
   Rev G.B. Molefe, Port Elizabeth, 2 April 1980 (by David and Celene Hunter).
   Adv Isadore Noach, Port Elizabeth, 3 August 1993.
   Mr Hyman Schauder, Port Elizabeth, 8 March & 1 June 1992.
   Mr John Sutherland, Port Elizabeth, 27 April 1993.
   Cllr J. Graham Young, Port Elizabeth, 23 Aug. 1988.